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Philips Price was Correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in Russia 
fron 1914-1918. He was involved in the formation of the Union of 
Democratic Control, which opposed Britain's entry into the war, and 
one result of the research for this thesis has been an indication 
that he became its principal source of information about Russia. 
During 1914-16, when Price acted mainly as a War Correspondent, his 
political ideas became increasingly radical. When the March 
revolution occurred he quickly moved to Petrograd. There he observed 
and reported on the progressive failures of the Provisional 
governments, the rise of the soviet principle, and the increasing 
influence of Bolshevism. Imediately before the November revolution 
he made a 6-week journey in the Volga provinces which gave him an 
unique insight into public opinion outside the capital. He was in 
the Smolny Institute when the Bolsheviks took power and for the next 
four months supplied the Manchester Guardian with a running 
commentary on events in Russia of which the British censorship did 
not take much notice. From April 1918 onwards Price became 
increasingly convinced that only the Bolsheviks could maintain 
effective government in Russia and his despatches were 
correspondingly censored and eventually stopped. An account is given 
on the machinery of British censorship and the way in which it was 
used as an instrument of an anti Bolshevik foreign policy. It is 
suggested that the C. P. Scott's personal opposition to that policy 
was powerfully reinforced by what he was learning from Price although 
he could not publish his material. In the autumn of 1918 Price 
became an active propagandist for the Bolsheviks. The extent of his 
activities in this field was only discovered during the research for 
this thesis, which ends with an attempt to assess the influence of 
Price's work, both published and unpublished, on dissenting opinion 
in Britain during and immediately after World War I. 
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NOTE ON DATES AND TRANSLITERATION 
The new-style dates have been used throughout, partly because Price 
adhered to them in dating his private letters and memoranda; and 
partly because his despatches, whatever the old-style date on which 
he sent them from Russia may have been, were naturally published in 
Britain on what were, in effect, new style dates even before the 
system was changed. He often datelined his despatches by the day of 
the week, rather than by the date, and in such instances it has 
generally been possible to attribute the equivalent of a new-style 
date to them, thus also indicating how long or how short a time 
elapsed before they were printed. 
Transliteration of Russian words has proved a problem, since some of 
Price's own transliterations were not only idiosyncratic but also 
inconsistent. Moreover since virtually all material quoted from 
other sources has, by the nature of this thesis, been taken from what 
was printed about Russia in the English language during the period 
under review, the inconsistences are necessarily compounded. It did 
not seem proper to change transliterations in already-published 
material. In the few cases in which reference is made to Russian 
material not yet translated into English, the British Library system 
of transliteration has been adopted. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Chapter 1. Early life, travel and politics 
Morgan Philips Price, born in Gloucester on 29 January 1885, was the 
elder son of Margaret Philips and William Edwin Price. Only people 
who did not know him ever referred to him as Morgan; he was always 
called Phil. His surname was not double-barrelled but a family 
history. His mother's family campe from Manchester where they had, in 
the century before her birth, amassed a considerable fortune making 
cotton tape and dealing in various merchandise. ' His father's 
family, originally Welsh mountain farmers, became importers of timber 
into the inland port of Gloucester and founded the firm of Price, 
Walker & Canpany which was - and is - probably the oldest timber 
importing business in the country. 2 In the first half of the 
1 The Manchester family of Philips are thought to have been 
descended fron Flemish Protestant weavers who settled in 
Staffordshire in the late sixteenth century. In 1747 one branch of 
the family, the brothers John and Nathaniel, migrated to Manchester 
where they opened a warehouse and prospered exceedingly. Robert 
Philips, the son of Nathaniel and father of Mark and Robert, was 
born in the last year of the reign of George II and died in the 
early years of the reign of Victoria. He became a Unitarian as a 
form of protest against the "Church and King" party, and was mobbed 
for his known sympathies with the American and French revolutions. 
This did not prevent him from becoming extremely popular in later 
life. Robert Philips was offered a baronetcy by Melbourne but 
declined it. He was one of the group of merchants who put up the 
money with which to start the Manchester Guardian. 
2 The origins of the firm Price, Walker & Co. can be traced to 
1736, when Morgan Price, son of a Welsh sheep farmer, came to 
Gloucester and speculated successfully by buying up a shipload of 
Norwegian timber which was in danger of being stranded by the Severn 
tides. The firm grew as a family concern'under his son, grandson 
and great grandson William Philip Price. In association at 
different times in the nineteenth century with the families of 
Washbourne, Potter and Walker, the firm frequently changed its name 
but always contained that of a Price. It was heavily and profitably 
involved in the provision of timber for both the canal and the 
railway building boons, and became a major importer of timber from 
the Americas, the Baltic and Russia, being one of the first to land 
timber fron Archangel (1827). It developed a profitable sideline 
and a good reputation for providing decent quarters for emigrants to 
America in its own ships when travelling unloaded. By the early 
years of the twentieth century Price, Walker & Co. were one of the 
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nineteenth century both families acquired landed estates. Both 
families shared the long tradition of Unitarianism in religion and 
more or less radical Liberalism in politics and their union by 
marriage epitcmised the classical connection between these two 
elements in British political history. Margaret Price's uncle Mark 
Philips was one of the first two M. P. s to be elected for Manchester 
when the city was enfranchised in 1832.3 Her much younger father, 
Robert Needham Philips, was M. P. for Bury almost without interruption 
from 1857.4 Her sister Caroline married George Otto Trevelyan 
largest timber importing firms in the country, but the business 
never fully recovered from the first World War and after the second 
World War it was taken over, becoming part of Magnet and Southerns. 
The operations at Gloucester are still run under its name, and in 
1986, to mark its two and a half centuries, a history of the firm 
was produced. Hugh Conway Jones: Price, Walker & Co. (Gloucester 
1986). 
3 MARK PHILIPS (1800-1873). Educated at Manchester New College 
York, he served his political apprenticeship in the late 1820s in 
the Reform and Anti-Corn-Law movements. He was returned as one of 
the first two M. P. s for Manchester after the Reform Act of 1832, 
defeating among others William Cobbett. Apart from continuing in 
the Anti-Corn Law movement in the House of Commons, he was not 
thereafter very active politically. He opposed all attempts to 
introduce factory legislation on classical laissez-faire grounds. 
In 1847 he retired fron politics for health reasons, and moved to 
Warwickshire where he had inherited some land at Snitterfield from 
his father (who had bought it as a property qualification). There 
he built a gigantic house, Welccmbe (now an hotel) and lived in a 
style to match it, becoming Deputy Lieutenant and then High Sheriff 
of Warwickshire. His support continued to be sought by aspiring 
Liberal candidates, however, and it was said of him that although he 
always dressed completely conventionally he somehow contrived to 
look like a gypsy. He was reputed to be the original upon whom the 
character Oswald Milbank in Disraeli's Coningsby was based. 
4 ROBERT NEEDHAM PHILIPS (1815-1890) was educated at the village 
school at Stand outside Manchester, then at Dr. Carpenter's Academy 
at Bristol, then at Rugby, at Manchester New College York, and at 
Glasgow University. He began work at the loans in his father's 
factory and his political education began by electioneering for his 
brother Mark. He was elected Liberal M. P. for Bury in 1857 and held 
the seat, with one interruption (when he withdrew) until 1885. He 
said even less in the House of Cannons than his brother, but was 
well-known by his constituents to stand for progressive causes, 
notably for locally-regulated education and the extension of the 
franchise, in supporting which he was strongly influenced by the 
attitude of the Lancashire weavers to the American Civil War. He 
also supported the protection of Trade Union funds, the Nine Hours 
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while he was M. P. for Tynemouth in 1869.5 The man she married, 
William Edwin Price, was M. P. for Tewkesbury at the time of her 
marriage in 1878.6 His father, William Philip Price, was M. P. for 
Bill, Free Trade, and a wealth tax and he was strongly anti-Jingo. 
But although in favour of redress of grievances in Ireland he 
opposed Hone Rule. Described variously as Independent, Liberal, 
Radical and Whig, he was reputed to prefer electioneering to sitting 
in the House of Commons. 
5 SIR GEORGE OTTO TREVELYAN (1838-1928) Son of Sir Charles 
Trevelyan (1st baronet) and brother-in-law of Lord Macaulay, 
Trevelyan was first elected M. P. for Tynemouth in 1865. Initially a 
Palmerstonian Whig he untypically moved leftward in the course of 
his political career. In 1869 he married Caroline eldest daughter 
of Robert Needham Philips. He was Chief Secretary for Ireland from 
1881-84 but in 1886 resigned from his next post (Secretary for 
Scotland) on the issue of Home Rule. However he quickly came round 
to Gladstone's point of view and from 1892-95 was back in the 
Government as Secretary for Scotland, this time with a seat in the 
Cabinet. He retired from politics in 1897 and devoted the rest of 
his long life to writing his four-volume history: The American 
Revolution. 
6 WILLIAM EDWIN PRICE (1841-1886) belonged to the first generation 
of Dissenters able to get into public schools (in his case Eton). 
After attending London University he went to Woolwich, secured a 
commission and for a few years served as Lieutenant in the 30th 
Light Infantry in Ireland and India. Realising that he was not 
suited to army life he returned home, as he thought, to the life of 
a country squire, and was surprised and pleased to find himself 
invited to stand for Tewkesbury at the. age of 27. Although very 
close to his father, W. E. Price's political views were considerably 
to the left of W. P. Price. He wanted universal suffrage sooner 
rather than later, and envisaged government intervention to control 
credit, stimulate employment and mitigate want. He also foresaw the 
need to curb the powers of the House of Lords. His love of travel 
(he was also a good linguist) gave him a greater interest in foreign 
affairs than any other members of the Price and Philips family. He 
felt strongly that Disraeli was wrong on the Eastern Question and 
intensely disliked British imperialist and annexationist activities 
in South Africa. He supported every Army reform measure and also 
wanted to see a complete reform of local government. After the 
General Election of 1880, although he personally was unequivocally 
exonerated, he was unseated for corruption in a notoriously greedy 
constituency and although invited to stand again for several other 
safe Liberal constituencies was unable to do so for reasons of 
health. He died at the age of only 45. 
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Gloucester. 7 In fact, for five years (1868-73) the two fathers-in- 
law (who had actually been at school together at one of the 
dissenting Academies) 8 and the two sons-in-law sat on the back 
7 WILLIAM PHILIP PRICE (1817-1891) was the great grandson of the 
founder of Price, Walker and Co. (see Chp. l (2)), his father having 
achieved some local eminence as an architect and Mayor of Gloucester 
as well as a timber merchant. Like his son's future father-in-law 
Robert Needham Philips, he received some education in Bath at Dr. 
Lent Carpenter's school for Dissenters, (see Chp. 1 (8)) but he was 
essentially self-educated, and entered the family firm's counting 
house. He was invited to stand as Liberal Candidate for Gloucester 
at the age of 30 and was first elected M. P. in 1852, remaining one 
of the city's M. P. s until he was made a Railway Commissioner in 
1873. His Liberalism was pragmatic and his adherence to his party 
conditional upon its appeal to his conscience and his common sense. 
He witheld his support from Palmerston on more than one occasion. 
Although a firm believer in the Victorian notion of progress, he was 
sceptical about the effect of the 1867 franchise reform unless 
accompanied by a strong secular public education programme. 
Although he accepted the force of Fenian argument he voted against 
Home Rule. By now a considerable landowner himself he always "voted 
for bread", as he put it, but thought Free Trade, though eminently 
desirable, was far from having been achieved. His railway career 
had begun in 1856 as one of the promoters of several small lines 
between South Wales and the Midlands (which were later taken over by 
the Great Western Railway). He was a Director of the Midland 
Railway for 21 years and from 1869-1873 its Chairman. On being 
appointed Railway Commissioner he severed all his railway and 
political connections and worked in that capacity until a few weeks 
before his death. A window was erected to his memory in Gloucester 
Cathedral, and it was said of him that he had the kindest heart, the 
wisest head and the ugliest face in Gloucestershire. 8 The Dissenting Academies came into being primarily as the result 
of the Act of Uniformity (1660), the Five Mile Act (1665) and other 
Conformity legislation which made it impossible for non-conformists 
to teach in the grammar schools and for their children to be 
educated in them, or indeed in any other public school. By the time 
that William Philip Price and Robert Needham Philips went to Bristol 
to get some of their education at Dr. Carpenter's Academy the great 
days of the Dissenting Academies were nearly over as a result of the 
repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. The Rev. Lent Carpenter, a 
well-known Unitarian Divine, appears however to have taken some 
private pupils in his own house in the 1830s. Lent Carpenter's son 
wrote that "though the number of his pupils was limited yet, when 
the important posts to which many of them were subsequently called 
is born in mind, it is difficult to estimate the amount of good 
which he was able to diffuse in places and circles far removed from 
his own. ". Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Lent Carpenter LLD: 
With Selections from his Correspondence. (Edited Russell Lent 
Carpenter. Bristol and London, 1842. ) This was a subscription 
edition and William Philip Price put himself down for two copies, 
though Robert Needham Philips did not appear to have subscribed. 
The classic work on the subject of Dissenting Academies is still 
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benches at Westminster at the same time. As Morgan Philips Price 
wrote in a short unpublished autobiographical fragment 9 "I think 
it might safely be said that I was predisposed to a political life. " 
When Price was born his father had been obliged to retire from 
politics due to extreme ill health and he died of Bright's Disease 
before his second son, William Robin, was born in 1886. The two boys 
were brought up by their mother, who was a serious and open-minded 
woman; she was also politically active. The Price family home near 
Gloucester, Tibberton Court, was held in trust for the elder son and 
was only visited occasionally from the children's home in Gloucester 
until the grandparents died. But Margaret Price had inherited (from 
her Philips aunts) a property outside Chepstow, on cliffs overlooking 
the river Wye. There the two boys were allowed to run wild in the 
intervals of education and developed interests: birds, plants, 
rocks, dogs, which remained with them throughout their life. Both 
boys were educated at Harrow and Price's first book, Notes on the 
Vertebrate Fauna of Harrow was published by the Harrow School 
Scientific Society in 1903, when he was 18. 
In October 1903 Price went'to Cambridge, where he managed to persuade 
his tutor to let him work for an Honours degree, this not then being 
Irene Parker: The Dissenting Academies in England: Their Rise and 
Progress and Their Place Among the Educational Systems of the 
Country. (Cambridge 1914. ) 
9PPrice papers. The quotation is from the draft introduction to 
an autobiography that was never, as such, written. M. P. Price did 
write an account of his travels and political activities which he 
entitled Back Bench Traveller, and which was rejected by Allen and 
Unwin as being too long. It has, however, been freely drawn upon 
for the purpose of this thesis, and remains in the custody of his 
literary executor. The manuscript with one entire section (on 
Turkey) omitted and the rest severely pruned, finally emerged as My 
Three Revolutions in 1969. 
I. 6 
thought - according to Price himself -a necessary exertion for a man 
in his social position. 10 He got a Third in Science and stayed on 
for a fourth year to get the University Diploma in Agriculture. 
During his four years at Cambridge other matters began to contend 
with field sports and science for his attention. Three days before 
his 20th birthday, on 26 January 1905, Price spoke in the Union for 
the first time, supporting the motion "that this House approve of the 
rise of the Independent Labour Party". In the unpublished first 
draft of what became his book My Three Revolutions Price owned to 
having felt "annoyance ... that a third party now seemed to be coming 
M Z. 9 kt 
up which1queer the Liberal pitch". ll But throughout his life he 
always seemed to like to hear the voices of dissent, and this was 
perhaps the first time he demonstrated what was to become a major 
characteristic. 12 At about this time also he met C. Ramalinga Reddy 
(later Sir Ramalinga Reddy, Chancellor of Andrha University) who was 
then an undergraduate at St. Johns. 13 A friendship began which 
lasted until Reddy's death in 1951. Through Reddy Price came into 
10 Back Bench Traveller (Ms) p. 120 
Ibid p. 128. 
12 Price had the words alteram partem audi (hear the other side) 
scribbled on bits of paper in several drawers of his desk and one 
pinned to the noticeboard above it. 
13 SIR C. RAMALINGA REDDY (1880-1951) While an undergraduate at 
St. John's College, Cambridge, he became Vice-President of the Union 
in 1906 and never forgot that he was the first Indian to be elected 
to that office. He became Principal of the Maharajah's College, 
Mysore in 1916, Inspector General of Education for Mysore from 1918- 
21 and Vice Chancellor of Andhra University from 1926-30. Between 
1921 and 1940 he was elected five times member of the All-India 
Advisory Board of Education, and in 1941 became a member of the All- 
India Board of Scientific and Industrial Research. Having been 
Secretary of the Cambridge University Liberal Club as an 
undergraduate, his next overtly political post was as Deputy Leader 
and organiser of the United Nationalist Party in 1924. But despite 
his youthful political energy, he did not continue to be politically 
active and his publications thoughout his life consisted largely of 
collections of his speeches on education, political economy and 
democratic reform. 
I: 7 
contact for the first time with members of the Fabian Society. In 
Reddy's interest he took part in his first campaign. Reddy was Vice- 
President of the Union in 1904 and according to custom and practice 
should automatically have been elected President in 1905. But he was 
passed over. Reddy's supporters, of whom Price was naturally one, 
and who equally naturally suspected that he had been passed over 
because of the colour of his skin, attempted to challenge the 
validity of the election, but without success. More than thirty 
years were to pass before the Union had an Indian President. 14 
Despite this setback Price began to speak regularly in the Union and 
generally took whatever passed for the progressive line on the issue 
under debate, except in the case of female suffrage. 
From 1895 onwards Margaret Price began to spend several months of the 
year at Tibberton Court, and by the time Price came down from 
Cambridge the family were spending most of their time there although 
there were still long visits to Pen Moel (the house outside 
Chepstow). In 1906, the year Price came of age, she took a small 
step which had a lasting influence on her elder son's life when she 
asked Sir Charles Dilke to tea. Dilke had been elected M. P. for the 
Forest of Dean in 1892 and Tibberton Court stood in that 
constituency. 15 Although Dilke was revered by the Forest miners he 
14 SURENDRA MOHAN KUMARAMANGALAM (1916-73) For a short account of 
the life of Kumaramangalam, see Dictionary of Labour Biography. Vol. 5 15 The constituency was created in 1884 out of the old West 
Gloucestershire division. Early in 1885, at a meeting chaired by 
Price's grandfather W. P. Price, it was agreed to establish a Liberal 
Association in the Forest. The first two M. P. s for the new division 
were the Liberals T. Blake and G. B. Samuelson; in 1891 Dilke was 
adopted as candidate. After the election of 1892 he was returned 
unopposed at every election until his death in 1911, and the Forest 
remained a safe Liberal seat until 1918 when it became and remained 
(except for 1931-35) a safe Labour seat until 1979. J. R. Howe. 
Unpublished M. Phil. thesis 'The Political History of the 
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still suffered a degree of ostracism in other quarters as the 
resulted of the Crawford case. 16 The constituency included a large 
rural as well as an industrial population, and he was not welcome in 
the houses of many of the Liberal county families. In 1906 his wife 
had recently died, and any hopes he might have entertained of a 
return to office under Campbell Bannerman had been disappointed. '? 
Parliamentary Constituencies of Cheltenham, Gloucester and the 
Cirencester and Tewkesbury Division of Gloucestershire 1895-1914'. 
With an Appendix on the Forest of Dean. (P. 248). The 
Gloucestershire Collection. Brunswick Road, Gloucester. 
16 On 12 February 1886 the Liberal M. P. Donald Crawford filed a 
petition for divorce, alleging adultery between his wife Virginia 
and Sir Charles Dilke. Because Mrs. Eustace Smith, Mrs. Crawford's 
mother, had earlier been Sir Charles' mistress, Dilke took his 
lawyers' advice to sutmit that there was no case to answer, since 
that meant he could not then be cross-examined in the witness box as 
to the earlier relationship. The case ended in a techncial 
acquittal for Dilke and a decree nisi for Crawford. But a press 
campaign, begun as soon as news of the impending trial broke and 
whipped up after it by W. T. Stead, editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, 
did irreparable harm to Dilke's reputation, and was probably partly 
responsible for the loss of his Chelsea seat in the election of July 
1886. In the circumstances, Dilke offered to assist in an 
intervention by the Queen's Proctor, in the hope of clearing his 
name. A new trial was ordered, but Dilke, as a witness rather than 
as a respondent, was not allowed to be represented by counsel. Both 
he and Mrs. Crawford were cross-examined and both admitted other 
acts of adultery. Although Crawford's decree nisi was upheld, Dilke 
was politically ruined. He lived to re-enter Parliament as M. P. for 
the Forest of Dean from 1892 until 1911, but with no realistic hope 
of achieving the high office which had earlier been predicted for 
him. Understandably, the first account of his life, published only 
seven years after his death, makes scanty reference to the trials: 
Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The Life of The Rt. Hon. Sir 
Charles W. Dilke (1918, two volumes). Roy Jenkins subsequently 
obtained access to much new material, and his biography, Sir Charles 
Dilke (1958) is aptly subtitled 'A Victorian Tragedy'. 
17 After the General Election of 1905, when the Liberals, now under 
Campbell-Bannerman, were returned to power, and during the period 
between December 1905 and February 1906, when the Prime Minister was 
constructing his Cabinet, some of Dilke's friends encouraged him to 
hope that he might be offered a place in the new government. No 
such offer cane. Dilke had never really expected one, although 
aware that his wife (who died in 1904) had never given up hope that 
he would be able to return to the front benches. Roy Jenkins 
(Sir 
Charles Dilke pp. 409-414) pointed out that it must have been more 
satisfying to be a Radical spokesman on the back benches in 
Opposition than on the back benches of the party in power, and Dilke 
was able not to show any disappointment he may have felt. 
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It was at this point that Margaret Price, herself an active Liberal 
and member of the country house establishment which had continued to 
turn its back on Dilke, asked him to tea. Her younger son recalled 
the radiance of Dilke's expression as he crossed the drawing room to 
meet her with both hands outstretched. Her elder son now found a 
political hero. Dilke probably had a greater influence on Price than 
any other man he encountered in his life before 1917, although he was 
only to know him for four years. 
From then on, by his own account, Price stayed frequently with Dilke 
at the Speech House Hotel18 in the Forest when he came down on his 
18The earliest allusion to a Verderer's Court in the Forest of Dean 
is in a patent roll of 1216. After the Norman conquest English 
forests were increasingly claimed by kings from commoners for their 
own use. A system of courts was set up to protect royal forests 
from encroachment and to preserve the "vert and venison". The 
system applied to all royal forests not just the Forest of Dean. 
The first, or preliminary court in the system was known as a Court 
of Attachment or Speech Court. Here cases were heard by four 
Verderers, theoretically elected by freeholders in the County Court 
on receipt of a writ by the Sheriff, in practice usually large 
landowners from the surrounding areas. These courts originally sat 
every 40 days, their powers were extensive and their punishments 
savage. The Speech Court in the Forest of Dean gave its name to the 
building still known as the Speech House, (although the present 
building was built in 1676 on the site of an earlier one) and a 
Verderers' Court still sits there three or four times a year. Most 
of the cases that used to come to it (e. g. poaching) have long since 
been deflected to police courts, but it still deals with certain 
cases of encroachment. Until 1777 a Mine Law Court was also held 
at the Speech House, to settle disputes among the Free Miners of the 
Forest of Dean. It is not known exactly when the Speech House 
became an hotel, although it was obviously well-established when 
Dilke became M. P. for the Forest. The Court Room, otherwise the 
dining room of the hotel, is used for its orginal purpose whenever 
the Verderers' Court is in session. For further reading see Ralph 
Anstis Warren James and the Dean Forest Riots (Oxford 1986. ) 
F. W. Bay Forest of Dean (1952. ) Arthur 0. Cooke Forest of Dean 
(1952. ) Chris Fisher Custom, Work and Market Capitalism (1981). 
Cyril E. Hart The Verderers and Speech Court of the Forest of Dean 
(Gloucester 1950). John Rodgers The English Woodland (1941). Brian 
Waters The Forest of Dean (1951). 
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periodic visits to the constituency. 19 He also went to stay with 
Dilke at his home at Docket Eddy. 20 Price became a sub-agent for 
Dilke in a particularly rural and unpromising area of the 
constituency near his own home. A letter from Dilke dated 5 April 
1909 asked him to be sure to arrive at the Speech House "before the 
other people do" so that they could talk in peace. 21 There is a 
fragment of an undated letter from Price to Dilke about meetings 
which the former had clearly either organised or chaired in his part 
of the constituency. 22 The letter obviously referred to the General 
Election of January 1910, since Dilke scrawled on the back of it: 
"The Daily News rightly guessed a fortnight ago that when Balfour 
'damped his agitation against the land taxes and took up the drink' 
it supported my opinion as proving that he had forced into (at least 
pretending) surrender to sense. "23 Dilke even found time in the 
19 Dilke habitually spent three periods every year in the Forest of 
Dean: one in the autumn, a month in the winter (except for a few 
years when Lady Dilke was not well enough), and the Whitsun Recess. 
He attended all 20 polling district meetings every year until 1900, 
also the annual meeting of the Liberal party and usually another big 
meeting addressed by the year's Honorary President of the party. He 
also always made a point of attending the annual Miners' Gala. He 
usually stayed at the Speech House Hotel, in the centre of the 
Forest, where the Panelled Room was reserved for his use, but he 
occasionally stayed at the Victoria Hotel at Newnham-on-Severn. 
20 Docket Eddy was the name of one of Dilke's riverside homes. His 
enthusiasm for rowing and sculling was legendary. In 1883 he 
purchased some land on the Thames at Pyrford, near Shepperton, and 
built a cottage there which was finished in 1885 and known as 
Pyrford Rough. Within a few years he had built another, far more 
substantial house, Docket Eddy, within walking distance of Pyrford 
Rough, and here he entertained his friends. 
21 Price papers 
Ibid. 
23 Ibid. Balfour disagreed with the diehards of his own party on 
the associated issues of the land value clauses of the 1909 Budget 
and Liberal plans to curb the powers of the House of Lords. When he 
was Prime Minister in 1904/5 he had shown an extraordinary personal 
interest in the 1904 Licensing Act, broadly designed to benefit 
publicans. Dilke's comment suggests that Balfour was using the 
latter interest to disguise his ambivalence about the real issues of 
the election. 
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middle of the campaign to tease Price on his views on Second 
Chambers, which he had expressed in a foreword to the reprint of an 
address on that subject given by his father in 1884. Price was 
circulating this as a contribution to the election campaign, and as a 
matter of course sent a copy to Dilke. Dilke wrote "I looked at the 
beginning and the end of your thing on Second Chambers and thought I 
had better not read between for you are a terrible Whig and Ia 
hopeless Radical and I feel confirmed in my view that it is best not 
to read you when you cite Bodley". The letter ended: "you, 
unfortunately, are the master of the existing situation which will 
survive me and with which you will have more to do than yours very 
truly Charles Dilke. "24 
Price worked hard for Dilke in this election, not merely by lending 
his cars25 but also, according to Dilke's own letter of thanks "in 
all sorts of ways. "26 There can be no doubt that Dilke liked Price 
and thought that he had a future in political life. While Price was 
out of the country for eleven months in 1910/11 (see below p. 14) 
24 Dilke was being a little unfair. The main body of the "thing" 
was W. E. Price's purely historical account of the evolution of 
second chambers in Europe, America and the British Empire up to 
1884. Price only cited Bodley in an Appendix which brought the 
account up to date. He also noted that Bodley (in his book France 
(1902)) had pointed out the difficulty of creating any democratic 
second chamber without first devising an electoral system designed 
to produce one. Price concluded that this difficulty narrowed the 
question down to whether the only practical solution was the 
restriction of the veto of the House of Lords. Dilke, as was well- 
known, favoured outright abolition. Price's copy of Bodley's book 
was a coming-of-age present from Ramalinga Reddy. 
25 Dilke's agent wrote to Price: "The splendid win for the 
Liberals was secured very largely by the service rendered by 
motors. " (Price papers. ) John Howe (see above F/N 15) noted that in 
this election "the Conservative motors had been an important factor, 
especially in bringing in the outvoters" and that the Conservatives 
"as usual had most motors" (pp. 224-6). 
26 Price papers. 
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Dilke wrote three times to his mother asking for news of him or 
thanking her for sending copies of his letters and diaries. "Of 
course I shall be delighted to do all I can to help him politically" 
he wrote in June 1910 "and I hope he understands this. "27 
Not quite a year earlier, in July 1909, a Gloucestershire neighbour 
Sir William Thistleton-Dyer had written almost prophetically to 
Price: "Glad to see you have definitely given up contesting the 
Tewkesbury Division. Keep your eye on the Forest of Dean. " 28 
Price had been invited to allow his name to go forward for 
consideration as prospective Liberal candidate for Tewkesbury in 
February 1909 but he declined the offer when it was made in July. 29 
The Gloucester Journal, regretting the decision on 17 July, noted 
that "the reasons for Mr. Price's decision are not disclosed though 
they are said to be many and consequently it is hardly possible to 
challenge his action in the matter. " It is unlikely that his reasons 
were due to political differences with the government. Price was 
already working for both Dilke and the Liberal candidate for 
Gloucester, Russell Rea at that time. Although he had spoken out 
against excessive expenditure on arms at a number of Liberal meetings 
27 Price papers. 
Ibid. SIR WILLIAM THISTLE'JX -DYER (1843-1928) The connection 
between the Price brothers and Thistleton-Dyer was almost certainly 
due to his eminence as a botanist. Robin Price (the younger Price 
brother) was a professional botanist until 1914 and again at the 
end of his life. Thistleton-Dyer was Director of Kew from 1875- 
1905. On retirement he went to live at Witcombe in Gloucestershire, 
where he spent the rest of his years as a country gentleman and J. P. 
There were however other points at which his life would have 
intersected with those of Price brothers for he was the 
representative of Oxford University on the Gloucestershire Education 
Committee from 1908-16 (while Philips Price was Liberal candidate 
for Gloucester), and he also held at various times in his life 
important scientific agricultural posts. 
29 Gloucester Journal 20.2.09 
I: 13 
in the county in 1909, his attitude to the budget and his estimation 
of the seriousness of the constitutional crises in 1910 should have 
made it obvious that the Liberal government of the day had his 
general support. 
The reason that Price declined the Tewkesbury candidature in 1909 is 
more likely to have been that he was not yet ready to devote himself 
to a political life. He was learning to manage his estates, which 
were then considerable, and also experimenting with various crop and 
afforestation schemes suggested to him by the School of Agriculture 
at Cambridge. He took a lively part in the activities of the 
Gloucestershire Root, Fruit and Grain Society. He was at that time 
going regularly each week into the Price Walker office in Gloucester 
to learn something about the timber business. 30 He hunted 
frequently with both the Ledbury and the Berkeley (his passion for 
fox-hunting was something he never lost). He had just been made a 
J. P.. He and his brother, both extremely good-looking, must have 
been two of the most eligible young men in Gloucestershire and they 
were invited out a great deal. Above all, Price had begun to 
travel. 
If his mother was disappointed at his reluctance to begin a career in 
politics she had only herself to blame. She and her husband had been 
indefatigable travellers, often to places well away from the 
30 Evidence of Price's political leanings even in this context came 
nearly 80 years later in a letter to the family from Mr. James Lee- 
Smith H. S. whose father had been a stoker at Price Walker & Co. 
during this period. Mr. Lee-Smith's mother told him that when Price 
learned that the stokers were dehydrated by their work he insisted 
that they should be provided with lime juice. 
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Victorian beaten track. 31 After the death of William Edwin Price 
his widow took her children all over Britain and the Continent in 
their school holidays. In 1906 she took them to Canada and down the 
St. Lawrence Seaway. Price then struck out on his own. He went to 
Norway, fishing and shooting with some of his sporting friends from 
Cambridge. In 1908 he and his brother went with J. H. Elwes, 
President of the Royal English Forestry Society (and also a family 
friend) to Denmark, Sweden, Finland and North Russia. Their main 
objective was to look at a number of unusual types of larch forest 
which were only to be found in these areas, but Price took the 
opportunity to visit Petrograd and learn something about the 
exporting end of the timber trade. He bought a bear cub (which 
eventually took up residence in an orchard in Tibberton) and also 
began to learn to speak Russian. 
On Price's birthday in 1910 the Morning Post carried an announcement 
to the effect that preparations were in progress "for the despatch of 
an important British Expedition which is being organised privately to 
Western and North Western Mongolia, a region concerning which 
practically nothing has been written in the English language. " The 
expedition consisted of three men: Douglas Carruthers, its leader 
31 While still in the army in India W. E. Price spent one of his 
leaves visiting Japan in 1864 and another in the Himalayas. There 
are no records of where else he went before his marriage except for 
the diary he kept of a journey in Canada and the United States 
during the Parliamentary recess in the winter of 1869 when he was 
accompanied by Sir Michael Hicks Beach (later Lord St. Aldwyn). 
They crossed the continent from coast to coast in one of the first 
(his son estimated the 10th or 12th) transcontinental trains. In 
1878 he took his wife on what must have been an unusual wedding tour 
in which they retraced his steps of nine years earlier and also 
branched off into New Mexico in the company of General Sherman. 
Margaret Price's photograph album records that they subsequently 
went together to Iceland (1881), Norway (1883) and Greece and Turkey 
(1884). 
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J. H. Miller and Philips Price. 32 The object was to explore the 
headwaters of the Yenesei River, getting there via Siberia. This 
country, then virtually a no-man's-land between the old Chinese and 
Russian Empires, was practically unknown to West Europeans at that 
time. From the Yenesei they moved on to Outer Mongolia and the Altai 
Mountains, where Price left the expedition to return via Chinese 
Turkestan to the Caucasus and European Russia. By now he could speak 
fluent Russian and his love affair with Russia had begun. 
Price, who was the botanist and geologist of the expedition, was away 
from England for just over a year. On his way back he found a 
telegram waiting in Moscow which told him to hurry as his mother was 
dangerously ill. He was too late to speak to her again. She died a 
week after his return without having regained consciousness. At the 
same time he had to be told that Dilke had died the previous month. 
For a while he completely lost his bearings and, by his own account, 
went into a deep depression. He blamed himself for having been away 
32 ALEXANDER DOUGLAS MITCHELL CARRUTHERS (1882-1962) explorer and 
naturalist. At a time when the only way to examine and identify 
specimens of the fauna of other countries was to kill and stuff 
them, Carruthers became an expert taxidermist and through this skill 
contributed largely to the store of knowledge about the animals of 
the areas he explored. He was also interested and something of an 
expert in climatology, and made a study of the effects of changes in 
climate on ancient civilizations. His main expeditions were (for 
the British Museum) to Syria (1904-1905), Ruwenzori and the Congo 
(1905-1906), Russian Turkestan and Bokhara (1907-1908), North West 
Arabia (1909), Mongolia and Central Asia (1910-1911) and Syria and 
Asia Minor (1913). He was also a map-maker, and spent most of the 
First World War at the War Office making maps of the Middle East. 
His books include Unknown Mongolia (1913), The Desert Route to India 
(1930), Arabian Adventure (1935), Northern Najd (1938) and Beyond 
the Caspian (1949). The entry for him in the Dictionary of National 
Biography was written by Price. (The other member of the 
Carruthers-Miller Expedition, J. H. Miller, was a big-game hunter. 
He died young and it has been impossible to obtain any further 
information about him. ) 
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while his mother was ill and punished himself by refusing to co- 
operate with Carruthers in writing up his part of the expedition. 33 
(A slight tendency to self-destructiveness was another trait that 
never left him. ) Almost the only activity which he undertook at this 
time was an attempt to get recognition for the Docker's Union at 
Price Walker. This was only a qualified success despite the fact 
that Ben Tillet came to stay with him at Tibberton Court for the 
purpose. The person who now helped him most was Francis Hirst, the 
editor of the Economist. 34 
Price never mentioned when or how he first met Hirst; the most 
obvious point of contact would have been at Dilke's house at Docket 
Eddy, though there is no proof of this. But a letter from Hirst to 
Price in May 1909 in which he not only invited himself to stay at 
Tibberton Court but also suggested that Price might go with him to 
Stockholm later in the summer suggests that their acquaintance, if 
not of long standing, was already quite close. 35 In September 1909 
33 Price finally gave his own account in the Journal of the Royal 
Geographical Society, Vol. 134 part 2, June 1968, in recognition of 
which he was made an Honorary Fellow of the R. G. S. He also wrote a 
paper with N. Simpson on the 'Flora of Mongolia' which was read to 
the Linnean Society on 17 April 1913 and published in the Society's 
journal Botany, Vol. XLI October 1913 pp. 385-456. 
34 FRANCIS WRIGLEY HIRST (1873-1953). After a distinguised career 
as a student at Oxford, Hirst was called to the Bar but soon turned 
to journalism as a career. He was editor of The Economist (1907- 
1916) and then founded his own journal Common Sense. He twice stood 
unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate, in 1910 and again in 1929, 
and never departed from his Liberal alleig ance. After 1921 he 
devoted his life to travel and writing. His most notable books are 
probably his Life of Thomas Jefferson (1926), Early Life and Letters 
of John Morley (1927), and Gladstone as Financier and Econanist 
(1931). His moral and intellectual support for the UDC was 
invaluable in 1914. Price was only one of many men whom he 
encouraged and inspired. See F. W. Hirst by his Friends (Oxford 
1958). See also Chp. 2 F/N 89 for his own account of why he 
resigned the editorship of the Economist and founded Common Sense. 
35 price papers. 
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Hirst must already have known that Price was planning to go on the 
Carruthers-Miller expedition for he wrote: "Sorry to hear about 
Siberia. Why these unnecessary risks? Do you want to join in the 
Polar scramble? Better try politics at home. "36 In November 1909 
Hirst tried to tempt Price to stay at home with the bait of an 
unspecified "agricultural constituency with Liberal majority and a 
good chance of holding it and probably Whips Office finding most of 
the money". 37 (He had been offered the candidature himself but 
intended to turn it down. ) A rare survivor of Price's own letters of 
this period is a copy of one he wrote to Hirst in December 1909 
describing the election campaigns in Gloucester and the Forest. 
Price hoped the Economist was going to deal with the Second Chamber 
issue and "shed the light of your judgement on this dark morass of 
political chaos". 38 In Hirst's last letter to Price before he left 
for Siberia he chided him for "leaving the poor old country in such a 
crisis" but wished him luck and told him not to take unnecessary 
risks. "Write to me if you can about conditions in Russia and 
Siberia and other exploited or exploitable regions that you 
traverse"39. Some time after Price's return in 1911 Hirst reminded 
him of this proposal and asked him to write three articles for the 
Economist describing the prospects for development in Eastern Europe 
and Siberia. Price then wrote a whole book about Siberia40. 
Through Hirst he met the Webbs and began to read more widely. 
Finally towards the end of 1911 he made up his mind to accept the 
offer of the Liberal candidature for Gloucestershire, the sitting 
36 Price papers. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Siberia by M. P. Price, (1912). 
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Liberal member Russell Rea having lost the seat to the Conservatives 
in the elections of December 1910. 
In the years 1912-13 Price began to develop rapidly along both of the 
lines which were to characterise his life: politics and travel. 
Although now committed to politics by his acceptance of the 
Gloucester candidature he did not see - and never did see - why this 
commitment should prevent him from travelling as much and as widely 
as he could. On his way home from Mongolia he had stood on the 
northern side of Mount Ar arat and longed to know what lay on the 
other side. In the autumn of 1912 he had his wish and went to 
Eastern Turkey, becoming an eyewitness to the last stages of the 
Balkan Wars41 and making a considerable excursion into northern 
Persia before returning along the Black Sea Coast. At Khoi in 
Northern Persia he had his first encounter with Tsarist Imperialism 
in action when he was arrested by Cossack troops while taking 
photographs in the bazaar. To his amazement he found there was a 
large detachment of Russian soldiers encamped just outside the town 
and well inside the Persian border. He protested vigorously, in 
Russian, and was released but the Persian Governor of the Province, 
with whom he was staying, advised him to go away quietly. Price gave 
a number of lectures after his return, not only about his own 
41 In October 1912 the Balkan League, consisting of Serbia, 
Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, encouraged by Pan-Slav elements in 
Russia, attacked Turkey. By the end of November the Turks had been 
driven out of the whole of Europe except for Constantinople, 
Gallipoli, Adrianople (on the Bulgarian frontier), Scutari (on the 
frontier with Montenegro) and Janina (near the frontier between 
Albania and Greece). Despite an armistice in December 1912 
hostilities continued until the Turks signed a treaty in London in 
May 1913 by which they relinquished all territory west of a line 
between Enos and Midia. The same treaty created the state of 
Albania to prevent Russia's protege, Serbia, from getting access to 
the Mediterranean at the expense of Austria's prote(e, Bulgaria. 
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experiences but also about the future of Persia, and an article by 
him on the subject was published in the Contemporary Review. 42 The 
following year the Manchester Guardian for the first time 
commissioned a series of articles from him before he set out on his 
next, and last pre-war, journey. This took him through the Balkans 
into Asiatic Turkey and then out again into Syria and Palestine. At 
Adrianople he stayed with the British Consul and there met Sir Henry 
Wilson, then Chief of Staff of the British Army, who had come to look 
at the battlefields of the Balkan Wars. Price recalled that Wilson's 
face fell when he was introduced as the Special Correspondent of the 
Manchester Guardian: a title he held then for the first time and was 
to hold intermittently for the next forty years. Four articles by 
him were printed between September 1912 and January 1914: on Thrace, 
Germany in Asia Minor, and Palestine and the new Jewish colonies. 
The Manchester Guardian also published a long report of a lecture on 
Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan which he gave to the Manchester 
Geographical Society on 10 March 1914. 
These two journeys accounted for only about one fifth of his time 
between becoming Liberal candidate for Gloucester and the outbreak of 
war in 1914, but they laid the foundations of his career as a 
journalist. The rest of the time (apart from agriculture, the timber 
trade, writing, dancing and fox-hunting) he devoted to the 
cultivation of his constituency and the study of subjects which he 
thought should, or knew did, concern his constituents. In May 1914 
he told the Gloucester Liberal Association that if they wondered why 
he had not been making so many speeches in the past year it was 
42 Contemporary Review April 1913 
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because he had made instead some 3,000 personal visits in the working 
class quarters of the city, to find out what people were thinking43. 
In the three years of his active candidature, however, he made 
innumerable speeches both to specifically Liberal audiences in the 
constituency and also at open meetings in all the Gloucester wards. 
Of his own political creed at this time Price said later that it was 
"typical of many radicals on the left wing of the Liberal party: a 
curious mixture of Socialism in home affairs and a traditionalist, 
almost Whig attitude to foreign affairs"44. On home affairs, 
predictably he supported the 1909 Budget and used the land tax 
proposals in it as a base upon which to construct his own programne 
of land reform. In a paper which he read to the Young Liberals in 
1914, after describing the main features of what he called 
contemporary feudalism on the land he outlined a programme which 
included a statutory minimum agricultural wage, a system of 
unemployment insurance to deal with any increase in the number of 
casual labourers who might thereby be put out of work; and a Land 
Court to deal with all conflicts of interests between landlords and 
tenants. He wanted cottages built with public money "to secure the 
social independence of the labouring class" and worked out a system 
akin to the modern rate support grant with which to finance such a 
building programme. He thought that, of all the land tax proposals 
in the 1909 Budget those dealing with site values were the most 
important because they would enable the nationalisation of land to 
take place gradually45. 
43 Gloucester Journal 30.5.15. 
44 Price Papers. Ms. 'Bank Bench Traveller' p. 414. 
45 Gloucester Journal 21.2.14. 
I: 21 
In home affairs he was, like all other Liberals at that time, much 
exercised by two other subjects: trade union law and Home Rule. 
In his 1913 tour of the Gloucester wards he devoted an entire speech 
(in a ward full of railwaymen and their families) to trade union 
issues46. He had clearly been prompted to give the matter some 
thought as the result of the wave of strikes which had taken place 
nationally in the preceding two years. His own attempt to get the 
Dockers' Union recognised at Price Walker & Co. in 1911 had resulted 
in a voluntary agreement between management and labour. This had 
been a step in the right direction, he told his audience, but he 
wanted to see such agreements not only extended to other parts where 
conditions were far worse, as London, but also given the force of an 
Act of Parliament. He supported picketing but thought numbers of 
pickets should be controlled and that there was scinething to be said 
for official pickets wearing badges. Although he thought that in 
themselves strikes were "barbaric" he also said that it was "a public 
scandal" that working people could not get their grievances redressed 
by any other means, and that this was the fault of the State and not 
of the workers. Perhaps more surprisingly, and certainly more 
popularly with an audience still vigorously opposed to the recent 
Osborne judgement47 he opposed contracting out, asking why Trades 
46 Gloucester Journal 15.2.13. 
47 The Osborne Judgement, so called after W. V. Osborne, a branch 
secretary of the Railway Servants, who brought the case in the first 
instance, was upheld by the House of Lords in December 1909. 
Henceforth it was unlawful for trade unions to expend any money at 
all on returning members to Parliament or on any political objective 
whatever. For the background to the case, see H. A. Clegg et al. A 
History of British Trade Unions since 1889 Vol I 1889-1910. (Oxford 
1964. ) pp 416-8. The decision in the Osborne case was partly 
remedied in favour of the Unions by the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 
of 1913. 
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Union members should not have to abide by majority decisions as in 
any other democratic process? 
On Home Rule his views became noticeably more radical between 1911 
and 1914. In a speech to the Western Counties Liberal Federation in 
December 1911, when T. P. O'Connor was the main speaker Price, as the 
newly-chosen candidate for Gloucester was given the task of moving a 
resolution welcaning the government's pledge to introduce Home Rule 
in the next Session48. He devoted much of his short speech to a 
parallel between Ireland and Quebec where, he maintained, there was 
exemplary co-operation between a religious minority and a religious 
oP 
majority, all of which served to underline the truth("one of the 
greatest Liberal maxims: that in order to create loyalty you must 
remove the causes of disloyalty. " By March 1914 he was taking a much 
less anodyne line, and in a speech to the Gloucester Liberal Club 
devoted entirely to Home Rule49 he spoke of the need to smash vested 
interests in Ulster before they could wreck the Parliament Act and 
restore the Lords' veto; and wondered "what would happen in mainland 
Britain if a poor man, outraged by sweated wages or driven to 
desperation by our unfair social system were to do one tenth of the 
things which well-fed gentlemen were on Ulster to do at the present 
time. 
On foreign affairs Price never really said anything that differed in 
essence from what was contained in his address to the Young Liberals 
of Gloucester in March 191250. The primary objects of foreign 
48 Gloucester Journal 18.12.11. 
49 Ibid 21.3.14. 
50I id 1.3.12. 
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policy were, as he saw them, to maintain peace; to safeguard the 
nation's commercial interests by means of the open door principle; to 
govern "the Asiatic subjects" of the Empire in such a way as to lead 
them towards self-government; and to continue the country's historic 
role of giving moral support to emerging nationalities and 
liberation movements. Doubtless his friendship with Ramalinga Reddy 
was to some extent responsible for the emphasis he gave to the third 
point. He positively welcomed Germany's relatively recent economic 
expansion and saw no threat in it at all. Germany had as much right 
to an open door as Britain; it was France who was erecting the walls. 
He was dismayed by how close Britain had come to war with Germany 
over the Agadir incident51. He deplored the fact that Britain was 
becoming increasingly "drawn into the vortex of Continental 
diplomacy". From this everything that followed was bad. Increasing 
international friction increased the burden of armaments which in 
turn "overweighted" the finances of the state and prevented money 
from being applied to measures of social reform which were urgently 
needed at home. In this connection he welcomed the internationalist 
stance of the labour movement, and hoped that "the power of labour 
may become stronger than the power of war. " 
If he developed his views upon any of these subjects it was in 
respect of Germany and the naval rivalry of Britain and Germany. In 
51 In July 1911 the German gunboat Panther was sent to Agadir in a 
display of strength designed to deter French expansionism in Morocco 
and enhance German interests. Britain, fearing a German threat to 
her trade routes through the Mediterranean, issued a strong warning 
to Germany the chief effect of which was to increase international 
tension. The French on the other hand entered into negotiations 
with Germany and in November 1911 came to an accolntadation whereby 
Germany recognised French rights in Morocco in exchange for the 
acquisition of two strips of land in the French Congo. 
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February 1913 Hirst came to Gloucester to speak to the Chamber of 
Commerce, and among the points he made was that the only proper use 
of a navy was as a strike weapon against the armed forces of any 
enemy, not to blockade civilian populations52. He also said that 
the German Navy Laws53 had only been enacted because of Germany's 
vulnerability in the light of Britain's claim to the right of capture 
on the high seas. Price elaborated these ideas in a somewhat naive 
paper which he read to the Ninth National Peace Council at Leeds in 
June 1913. He argued that no wars should be allowed "to interfere 
with the economic network which 'the republic of commerce' had built 
up as the basis of civilisation". Belligerent nations would always, 
he maintained, be able to get their supplies samehow in the railway 
age, so "why not scratch the pawns of maritime conmerce and allow the 
game to be played out between the armed naval and military forces on 
both sides. " He appeared at that time to believe that any future war 
would be fought according to the rules of international law, built up 
over the past two hundred years, and all that was needed was a 
relatively minor modification of the rules54. 
52 Gloucester Journal 1.3.13. 
53 The appointment of Tirpitz as Navy Minister in 1897 marked a 
turning point in German naval arms policy which had behind it the 
support not merely of the Kaiser but also of powerful commercial and 
colonial interests. The formation by the British of a naval "flying 
squadron" in 1896 was seen to indicate that war with Britain was now 
not impossible. Tirpitz quite specifically wanted to create the 
kind of political power factor against the British which, he was 
convinced, a large navy could provide. A succession of Navy Laws 
passed in 1898,1898,1900,1906 and 1908 drew up a naval building 
programme the object of which was to ensure that the German fleet 
could defeat any possible enemy. The size of the British fleet 
was from then on, therefore, inevitably the yardstick for the size 
of the German fleet. See Paul M. Kennedy: The Rise of Anglo-German 
Antagonism 1860-1914 (1982); and also by the same author, 'The 
Development of German Naval Operational Plans against England 1896- 
1914', English Historical Review, Vol. 89, (1974) pp. 48-76. 
54 The Immunity of Sea-borne Commerce from Capture by M. Philips 
Price. A paper read at the Ninth National Peace Congress, Leeds, 
1913. Published as a pamphlet by the National Peace Council. 
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Thus Price, in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war 
in August 1914 gave little advance warning in what he said in public 
of the line he was going to take on the war. But two small clues are 
to be found in his speeches as to the way in which he always - but 
observers rarely - managed to reconcile his then modest radicalism 
with his not inconsiderable wealth. In March 1912 in his 
presidential address to the Gloucester Young Liberals55 told them 
that when his Tory friends asked him how he, with his interests, 
could be a Liberal he was often at a loss for a reply, not because he 
had no arguments but because he had so many he did not know which to 
use first. Two years later he told the same audience56 that he was 
often asked "'How can you favour anything which either really or 
apparently affects your position as a landowner? ' My reply is, that 
my duty is to regard this problem from the standpoint of the public 
interest first and my private interest second. " He added that he 
felt sure that many other landowners felt exactly the same "but do 
not happen to have acquired the habits of looking upon relations 
between the individual and the state in the same light as I have. " 
Price surprised and shocked most of his constituents, nearly all of 
his county friends (by some of whom he was ostracised to the end of 
his long life) and even some members of his immediate family when, in 
August 1914, he strongly opposed British involvement in a European 
war. As he himself acknowledged, his general political outlook was 
only moderately radical and he had been by no means alone in his 
opposition to the arms race against Germany. Yet he suddenly found 
55 Gloucester Journal 1.3.12. 
56 Ibid 21.2.14. 
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himself one of a very small group who opposed the war on political 
rather than religious grounds. The explanation is almost certainly 
to be found in the influence of his cousin Charles Trevelyan. 57 
Although Price proved over and over again in his life that he was not 
easily influenced, there were a handful of people who made exceptions 
to this generalisation about him. Among them were Reddy, Dilke, 
Hirst and Trevelyan. 
Trevelyan's mother and Price's mother were sisters. His mother's 
brother-in-law, the historian and Liberal politician Sir George Otto 
Trevelyan appears to have appointed himself a proxy father to the 
Price brothers. Sir George's own three sons, Charles, George and 
57 CHARLES PHILIPS TREVELYAN (1870-1958). Third baronet. His 
parents were the historian, George Otto Trevelyan, and Mary Caroline 
Philips, the sister of Price's mother. Trevelyan was educated at 
Harrow and Trinity College Cambridge. He was elected to Parliament 
as a Liberal for the Eiland Division of Yorkshire in 1899 and 
retained that seat until 1918. Trevelyan was a politician who took 
an intense interest in education. He was Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Board of Education fron 1908-1914, and President of the Board of 
Education in the Labour Governments of 1924 and 1929. He resigned 
from the Government twice: in 1914 because of Britain's entry in 
the European war, and in 1929 because of proposed cuts in Government 
expenditure on education. The other major preoccupation of his 
political life was the democratic control of foreign policy. He was 
one of the founders of the Union of Democratic Control in 1914, and 
fought for the causes it espoused with great courage in the House of 
Commons during the First World War. He lost his seat in 1918, but 
joined the Labour and Independent Labour Parties, and was elected 
Labour M. P. for the Central Divison of Newcastle in 1922. His 
resignation in 1931 was soon followed by the General Election, when 
he lost his seat, and he did not stand again. But he lived for 
another quarter of a century, out of active politics but still a 
force to be reckoned with on the Left of the Labour party. Price 
wrote the entry for him in the Dictionary of National Biography. 
Trevelyan's biography was written by A. J. A. Morris: C. P. Trevelyan 
1870-1958: Portrait of a Radical (Belfast 1977). There are frequent 
references to Trevelyan in Marvin Swartz: The Union of Democratic 
Control in British Politics during the First World War (Oxford 
1971). The Trevelyan papers are kept at Newcastle University 
Library. Letters from M. P. Price to Charles Trevelyan will be 
identified throughout this thesis by the letter C. P. T., followed by 
the date on which they were written or their reference number. 
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Robert were like elder brothers to the Prices. They followed each 
other to the same schools and stayed in each others' homes in the 
school holidays. Charles Trevelyan had entered Parliament in 1899, 
when Price was still at Harrow. By the time Price was ready to 
commit himself to a life in politics (1911) Trevelyan was already a 
junior member of the government as Under-Secretary at the Board of 
Education. The two cousins had so much in connan that it is hard to 
identify a particular moment or a particular issue when, in effect, 
they joined forces. Russia may have been one of the consolidating 
factors: Charles was disgusted by the Anglo-Russian treaty of 
1907.58 Both men were unable to see that Labour posed a threat to 
the Liberal party, but saw Labour rather as a natural ally. The 
National Peace Council, of which Charles was a founder member, was 
certainly a common interest. Charles was fifteen years the elder of 
the two and Price looked up to him, but Charles did not look down on 
Price, rather he did everything he could to encourage him. It was 
58 The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Negotiations for this 
treaty occupied two years and were conducted chiefly by the Russian 
Foreign Minister Izvolsky and the British Ambassador Sir Arthur 
Nicolson. They were begun when Russia's credibility in Europe was 
at a low ebb, partly as the result of her defeat at the hands of 
Japan and partly because of 1905 Revolution. The Convention 
formalised what was, in effect, the status quo in the Near East: 
Persia was divided into zones of influence, with the Russians 
predominating in the north and the British in the south. Similar 
understandings were reached in respect of Afghanistan and Tibet. 
During the negotiations the possibility of Russian access to the 
Dardanelles was more than once floated, at that time more as an 
inducement to complete them than seriously. The Convention brought 
a new factor, a Russo British alignment, into West European affairs, 
and though not deliberately aimed against Germany was nonetheless 
seen by Germany as having that effect. It also outraged Liberal 
opinion in Britain. A full account of the negotiations is given by 
Rogers Platt Churchill in The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 
(1939). They are mentioned in the memoirs of most European 
diplomats active in that area at that time, and described by Harold 
Nicolson in Sir Arthur Nicholson Bart., First Lord Carnock (1930) 
pp. 232-257. See also Firuz Kazemzadeh: Russia and Britain in 
Persia, 1864-1914 :A Study of Imperialism. (Yale 1968. ) 
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not till the summer of 1914 that their hitherto friendly relationship 
took on the aspect almost of a working partnership. 
In the early summer of 1914 most observers recognised that a general 
war in Europe was probably inevitable, but on the available evidence 
it did not follow that Britain must be drawn into it. Price recalled 
that he was at a party in London when word came of the assassination 
at Sarajevo. "The news caused a lot of talk but little concern" he 
wrote later. "As I see it now I realise that we were not thinking so 
much as dreaming. "59 Trevelyan, however, was wide awake. At the 
beginning of August, with Norman Angell and others he formed a last- 
minute pressure group: The Neutrality Committee, to the funds of 
which Price subscribed. They issued a manifesto to the press which 
was largely ignored, and distributed half a million leaflets in 
London alone in the last two days before the outbreak of war. For 
Trevelyan propaganda was not enough, and on the eve of the 
declaration of war he resigned his post at the Board of Education on 
the grounds that he could not continue to be a member of a government 
which took his country into a war which he believed to be totally 
avoidable. For two days he kept quiet and then, on 6 August, went to 
a dinner given by Norman Angell and found Price among the guests. 
(Price appears to have got to know Angell at about the same time as 
he met Hirst and to have been a member of a group sometimes referred 
to as "Angell's young men". ) 60 It was at this dinner that the ideas 
59 Price Papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller'. p. 317. 60 There can be little doubt that at this stage in his life Price 
had been strongly influenced by Norman Angell, whose book The Great 
Illusion was published in 1910. The belief that war could not 
happen because it made no sense contributed to the paralysis of 
opposition to war in July 1914, though, Angell himself took an 
active part in the formation of the U. D. C. (See Chp. 2, page 11). 
An illuminating account of this phenomenon is given by H. Weinroth: 
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which were to result in the formation of the Union of Democratic 
Control were first discussed and written down - supposedly on the 
back of an envelope - by Trevelyan himself6l. Price was among those 
to whom Trevelyan sent the first draft manifesto for comment. 
Another was Hirst who, while he supported the objectives of the group 
personally, felt that as editor of the Economist he could not 
formally associate himself with it. Hirst criticised the draft in a 
number of ways and suggested that one thing that was badly needed as 
the foundation of any campaign to secure a fundamental change in the 
control of foreign policy was a book documenting the origins of the 
war62. It may have been this suggestion that accounts for the fact 
that by the middle of August 1914 Price was staying at an hotel in 
London and working day and night on the book that was to be published 
in November under the title The Diplomatic History of the War. He 
found time, however, to form a branch of the Union of Democratic 
Control in Gloucester and to get Trevelyan to come and address it63. 
He was present at the inaugural meeting of the U. D. C. in London on 17 
November and was to become an elected - if absentee - member of the 
General Council from 1915 -1919. 
On the eve of the declaration of war Price, who had subscribed to the 
Neutrality Conmittee, wrote a letter which was published in the local 
daily paper, the Gloucester Citizen, on 4 August. He enclosed a copy 
of the Committee's manifesto and asked the editor to publish it 
"because there may yet be time to save the situation". He pointed 
'Norman Angel and The Great Illusion: An Episode in pre-1914 
Pacifism'. Historical Journal Vol. 17 (1974) pp 551-574. 
61 Newcastle University Library (C. P. Trevelyan papers) CPT 33. 
62 Ibid 73.159. 
63 Ibid Ex 107. 
I: 30 
out that the manifesto was no "peace at any price" policy, because 
Britain's position might already have been "fatally compromised 
behind our backs and we may have to prepare for the worst. " But, he 
went on, 
"War with a Western Power like Germany, even under the 
justest circumstances, is a calamity. War against her 
to serve the interests of a hypothetical and illusory 
Power Balance in Europe is a crime against humanity... 
As one who knows Russia and the Russians I am keenly 
alive to this danger from the East, and realise all the 
more the necessity of keeping intact the civilisation 
of Western Europe, and of preventing the further 
degradation and misery of our population. " 
But he concluded that if war did break out 
"we must see our Government through, however much we 
may think they have acted wrongly by involving us in 
this terrible affair. "64 
For Price, "seeing the Government through" entailed agreeing to act 
as a Russian interpreter for the Home Office, but the task was not 
onerous. "So far" he wrote to his brother on 18 August, "I have had 
nothing to do except to interview an old Russian peasant who was 
stranded on an impounded German steamer on the Thames"65. But his 
main preoccupation at this time was the preparation of the book. He 
realised that he must consider his position as Liberal candidate for 
Gloucester. Accordingly he wrote a long letter of 24 August to the 
President of the Gloucester Liberal Association, Mr. Ralph Fream66. 
64 Gloucester Citizen 4.8.14. 
65 Price papers. 66 Ibid. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p 423. The original of this 
letter has not been preserved. Ralph Fream, Chairman of the 
Gloucester Liberal Association in 1915, was a Gloucester solicitor. 
He was elected a Liberal Councillor for the Tidworth ward of 
Gloucester at every local government election from 1900 to 1911, but 
the Gloucester Liberal Association Annual Reports are not very 
informative about him, and although he outlived Price, the 
Gloucester papers carried no obituaries of him. Some idea of his 
interests can be gleaned from the topics of two public speeches 
which he made in 1909: 'Trade and Labour' and 'Tariffs and Labour'. 
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In it he reminded Fream that he had, 
"for some two or three years past... been with a number 
of friends of mine both in and out of Parliament 
somewhat critical of and uneasy about the foreign 
policy of the Government. " 
They had continued to hope that the government would "steer clear of 
any serious European catastrophe" but now that war had come he would 
support the government in bringing it to a successful conclusion. 
But this did not imply unconditional approval of Liberal 
statesmanship and he reserved the right "to speak out and criticise 
whenever I think the tine has arisen. " He told Fream of his 
involvement in the nascent U. D. C. and thought it more than probable 
that 
"those of us who are either M. P. s or Liberal candidates 
might find ourselves in a difficult position at the 
next election... I should only be able to support the 
Government until I thought that the country was out of 
danger and then I should be bound to reserve a free 
hand to co-operate with any party or Group who would 
work for the objects which we have in view. " 
He asked Fream to read and discuss his letter with the "influential 
members" of the Gloucester party and to let him know what they 
thought. He would decide nothing in a hurry. But if his views did 
not meet with support 
"among the rank and file of progressive people in the 
City then it is clear that it is my duty to reconsider 
my position as prospective Liberal candidate. " 
On 10 November Price wrote to his brother: 
"My book is out and there is an ominous calm before the 
storm... I have had numberless congratulations upon it 
from Ramsay MacDonald, Charles Trevelyan, Norman 
Angell, Lord Bryce, Lord Beauchamp,, Hirst and others, 
but I know that it will obtain no general recognition 
till this war is over67. " 
67 Price papers. 
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In this he was quite wrong. The book was studiously shunned by the 
Northcliffe press but more tl 
reviewed either the first or 
expected that the book would 
not ignored and many even of 
that it was, in the words of 
Journal (4 November 1918) "a 
ability". 68 
han 30 other newspapers and journals 
the second edition. It was hardly to be 
find much favour, but it was certainly 
the most critical reviews acknowledged 
the local Tory paper, the Gloucester 
monument" to his "industry, research and 
Possibly even before he finished writing the book and certainly 
before it came out Price had already decided upon his next step. He 
wanted to go to Russia for the Manchester Guardian. He had conceived 
the idea that with his knowledge of Russia and Russian he might be 
68 Diplomatic History of the War (1914). The book took the form of 
an historical introduction followed by a diary of negotiations and 
events in the various capitals of Europe, the texts of official 
documents of the various governments, speeches in European 
parliaments, an account of the progress of military preparations, 
and a selection of quotations from the Press of all the 
belligerents. Although some reviewers questioned Price's 
impartiality, nobody questioned its value as a collection of 
documents until the spring of 1915, when the second edition came 
out. By then, other accounts of the origins of war had begun to 
appear, notably William Archer's History of the Thirteen Days (1915) 
in an Appendix to which Archer subjected Price's book to "detailed 
vivisection" according to the columnist 'Rob Roy' in Forward 
(28.10.16). Earlier (19.8.16) 'Rob Roy', a Glaswegian Fabian called 
Dr. Stirling Robertson (who according to the editor of Forward, 
Thomas Johnson, "kept the anti-Marxian front well abaze"), had 
written an unexpectedly hostile review of E. D. Morel's book Truth 
and the War (1916) in which he criticised Morel for having commended 
Price "without a word of caution to his readers". Morel came to 
Price's defence in a letter to the editor of Forward published on 
23.9.16, in which he asked to be told what matters of fact stated by 
Price and used by him were incorrect. Price was, Morel wrote, "not 
above error" and he did not "go bail for every word he has written". 
But Morel thought him "one of the best informed of the younger men 
of today on international affairs in general and especially in 
regard to Russian affairs. " 'Rob Roy' did not reply until 28.10.16, 
when he again attacked Morel for having given Price as a "primary 
historical authority" without having given any hint that he was a 
"suspected source" who had been discredited by William Archer. 
I: 33 
able to play some part in dispelling the wishful thinking, which was 
so enthusiastically expressed in much of the British press, that 
Russia was somehow going to become more democratic purely as the 
result of being in alliance with Britain and France; and - more 
cynically - that she was going to save Western Europe by 
'steamrollering' into Germany"69. In the early autumn, when 
visiting his aunt near Manchester, he called on Scott and was invited 
to lunch at Scott's home. "There we arranged something that was to 
become one of the turning points of my life. "70 Price was 
authorised to go to Russia for the winter and to stay longer if it 
seemed desirable. Scott told him that he might not be able to 
publish everything he sent "for reasons connected with the war. But 
at least he wanted to be informed. "7l Scott would however have been 
surprised by Price's choice of words in the last letter he wrote to 
his brother before leaving for Russia, since nothing in any of his 
surviving speeches or writings at this time anticipate such a marked 
movement to the Left. 
"I must get in touch with the Social Democrats and 
other brothers of the faith and see what hope there is. 
I see there is fighting in the Caucasus. I shall go 
there as soon as possible, not half... After all 
fighting is all right for those barbarians whose second 
nature it is, but for Western Europeans Wait till 
the dawn of International Socialism. Adieu my dear 
gob. "72 73 
69 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller'. pp 429-30. 70 M. Philips Price My Three Revolutions (1969) p. 124. 71 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller'. pp. 429-30. 
Price papers. 73 WILLIAM ROBERT PRICE (1886-1975). There is probably no more 
appropriate place than this in which to give some details of the 
life of M. P. Price's brother, always known as Robin. Educated at 
Harrow and Trinity, Robin Price was single-mindedly a botanist 
throughout his life. His only other field of study was humanism. 
In 1908 he accompanied his brother on the Henry Elwes expedition to 
look at larch forests in the Baltic area (see above p. 14). In 1910 
he went, again with Elwes, on a botanical expedition to China and 
Formosa (Taiwan), where a number of plants were named after him. 
The best known is probably Lilium Formosanum Var. Price. He then 
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worked at Kew until the outbreak of war. Severely handicapped 
throughout his life by a stamper, he joined the artillery as a 
private soldier because he feared he might not be able to utter 
words of command. His manuscript account of his wartime experiences 
as a highly intelligent and educated man serving in the ranks: 
'Gunner on the Somme', is deposited at the Imperial War Museum. 
Between the wars he was a prominent member of the Cotswold Field 
Naturalists' Society' and he was one of the editors of the Flora of 
Gloucestershire, (Arbroath 1948). Late in life, as a widower, he 
travelled round the world, visiting Formosa among other places, 
where he was received with honour as a botanist. He returned to 
work at Kew in his '80s where he identified samples at the Herbarium 
until, reluctantly acknowledging that the ladders were getting too 
much for him, he began cataloguing part of Kew's immense collection 
of water colour paintings, some of which he was able to put on 
public display for the first time. This he did until a few weeks 
before his death. Letters from M. P. Price to his brother will be 
identified throughout this thesis by the letters W. R. P., followed by 
the date on which they were written. 
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Chapter 2. War Correspondent 
Price arrived in Russia on 13 December 1914. Apart from six weeks in 
Stockholm early in 1915, where he went to prepare the second edition 
of the Diplomatic History of the War, and short excursions in Persian 
and Turkish territory while on the Caucasus front, he was to remain 
in Russia for exactly four years. This was an accident of the war. 
Neither he nor Scott had it in mind that he should remain there so 
long. What emerges from his private correspondence during the winter 
and spring is that his decision to remain in Russia at that time had 
a lot to do with his attitude to the war itself. In his first letter 
from Russia to his brother (who, while completely agreeing with and 
supporting his attitude to the war had nonetheless enlisted within a 
few days) he said: "I fear we are severed by a psychological barrier 
which was artificially hurled between us on those first terrible days 
in August last" 1. To his Uncle Charles Lee Williams (Tuffet) 
whose only son Owen had also enlisted he wrote "No doubt they are 
happy. But oh! what a cause! " 2 In nearly all his letters 
between January and March 1915 he talked of his "duty" as he now saw 
it. "Having used all my influence to prevent the war I must now help 
1 W. R. P. 30.1.15 Price papers. 2 CHARLES LEE LEE-WILLIAMS (1851-1935), Mus. Bach., Oxon, was 
organist of Gloucester Cathedral from 1882-1897. He retired 
ostensibly on grounds of ill health, but continued to travel 
extensively throughout the Commonwealth as an Examiner for the 
Associated Board of the Royal College and Royal Academy of Music for 
many years thereafter; an association with the Three Choirs' 
Festival brought him the friendship of Sir Edward Elgar. He married 
Alice Gwenillian, younger daughter of W. P. Price, enjoyed country 
pursuits and was much loved by his family-in-law. His loyalty to 
Philips Price showed that under a gentle and self-effacing manner lay 
considerable independence and strength of mind. Because he lived in 
a large house in a suburb of Gloucester called Tuff ley, he was always 
known to his family as, iffet. Letters from M. P. Price to Tuffet 
will be identified throughout this thesis by the letters C. L. W. 
followed by the date on which they were written. 
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to prepare for peace by informing myself of the developments both 
political and military throughout Europe and try to help and prepare 
opinion when the time comes. "3 And to Charles Trevelyan: "I feel 
rather a rascal to have run away and left you at this critical time, 
but I do feel that it is good to study the East European question on 
the spot. " (Price's emphasis. )4 
While in Stockholm he read the German press and tried to see the 
German point of view. "I am coming more and more to feel that not 
only are they no worse than we are, but that they have actually got 
more right on their side than any belligerent state. "5 He inclined 
to accept Germany's claim to neutral countries that she was fighting 
for the freedom of the seas. He wrote to Trevelyan on 3 March: "I 
wonder if we ought not to include in our 4 points of the U. D. C. a 
statement to the effect that seapower must be internationalised, 
right of capture abandoned, and food struck off contraband 
lists. "6 He also, from Stockholm, wrote again to Ralph Fream, 
Chairman of the Gloucester Liberal Association and this time he 
resigned his candidature. He then asked Tuffet to make sure that the 
Gloucester papers published his letter of resignation, adding: "It 
is obvious that my job for the next few years is writing, propaganda 
and education of the new public opinion which has got to grow in 
Europe... Europe is my battleground, not a provincial town in S. 
England. n7 
3 W. R. P. 30.1.15. Price papers. 4 C. P. T. 21.1.15. Price papers. 
5 W. R. P. 3.3.15. Price papers. 
Price papers. 
7 On 8 July the Gloucester Citizen and on 10 July the weekly 
Gloucester Journal published the following letter from Price: "It is 
with profound regret that I ask the Gloucester Liberal Association to 
relieve me of the position of prospective Liberal Candidate. My 
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Even before he went to Stockholm, however, he had made a start as a 
war correspondent, and got himself to the Polish front. Sixty miles 
west of Warsaw the Russian lines were so close to the German that the 
soldiers could hear each other talking. With perhaps a touch of 
defiance he told his brother "I have been under fire already" 8. 
He wrote three articles for the Manchester Guardian about this 
experience 9 and was responsible for much of the material in two 
more in the EconomistlO. He made a great point of getting the 
Russian soldiers to talk to him and his articles are full of passages 
in quotation marks. Of the Russian army at that time he wrote later 
relations with the Liberals of Gloucester have been of such a cordial 
and friendly nature that it is only from motives of absolute 
necessity that I feel compelled to retire, and I can assure them that 
I shall look back on the last three years which I have spent in their 
midst as one of the most profitable, as well as a the most pleasant 
experiences of my life. I however look forward at some future date 
to the recommencement of the work which has now been broken off, for 
I feel confident that the need for strong democratic control in 
public affairs, whether home or foreign, will be greater in the 
future to stem the tide of reaction and the overwhelming of European 
civilization. " The Citizen did not comment, but the Gloucester 
Journal went on to report that "after explanation by the Chairman" 
the meeting of the Gloucester Liberal Association resolved 
unanimously "with extreme regret to accept the resignation". In a 
leading article the same day the editor declared that it would be 
"idle... to speculate as to Mr. Price's part in future activities to 
which he refers" and pointed out that but for the war Price would 
probably already have been the M. P. for Gloucester. "But nothing 
will bring back the pre-war conditions, and Mr. Price and the 
Liberals of Gloucester are equally able to face the new and grave 
problems which the future will bring in entire freedom from 
engagements which were entered into without any possible conception 
of the conditions of today. " 
8 W. R. P. 30.1.15. Price papers. 
9 Manchester Guardian 3.1.15. Datelined Warsaw January 1. 'The 
Russian Army at work' Signed M. Philips Price. 22.1.15. Datelined 
'From a point west of Warsaw, January 1', 'In Russian Trenches'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 27.1.15. Datelined Petrograd January 4. 
'Russian Defences'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
(Where datelines are self explanatory they will not be placed in 
inverted commas. Where they are obscure or unusual they will be 
placed in inverted commas and an attenpt made to identify the actual 
date on which the despatch was sent. ) 
10 Economist 6.2.15 and 6.3.15 
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that it was "slow and cumbrous" but "somehow it worked" even if "more 
that half of the army consisted of soldiers supplying the rest. "11 
But at the time he doubted "whether one can look to the Russian army 
to do more than continue to hold up large forces of German troops in 
the eastern theatre. Any advance into German territory is not to be 
contemplated for the present at any rate. "12 After his return from 
Stockholm to "dear old Russia, where everything is forbidden and yet 
you can do everything"13 he immediately arranged to go to the 
Galician front, travelling via Kiev to Lemburg (Lvov), which had been 
captured from the Austrians only a few months earlier. Everywhere he 
went he saw the grim effects of Russification upon the local 
populations: Ukranians, Ruthenians, Jews and Poles. "Once I lived 
in Europe, now I am in Asia" he remembered an Austrophil Pole saying 
to him many years later14. He also recalled that he wrote to Scott 
about this but that the Manchester Guardian did not make use of the 
information15, although the Economist later published a full account 
of the state of Galicia over his name16. It seems likely that his 
reports were beginning to attract attention, because at about this 
wri tQ 
time he was asked toLsome articles for America by the Associated 
Press17. But the Manchester Guardian did publish two out of four 
pieces he sent them describing the Russian retreat from Lemburg, in 
which he was caught, and the firing of the Russian oilfields at 
11 Price Papers, Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 438. 12 Manchester Guardian 27.1.15. See F/N 9. 
13 W. R. P. 30.1.15. Price papers 
14 Price papers, Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 443 15 Price papers, Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 442. See also F/N 36. 
16 Economist 12.6.15. 
17 A. M. P. 22.3.15. Price papers. Associated Press do not keep 
archive material longer than 30 years, and it has therefore been 
impossible to discover what, if anything, Price wrote for them. 
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Borislav, which he saw from a distance18. "These adventures in 
Galicia" he wrote to Scott privately "convince me that the Tsar's 
regime has not only not changed for the better, but also that as a 
military power the Russian Empire is clearly declining. "19 
Price's first article for the Manchester Guardian after his arrival 
had been uncharacteristically euphoric. There was, he found "a new 
spirit abroad in the land... there are no internal politics in Russia 
today. "20 But thanks to a number of letters of introduction from 
Professor Bernard Pares)(21), he was able to secure interviews with 
Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister22, the Kadet Leader 
18 Manchester Guardian 
9.6.15. Datelined 'In the Carpathian foothills'. 'On the Battlefield 
of Galicia'. Signed M. Philips Price 
22.7.15. Datelined Lemburg, June. 'The Burning of the Oil Wells of 
Galicia'. Signed 'From a Correspondent'. 
19 Price papers, Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 444 
20 Manchester Guardian 
7.1.15. Datelined Petrograd December 21. 'Russia and the War'. 
Si ned M. Philips Price. 
21 SIR BERNARD PARES (1867-1949) first went to Russia in 1898, after 
which Russia and the Russian language became his principal study. He 
was Reader in Russian History at Liverpool University from 1906-1908 
and then Professor of Russian Studies. From 1914-1917 he was 
attached to the Russian Army and in 1917 became a special adviser to 
Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd. After the 
Revolution he returdto Britain and became one of the most 
influential of the Russia specialists in the Political Intelligence 
Department of the Foreign Office. From 1919-1936 he was Professor of 
Russian Language, Literature and History at the University of London 
and from 1922-1939 Director of the School of Slavonic (subsequently 
Slavonic and East European) Studies. He was co-editor of the 
Slavonic Review and author of many books, notably the History of 
Russia (1926) and The Fall of the Russian Monarchy (1939). He also 
produced My Russian Memoirs (1931), A Wandering Student (1938) and a 
highly esteemed translation of Krylov's Fables (1942). He visited 
Russia between the wars and although formally retired in 1939 
lectured on Russia for the Foreign Office throughout the second world 
War. Dictionary of National Biography; Slavonic Review Vol 28-29 
(1949) pp. 28-38: appreciations of Pares by R. Seton-Watson, 
G. R. Noyes and W. J. Rose. 
22 SERGEI DMITRIEVICH SAZONOV (1861-1927). Born of a wealthy 
family, Sazonov joined the Tsarist Foreign Service in 1883 and served 
overseas until 1909, when he became Deputy Foreign Minister under 
Izvolsky, and Foreign Minister in the following year. He played an 
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Miliukov23, the Octobrist leader Guchkov24 and the writer Peter 
Struve25. In between his excursions to the front Price began to 
important role in preventing the escalation of the First Balkan War 
but was less successful in the case of the second. Strongly pro-Serb 
in the run-up to the First World War, he was for over half a century 
credited with the formulation of a 13-point prograimne of war aims 
approved by the Tsar, which included the partition of Turkey 
and Russian control of the Straits and Constantinople. A liberal 
monarchist in domestic politics, he was dismissed by the Tsar for 
supporting Polish autonomy. After the Bolshevik Revolution he became 
adviser on foreign affairs to Denikin and Foreign Minister to 
Kolchak. He died in Paris. His partial autobiography, Fateful 
Years, 1919-1916, was published in London in 1928. The most recent 
work on his life has been done in a larger context by C. Jay Smith 
Jr: The Russian Struggle for Power 1914-1917 (New York 1956) and 
Andrew Rossos: Russia and the Balkans (Toronto 1951). 
23 PAUL MILIUKOV (1859-1943), historian turned politician, became 
involved in politics via the Union of Liberation, and because of his 
liberal sympathies was obliged to spend most of his early life 
abroad. He returned to Russia in 1905 and devoted the rest of his 
political life to the increasingly anachronistic cause of trying to 
create some form of parliamentary democracy on West European lines in 
Russia. He was a founder member of the Constitutional Democratic 
Party (Kadets) in 1905, and elected to the Duma in 1907. In the 
Fourth Duma (1912-1917) Miliukov moved increasingly to the Right in 
his desire not to frighten away the moderates while still retaining 
some oppositional momentum. In 1915 he became unofficial leader of 
the Progressive Bloc in the Duma, and on 1 November 1916 his 
"stupidity or treason" speech resulted in the dismissal of the 
incompetent and reactionary Prime Minister, Stürmer. It also made 
Miliukov appear briefly to be voice of the reform movement in Russia. 
He saw the March Revolution as a victory for the Duma and a 
vindication of his tactics. His term of office as Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government was however short- 
lived, and in December 1917 he threw in his lot with the Counter- 
Revolution. See below Chp. 3 p. 80 F/N 15. A full account of his 
life is given by Thomas Riha: Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics 
(Notre Dame 1969), and in his article 'Miliukov and the Progressive 
Bloc in 1915: a Study in Last Chance Politics', Journal of Modern 
Hist Vol 31 (1960) pp. 16-24. 
24 ALEXANDER GUQiKOV (1862-1936) came of a merchant family and was a 
founding member of the Octobrist Group in November 1905, becc*ning a 
member of the Third Duma in 1907. Active in the Russian Red Cross 
ever since the Russo-Japanese war (when he was captured by the 
Japanese) he was Chairman of it when Price interviewed him. He later 
also became Chairman of the Central War Industries Committee. Well 
before 1917 he had lost all hope that the Duma could become an 
effective instrument of reform. Though not personally anti- 
monarchist, he was involved in a plot to kidnap the Tsar and form a 
new government under the Tsarevich. The March Revolution occurred 
first. He was briefly a member of the First Provisional Government, 
as Minister for War, but resigned with Miliukov, later joined 
Denikin, and eventually went into exile in Berlin and Paris. He left 
no memoir and no full-length biography has yet been attempted, but an 
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appreciate the political situation rather better. He was not amused 
by Sazonov's reaction when Price told him, in reply to Sazonov's 
question, that he believed a large section of public opinion in 
Britain had been against participation in a European war until 
Belgium was invaded. Sazonov had laughed, and said: "Is that all 
you entered the war for? I was convinced that war was inevitable 
long before it broke out because I saw that we should never have 
peace in Europe till Germany's attempt to dominate Turkey was 
broken. "26 Price wrote a private letter to Scott about these 
interviews but nothing appeared in the Manchester Guardian27. On 
the other hand the Economist produced an article about an interview 
with a "high official" using very much the same words as those Price 
had used in his letters home at this time28. It was an understood 
thing between him and his correspondents that they should send copies 
of his letters to one another, and the distribution list of course 
included Hirst, who appears at first to have made more use of them 
than did Scott. Nearly all his letters (apart from those to Scott) 
informative monograph was written by William Gleason: 'Alexander 
Guchkov and the end of the Russian Empire', Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 73, part 3,1983. 
25 PETER STRUVE (1870-1944), economist and writer. One of the 
"legal Marxist" ideologues of the Social Democratic party, he wrote 
the Manifesto for their first party congress in 1889, but by 1900 had 
already broken away and by the time Price met him, Struve had moved 
far to the Right. After a brief spell as a Kadet deputy in the 
Second Duma he confined himself increasingly to theorising until the 
outbreak of war. In 1915 he became Chairman of the Committee for the 
Restriction of Enemy Supplies and Trade (KOS) in which post he worked 
closely with its British counterpart, the Ministry of Blockade. 
After March 1917 he served briefly under Miliukov in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, but in December 1917 threw in his lot with the 
Volunteer Army. In 1920 he entered upon a life of exile and emigre 
politics. His biography is in two volumes. Richard Pipes: Struve: 
Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905 and Struve: Liberal on the Right, 
1905-1944, published by Harvard University Press, 1970 and 1980 
respectively. 
26 Price papers, Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 434. 
27 Price papers, Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 436. 
28 Economist 6.2.15. 
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were addressed in the first instance either to Trevelyan, to Tuffet, 
to his brother or to his most supportive aunt, Anna Maria 
Philips29. 
When Price returned to Petrograd from the Carpathian front in May 
1915 he noticed that "people here are beginning to sicken of the war, 
but the Government here is so powerful and the people so disorganised 
and without will that I don't think there will be any movement for 
peace now that Count Witte is dead. "30 31 He came away from 
another interview with Sazonov with the impression that "he did not 
29 ANNA MARIA PHILIPS (1857-1946). The daughter of Robert Needham 
Philips by his second marriage, Anna Maria Philips never married. 
She was her father's companion and hostess until his death in 1890, 
after which she quietly embarked on a long life of public service, 
her chief interests being schools and hospitals. She was a member of 
the Lancashire Education Committee from its foundation in 1903, 
represented Manchester University on the Committee of the Stand 
Grammar School for Boys, and was closely involved in the building at 
Stand of a Grammar School for Girls. She was a member of the Board 
of the Manchester Northern Hospital for nearly 40 years. Her five 
nephews (the three Trevelyan and two Price brothers) and their many 
children provided her with a large family, and she took a careful 
interest in the lives and fortunes of each member of it. Although in 
failing health she appeared to have clung to life in January 1946 
just long enough to hear what Price had to tell her about Russia when 
he went to see her immediately after returning from his first visit 
there since 1918. She died a few hours after he left her house. 
Letters from M. P. Price to Anna Philips will be identified throughout 
this thesis by the letters A. M. P. followed by the date on which they 
were written. 
30 A. M. P. 27.5.15. Price papers. 
COUNT SERGEI YUL EVICH WITTE (1849-1915). An able minister under 
Alexander III, Witte presided, as Minister of Railways and then of 
Finance over a period of unprecedented economic expansion in Russia 
and was largely responsible for the huge scale of foreign investment, 
especially by France, in the Russian economy. His reputation as a 
peacemaker, to which Price obviously referred, was presumably based 
on the fact that he had been the chief architect of the Treaty of 
Portsmouth which ended the Russo-Japanese War in August 1905. He 
had, moreover, vigorously denounced the drift to war with Germany in 
1914. Known to have drafted most of the October Manifesto of 1905, 
he was probably regarded more outside Russia as a reformer than he 
actually was. He died suddenly in March 1915. His Reminiscences 
were published in Paris and London in 1921. See also Howard D. 
Mehlinger and John M. Thompson: Count Witte and Tsarist Government 
in the 1905 Revolution. (Indiana University Press 1972. ) 
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look forward with any great enthusiasm to a very serious change in 
the internal politics of Russia". 32 On 6 June he wrote to 
Trevelyan: "I am really beginning to think that unless the situation 
changes there may be an upheaval. The events of the last few days 
have made me begin to think. "33 He was having to think not only 
about the situation on which he was reporting, but about his own 
situation. 
Price had been getting indications of his unpopularity in Gloucester 
from his uncle, Tuffet, who was doing his best to keep an eye on 
Price's finances and the welfare of his staff at Tibberton Court. 
Tuffet was a kindly and open-minded man but dominated by his wife 
Alice, the sister of Price's father. She was a highly patriotic 
woman who ran a hospital in Gloucester and bitterly disapproved of 
her nephew's politics and activities. Price was in constant 
correspondence with Tuff et but did not keep his letters. It is 
therefore possible only to infer what Tuffet was saying from Price's 
reactions. Tuffet may well have exaggerated the degree of local 
hostility to Price, given the awkward situation in which he was 
placed within the family. But he certainly managed to give Price the 
impression that Gloucester was up in arms against him. In a letter 
to his aunt Anna on 27 May 1915 Price told her about Tuffet's 
warnings, concluding that what they amounted to was: "Political 
career ruined. Social ostracism in City and country. Possible 
personal violence on self and property... Needless to say it does 
not increase my desire to hurry home, especially as I now have 
opportunities of visiting the third theatre of Eastern warfare in the 
32 A. M. P. 27.5.15. Price papers. 
33 C. P. T. 6.6.15. Price papers. 
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Caucasus". He wrote to his brother: "You are in some ways in a 
happier position, for if you return safely you are for the rest of 
your life an honoured and respected man; while I shall be looked on 
as a leper because I told my countrymen the truth when they wanted 
lies, "34 35 In the sunnier of 1915, therefore, Price was inclined 
to stay in Russia as long as he could with a view to writing a book 
about Anglo-Russian relations. But he still saw himself as a war 
correspondent. The Russian authorities were, however, now making it 
almost impossible for correspondents to get to the Russian Western 
front and the Russian censor would not pass articles on political 
questions. Price had been shocked by what he had seen of 
Russification and anti-Semitism in the Russian-occupied parts of 
Galicia but could report nothing to his paper. "Rather than bury my 
conscience in Europe I decided to betake myself to Asia. "36 
34 W. R. P. 29.5.15. Price papers. 
35 A study of the two Gloucester papers for the period January - 
September 1915 has elicited nothing whatever to substantiate Tuffet's 
apparently alarmist messages. As noted in F/N 7 above, Price's 
decision to resign the Liberal candidature was not even reported 
until 7 July. During the spring of 1915 generally jingoistic letters 
were beginning to appear in the papers, mainly in the Citizen, and 
there were constant reports of recruiting drives, but never a word 
against Price. This is the more surprising because two local 
regiments had already incurred heavy losses: The Gloucesters at 
Ypres in May (where according to a letter by one survivor printed in 
the Citizen they were "mown down like rabbits"), and the 
Gloucestershire Hussars at the Dardanelles. But nobody appears to 
have wanted to vil-. ify Price for not having been among them. One 
possible explanation is that he was probably quite widely known to be 
acting as a war correspondent in Russia; events on the Russian front 
were receiving extensive coverage in the local press throughout that 
period, and if anyone thought about Price at all, it would not have 
been as one avoiding danger. It would seem, therefore, that what 
Tuffet was telling him was a combination of pillow talk and a sense 
of animosity that was undoubtedly growing against Price in 
Gloucestershire county society, and which to a greater or lesser 
extent dogged him throughout his life. 
36 In a memorandum to Charles Trevelyan dated 18 August 1917 Price 
recalled that he had seen how "in the region of Stanislaus and Lalice 
the house of every Jew was deliberately burned. I used to see the 
Jews with my own eyes being led away in droves with chains clanking 
on them to an unknown fate but one not difficult to guess". 
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Moreover, as he later wrote, there were no other correspondents from 
the Western Allies on the Caucasus front "and this was very much my 
country"37. 
In 1911 on his way back from Mongolia and again in 1912 Price had 
ridden in and out of the border areas between Russia, Persia and 
Turkey. He was therefore better placed than most Western war 
correspondents to appreciate the strategic importance of the Caucasus 
front. After observing two seasons' campaigning there in 1915/16 he 
was to become convinced that if this theatre had been taken seriously 
by the Entente powers, Germany could have been encircled and defeated 
long before November 191838. 
(Newcastle University Library, C. P. Trevelyan Papers 69. ) The 
quotation in the text is from the author's preface to his book War 
and Revolution in Asiatic Russia (1918). In what is probably the 
first account in the English language of these events, Daniel W. Graf 
described how the whole area west of a line from Petrograd to 
Smolensk came under military rule as a result of the emergency 
regulations put into effect in July 1914. This was marked not only 
by arbitrariness and confusion but also by unprecedented atrocities 
against the civilian population, notably (the army being one of the 
strongholds of anti-semitism in Russia at that time) atrocities 
committed against the Jews. Graf went on to note that the policies 
of the military in this area and at this time did much to alienate 
public opinion from the Russian Government, particularly among 
intellectuals. He also pointed out that the Grand Duke Nicholas, 
then still Comuander in Chief had, contrary to both prevailing and 
persistent mythology, done his best to control the behaviour of his 
subordinate generals. Indeed,? Graf argued, it was his reputation for 
liberalism in Poland that got him sacked and relegated to the 
Caucasus. Daniel W. Graf: 'Military Rule Behind the Russian Front 
1914-1917: the Political Ramifications'. Jahrbucher fur Geschichte 
Ost Europas (1974) (Franz Steiner Verlag, Gmb. H. Wiesbaden). See 
also a collection of papers apparently put together by David Soskice 
for the Jewish Conjoint Foreign Committee and marked MOST SECRET. 
Stow Hill papers, House of Lords. 052/1. 
37 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 454. 
Lloyd George devoted virtually the whole of Chapters X-XVII of 
his War Memoirs to attacking the Allied generals for insisting on 
trying to win the war in the west when it could, in his view, have 
been won for much less cost and in a far shorter time in the East. 
He devoted a further excoriating Chapter (XXIX) to 'The Mesopotamia 
Muddle'. But there is not one word in any of these chapters which 
suggests that he saw the strategic potential of a link-up between the 
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The key to the control of the area was the high volcanic plateau 
between the Black Sea and the Caspian which dominated the natural 
valley lines of communication between the three countries, and on 
which stood, opposing one another, the Russian fort of Kars and the 
Turkish fort of Erzerum. When Turkey entered the war on 31 October 
1914, Russian troops from Kars briefly advanced in Turkish territory, 
but at that time the Russian High Command was more interested in the 
Polish and Galician fronts against Germany and Austria. For Turkey, 
on the other hand, the Caucasus front was then the main interest. 
The Turks counter-attacked and by 28 December 1914 had surrounded 
Kars, from where they were within two days' march of Tiflis. But on 
2 January 1915 the Russian drove them back. The Turks now set their 
sights on the Persian provinces of Azerbaijan, hoping to outflank the 
Russians on the east instead. In April 1915 they occupied the 
Urumiah plateau and on 1 May were outside Dilman, just north west of 
Lake Urumiah, greatly outnumbering the Russian defenders. There was 
no siege, however, because having got there the Turks ran out of 
British army in Mesopotamia and the Russian army in the Caucasus, 
although those on the ground in these areas clearly did, and 
continued to do so even after the March Revolution. Lloyd George saw 
the alternative strategy entirely in terms of an advance into the 
Balkans from Salonika. As late as August 1917 the plenipotentiary in 
London of the Provisional Government, Nabokov, tried to interest 
Milner in co-operation between the Russian and British forces in Asia 
Minor. Milner replied that there was no possibility of a combined 
offensive as Britain had been forced to withdraw forces from 
"idleness" in Salonika and the situation in Mesopotamia had been 
"seriously compromised". Secret Diplomatic Documents and Treaties 
Vol. I, published in Petrograd, January 1918, by the Bureau of 
International Propaganda. (Xerox in DLB Coll. University of Hull. ) 
The interrelationship of the two theatres is discussed by W. E. D. 
Allen and Paul Muratov in Chapter 33 of Caucasian Battlefields. A 
History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921 
(Cambridge 1953). See also Ronald G. Suny The Baku Commune 1917-18: 
Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution in Asiatic Russia 
(1918) pp. 64-68. 
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ammunition. Moreover here had been a serious revolt in their rear by 
the Armenian population of the Turkish town of Van. The Turks 
retired to Bitlis, west of Lake Van, and the Russians advanced and 
they relieved the Armenians at Van. Fighting raged back and forth in 
the area south east of the Black Sea throughout the summer of 1915, 
but by the end of the season the Russian had not only cleared the 
Turks out of north west Persia but also occupied the whole of the 
south eastern Armenian plateau. The Turks, whenever they retreated, 
devastated any Armenian village in their path and massacred the 
indigenous populations, whether Christian or Muslim. 
This was the situation when Price arrived in the Caucasus theatre. 
He was to remain there, with a few trips back to Tiflis and one to 
Kharkov, almost until the March revolution nearly two years later, 
although in the second year on that front he spent more time on war 
relief than on war reportage. 
The fighting in the Caucasus theatre was interrelated with the 
British campaigns against the Turks both at Gallipoli and in 
Mesopotamia, whether the politicians saw it that way or not. There 
seems to be no disagreement that the Dardanelles expedition among 
other consequences had the effect of preventing more Turkish troops 
from being deployed against Russia in the Caucasus, at a time when 
the latter was under desperate pressure on the Polish and Galician 
fronts. The British defeat at Gallipoli thus not only released 
Turkish troops to add to the pressure in Mesopotamia, but also gave 
rise to fears, at the Russian Military Headquarters (Stavka), that 
Turkish troops might now appear on the Polish front. On the other 
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hand, by early 1916 the Russians in the Caucasus theatre were 
buoyant. On the east their forces under General Baratov had defeated 
Turco-German troops in Persia and were established at Kirmanshah, 
only 120 miles from what is now the border with Iraq. Although the 
French were against any diversions in this area and the Grand Duke 
Nicholas (Commander in Chief in the Caucasus) was lukewarm towards 
the idea of Anglo-Russian co-operation in Mesopotamia because he 
thought the British lacked strategic sense in that theatre, General 
Baratov was given permission, in the spring of 1916, to create a 
diversion in northern Mesopotamia in the hope of preventing the 
surrender of British troops besieged at Kut. Unfortunately he could 
not get far enough in time to prevent that, but his advance tempted 
the Turks into yet another diversion into Persia. This in turn 
provided a breathing space for the British during which they were 
able to prepare for their eventual march on Baghdad. Meanwhile on 
the west Caucasus front, the Russians under General Udenich occupied 
Erzerum in February 1916, and the conquest of the rest of the Black 
Sea Coast to a point west of Trebizond followed in April. Thus 
Anglo-Russian co-operation, though neither planned nor systematically 
executed, was in fact quite effective in preventing the Drang nach 
Osten. 
Price had arrived in Tiflis on 24 June 1915 with letters of 
introduction to the Grand Duke Nicholas. In the first week of July 
he set out for the Turkish front via Tabriz, where the Russian 
military headquarters were then situated, to obtain the necessary 
passes. From there, "equipped like war correspondents used to be" 
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with two horses, a servant and a tent, he set out towards Urumiah39. 
The Turks had already retreated from the most easterly point of their 
advance at Dilman on the north west tip of the Lake, but on his way 
Price encountered thousands of terrified Armenian and Assyrian 
refugees still flying into Persia. At Urumiah he met and stayed with 
an American medical missionary, Dr. Packard40, and went with him 
into territory controlled by the Khurds, who were making the most of 
the opportunity provided by the war to pursue their own interests: 
territory and plunder. Dr. Packard, who was trusted by everybody, 
had undertaken to try to secure the release of some Assyrian 
Christians (Nestorians) who were being held prisoners by the Khurds, 
and at the same time to try to persuade the Khurds to accept a 
Russian offer of an amnesty. 
In October 1915, having been delayed by a serious accident41, Price 
set out for Van and there found an old acquaintance, now Colonel of 
39 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 454. 40 Dr. Henry P. Packard ran the American Presbyterian Mission 
Hospital at Urumia, Azerbaijan, from at least 1902 until at least 
1916. It has proved impossible to obtain any further biographical 
information about Dr. Packard, but Price, who met him in August 1915, 
gave a very full account of him and his work at that time in his War 
and Revolution, pp. 99-102 and 110-121. Price described him as "six 
feet tall with the eye of an eagle and the courage of a lion", a man 
who was "intimately acquainted with every tribal chief of the Khurds 
and can go among the fiercest and most intractable of them, such is 
his moral hold over these men and the confidence which they place in 
a man who is not engaged in political intrigue". Price described 
some of his exploits and went with him on several expeditions. The 
Quaker Alfred Backhouse described one of Dr. Packard's more dramatic 
(and successful) humanitarian actions in The Friend of 4 August 1916. 
Letters from Mrs. Packard to Price's aunt, which give some insight 
into the life of the Packards at that time, are among the Price 
PWers. 
4 Price was returning to the Mission in an open carriage when the 
horse took fright and bolted. Thinking he might be able to stop it 
he jumped out but was knocked out and remained unconcious for three 
days. His hearing, never good, was affected for the rest of his 
life. 
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the 6th Armenian Volunteer Battalion. He went with them in November 
towards Bitlis in an expedition to drive the Turks out of a position 
which threatened the Russian left flank at Van. For this purpose he 
was attached to the Red Cross Unit which went with the battalion. 
Winter had fallen by the time their object had been accomplished and 
the direct passes back to the Caucasus were closed by snow. Price 
was obliged to return to the Caucasus as he had come: via Persia. 
At Khoi, where had had been arrested by the Russians in 1912 (see 
above p. 18) he spent a few days recovering from the rigours of the 
expedition, but was back in Tiflis for a few days early in January 
1916. From there he made a short excursion to Kars, but wrote again 
from Tiflis to his family that he intended to remain there for a 
while and write up his material on the Caucasus front before visiting 
Petrograd to study the political situation. After that he planned to 
return to the front. He was on the point of leaving for the capital 
when word came that the fall of the Turkish fort of Erzerum was 
considered imminent. He at once applied to go there, and was the 
only Western European among a party of Russian journalists who were 
the first to arrive at Erzerum after its capture. He then returned 
to Tiflis, but little more than a month later was at the front again, 
this time at the point where the Russians reached the Black Sea. He 
arrived in Trebizond in a troop transport, again only a few days 
after the Russians had taken the city. 
Although for the rest of 1916 Price devoted himself almost entirely 
to relief work among the refugees in the area, he often found 
hospitality for the night in Russian encampments in the newly- 
occupied areas. He still kept in touch with developments on the 
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Caucasus front and continued to write about it, but he no longer 
followed the Russian army about. 
When in October 1915 Price had first encountered the scale of the 
population displacement in the Caucasus and the devastation caused by 
the war, he sent a message back to Shipley, the British Consul in 
Tabriz, who in turn telegraphed the Archbishop of Canterbury. In 
fact the first move to establish a Lord Mayor's Fund for the relief 
of the Armenian and other refugees had already taken place at a 
meeting at the Mansion House on 5 October. By June 1916 the Fund had 
collected £53,000. Relief from this quarter inevitably took time to 
arrive, and in spite of the effort of Russian and American missions 
in the area, Price noted, when he passed through it again some weeks 
later that the condition of the refugees had noticeably deteriorated 
and their numbers had increased despite a continuous loss from 
disease. By now there were some 250,000 Armenian and other refugees 
in the Caucasus and Persia42. Price wrote a number of reports for 
the Lord Mayor's Fund. He became increasingly concerned about the 
42 A report by Price on the plight of Armenian refugees at this time 
is included in The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: 
Documents presented by Viscount Bryce to Viscount Grey of Fallodon 
(1916). There are no archives for the Lord Mayor's Fund for Armenian 
Relief, as the archives of any Relief Fund are considered the 
personal property of the incumbent Lord Mayor on any given occasion. 
Price also wrote about what he found to Charles Trevelyan. "... after 
the retreat of Enver Pasha from the Kars province in January 1915 
band warfare had broken out on a large scale. Armenian and Greek 
bands, led by agents of the Black Hundreds fell upon the Moslem 
population. I found all the Tartar villages of the Ardahan and 
Sarikamish regions in ruins and of the 180,000 Moslem inhabitants 
that there were before the war only 30% remained. In north-west 
Persia also along the south shores of Lake Urumiah all the Persian 
and Khurdish villages were destroyed and the people homeless and 
starving. The Cossacks had passed by here during the previous 
winter. In the Black Sea region and district of Artvin of the 60,000 
native Moslems only 7,000 remained in the winter of 1916. " 
(Newcastle University Library. C. P. Trevelyan papers 69. ) 
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less publicised plight of Moslem refugees in Lazistan, which he saw 
for himself when following the Russian army in the Black Sea area. 
In April or May 1916 he and one of his Russian journalist colleagues, 
Zdanevitch43, issued a joint appeal on their behalf: Price to the 
Lord Mayor's Fund and Zdanevitch to the Russian press. When he 
returned to Tiflis in the early summer of 1916 he found that the Fund 
had by now sent out a mission led by the Quaker, Alfred Backhouse, 
with the Rev. Harold Buxton in charge of administration. There was 
nothing to connect Price's appeals with their appearance, but in view 
of his obvious interest in and knowledge of the area, they asked him 
to co-operate with them. The objects of the Lord Mayor's Fund had 
43 ILYA ZD NEVITCH (ILIAZD)(1894-1975). Born into an intellectual 
and artistic family in Tiflis, Zdanevitch formally studied law at St. 
Petersburgh but from an early age was, in fact, a practising artist 
in almost every medium. At the age of 17 he was not only "converted" 
(his own word) to futurism but also discoverd the now world-famous 
Georgian primitive painter Pirosmani. In pre-revolutionary Moscow he 
was one of the leading advocates and publicists of the avant garde in 
the arts. He was not called up at the outbreak of war, but began to 
work as the correspondent in the Caucasus of the newspaper Rech, 
which is how he came to meet Price. As war correspondents they often 
travelled together on the Caucasus front, and in 1916 collaborated in 
the raising of funds for and administration of famine relief in 
Lazistan. During this period Iliazd not only proved himself to be an 
able and enterprising mountaineer but also developed an abiding 
interest in early Byzantine Christian architecture, on which subject 
he was to become a world authority. For a time he played a central 
role in the immediate post-revolutionary flowering of futurist art in 
the Soviet Union. Recognising before long that these days were 
numbered he moved to Paris in 1921. He soon became friends with 
Picasso, involved himself in the Dadaist movement, and thenceforth 
was at the centre of most of the aesthetic arguments of the next 20 
years. His artistic talents led him into every conceivable form of 
expression. He was a prolific writer, his works embracing drama, 
poetry and prose in both Russian and French; a brilliant engraver; 
under Picasso's influence he became fascinated by ceramics; he 
designed clothes for Chanel. He died suddenly in his 82nd year. 
Regrettably his Lettres A Morgan Philips Price, written in Russian in 
1929, and giving an account of his life since 1917, remain 
unpublished. But he kept in touch with Price and visited him in 
England twice, once in 1930 and again in 1953 (on the last occasion 
designing a bookplate for Price's 3-year-old granddaughter). This 
note is based on a chronology prepared by his widow, Helene Iliazd, 
for an exhibition of his work at Quebec in 1984. 
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deliberately not been confined to the relief of Armenians only and it 
was available for distribution to all communities in distress as the 
result of the war in the Caucasus. Price felt special concern for 
the Lazistan Moslems who, though not systematically massacred like 
the Armenians had nonetheless lost their homes and their means of 
livelihood. He was an obvious choice as an agent, since he already 
knew the country. At the end of May 1916 he set out from Khars with 
a representative of the Moslem Benevolent Society to open a store at 
Karamse and to arrange for the registration of refugees. Throughout 
June and July he travelled more than 500 miles, mainly on horseback 
but sometimes on foot, throughout Lazistan, identifying the needs of 
the population, many of whom he found sheltering in caves or among 
the ruins of their villages and vineyards. 
Price return 'to Tiflis again in mid-August. By now goods and funds 
brought by a whole range of relief organisations had arrived in the 
Caucasus; one of the organisations concerned was the Red Crescent 
Society, which took a special interest in the Moslem refugees. Price 
was now asked to distribute 50,000 roubles worth of aid from the Lord 
Mayor's Fund and the Red Crescent, to which he added £2,000 of his 
own money. In the course of October he bought 300 packets of 
clothing and 6000 poods of maize. On 7 November he set out for Batum 
again accompanied by a representative of the Moslem Benevolent 
Society. From Batum he sent half the maize to Morgul by wagon; from 
there it could go no further on wheels and the local people carried 
it into the mountains on their backs. The other half of the maize 
and all the clothing had now arrived at Artvin; this was loaded on to 
mules and he personally took the baggage train along precipitous 
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mountain tracks to Melo, an area inhabited, as he put it, by ghosts 
and skeletons. The tracks were often so twisting and narrow that all 
the mules had to be unloaded and reloaded in turn to enable them to 
get around the corners. He returned to Artvin to arrange for further 
supplies to be got into this area and then went to the bazaar at 
Kutais to order a further 10,000 yards of cloth for despatch to 
Lazistan. He returned to Tiflis in January 1917 intending to write 
but until the March revolution he continued to be deeply involved in 
relief work. There was a plan, favoured by the Quakers, to set up 
small spinning and weaving industries in the Caucasus as the most 
effective form of self-help that could be devised for those Armenian 
and Assyrian refugees who could not be repatriated, and Price would 
have been involved in organising these had not the revolution 
intervened. 
Price's writings from the Caucasus in 1915-16 fall into three groups: 
his letters home; his diary, which also formed the basis of his book 
War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia; and his articles for the 
Manchester Guardian. As might be expected, his letters home are the 
most uninhibited of his writings and give far more graphic accounts 
than anything that was published of the terrain, the cold, the 
hunger, the fear and the excitement. On the eve of the action with 
the Armenian volunteers he described for Tuffet the sombre mood in 
the camp: "either we succeed, in which case the Armenians massacre 
every prisoner they take, or else they (the Turks) succeed, in which 
case they massacre us to a man. "44 He had a curiously ambivalent 
attitude towards the fighting on this front. Before leaving Tiflis 
44 C. L. W. 14.11.15. Price papers. 
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in July 1915 he had written: "The fighting on this front is much 
more sporting. It is scouting behind rocks, guerilla warfare in the 
mountains needing skill in horsemanship and marksmanship. "45 He got 
so carried away in the action with the Armenian Volunteers that 
although a non-combatant he accompanied the Armenian cavalry for a 
time in their unsuccessful pursuit of the retreating Turks, 
describing it in his diary almost as if it had been a foxhunt46. 
But he later wrote to his uncle: "I am pleased to think that though 
I have been in several fights in Armenia... I have never lifted my 
hand in violence or fired a rifle or a revolver, but have done what 
little I could to bring in wounded and give help to refugees and 
starving people. "47 He did not attempt to hide his satisfaction at 
finding himself to be the only West European correspondent on this 
front in a letter to his aunt: "Oh what vastly interesting events 
will take place in the East this year. I am mightily glad I am here 
and all alone in my glory, not another war correspondent except 
Russians. "48 
Price wrote an account of his travels and experiences in this theatre 
between August and December 1915 in the form of a diary which he 
despatched in three parts to his aunt in January 1916, and which she 
had typed for circulation. Unfortunately one part of it was lost, 
but 11,000 words remain in the Price papers. he drew heavily on this 
material for his book, but that was not to be written for another 
year. 
45 C. L. W. 5.7.15. 
46 Price papers. 
47 C. L. W. 16.1.16. 
48 A. M. P. 7.5.16. 
Price papers. 
Price papers. 
Price papers. 
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The first article by Price about the Caucasus front to appear in the 
Manchester Guardian concerned the Battle of Dilman, which had taken 
place four months earlier, but of which he was able to obtain the 
first eye-'witness accounts to appear in Western Europe49. This came 
out on 27 October 1915 and was followed on the next day with a piece 
by him on Khurdish incursions into Persia which had begun even before 
Turkey entered the war, apparently instigated by the Turks, and 
creating a reign of terror in north west Persia50. Two weeks later 
the paper published an article describing his expeditions into 
Khurdish territory with Dr. Packard5l. The next to appear (21 
January 1916) described the Armenian massacres in the aftermath of 
the 1915 canpaign52. Price told his aunt that he had sent off a 
number of articles in January but did not specify in his letter what 
they were about53. There is no indication that these were the 
articles which subsequently appeared, or whether parts of several 
were combined in Manchester to make a different whole. One of them 
at least would appear to have been a descriptive piece written in 
December, which was published on 28 February, about the action near 
Lake Van54. 
49 Manchester Guardian 27.10.16. Datelined 'With the Russians in NW 
Persia, September'. 'The Story of the Battle of Dilman'. Signed M. 
Philips Price. 
50 Ibid 28.10.16. Datelined Urumiah September. 'War and Massacre in 
Northern Persia'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
51 Ibid 11.11.16. Datelined Urumiah September. 'A Khurdish 
Amnesty'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
52 Ibid 21.1.16. Datelined Tiflis 26 December. 'The Armenian 
Remnant'. Signed 'A Correspondent'. The dateline is erroneous since 
Price was in Persia on 26 December 1915, but there can be no doubt 
that he wrote the article. 53 A. M. P. 18.1.16. Price papers. 
54 Manchester Guardian 28.2.16. Datelined 'With the Russians in the 
region of Van, December'. 'Forward with the Grand Duke'. Signed M. 
Philips Price. 
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When news arrived in Tiflis early in February 1916 of the fall of 
Erzeruin Price sent a telegram about it to Manchester, at the expense 
of which Scott later demurred. A letter would have done, he wrote to 
Price, since the front was a distant one and no other West European 
paper had a correspondent on it55. However Price's extravagance 
enabled the Manchester Guardian to print a short report of the event 
on 21 February, only five days after it occurred. A piece on the 
general military situation, written in December 1915 but not hitherto 
published, now proved to have stood the test of tine. Printed on 24 
February it underlined the importance to the Turks of Erzerum and the 
interrelationship of the campaigns in the Caucasus and 
Mesopotamia56. After reaching Erzerum Price wrote a series of 
articles: one about the fort itself 57, another about Udenich's 
campaign to capture it58, two about the subsequent capture of 
Trebizond59 60 and a long and thoughtful piece which came out 
under the title 'The Advance of the Russians in Armenia and 
55 Price sent three telegrams (at his own expense) about the fall of 
Erzerum, and was rewarded, on his return to Tiflis, by a telegram 
from Cross Street saying "Do not telegraph". According to David 
Ayerst: Guardian - Biography of a Newspaper Footnote, p. 404, this 
was because, since Price was the only English-speaking correspondent 
there, "the news would keep". Price himself sent an apologetic 
letter to Scott on 8 March 1916 explaining that he had thought the 
Manchester Guardian would have been pleased to be the first British 
or American newspaper to be able to publish details of the capture of 
the fort. (Price papers. ) 56 Manchester Guardian 24.2.16. Datelined 'With the Russian Army in 
the Region of Van, December 12 1915'. 'The Campaign in Asia'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
57 Ibid 7.4.16. Datelined Erzerum 7.3.16. 'Erzerum Visited'. 
Sig ned M. Philips Price. 5 Ibid 24.4.16. Datelined 'With the Russian army in the Caucasus 
7.3.16'. 'First Story of the Fall of Erzerum'. Signed M. Philips 
Price. 
59 Ibid 1.5.16. Datelined Trebizond 25.4.16. 'Turkish Losses about 
Trebizond'. Signed 'Our Correspondent'. 
60 Ibid 23.5.16. Datelined 'With the Russian Black Sea Fleet, 
29.4.16'. 'At Trebizond'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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Persia'6l. In it Price attempted to do justice to the achievements 
of the Russian armies in the Caucasus and pointed out that these had 
secured for the Allied "not only almost complete control of Central 
Asia but also the chance of successfully terminating the war was far 
as concerns the political problems of the East, which were originally 
one of the main causes of the war. " 
In the course of his relief work Price met a number of high-ranking 
Russian officers of the army of occupation or in the field. His next 
article to be printed, on 8 July 1916, contained appreciations of the 
Grand Duke Nicholas (both as a relatively progressive Viceroy and as 
Conuander in Chief), and of two of his field commanders, Generals 
Udenich and Prezhvalski. Both these men had an unparalleled 
knowledge of the Caucasus, both lived and dressed as simply as their 
men, and both epitomised for Price the spirit of the Caucasus 
Army62. He later wrote an appreciation of General Peshkov, whose 
duty it was to administer an area the inhabitants of which were "all 
more or less in a state of antagonism and mutual suspicion with one 
another. "63 Towards the end of July 1916 the Russians captured 
Erzingen, advancing inland along the depression between the Taurus 
and the Anti-Taurus mountains in the area south of the Black Sea. 
Price, although temporarily back in Tiflis at this time, wrote a long 
piece about this development which the Manchester Guardian printed on 
12 September and acconpanied with a special map. In it he pointed 
61 Manchester Guardian 6.5.16. Datelined 'With the Russians, 
6.4.16'. 'The Advance of the Russians in Armenia and Persia'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
62 Ibid 8.7.16. Datelined 'With the Russian army in the Caucasus, 
June'. 'Russia's Leaders in the Caucasus'. Signed M. Philips 
Price. 
63 Ibid 13.9.16. Datelined Tiflis 7.8.16. 'Russia's Conquest in 
Armenia'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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out how much more the fighting in the Caucasus depended upon 
geography and indeed on geology than the campaigns in Western Europe. 
He described in some detail the achievements of the Russian engineers 
in this hitherto roadless region, where the Turks, relying on mules 
and camels only, had more than once been forced to turn back or 
abandon their gains for lack of ammunition. The Russians, on the 
other hand, had built 140 miles of roads in four months in 1916, 
built bridges over all the principal rivers of the Chorokh basin and 
established ammunition dumps at every road junction64. 
During the Turkish counter-attack in the summer of 1916 Price was 
almost wholly preoccupied with relief work, but he wrote two articles 
for the Manchester Guardian about the campaign during brief visits to 
Tiflis. In the first he argued that the Russians were everywhere 
retreating to prepared positions, and that diplomatic, financial and 
military assistance by the Allies to Persia during the previous year 
had reduced the danger from Germano-Turkish intrigues in that country 
and even induced a spirit of co-operation among the Persians65. 
Later he evaluated the situation rather differently, and wrote 
another article in which he concluded that the evacuation of Erzingen 
by the Turks had been only a preliminary to a big counter-offensive 
designed to draw the Russians deeply into the valley of the Western 
Euphrates and distract them in Persia while throwing the main weight 
of their attack into the area around Lake Van. He attributed the 
64 Manchester Guardian 12.9.16. Datelined 'With the Russian army in 
the Caucasus 7.8.16'. 'Armenian Campaign'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
65 Ibid 18.9.16. Datelined 'With the Russian army on the Caucasus 
Front 14.8.16'. 'Caucasus Front: Counter Attack of the Turks'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
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failure of the Turkish strategy in part to General Udenich's tactics, 
but also 
"to the newly arrived British motor-car detachment... 
this is the first time that such things have been seen 
on the plateau of Armenia and it is a noteworthy 
fact that they should have been introduced by 
Englishmen. e 
When Price first went to the Caucasus in the summer of 1915 he was 
still undecided about returning to England, although he was already 
becoming increasingly averse to the idea. He knew he would not 
enlist, he knew what would happen to him if he did not68, and he 
knew also that he did not want to return to the old squirearchical 
66 Manchester Guardian 13.10.16 
Datelined Tiflis 16.9.16. 'Turk Counter-Attack'. Signed M. Philips 
Price. 
67 Oliver Stillingfleet Locker Lampson (1880-1954) was Conservative 
M. P. for North Huntingdon when war broke out in 1914. As was then 
still possible, he formed and largely financed his own armoured car 
squadron, then part of the R. N. A. S., one of a number originally 
intended for "aeroplane support", which then meant reconnaissance 
and the rescue of pilots who had been shot down. When armoured cars 
were about to be superceded by tanks in 1915 and their personnel 
transferred to Army command, Locker Lampson managed to get his 
squadron left under the Admiralty, and personally engineered an 
invitation to take it to Russia as part of an inter-allied courtesy 
exchange of units. Rather to his surprise the Admiralty added two 
more squadrons, making a division of 4 officers, 455 men, 37 armoured 
cars and full supporting armament and ancillary equipment, all of 
which he commanded. They arrived too late to be of any use to the 
Russians on the Western front and were sent to the Caucasus, arriving 
at Erzerum in August 1916. The unit was in action, supposedly 
against the Turks but mainly against the Khurds, on the Mush plain in 
August 1916 and was then transferred to the Roumanian front. It saw 
action in Dobruja early in 1917 and was involved in the Brusilov 
offensive - and retreat - in the summer of 1917. After the November 
Revolution the unit was returned to Britain, transferred to Army 
command and sent to Mesopotamia. Remnants of it were later 
incorporated in another expedition which still tends to be regarded 
as a one-can band: Dunsterforce. (See Ch. 8 F/N 23). An account of 
Locker Lanpson's unit was written by Bryan Perrett and Anthony Lloyd: 
The Czar's British Legion (London 1981). See also Who Was Who and 
the Times obituary, 9 October 1954. 
68 A Bill to introduce universal compulsory military service was 
introduced on 2 May 1916 and received the Royal Assent on 25 May. On 
6 June Price wrote to Trevelyan "I am just the man they will pounce 
on. But I will undergo anything, including loss of liberty, property 
and even life rather than take part in this crime. " Price papers. 
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life. When he learned that his butler was considering enlisting he 
wrote and told him why he personally opposed the war: 
"England and Germany could have peace tomorrow on honourable terms if the ruling classes in both 
countries wish it. " 
But if he felt he must go, Price told him, his pay would be 
supplemented so that his wife would not go short69. At the same 
time he wrote to his uncle: 
"What a curse it is that one's ancestors have saddled 
one with all the snobbish and expensive institutions of 
bygone and corrupt mediaeval society. "7° 
By the spring of 1916 he had moved further still to the left and was 
beginning to use the language of the Left. He wrote to Trevelyan: 
"I renounce landocracy and the right to rob my fellow 
men. I can't give my lands away to the state or divide 
them among the peasants as I ought to do because the 
will of my grandfather forbids this, so all I can do is 
wait till, as I hope and pray, some terrible economic 
catastrophe will overwhelm Western Europe and bring the 
whole system of landed estates crashing to the 
ground. "71 
In the same week he wrote to his uncle: 
"The social system which creates privileged classes, 
and particularly the landowning class, is responsible 
for all the miseries of mankind and is directly 
responsible for the war. "72 
And he told his aunt that he had come to see that war was inevitable 
"because capitalist ruling and military castes would 
always divide men into warring groups. "73 
When Price resigned the Liberal candidature for Gloucester Trevelyan 
had not, apparently, approved. Price had written and told him that 
69 Price papers, letter to Walker, 26.6.15. 
70 C. L. W. 25.6.15. Price papers. 
71 C. P. T. 30.3.16. Price papers. 
72 C. L. W. 27.3.16. Price papers. 
73 A. M. P. 18.1.16. Price papers. 
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he could now support only one party, and that was the U. D. C. 
"The Liberal party died on August 4 1914. It was 
buried in the middle of May by an undertaker called the 
Coalition. Its son the U. D. C. (still a minor) 
inherits the property but it is doubtful if he will be 
able to live on the family estate for m years as 
heavy Death Duties will have to be paidany . "74 
The U. D. C. was "the only organ of truth in England" he later wrote to 
his aunt, "but it is like a minute piece of straw in a desert 
hurricane. "75 Throughout his period in Russia Price sent 
instructions every few months to his uncle to send sums ranging from 
£200- £500 to the U. D. C. The nature of his relationship with the 
U. D. C. will be considered in more detail in Chapter 11. 
In contrast to the hardening of his political ideas, Price during his 
time in the Caucasus also developed a strong streak of fatalism, or 
passivity, as he often called it. He recognised the changes in 
himself and the paradox which they presented, and tended to attribute 
his predicament to the fact that he had had so much space and time in 
which to think, and to the nature of the country in which he had been 
travelling. It is difficult to think of better reasons. Though his 
letters home were full of requests for books he could neither have 
received them while with the Russian army nor carried them about with 
him. He obviously did not see newspapers regularly and could read 
his letters from England only when he returned to Tiflis. Although 
he had been much with soldiers he was also often alone; and while on 
the one hand the sights of war and increasing familiarity with its 
victim may have radicalised him politically, the landscape in which 
he moved exerted an opposing pull away from the realities of life. 
74 C. P. T. 5.7.15. Price papers. 
75 A. M. P. 18.1.16. Price papers. 
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He did carry one book with him: The Light of Asia76 given to him by 
his brother; he told him in a letter that he read it every day, as a 
Bible, and memorised passages from it77. When in Tiflis and under 
the influence of his Russian friends he discovered Byron and Wilde 
for the first time, and through them came to value the idea of "an 
inner life, that England utterly failed to teach me"78. "The days 
of solitary riding in mountain plateaus [sic] and deserts have caused 
me to look on life and all its wickedness now passively" he wrote to 
his brother, adding that he had abandoned all thought of a political 
career and now "sought salvation within myself in Asia. "79 
He had come to doubt "if it would be possible or even desirable to 
take any steps in England to actively combat evil" he wrote to his 
aunt. He shared many ideals with his cousin, but whereas Trevelyan 
expressed them in action, according to Western traditions, he now 
felt more inclined towards contemplation in the Eastern tradition. 
Having been brought up in the one and having now experienced the 
other, Price described himself to his aunt as a "mongrel" and could 
not decide which was right. He thought Trevelyan "beyond measure 
76 The Light of Asia or The Great Renunciation (Mahabhinishkramana) 
being the Life and Teaching of Gautama Prince of India and Founder of 
Buddhism as told in verse by an Indian Buddhist. Sir Edwin Arnold, 
M. A., K. C. I. E., C. S. I. (Copyright Edition Leipzig, Tauchnitz 1891). 
This book was first published in 1879 and went through 60 editions in 
England and 80 in America. Described by 'T. S. ' in the Dictionary of 
National Biography as "the Buddhist legend presented in the 
Tennysonian manner", the book is an imaginary translation of the 
story as told by an imaginary Buddhist votary of Prince Gautama. 
Arnold was a student of oriental cultures and a considerable 
linguist, who managed to combine a vast literary output with being 
leader writer of the Daily Telegraph for 28 years. He supposedly 
influenced the paper's editorial line on the Eastern question, being 
veV pro-Turk. 
7TW. R. P. 21.1.16. Price papers. 
78 C. P. T. 27.9.16. Price papers. 
79 W. R. P. 21.1.16. Price papers. 
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heroic" and was clearly uneasy about his own passivity80. In a 
letter to Trevelyan in March 1916 he wondered if he had overreacted 
to the criticisms of him which had - perhaps over-assiduously - been 
relayed to him from Gloucestershire by Tuffet in the previous spring. 
Was there, he wondered "a tender spot in my character that for some 
unknown reason flinches under the terrible ordeal of persecution" or 
was it simply that he had become overawed with "the vastness of the 
forces of nature and the relative impotence of man". Yet "all the 
fundamental stonework in me says 'go into the world and preach the 
truth - you know it - and defy the consequences"81. In another 
letter to Trevelyan the following September he contrasted the 
tolerant attitude of the Russian courts to conscientious objectors 
with that taken by the "Shallows" of the British tribunals and 
acknowledged that this was another reason why he was drawn to 
Russia82. He was clear about one thing. "I have nothing in common 
with my countrymen and cannot take part in what they are doing... I 
intend to spend the rest of the war on this front with occasional 
returns to Russia to keep in touch with the internal situation. "83 
A few months later he was talking of remaining in Russia 
"indefinitely" and of trying to get a permanent job as a 
correspondent in Petrograd "for the Manchester Guardian or any other 
respectable paper not in the venomous Northcliffe gang"84. 
Price was, in fact, already doing work for other papers besides the 
Manchester Guardian, including two Russian papers, Yuzhni Krai and 
80 A. M. P. 28.3.16. Price papers. 
81 C. P. T. 30.3.16. Price papers. 
82 C. P. T. 27.9.16. Price papers. 
83 C. L. W. 16.1.16. Price papers. 
84 A. M. P. 26.5.16. Price papers. 
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Kavkas85, But his main additional work was that which he did for 
the Economist. As early as June 1915 he had told Tuffet that the 
Economist appeared to regard him as their permanent representative 
in Russia86. In the two years 1915-16 twenty-four pieces appeared 
in the Economist which can reasonably be attributed to him. Either 
they took the form of signed letters to the editor; or they were 
written from or about a place at which he was known to be at the time 
of writing; or the words are quite definitely taken from one of his 
letters, copies of which were sent as a matter of routine to Hirst. 
By the end of 1916 he was sending material about once every two weeks 
to the Economist. "It is no small work, I can tell you" he wrote to 
his aunt, "to read every day some ten or twelve Russian papers and 
journals and extract all the news for an article. "87 Most of his 
contributions read like extracts, but in the autumn of 1916 he wrote 
a major series of five articles: three on Russian trade and trade 
policy, one on Russia's war finance and a fifth on income tax, high 
prices and agriculture88. These were fairly obviously intended for 
Hirst; after Hirst's departure from the Economist Price wrote only 
two more pieces for the journal, both datelined Tiflis January 1917. 
On the other hand material was attributable to him in the same way as 
85 Yuzhni Krai (literally Southern Border). The Bibliography of 
Periodicals of Russia 1901-1916 (Leningrad 1960) lists this as a 
Kharkov paper dealing in political, economic and literary matters, 
founded in 1880. Price's friendship with Professor Sobolev (see 
below F/N 98) probably accounts for his connection with this paper. 
Kavkas: a political/literary daily paper founded in 1901, published 
in Tiflis. Again, the connection with Price is obvious, Tiflis being 
his base for much of 1915 and all of 1916. 
86 C. L. W. 25.6.15. Price papers. 
A. M. P. 1.2.17. Price papers. 
88 Economist 16.9.16 'The Trade of the Russian Empire V. Anon. 
23.9.16 'The Trade of the Russian Empire II'. Anon. 7.10.16 Signed 
letter datelined Kharkov 16.8.16, headed 'The Trade Policy of 
Russia'. 21.10.16 'Russia's War Finance'. Datelined 'From our 
Correspondent', Kharkov, 25.8.16.21.10.16 'Russia: Income Tax, 
High Prices, Agriculture'. Datelined 'Our Correspondent, Kharkov'. 
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it had been in the case of the Economist began to appear in Hirst's 
new journal, Conran Sense, the first number of which appeared on 7 
October 191689. This contained a piece on the economic situation in 
Russia from "a correspondent who has been travelling in Russia". Two 
more articles appeared in Common Sense in 1916, one on Haney values 
in Persia90 and another on famine prices in Russia91, and Price 
continued to contribute to it thereafter in much the same way as he 
had done to the Economist until all his correspondence was stopped by 
the censor in 1918. 
Price's last four articles for the Manchester Guardian in 1916 also 
dealt with issues underlying or associated with the war rather than 
directly with military affairs. One described the evolution of the 
Armenian nationalist movement and showed how the activities of the 
Armenian Volunteers from Turkish Armenia had, to some extent, brought 
89 The Economist, during the period of Hirst's editorship, was still 
a family concern, owned by the daughters of its first editor and 
founder, James Wilson. Hirst, who had set out to regain the wider 
perspectives over public affairs which had marked Bagehot's 
editorship, took up an attitude to the war which was very different 
from that of most other British publications at that time. He found 
himself at odds, before very long, with two of the Trustees of the 
Economist, "young starred 'patriots'" as he described them in a 
letter to Scott on 16 August 1916 (John Rylands Library 334/1102). 
He told Scott that although his "dear old ladies" had implored him to 
stay he found his position impossible. In a Valedictory in the 
Economist of 8 July 1916 he wrote: "Since the war began the function 
of an editor who believes that truth and patriotism ought somehow to 
be reconciled has been difficult and even hazardous". He identified 
as his two great fears "the bankrupt condition of several great 
nations" and the threat posed by censorship to Parliament and the 
press. On the first page of the first number (7 October 1916) of the 
journal which he now founded, Common Sense, he struck the keynote of 
its policy by calling on Parliament and the public "to keep their 
heads and study the facts" and concluded: "To fight on until 
the right terms can be secured is a policy which few Englishmen would 
disallow. To fight on after the right terms can be secured for the 
sake of... 'a knock-out' can hardly be called a policy at all. " 90 Common Sense 25.10.16. 
91 ! bid 9.12.16. 
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about the terrible retribution which the Turks were inflicting upon 
the Armenian populations92. His next dealt with the Anglo-Russo- 
Persian Convention of 23 July 1916 which attempted to ensure that 
Persia would maintain a position of friendly neutrality towards the 
Allies93. The third concerned the political situation in Russia 
where, Price noted, the expansion of war industry had increased the 
power of the industrial and commercial classes to a point at which he 
thought it would not be surprising "if a great reconstitution of the 
Government were now to take place" but that the support of the army 
against the bureaucracy made it unlikely that there would be "a coup 
d'4tat such as cut the knot of Russian domestic politics many times 
in the past"94. Printed on 25 November, the article was undated and 
there is no way of knowing when Price wrote it. It seems likely, 
however, that he was being quite accurately prophetic, since it was 
preceded by a note from the editor explaining that it had been 
written before news arrived of the fall of Stürmer95. The last 
article Price wrote in 1916 was not actually meant for publication at 
all but as a private briefing for Scott who nonetheless published it. 
In it Price said that the economic crisis in Russia was now so great, 
92 Manchester Guardian 16.11.16 No datelined. 'Turk and Armenian: 
A Chapter of Secret History'. Signed 'From Our Correspondent in the 
Caucasus'. 
93 Ibid 12.12.16. Datelined 'Our Correspondent in the Caucasus 
12.11.16'. 'England, Russia and Persia: A New Situation'. Signed 
M. Philips Price. 
94 Ibid 25.11.16. No dateline. 'The Political Struggle in Russia'. 
Signed 'A Correspondent'. 
ý, BORIS VL ADIMII)1ICH ST[JRMER (1848-1917). One of the most hated 
figures in Tsarist political circles, he became a member of the State 
Council in 1904 and Minister of Internal Affairs in 1907. Through 
Rasputin's influence he became chairman of the State Council in 1916. 
Strongly pro-German and opposed to Russia's alliance with the Western 
powers, he was sacked after a brief spell as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in November 1916, and least partly in response to Miliukov's 
notorious speech in the Dunn with its refrain: "Is it stupidity or 
is it treason? ". Arrested by the Provisional Government, he died in 
prison. 
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the "steady deterioration in the capacity of the country to 
distribute its masses of accumulated produce" so marked, that it had 
become "increasingly clear to all Russians that a serious danger will 
arise unless the people are taken into the confidence of the 
Government"96. The article was blacked out by the Russian censor in 
those copies of the Manchester Guardian that got through to Russia, 
and Price was extremely surprised to find it had been published at 
all when he read it, as he was later to read other articles he had 
written, in the British Embassy at Petrogradv4ere uncensored copies 
were available, presumably brought in the diplomatic bag97. 
Price appeared to have a natural flair for journalism and for 
perceiving what was newsworthy and what was not. He was forward- 
looking and immensely industrious. He was also lucky in his friends. 
Probably his best insights into the likely course of political 
developments in Russia came through his personal associations. Quite 
by chance, in Mongolia in 1910, he had met Professor Mikhail 
Nikolaevitch Sobolev, who held the chair of Political Economics at 
the University of Kharkov98. The two men corresponded frequently 
96 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 449. 
Manchester Guardian 6.1.17. Datelined Tiflis 5.2.17. 'The 
Economic Crisis in Russia'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
98 MIKHAIL NIKOLAEVICH SOBOLEV. Born in 1869, he graduated in the 
law faculty of Moscow University but, to judge by his published work, 
soon turned to economics. He taught political economy at the 
Aleksanderskoe Commercial Institute in Moscow from 1892-96 and in 
1899 was made Professor of Political Economy and Statistics at the 
University of Tomsk. In his unpublished autobiography Price wrote 
that he met Sobolev during his journey to or from Mongolia in 
1910/11, but not where or how: it could have been at Tomsk on his 
way out. In his book Siberia (1912) Price referred to the "privilege 
of consulting Professor Mikhail Sobolev" and quoted fairly 
extensively from Sobolev's book Russo-Mongolian Trade. At some point 
between 1910/11 and 1915 Sobolev obviously got a chair at the 
University of Kharkov. There is no entry for him in any of the main 
Soviet Encyclopaedias and no indication of the date of his death has 
been found. His last two dated works appeared in 1915: History of 
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between 1911 and 1915. In July 1915 Price stayed with Sobolev on his 
way to the Caucasus. during the summer of 1916 he stayed with him 
again for several weeks, when he worked in the University Library, 
getting among other things material for the Economist articles (see 
above p. 6s) and being taken about the area outside Kharkov by Sobolev 
or one of his colleagues at the university. Price also had friends 
in Tiflis, where he made his base in 1915 and 1916, some of whom he 
had also known for several years. He was intrigued to find, when he 
first returned there in 1915, that they were all now talking nothing 
but Socialism and Henry George, one of whose books (Price did not say 
which) had recently been translated into Georgian. During one of his 
flying visits in 1916 he wrote to tell Trevelyan how much the letters 
he had sent from England on the political situation there had been 
appreciated by his friends in Tiflis, and that he had translated some 
of them for some of the Russian newspapers, though without divulging 
the author's name. 99 
In addition to his articles for newspapers and periodicals, Price 
naturally continued to write letters home during 1916. Some of them 
amounted to memoranda on the political situation and some were 
clearly intended to be purely briefing papers. These would almost 
certainly have been addressed to Trevelyan in the first instance. It 
is quite clear - because Price kept carbons of some of these - that 
Trevelyan had them retyped for circulation. A carbon copy of one 
dated 30 March 1916 was found among the Ponsonby papers. It is of 
the Russian German Trade Agreement and The Principles of Trade Policy 
in Connection with Protectionism. His earlier books include one on 
Russian tariff policy in the second half of the nineteenth century 
(1911), one on the commercial geography of Russia (1900) and one on 
Siberia (1905). 
99 C. P. T. 20.1.16. Price papers. 
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particular interest because, being written so early in the year it 
dealt almost entirely with political events in 1915, during most of 
which time Price had been on the Caucasus front. He had clearly, 
therefore, done a great deal of homework when he was back in Tiflis 
in March 1916. In it he described the rising discontent with the 
conduct of the war in 1915, the dismissal of the War Minister, the 
prorogation of the Duma, and the attitudes of the main political 
parties to the war. He enphasised particularly the formation of the 
Progressive Bloc but pointd out that although the parties which 
supported it were all liberal in internal affairs they were, "on all 
foreign questions most Chauvinist of any party in Russia... great 
believers in war to the last gasp as a means of saving Russia 
internally. " He also called them "modern representatives of the old 
Slavophile school" and added that "all the thinking men of Russia are 
in synpathy with these parties". In the same paper he noted that the 
Russian Social Democrats were as divided about the war as the 
Socialists of Germany and England, and reported that one of them, whoa 
he knew (but did not identify) had recently made a very courageous 
anti-war speech in the duma "which was not reported but which I heard 
about"100. He went on to describe the deteriorating economic 
situation and the war-weariness of the people, and criticised the 
Progressive Bloc for utilising this discontent not to agitate for 
peace but to try to bring about merely fiscal reforms. He concluded 
"the days of the old regime are numbered but "whether the chauvinism 
of the Progressive Bloc is likely to be better then the reactionary 
stagnation of the Court Party seems to me doubtful... Meanwhile the 
100 The five Bolshevist members of the Duma, described by Pares as 
"men of no particular prominence" were all sent to Siberia in the 
spring of 1915 for circulating anti-war literature, sent in by Lenin. 
(Bernard Pares: The Fall of the Russian Monarchy, 1939) p. 333. 
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silent masses suffer and hardly a murmur breaks the sound of the 
tramp of Siberian peasant youths going off to kill and be killed by 
Arabian and Turkish shepherds. "101 
His pessimism about the political outlook continued into the summer 
and autumn. Shortly before he went to Kharkov in August 1916 he 
wrote to his aunt that the internal situation was everywhere 
deteriorating, and that he saw "no great opening for political 
progress as a result of all this... the Russian people are too 
disorganised to procure any reform by political means and the war is 
weakening their powers of organisation daily. "102 While staying at 
Kharkov, Price later recalled that his academic friends had warned 
him that Russia would not, in their opinion, be able to carry on the 
war without more supplies from the Western Allies and even if they 
got them, the transport system might not be able to distribute 
them103. He wrote to Trevelyan that agricultural production in the 
area around Kharkov had been remarkably effective that summer, but 
that friends who had been in the central and northern provinces were 
telling another story. Even so, Price concluded, "I doubt a 
conflagration. " In the same letter he noted how much British 
prestige had suffered, while he was away in Lazistan, as the result 
of the treatment of the Irish after the Easter rising. He referred 
to the "painful impression" created by the execution of Casement and 
the disillusionment with Britain of Russian intellectuals. It would, 
he thought, set them "seeking out new paths for Russia's political 
development, leaving the blind alleys of Western Europe behind. "104 
101 Bodleian Library. Ponsoby papers. 
102 A. M. P. 5.12.16. Price papers. 
103 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 499. 
104 C. P. T. 27.9.16. Price papers. 
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Then, in the months between September 1916, when he wrote those 
words, and December 1916, Price clearly became aware of developments 
which might prove them to be, as a prediction, less pessimistic than 
they appeared. Shortly before Christmas 1916, in a postcard written 
to his aunt from the Persian border he wrote: "Most important events 
are happening in the internal situation of Russia about which I 
cannot write. As soon as I can I mast go to Petrograd. I have 
delayed hitherto because in the towns of European Russia one is 
threatened with starvation. " The words "no sugar, no meat, often no 
bread" were heavily blacked out by the Russian censor but remained 
legiblel05. In his last letter before the revolution, again written 
to his aunt, and written within weeks of its outbreak, he said: "I 
should not be surprised if 1917 may not see the dawn of reason in the 
minds of men, stimulated by that most valuable of all psychological 
tonics - hunger. " 106 
105 A. M. P. 16.12.16. Price papers. 
106 A. M. P. 1.2.17. Price papers. 
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Chapter 3. The March Revolution 
For the first three months of 1917 Price remained in Tiflis, working 
on the book that was published in 1918 under the title War and 
Revolution in Asiatic Russia. He also wrote two long articles for 
the Economist and one for Common Sense but nothing, apparently, for 
the Manchester Guardian. The Common Sense articlel enlarged on the 
"chauvinism of the progressives" which he had deplored in his letter 
to his aunt and who, as he put it in his article "hoped to attain 
command of the ship of state by swimming in the tide of war. " This 
chauvinism, Price wrote, was justified in some minds with a touch of 
Slavic mysticism which attempted to cast Russia in the pre-destined 
role of protector of small nationalities. The Economist articles 
were less overtly political2. The first dealt with the decline in 
food production and the gap between supply and demand in coal and 
metals caused by the demand for munitions. This in turn accounted 
for the unrepaired rolling stock and railway lines which were 
disrupting the distribution of food throughout Russia. The second 
article dealt with the fall of the rouble on foreign exchange markets 
and the five-fold increase in paper money since the beginning of the 
war. Price outlined various remedies which were being proposed by 
various economists, one of whom was his friend Professor Sobolev. 
1 Common Sense 17.3.17. Datelined Tiflis 4.1.17. 'The Russian 
Progressists and Trade Policy'. Signed M. Philips Price. 2 Economist 31.3.17. Datelined Tiflis 15.1.17. 'Russia, Scarcity 
and Labour, the Sugar Crop, Iron and Steel, Coal, Irrports of Raw 
Materials'; and 7.4.17, datelined Tiflis 15.1.17. Untitled. Both 
unsigned. 
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These articles said nothing new and gave little away, but on 3 
February, within days of despatching them to London, he wrote to his 
aunt: 
".. the air is full of weird and uncanny rumours.. before 
the year is over I expect something is pretty sure to 
take place more or less exciting. n? 
To Tuffet he said: "discontent is everywhere stalking the country, 
outspoken and frank. "4 In an undated memorandum to Charles 
Trevelyan about this period which appeared as an article in the July 
U. D. C. 5 he said: "... by Christmas people began to speak openly 
about revolution and in the Caucasus, where I was, the Socialist and 
revolutionary societies began to organise for a general strike. The 
Government, on the other hand, commenced exiling and arresting on a 
larger scale than hitherto. Several friends of mine-during January 
and February (1917) disappeared suddenly and I found they had been 
arrested by 'administrative order'. " Nonetheless in the only 
surviving personal response to the March revolution -a postcard to 
his aunt6 - he wrote "I knew this was coming sooner or later but 
did not think it would come so quickly". Three years later he began 
his book My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution7 with the 
words: "The March Revolution came like a thief in the night. " 
In Tiflis there had been rumours of strikes on the railway between 
Tiflis and Batum early in March 1917 and even of disorders in 
Petrograd, but nothing to prepare people for the scale of the 
impending changes. News of the Tsar's abdication reached Tiflis on 
3 A. M. P. 1.2.17. Price papers. 
4 C. L. W. 1.2.17. Price papers. 
5 Price papers. 
6 A. M. P. 13.3.17. Price papers. 
7 M. Philips Price: My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution 
(1921). 
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Friday 16 March 1917 and Price, who could obviously only describe 
what he saw, sent off a short report (probably cabled, since it was 
less than 100 words long) to the Manchester Guardian. It was printed 
on 20 March under the heading Enthusiasm in Asiatic Russia, in the 
00lum adjoining Lloyd George's statement in the House of Commons 
which announced that a Provisional government had been formed in 
Russia with the express intention of carrying on the war with 
increased vigour. In the meantime there took place one of the 
more bizarre episodes in Price's journalistic life. On Sunday 18 
March there was a great gathering of representatives of all the 
peoples of the Caucasus just outside Tiflis, which Price attended. 
When he returned to his lodgings he found himself summoned to see the 
Grand Nicholas, the Tsar's uncle, formerly Viceroy of Caucasus and 
newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the entire Russian army. The 
account of this virtually exclusive interview (three Russian 
journalists were also present) which he sent to the Manchester 
Guardian apparently appeared in one edition of the paper and 
disappeared from all subsequent editions. To the end of his life 
Price remained positive that he had seen his account in print in the 
News Room of the Anglo-Russian Conmission in Petrograd a few weeks 
later, but he never managed to find another copy. Nor is it in any 
of the bound or microfilm editions of the Manchester Guardian which 
are available. (The suppression of the story is almost certainly the 
first instance in which one of Price's articles was affected by a 'D' 
notice and would have been directly attributable to British intrigues 
around the figure of the Grand Duke (See Appendix I). ) Fortunately 
Price wrote a second account of the interview only a few weeks later 
which he included in his first memorandum on the revolution for 
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Charles Trevelyan, and this appeared in the July edition of U. D. C. 
It began by describing the effect of the abdication in Tiflis: 
"As soon as the news came through that Petrograd was in 
the hands of the mob, instantly the working classes and 
students in Tiflis arrested the police, while the 
middle class and intellectual elements formed a 
committee of public safety... Next day feeling became 
more tense and fear was expressed in Tiflis that the 
Grand Duke Nicholas was trying to start a counter 
revolution. " 
On the afternoon of 18 March Price "received a letter from the 
military censor saying briefly that the Grand Duke Nicholas would 
receive me at 3 o'clock for the purpose of giving me a communication 
for the Manchester Guardian. " Price went on: 
"I was received by Prince Orlov, the Grand Duke's 
secretary, who was looking very worried, and he led me 
into the large hall, where I saw the Grand Duke 
Nicholas walking up and down with his head down. He 
look pale and thin, his hands were shaking, and when he 
began to speak his voice was so faint that I could 
scarcely hear what he was saying. He had evidently 
been living through a great deal those previous three 
days. He then said to me in Russian: 'I have asked 
you to come to make you the following statement' and 
then he read from a bit of paper what I took down and 
telegraphed off that evening to the Manchester 
Guardian. He said that he considered it necessary to 
recognise the new order of things in Russia as the sole 
salvation of the country, and that as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army he would allow no reaction of any 
kind, for the new state must be founded on a sure 
basis. I then thanked him for his communication, 
congratulated him on his appointment, and left. It was 
thus clear that whatever his intentions may have been 
on the Friday and Saturday, he had decided by Sunday 
that the revolution must be recognised as successful. 
Hence, no doubt, the reason why he called me to make 
that statement. " 
Price's next despatches to the Manchester Guardian were sent off on 
19 and 20 March but not printed until 27 March. 8 They were both 
very brief accounts of reaction in the Caucasus to the news of the 
formation of the Provisional government. Manchester Guardian readers 
8 Manchester Guardian. 27.3.17. Datelined Tiflis 19.3.17. 'The 
Asiatic Provinces'. Signed 'From Our Correspondent'. 
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had to wait for another month before getting a full description of 
the great popular gathering which took place on the morning of the 
day Price was sent for by the Grand Duke. 9 
Immediately after writing up his interview with the Grand Duke Price 
began, as he put it in a letter to his aunt on 13 March 1917 "running 
about the Caucasus... attending revolutionary meetings. " On his way 
to Moscow at the end of the month he wrote two articles about his 
experiences, datelined 31 March, Rostov-on-Don. In one of these he 
described as a heartening by-product of the revolution the abatement 
of separatist feeling in both Armenia and Georgia: he was also 
impressed by the energies released and the inventiveness shown by 
local populations in designing and electing their own forms of 
representative assembly. In the other he described in some detail 
how the revolution had taken place in Kars, where a secret committee 
of the army had taken over the fortress while the town had elected 
its own governing body. The original of this article has disappeared 
but it was printed, probably in full in the Manchester Guardian on 8 
May 1917 10. In an unpublished article written on the same day 
Price described how his train had passed through Cossack 
territories. He noted how the Cossacks, too, had set up 
revolutionary committees: "We have not forgotten the mistakes we 
made in 1905". Wherever the train stopped Price saw platforms 
crowned with soldiers hoping for a lift ("They seemed to be 
9 Manchester Guardian 27.4.17. Datelined Tiflis 19.3.17. 'Haw 
the Revolution Came to the Caucasus'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
10 Ibid 8.5.17. Datelined Rostov-on-Don 31.3.17. 'The Revolution 
in Asiatic Russia'. Signed M. Philips Price. The title of the 
article was taken from the other which Price wrote on the same day 
but of which only one paragraph was used, incorporated into the text 
of the one that was printed. The original in its complete form is 
with the Price papers. 
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travelling in all directions"). In each station he saw "the office 
of the Alliance of Soldiers' Deputies, a sort of military trades 
union which like a mushroom has suddenly sprung up in the night in 
response to that great Russian tendency for communal councils", and 
he observed that "internal reconstruction, not foreign war, was the 
topic of the day. " 
Price arrived in Moscow in the early hours of the morning, some time 
in the first week of April 1917. The first thing he noticed was the 
absence of police from the streets. A few hours later he was equally 
struck by the number of street meetings and demonstrations which were 
taking place. "A great event was still being celebrated and no one 
seemed to be able to settle down. "11 In his first article from 
Moscow for the Manchester Guardian (also unpublished) he wrote that 
his "first idea was to get in touch with the opinion among the Moscow 
merchants and to find out how they were reacting towards the 
revolution. " Given that Price had not set foot in Moscow for nearly 
two years and can have had few contacts as yet, this was not as 
strange an impulse as might at first appear, and he therefore called 
on the head of one of the great textile manufacturing houses whom he 
had known "for some years": presumably since his first visit to 
Russia in 19 08. The results of the interview, as he wrote them up, 
were curious. The head of the family, Price recorded, welcomed the 
revolution but thought that Russia was in great danger: from 
"Jesuits, Germans and Jews". The sons had "dropped Jesuits out of 
the trio of bugbears" and gave the revolution a qualified welcome on 
the basis that it was in any case inevitable. Both generations 
11 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller', p. 510. 
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wanted a republic, and both agreed that the breakdown of transport 
was the most serious of the crises faced by the new government. 
Price ended this article by warning, as early as the first week of 
April 1917, of the danger from "partisans of the late government" who 
were already "spread about all over the country. " 12 
Shortly after his interview with the merchants Price must have 
succeeded in contacting the Social Democrats in Moscow because in a 
letter to Trevelyan written on 11 April he referred to the fact that 
he had already wired to him asking for Socialist literature from 
England, for which, the Social Democrats had told him, they were 
"starved". On the same day as he wrote the letter, Price also wrote 
the long memorandum to Trevelyan (noted above) which was to appear as 
a front page article in the July edition of the U. D. C. (and see below 
p. 82). At some point around this time Price made a quick visit to 
Petrograd, from where he sent a short message which appeared in the 
Manchester Guardian on 7 April. It was perhaps symbolic, for a first 
ingression, of the new order: soldiers, he reported, no longer 
saluted their officers in the streets, as they still did in Moscow. 
A longer piece from Petrograd, printed on 11 April, reported that the 
12 The unpublished article 'Moscow and the Revolution', subtitled 
'Attitude of the Commercial Classes' was datelined Moscow 6.4.17. 
For further reading on the Moscow merchants, whose role in pre- 
revolutionary politics was rather more significant than might be 
deduced from the interview Price described in his article, see Ruth 
Amende Roosa and James D. White: 'Russian Industrialists and State 
Socialism 1906-1917' Soviet Studies Vol. 22 (1972) pp. 395-408 and 
Vol. 24 (1973) pp. 414-425; see also Lewis H. Siegelbaum: 'Moscow 
Industrialists and the War Industries Committees during World War I', 
Russian History Vol. 6 (1978) pp. 64-83. For a full account of this 
phenomenon, see Ruth Amende Roosa's unpublished PhD. thesis (Columbia 
1967): 'The Association of Industry and Trade 1906-1914: An 
Examination of the Economic Views of Organized Industrialists in Pre- 
Revolutionary Russia'. 
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views of the Foreign Minister, Miliukov had been in effect disowned 
by the Provisional government. 
Learning late on the night of 22 April that Miliukov had been 
visiting Moscow and was already in his railway carriage, about to 
return to Petrograd, Price rushed to the station and was granted an 
interview. When Price asked him how the question of Constantinople 
was affected by the Provisional government's recent declaration in 
favour of the principle of free trade through the Straits, Miliukov 
answered that free trade in itself was acceptable, but that Russia 
would have to "insist" on the right to close the Straits to foreign 
warships, "and that is not possible unless she possesses the Straits 
and fortifies them". Price's account of this interview appeared in 
London on 26 Apri113 and was telegraphed back to Russia the next 
day. This time Miliukov's views were formally repudiated by the 
Petrograd Soviet. Price felt that the interview had not a little to 
do with Miliukov's subsequent resignation which he reported on 
21 May14. "I never thought" he wrote later "that when I went into 
the railway carriage late that night in Moscow I should be the cause 
of the fall of the Russian Foreign Minister. " He added, more 
modestly, "I can see ... that he would have gone sooner or later, but 
... I must have hastened the process. "15 
13 Manchester Guardian 26.4.17. Datelined 'Moscow Sunday'. 
'Russian Control of the Straits'. Signed 'From Our Correspondent'. 14 Ibid 21.5.17. Datelined Petrograd, Saturday. 'Free Russia's 
Peace Formula'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
15 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' pp. 514-515. Although 
the Provisional Government had issued a statement disavowing 
annexationist war aims as early as 27 March 1917, Miliukov had 
continued to go his own way and, just before giving his interview to 
Price had, on"18 April, sent a Note to the Allied Governments 
implying that there would be no changes in the network of secret 
treaty undertakings between the Allies. The interview with Price 
appears to have taken place on 22 April when street demonstrations 
3: 81 
Three more short pieces by Price appeared, one on 28 April from 
Moscow and two, on 30 April and 3 May, from Petrograd. Again he 
dwelt on the differences in atmosphere between Moscow and Petrograd. 
Speakers at street meetings in Moscow were calling for peace with 
Germany, but not a separate peace. In Petrograd the soldiers were 
not asking for peace at all. Moreover they all insisted "that the 
revolution was made by the army". Indeed, in Petrograd "the soldiers 
are growling against Lenin, the refugee whose return was facilitated 
by the German Government ". This was the first reference Price had 
made to Lenin. 
Until the spring of 1917 Price was not often reporting "news". 
Nearly all his despatches from the Caucasus had been sent by post. 
Now he began to use the telegraph more often. But for a variety of 
reasons the dating of his messages became increasingly imprecise. 
Sometimes he datelined them merely by the day of the week, and if 
they were held up by the Censor they might be several weeks old 
before they were printed without anybody being aware of it. The 
change to the new style dating may have caused confusion, although 
Price himself always used the new style in his letters and this helps 
to identify where he was at a given moment if he happened to write a 
letter. Another problem was that the titles under which he sent 
articles or despatches were subject to editorial changes in Britain. 
against Miliukov were already taking place in Petrograd, and the 
Provisional Government had issued another statement affirming its 
solidarity with the Soviet on the subject of war aims. When, shortly 
afterwards, the Soviet agreed to enter the first Coalition 
Government, Miliukov resigned. The incident is mentioned by William 
G. Rosenburg: Liberals in the Russian Revolution (Princeton 1974) 
pp. 94-133 'The April Crisis' , in F/N 28 p. 102. See also Rex 
Wade: 
The Russian Search for Peace, February-October 1917, (Stamford, 1969) 
. 2. 
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Yet another was the editorial amalgamation of parts of several 
telegram into one article, sometimes in a different order from 
that in which they were sent. The only absolute certainty is the 
date on which they appeared in the Manchester Guardian. However if 
they are looked at only in order in which they appeared, they give an 
inadequate picture of the way in which Price's mind was working. 
is only if they are analysed in terms of their subject that it is 
possible to see his growing awareness of the national and 
international dimensions of what he was reporting. 
(i) Political developments 
It 
Price had seen very little of Russia outside the Caucasus for nearly 
two years. His memorandum on the situation, written for Trevelyan in 
Moscow on 11 April and printed in U. D. C. in July, when he had been 
less than two weeks in European Russia, must have been based as much 
on his reading of newspapers and conversations with Georgian 
socialists and people met on trains, as anything he had yet seen for 
himself. From this memorandum it is obvious that he was already 
clear in his own mind that it had been "the urban proletariat and 
the peasant that have made the revolution" (whatever the army may 
have thought). The so-called progressives had, he thought, been "in 
some ways more reactionary and dangerous to peace than the old 
ourrupt cliques round the Emperor. " He thought it no wonder that the 
Provisional government formed by "this capitalist-professor ial group" 
were distrusted by the Petrograd Soviet. He now realised that the 
land-hungry peasants had gone to war determined to settle accounts 
with their landlords when they got home. The array had become "a real 
popular peasant institution, as much interested in using its power 
3: 83 
for the settlement of the internal problems of Russia as in 
prosecuting the war with Germany". If his account appears to be full 
of inconsistencies, so, surely, was the situation he was describing. 
The Cossacks had come to see, he reported, that their interests were 
identical with those of the peasants and industrial workers. The 
elected body of these three elements, the Petrograd Soviet, "is at 
the moment the real ruler of Russia". After describing how the 
revolution had come to the Caucasus and recounting his interview with 
the Grand Nicholas (quoted above) Price went on to identify what had 
clearly impressed him most about the Petrograd Soviet's programme: 
the formula of peace without annexations or indemnities. This he 
described as "the most splendid thing for the civilisation of the 
world. They are ready to prosecute the war energetically but only, 
as they tell me, to defend their new-won freedom, and as soon as they 
can come to an arrangement with the German Socialists to upset the 
ruling class in Germany and establish an international settlement in 
Eastern Europe and Western Asia they will force peace. " The Allies 
would, Price wrote, have to reconsider the situation; the effect of 
"this wonderful revolution" was bound to influence "the working class 
proletariat even of reactionary England". Price concluded the long 
memorandum by pointing out that the army, "being a peasant army, is 
intensely interested in the land". But Russia had been "seething 
with social and political discontent" and anybody except the Times 
correspondent, said Price, could have told the British public long 
ago that Russia could not stand the strain of a great war for 
long. 16 
16 U. D. C. July 1917. 
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Towards the end of April Price secured an interview with the Minister 
of Agriculture in the Provisional government, Shingarev 17, and upon 
the interview he based an article on the food situation and the land 
question. After outlining Shingarev's account of the measures by 
which he proposed to avert famine, Price went on to report that after 
the interview he had gone to a number of soldiers' meetings on the 
land question in the environs of Moscow. He concluded that the 
capitalist middle classes and the urban proletariat were now both 
bidding for the support of the peasants. "The latter offer them the 
Inperial and private owners' land for nothing, but under the 
influence of Marxist Socialism wish to concentrate all land ownership 
in the State, making the peasants perpetual tenants. " The former had 
a more moderate plan for creating a land reserve to be handed over to 
rural communes or Zemstvos and let out at fair rents. Price did not 
offer an opinion as to which formula was the most likely to appeal to 
the peasant sold iers. 18 
In June Price wrote a long article for the Manchester Guardian in 
which for the first time he attempted to analyse the elements of the 
situation in Russia for a wider public that he could have hoped to 
reach in his April memorandum to Trevelyan. It concluded with a 
passage on the recognition by the Provisional government of greater 
or lesser degrees of autonomy in Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, the 
17 ANDREI IVANOOVICH SHINGAREV 1869-1918. A Kadet member of the 
Second, Third and Fourth Dumas, Shingarev was the author of the Kadet 
programme for agricultural reform and became Minister of Agriculture 
in the first Provisional Government and Minister of Finance in the 
second. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly, arrested on 
charges of anti-Soviet activity, and murdered in prison on 20 January 
1918. 
18 Manchester Guardian 1.6.17. Datelined Moscow 23.4.17. 'Free 
Russia's Internal Problems'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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Caucasus, Russian Turkestan and Siberia, but the article was 
misleadingly entitled Russia and the Rights of Nationalities. It was 
not printed until 4 August, by which time there was little in it of 
news value. Price began by identifying and describing the main 
protagonists before and after the revolution, much as he had done in 
his April memorandum. But by June he was able to bring the picture 
up to date. The Provisional government had used Miliukov's 'war to 
victory' policy as an excuse for postponing land redistribution. The 
Soviet's 'peace without annexations' policy should be seen in this 
context as a means by which the international proletariat could 
aspire to take government out of the hands of capitalist war making 
classes. The Maximalists and Minimalists, as the Bolsheviks and 
Mensheviks were still comunonly known were agreed on this objective 
and differed only on questions of tactics and timing. The right of 
self-determination had been added to the peace formula because it had 
been recognised as "a factor to be reckoned with in world politics". 
The distribution of Price's articles in the Manchester Guardian 
throughout the spring and summer of 1917 became increasingly erratic 
and requires explanation. Apart from brief news items in March 
and April, only eleven articles by Price, written between March and 
September were printed, and in two of them he was virtually acting as 
a messenger boy. To some extent this was probably due to the fact 
that for part of the period in question he was not the only 
correspondent in Russia working for the Manchester Guardian. Price 
himself later attributed the presence in Russia of the other 
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correspondents, Michael Fartxnan19 and David Soskice 20, to Scott's 
lack of confidence in his objectivity. He thought that Soskice, at 
least, had been sent to rectify his supposed partiality for the 
Bolsheviks. This was, of course, hindsight, for Price as yet had 
exhibited no particular partiality for the Bolsheviks. What actually 
19 MICHAEL FARBMAN, born in Russia in 1880, had been a publisher and 
author of a history of Italian Renaissance architecture before coming 
to England as the correspondent of one of the Petrograd newspapers. 
His political orientation before 1917 must be deduced from the fact 
that he seized upon the March Revolution as a pretext to offer his 
services to Scott. He sent back a number of distinguished despatches 
to the Manchester Guardian in the spring of 1918 before returning to 
England in May, this time as correspondent in England for Novaya 
Zhizn. He was also a frequent and well-informed contributor to both 
The Nation and the Herald on Russian affairs for the rest of the war. 
He returned to Russia for the Manchester Guardian in 1920 and 1921. 
He also founded the Europa Year Book series in 1926, which continues 
to this day, being an annual survey of European politics, art and 
literature. Farburan wrote several books on Russia in the early 
1920s, including Bolshevism in Retreat (1923) and After Lenin. The 
New Phase in Russia (1924). The last of his books of which there is 
any record was The Five Year Plan, published in New York in 1931, 
which suggests that he may have moved to America. The National Union 
of Journalists have no information about him. 
20 DAVID VLADIMIROVICH SOSKICE (born Soskis), 1866-1941. A Ukranian 
Jew, he became a Socialist Revolutionary while still a schoolboy, and 
graduated in law at Odessa in 1889 despite police harrassment through 
his student days. He then spent three years in various prisons 
before leaving Russia in 1893. He lived briefly in Switzerland and 
settled in England in 1898. He joined the foreign organisation of 
the S. R. s in London in 1901 and soon became active with the Society 
of Friends of Russian Freedom; he also joined in the work of the 
British Parliamentary Russia Committee. His journalistic career was 
helped by his friendship with Brailsford, and he began to write on 
Russian affairs for the Daily News and on English affairs for Nasha 
Zhizn and Pravda. After 1905 he returned to Russia as correspondent 
for the British Tribune (1905-1908); he then represented the Daily 
Chronicle (1913 and 1915) and the Manchester Guardian (1917). While 
in Russia in 1917 he became Kerensky's Secretary and after Kerensky's 
flight Soskice continued to be his ardent advocate, a strong opponent 
of the Bolsheviks and proponent of intervention. Nonetheless by 1920 
he recognised that "the hour for overthrowing Bolshevism by force... 
had passed. Today the only choice that remains is to join a battle 
of ideas". David Soskice's papers are deposited with the Stow Hill 
papers at the House of Lords. See especially Boxes DS 1 (5) and (6) 
and DS 6 (24). See also Barry Hollingsworth: 'David Soskice in 
Russia in 1917' European Studies Review Vol. 6 (1976) pp. 73-98 and 
'The Society of Friends of Russian Freedom: English Liberals and 
Russian Socialists, 1890-1917' Oxford Slavonic Papers, New Series, 
1970, pp. 45-64, and 'The British Memorial to the Russian Duma 1906', 
Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 53 (1975) pp. 539-557. 
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happened, and what Price apparently never knew, was that both Fartinan 
and Soskice had written to Scott quite independently, and asked him 
to facilitate visits to Russia which each desired to make for his own 
reasons, by appointing them Special Correspondents. Scott, with only 
one man covering both a continent and a revolution, not surprisingly 
agreed to do so 21. In his letter to Farburan of 6 April 1917 Scott 
specifically asked him, while in Petrograd, to act "in close co- 
operation with our correspondent Mr. Philips Price and merely to 
supplement what he is sending us. " 22 Seven weeks later in his 
letter appointing Soskice, Scott made no such stipulation, although 
his London editor, James Bone, asked him to get in touch with Price 
on arrival. Price left no record of meeting Farbman, but Farbman was 
a guest at his wedding in Berlin two years later and obviously they 
had become friends. Price frequently referred to Soskice however, in 
21 Although Price sent in a good deal of material in the spring of 
1917, he was not, from Scott's point of view, a reliable source of 
information. As his status as the Manchester Guardian's 
representative in Russia was never clearly defined for long at a 
time, Price appears to have felt free to decide where he should go 
and what he should write about. On the one occasion before the March 
Revolution that he sent a despatch by telegram (the fall of Erzerum) 
he had been reproved for extravagance. It seems a little unfair, 
therefore, that having appointed Soskice as a telegraphc 
correspondent both Scott, W. P. Crozier, the News Editor, and James 
Bone, the London Editor, saw fit to appeal to Soskice for news 
because Price sent only written despatches. James Bone referred to 
Price in a letter of 29 May as "our correspondent in the Caucasus" 
who was now "sending messages from Petrograd" in a way which made 
them sound like greetings telegrams. On 6 August Crozier cabled to 
Soskice: "Please keep us informed by telegraph of all important 
developments and our views of policy Price only sending letters". 
Later on the tone of Scott's cables to Soskice became quite frantic: 
25 September: "Kindly continue to act as long as you can where is 
Price"; 5 October: "Can you give us Price's address wire reply"; 
12 October: "Can you give us Price's address or any kind of 
information about him". (Stow Hill papers, House of Lords, DS 1 Box 
novlcott that he was 4). It seems incredible that Price hYý 
intending to go on his projected J'ourne 
; but rat entirely out of 
character. 
22 The John Rylands University Library, Manchester. Scott papers 
A/F3/1 and A/575/2. 
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such careful terms that it is difficult to avoid the impression that 
his feelings had been hurt by the appointment. They agreed to divide 
the work between them, Soskice taking "the activities of Government 
and the official circles" and Price confining himself, as he put it, 
to the activities of the Soviet and events in the provinces23. 
Soskice's first article appeared in the Manchester Guardian on 27 
June and between then and the November revolution a total of 17 
pieces by him were printed. 24 
The arrangement was not without its compensations for Price, and the 
first result of this division of labour can be seen in Price's 
coverage of the Kronstadt Commune and Finnish politics. Price was 
interested by rumours of anarchy in the Baltic Fleet and guessing 
rightly that the Fleet was likely to play a significant role in the 
development of the revolution, visited the naval bases at Kronstadt 
in mid-June and Helsingfors (Helsinki) in early July. A brief 
account of the first visit appeared in the Manchester Guardian on 18 
June, in which he reported "everything in good order and the rumours 
of serious disorder unfounded". He also noted that the sailors were 
taking the same line as the soldiers he had talked to: they would 
fight to defend the revolution but they would not take the offensive. 
A very much longer account of the Kronstadt Commune appeared on 17 
July and was reprinted in the New York Tribune on 7 August. In this 
Price went to some pains to play down the allegations of the 
extremism of the sailors which were being widely circulated in the 
23 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' pp. 535-553. 24 The articles signed by Soskice during this period were mainly 
concerned with the July offensive, the July Days, Finland (where, 
despite their division of labour agreement, Soskice also went at this 
time), the Moscow Conference, Stockholm, Kerensky and Kornilov. 
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West. His visit to Finland resulted in an equally soothing report on 
the Council of Sailors of the Baltic Fleet at Helsingfors 25, and 
two much longer articles on the political situation in Finland. In 
the first26 he reported an interview with the Finnish Prime 
Minister, M. Tokoi27 who represented himself as having been 
reassured by the emergence of the Soviet as the real power in Russia. 
In the second article28 Price described the situation in more 
detail. The Finns were resenting the amount of money which they were 
being asked to contribute to the Provisional government's exchequer, 
and distrusted it for not having granted full and immediate autonomy 
to Finland, though they were willing to wait for the Peace Conference 
25 Manchester Guardian 10.7.17. Datelined Helsingfors Saturday. 'A 
Baltic Council'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
26 Ibid. 23.7.17. Datelined Petrograd Saturday. 'Autonomous 
Finland'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
27 OLOF TOKOI (1873-1963), the first Social Democrat in the world to 
become prime minister by the parliamentary process. He was first 
elected to the Finnish Diet in 1908, became Speaker in 1913 and in 
1916 head of a coalition government based on a popular though not a 
parliamentary majority. An ardent advocate of Finnish Independence, 
his government refused a loan to the Provisional Government in July 
1917 on the grounds that it might be used in an Imperialist war. 
Soon afterwards Kerensky dissolved the Diet and in the new elections 
the Social Democrats lost their popular majority. In December 1917 
the new Finnish government declared its independence from Russia. 
Tokoi continued to use his influence to encourage his right-wing 
successor (Svinhufvud) to secure recognition for Finnish independence 
from the Bolsheviks. He became Minister of Food in the first Finnish 
Revolutionary government in January 1918 but was driven into exile 
with the victory of the Finnish Whites under Mannerheim in the 
ensuing civil war. He died in exile in America. The major recent 
work in English on Finnish history of this period is Anthony F. 
Upton, The Finnish Revolution 1917-1918 (Minnesota 1980). David 
Kirby has contributed a series of illuminating articles: 'Stockholm- 
Petrograd-Berlin. International Social Democracy and Finnish 
Independence 1917' (Slavonic and East European Review 54 (1974) 
pp. 63-84; and 'The Finnish Social Democratic Party and the 
Bolsheviks', Journal of Contemporary History, (i) Vol. 7 (1972) pp. 
181-198; (ii) Vol. 11 (1976) pp. 99-113. Kirby is also the author of 
Finland in the Twentieth Century (1979) and Finland and Russia, 1808- 
1920: From Autonomy to Independence. A Selection of Documents 
(1975). Olof Tokoi's autobiography for this period, Sisu (New York, 
1957), contains useful details. 
28 Manchester Guardian 31.8.17. Datelined Helsingfors July. 
'Finland and the Russian Revolution'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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eventually to confirm their international status. Price also 
reported that some of the Russian sailors on the council of the 
Baltic Fleet were disappointed in the lukewarm attitude of their 
Finnish comrades. He noted "the inmense psychological gulf which 
separates the warm-hearted Russian revolutionary from the cold, 
unimaginative Finn. I felt that the wave of the Russia Revolution in 
its north westward passage had struck a rock and was surging round it 
without creating any visible impression. " 
What Price learned in his many conversations with sailors and 
soldiers in the course of the spring of 1917 proved relevant when, 
during the early summer he was approached, as were many other British 
correspondents in Petrograd, by an official from the Anglo-Russian 
Commission, a propaganda bureau run in close touch with the British 
Embassy. 29 Price was asked to write articles encouraging the 
Russians to renew their offensive against the Central Powers. He 
declined to do so on the grounds that everything he had been hearing 
had convinced him that the armed forces would simply refuse to wage 
an offensive war unless the Allies accepted the peace formula of no 
annexations and no indemnities, which was by now widely supported, 
29 The senior staff of the Anglo-Russian Commission included the 
novelist Hugh Walpole and Harold Williams, correspondent in Russia of 
the Daily Chronicle. The Commission, or Bureau as it was also known, 
produced 1,000 broadsheets a day for circulation to soldiers and 
workers and ran a special cable service for the Russian press. It 
also used speakers and films to make pro-Entente propaganda. Its 
reading room contained copies of every British newspaper 
and periodical. Despite the fact that Cecil thought very little of 
propaganda, the staff of the Bureau was increased shortly before the 
November Revolution. (INF 4/1B). Arthur Ransome gave his own 
version of the Bureau in The Autobiography of Arthur Ranscme (Ed. 
Rupert Hart Davis, 1976) pp. 189-190 and 194. 
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and also repudiated the secret treaties made by the Tsarist 
government30. 
For the rest of the summer of 1917 with few exception Price did not 
attempt to keep the Manchester Guardian supplied with day to day 
news. Instead he wrote long descriptive articles about major 
developments. Thus he attended the first All-Russian Council of 
Peasants Deputies in May and sent a long account of it which did not 
appear in print until 7 August, with no editorial note and the words 
"last week I attended the Conference" still embedded in the text3l. 
The article described the origins of the Peasants Congress movement 
and gave a graphic account of the proceedings. Price pointed out 
that the dominant political influence among the peasants was still 
that of the Social Revolutionary party. Lenin's thesis that there 
was an identity of interest between the urban and rural proletariats 
was firmly rejected by the conference. It was on this occasion that 
Price first saw and heard Lenin, whom he described as "the famous 
Marxist Maximalist" who "held his audience well drawing frequent 
applause from them, but as soon as he had finished from one end of 
the hall to the other speakers got up and began to pull his arguments 
to pieces". 
The next major conference to take place was the First All-Russian 
Congress of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, which Price attended at 
the beginning of June when he returned briefly to Petrograd between 
his visits to Kronstadt and Helsingfors. By this time Soskice must 
30 M. Philips Price. My Three Revolutions (1969) pp. 59-60. 
31 Manchester Guardian 7.8.17. Datelined 'From Our Petrograd 
Correspondent'. 'A Peasant Parliament'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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have been established in Petrograd and Price may have thought that 
according to their agreement Soskice would cover this conference for 
the Manchester Guardian. In the event the only accounts of the 
Congress to appear in that paper were contained in a handful of 
agency messages. For whatever reason, Price's account of the 
Congress was not sent to the Manchester Guardian but to Common Sense, 
where it appeared in six columns on 4 August, datelined June 26. 
The account was described on the front page as "wonderfully moving" 
and used as a peg on which to hang a leading article presumably by 
Hirst, on the danger of famine occurring in Russia. Price's 
description of the Congress is by far the most detailed that he ever 
wrote about it, and may well be one of the fullest to have been 
published in English anywhere. He quoted extensively from it himself 
in his book My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution (pp. 42-48). 
The piece contained many verbatim reports of key passages from the 
main speeches and conveys a strong sense both of the previous history 
of the Russian Left and of the historic nature of the occasion. In a 
memorable section Price dealt with an epic encounter between Lenin 
and Kerensky, when Lenin taunted Kerensky with the ineffectiveness of 
the Provisional government and offered to take power himself. After 
rebutting Lenin's arguments Kerensky concluded with the words (in 
Price's account) : 
"'Out of the fiery chaos that you wish to make will 
rise, like a Phoenix, a dictator. ' He paused and 
walked slowly across the platform towards the corner 
where the group surrounding Lenin sat. Not a sound was 
heard in the great hall and we waited spellbound for 
the next sentence. 'I will not be the dictator that 
you are trying to make'; and so saying he turned his 
back scornfully upon Lenin. " 
Price wrote one more detailed account of a conference during this 
summer of conferences. This was an account of the first 
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democratically elected Ecclesiastic Council of the Orthodox Church, 
which had met in the last week of August 1917, and to which delegates 
had been chosen from every parish in Russia by adult suffrage. Price 
observed with interest and described the emergence of a predictable 
split between the progressive bloc of parish priests and laymen, and 
the old Church hierarchy. He concluded that the problems of 
disendowment and compensation for Church lands confiscated by 
the peasants would depend upon the church "re-establishing that moral 
prestige which it has lost owing to its contact with the Tsar's 
government". By the time this article appeared - 27 October - the 
subject must have seemed of rather academic interest. 
Before dealing with the series of articles which Price next wrote, 
all of which were about the economic situation in Russia, mention may 
be made of two occasions when he was used to convey messages. 
Towards the end of August he was asked by Tseretelli, then still 
President of the Petrograd Soviet, to send a telegram to Trevelyan in 
London welcoming "the action of British comrades, led by Henderson, 
in their struggle for Stockholm" and denying that there was any 
disagreement between the Soviet and the Provisional government about 
the desirability of holding a conference of all the European 
Socialist parties32. This was printed in the Manchester Guardian 
32 In May 1917 two peace initiatives more or less coincided. One 
came from the 'northern neutrals' who wanted a conference at 
Stockholm of the socialist parties of all the belligerents to attempt 
to formulate a common peace policy. The other came from the 
Petrograd Soviet, which wanted a discussion of its own formula: no 
annexations or indemnities and the right of national self- 
determination, which had been adopted by the second Provisional 
Government as the price of the Soviet's support for a summer 
offensive. The British Labour Party wanted to send its own 
delegation to Russia to discuss these proposals but Lloyd George was 
first off the mark and despatched Arthur Henderson, then a member of 
the War Cabinet, to Russia to assess the situation. Judging from the 
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on 25 August and in U. D. C. in September, by which time the issue of 
Stockholm was no longer news. A few days later, when observing the 
views he was expressing to the French Socialist Albert Thomas at that 
time, Lloyd George was personally inclining to support the idea of 
the conference. Henderson returned in July convinced that the 
conference would take place and that abstention from it by the 
Entente socialists would be a grave mistake. Having persuaded his 
colleagues on the Labour Party Executive to convene a special 
conference of the party for 10 August, Henderson went to Paris with 
two other M. P. s. MacDonald and Wardle, to formulate a common front 
with the French majority socialists: they would participate if the 
conference was consultative but not mandatory. On his return to 
London Henderson was first summoned to a meeting of the War Cabinet 
and then kept waiting outside while his colleagues discussed his 
actions and their attitude. When finally admitted he challenged them 
in vain to demand his resignation. The Labour party conference was 
duly held on 10 August and voted 3-1 in favour of sending a 
delegation to Stockholm. After an interview the same evening with 
the Prime Minister Henderson resigned from the Cabinet, which had 
already, in any case, decided to refuse passports to any British 
delegation for the purpose of attending a conference at Stockholm. 
Much was subsequently made by Lloyd George of Henderson's 
alleged failure to tell the Labour Party of a telegram from the 
Provisional Government (sent at the prompting of the Russian Charge 
d'Affaires in London, Nabokov) expressing its own lack of interest in 
Stockholm. Henderson's biographer believed that there were two 
telegrams, one of which Henderson had already seen and referred to in 
his speech, and another, spurious, one, which he did not see. It 
would appear that the telegram which Price forwarded from Tseretelli 
to Trevelyan may have been intended to repair the damage caused by 
the reported rift between the Soviet and the Provisional Government. 
As eventually printed in the Manchester Guardian it was undated and 
there is no way of knowing when it was sent. It is, however, 
unlikely that Tseretelli would have bothered to send it when the 
issue was already dead and buried, and it is reasonable to presume 
that the telegram was deliberately held up by the Press Bureau until 
it had become irrelevant. 
A good short account of the Stockholm Conference which did not 
take place is given in British Labour and the Russian Revolution by 
Stephen Richards Graubard, (Harvard 1956) pp. 22-35. Mary Agnes 
Hamilton dealt with the subject fully in her biography Arthur 
Henderson, (1938) pp. 12-162. Lloyd George's version is given in his 
War Memoirs, Vol. IV Chapter 58, pp. 1881-1924. A full dress debate 
on the subject took place in the House of CoMnons on 13 August 1917 
and can be found in Hansard. David Kirby, in an article in the 
Historical Journal 25 (1982) Vol. 3 pp. 709-716, 'International 
Socialism and the Question of Peace in the Stockholm Conference of 
1917', gives an account of the divisions within the European 
Socialist parties which would, in all probability, have rendered any 
conference between them futile at that time. See also Julius 
Braunthal History of the International, Vol. II 1914-1943 pp. 65-95. 
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Moscow Conference33, presumably without the intention of writing 
about it for this was certainly in Soskice's field, Price was handed 
by Soskice a message from Kerensky. Soskice was by then also acting 
as Kerensky's Secretary, and may have had reservations about asking 
the paper to print it himself. At all events, Price passed it on and 
it was printed on 1 September. Kerensky wanted it to be known that 
the purpose of the Conference was to enable the Provisional 
government "to get acquainted with the opinions and needs of the 
country, and by letting the assembled representatives of all classes, 
ranks and races know the truth about the crisis through which Russia 
is passing, to bring before the whole nation the necessity of union 
for the defence and its liberties. We are able confidently to state 
that our objects have been to a large extent attained. " 
33 In his Reminiscences (pp. 69-79) Price gave what must be one of 
the only eye-witness accounts in the English language of the Moscow 
Conference. In My Three Revolutions (pp 62-65) he described it in 
less detail but with, perhaps, a longer perspective. In his earlier 
book, he had defined the Conference, called by Kerensky for 25 August 
1917 as "a State Conference of all 'live elements in the country'" 
but did not attribute the quotation: they might well have been 
Kerensky's own words. In the later book he wrote that it was "the 
last attempt to save Russia from internal disruption. It was all in 
the line of Russian history and tradition. In the past, during great 
crises, conferences like this had generally met to try to solve the 
problem of how to hold the vast country of Russia together, to find a 
ruler when an old one had failed, or set up an oligarchy of military 
leaders to carry on at least temporarily. These conferences were 
known as 'Zemsky Sobors' or Councils of the Nation. " This Conference 
lasted three days, at the end of which it was clear that, unlike 
those summoned by Ivan the Terrible or Boris Godunov, it had achieved 
nothing. 
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(ii) Economic Situation 
Price had been in Finland during the July days34 which, again, were 
covered in the Manchester Guardian only by agency reports. But after 
his return to Petrograd he sent in a short account of the formation 
of the Second Provisional government on 8 July 1917, in which he laid 
greater emphasis on the worsening economic situation that he did on 
the "recent tragic events in Petrograd": his way of describing the 
July days. In one of his now increasingly rare letters home he 
related: "I missed the rebellion here last week, or at least only 
came in for the tail end of it. Things are pretty bad here, both in 
the rear and at the front. I don't see how Russia can hold out 
beyond the autumn. The army is breaking up and the country is 
threatened with famine... It is essential that people should realise 
in England the desperate straits in Russia"35. In the sumaner of 
1917, therefore, Price appears to have concentrated his reporting 
entirely upon the economic situation. Four articles by him on this 
subject were published between July and September, one in the 
34 At the time and for many years afterwards, the period of unrest 
known as the "July Days" in the summer of 1917 was widely regarded as 
a premature, unsuccessful Bolshevik coup d'etat. More recent 
historians tend to recognise that the events of these days were the 
outcome, ill-organised almost to the point of spontaneity, of 
frustration with the lack of clear direction or leadership in the 
months following the March Revolution. Insofar as any identifiable 
groupings lay behind the unrest, they were anarchists and Bolshevised 
military units. The Kronstadt sailors who came to take part in the 
demonstrations were little more that catspaws. Bolshevik political 
leaders were for the most part against them, although not strongly 
enough to prevent them from taking place. The July days are 
graphically described by Alexander Rabinowitch in Prelude to the 
Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising 
(Indiana 1968). A good short account is given by Marc Ferro in 
October 1917 (pp. 19-35 in the English translation by Norman Stone, 
1980). See also David Mandel: The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of 
the Old Regime: from the February Revolution to the July Dam (New 
York 1988) and Israel Getzler: Kronstadt 1917-1921: The Fate of 
Soviet Democracy (Cambridge 1983). 
A. M. P. 25.7.17. Price papers. 
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Manchester Guardian and three in Camion Sense. The first, written 
for the former and quoted from in the latter on 4 August, appeared 
on 27 July. Although not datelined, to judge from its content it 
cannot have been much delayed between the writing and publication. 
In the very first paragraph Price asserted that "the spectre of 
famine is already stalking over the great Russian plain" and he 
quoted from a recent speech by the Minister of Agriculture, 
Shingarev, who reported that in the northern provinces peasants were 
beginning to kill themselves and their children "to escape from the 
pangs of hunger". He recapitulated some of the basic information on 
food production which he had derived from his earlier interview with 
Shingarev and went on to analyse yet again the underlying financial 
crisis: the "mad dance of the paper milliards". He discussed the 
role of speculators in withholding raw materials and the 
self-defeating wage rises which the workers had demanded immediately 
after the revolution; and concluded with his own list of "stern 
measures... needed to prevent a catastrophe": minimum wages, fixed 
prices, and state control over and reinvestment in war industries. 
On 12 August Price wrote a piece more than 4,000 words long from 
Petrograd which was printed by Co rson Sense in three parts on 
September 8,15 and 22. In the first he described again the factors 
which had brought Russia, immersed simultaneously in both a war and a 
revolution, "within measurable distance of being starved to death" 
while the Western Allies tried to persuade her to "throw over her 
social reforms ... and die in the last 
ditch for the annexation of 
Constantinople. " The second part described and explained the "wild 
yearning for land" of the Russian peasant but pointed out that 
redistribution would not necessarily "turn Russia into a country of 
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peasant proprietors. " The Russian peasant, said Price, "remains true 
to his conmunism... land is the property only of the people; there 
can only be property in the products of labour on the land. " The 
real danger for the future lay in a decline in productivity. In the 
third part Price described the unpreparedness of Russia's middle and 
manufacturing classes for war, and how their response to war had been 
profiteering and speculation. It was not surprising that after the 
1917 March revolution the workers were "determined to get some of 
their own back". Price quoted statistics which had "come to light" 
showing that in the Moscow area since the beginning of the war the 
percentage rise in profits had been 171%. meanwhile the wages of 
workers in the same area had risen by 15% and the cost of living by 
79.5%. The result of the demand for wage increases had so far simply 
been to increase the amount of paper money in circulation. "Hard 
necessity" wrote Price in August 1917 "quite apart from the 
political aspect of the question" was forcing the State to "enter 
upon a plan of 'sequestration' of industry". The first signs of a 
new order had been the creation of a Regional Supply Committee 
covering sixteen provinces, and made up from delegates from Soviets 
and the old Alliance of Zemstvos and Cities, with the task of 
guaranteeing the supply of raw materials to manufacturing industries, 
the right to requisition manufactured goods for distribution and 
sale, and duty of creating conciliation boards to settle questions of 
wages and hours in the areas over which its writ ran. "Of course 
this is a long way from nationalisation of industry, but the above 
development points all in this direction. " 
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(iii) International Implications 
As already noted, Price wrote little on any subject for the 
Manchester Guardian in the summer of 1917 and confined himself 
largely to economic affairs in what he wrote for Common Sense. He 
did, however, on 17 and 18 August write three long memoranda for 
Trevelyan, largely concerned with aspects of the Russian revolution 
with international significance36. These were probably intended as 
briefing papers for his friends in the U. D. C. and not for publication 
in its journal (and indeed they were not so used), but they were all 
given titles and seem to fall into a kind of sequence. In what 
appears to be the first, Price discussed the question of 
responsibility for war damage. He pointed out that if scapegoats 
were to be found it was Russian mobilisation that had precipitated 
the outbreak of war, but "the Russian revolutionary democrat" laid 
the blame "equally at the door of Hohenzollerns, Romanovs and 
Hapsburgs without distinction". Nor was there anything to choose 
between the combatants when it came to the persecution of minorities. 
He went on to compare what he had seen of both German and Russian 
persecutions in Poland and Turkish and Russian persecutions in 
Armenia in 1915 and 1916. The new Russia, said Price, saw no hope of 
getting reparations for past wrongs except by "an international 
commission financed by the treasuries of all the belligerent powers". 
The second memorandum noted the extraordinary speed with which class 
consciousness had developed in Russia since 1905, despite subsequent 
repression. "The writer has been informed from a trustworthy 
revolutionary source that a revolution was planned for the autumn of 
1914 to break out at three points, Petrograd, Helsingfors and 
36 Price papers. 
3: 100 
Kronstadt". The Tsarist government had got to- know about the plan 
and reckoned that a foreign war was the only way to prevent it from 
being carried out. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was a godsend to 
the government. But the overthrow of the Tsarist regime early in 
1917 was only "a prelude to a such greater and more bitter struggle". 
Price went on to describe and account for the lack of nationalist 
feeling among the masses in Russia. This was due to the late 
development of capitalism, which only began to flourish "on the ruins 
of the mediaeval village" after the abolition of serfdom. The 
amorphous half peasant half-urban masses had no point of contact with 
the capitalist class above it and easily developed into "a 
proletariat with a strong class consciousness that knew no bounds of 
nationality". Unfortunately, although Imperialist ideas were quite 
foreign to the Russian nature, the Russian workers were very weak in 
national institutions. "The problem before the revolution now 
therefore is the organisation of the masses and the creation of 
durable political organs through which the ideas of the revolution 
can be translated in actuality. " The third memorandum developed the 
theme of "peace without annexations and indemnities". Although the 
Great Russians (that is, the Russians of the central plains and 
northern forests) had very little national feeling as understood in 
the West, this was not true of the border states: Poland, Finland, 
the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia 
and Siberia. A third element therefore had to be added to the peace 
formula: the right of every nationality to settle its own destiny by 
self-determination, by which was meant referendum. The process had 
already begun, pending confirmation by the Constituent Assembly, in 
most of the border states that he had named. 
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Chapter 4. 'Through the Russian Provinces' 
on 4 September 1917 Price sent postcards from Moscow to his aunt and 
his uncle in both of which he said that he would be leaving for 
Novgorod that night on his way to Kazan on the Volga, and would 
probably be away for three weeks. He also mentioned that the bread 
ration in Moscow was down to 1/21b. a day and there was "no meat 
anywhere". He was to be away, in fact, for more than seven weeks, 
returning to Petrograd only just before the November revolution. 
Whether or not he had intended to be away from the capital for so 
long, his instinct to go looking for information and the wealth of it 
that he found himself accumulating made it almost inevitable that he 
would go on travelling for as long as he could. In the course of his 
travels he wrote nine articles, the first three posted from Samara on 
22 September, and the last written at Yaroslavl on 24 October. They 
were published in the Manchester Guardian between 27 November and 8 
December out of chronological order, as a series to which the editor 
gave the collective title 'Through the Russian Provinces'. Some of 
them may not even have reached England until after the news of the 
November revolution had arrived. Indeed some of Price's own 
despatches about the revolution were published before most of the 
articles in the series. Taken together, they form an account unique 
in the English language of the impact of the March revolution on the 
Volga provinces, and in some of the northern Cossack territories and 
the Khirgiz steppes, from where he was also able to learn something 
at close second hand about developments in Turkestan. These articles 
will be dealt with in the order in which they were written, insofar 
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as it is ascertainable, and not in the order in which they were 
published. 
In his unpublished autobiography Price later wrote "One can feel the 
pulse of Russia best by going to the heartland of the country ... I was 
extraordinarily fortunate because as yet civil war had not broken out 
and communications were still more or less intact. Moreover there 
was no restriction of travel, because no-one in the country had 
sufficient authority to prevent anyone else from doing what he 
wanted. "l Armed with letters of introduction from the Petrograd 
Soviet and the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party 
(S. R. s) Price made his way down the Volga to Samara, which he made 
his first base. From there he set out by train for Orenburg, where 
"an azure blue sky overhead and an atmosphere of crystal told me that 
I was approaching the threshold of Asia" and where he found "Moscow 
wares and picture palaces in one street" and "carpet bazaars and 
camel caravans" in the next2. From Orenburg, where he was lucky 
enough to be invited to attend the first gathering of the Orenburg 
Cossacks for a hundred and fifty years he set out "armed with a map 
and a tea kettle"3 and in a peasant cart with a driver and two 
horses headed eastwards. He stopped at a trading centre on the edge 
of the Akhnolinsk province east of which the Turgai steppes stretch 
2,000 versts to the Chinese frontier. This was the furthest point of 
his journey. He then retraced his steps to Samara, and went by boat 
northwards to Kazan, a two-day journey. He particularly wanted to 
see how the Volga Tartars, the descendents of the Golden Horde, had 
1 Price papers. 
2 Ibid p. 564. 
3 Ibid p. 571. 
Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 551. 
4: 103 
been affected by the revolution. From Kazan he returned, again by 
boat, to Nijni Novgorod. 
In what appears to be the first of the series4 Price gave a 
detailed account of the way in which the March revolution had taken 
root in the villages of the Volga provinces. He described the 
Councils of Peasants Deputies: the circumstances of their formation, 
the way they were elected, how they operated and to what extent their 
authority was enforceable. He noted the growth of the Co-operative 
Movement among the peasants and the hostility with which it was 
regarded by the forces of reaction: retailers who feared their 
conpetition, small landed proprietors who felt threatened by schemes 
for land redistribution, and members of the Kadet party. The 
Councils had however Price estimated, gained the allegiance of 99% of 
the politically conscious peasantry, of all the soldiers in 
provincial garrison towns, and a few intellectuals. The prevailing 
ideology was, he found, Socialist Revolutionary, not Marxist, (By 
which he meant Bolshevik). But the S. R. s who inspired the Councils 
of Peasants Deputies and the Social Democrats who inspired the urban 
Soviets were "united in their determination once and for all to 
abolish landlordism and the rights of property... It is certain that 
whatever else may happen the Russian landlord will become a thing of 
the past. " 
4 Manchester Guardian 4.12.17. Datelined Samara. 'The Peasants 
and their Land Programme'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
4: 104 
The next articles described the work done by Chernov during his 
tenure as Minister of Agriculture6 to prepare the way for land 
redistribution, and the opposition to him from the Kadets and allied 
interests. So effective had this opposition been that in the lower 
Volga provinces the peasants had been driven to taken the law into 
their own hands and had drawn up a "temporary land socialisation 
scheme", thus becoming, as Price put, "the rural counterpart to the 
Maximalists". The peasants had presented the Provisional government 
with a 
. 
fait accompli secure in the knowledge "that the armed forces 
of the country, which are their own sons, will be on their side". 
Price went on to describe how the land had been divided: "The change 
at first sight seems merely a matter of book keeping, but it is 
fraught with tremendous social and economic consequences. " There 
was, however a danger that communal landholding would become a 
fixed practise at village level only, in which case the S. R. idea of 
establishing a national land reserve would fall. This led Price to 
the main reason which he thought underlay the tendency to local 
autonomy in land settlement schemes: the fear of immigration by 
peasants from areas where land was less plentiful. Another, 
secondary, reason was the breakdown in food distribution caused by 
5 Ibid 5.12.17 Datelined Samara. 'How the Peasants Are Taking 
Over the Land'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
6 VIKTOR MIKHAILOVICH CHER X)V (1873-1952). A prominent Socialist 
Revolutionary theoretician, Chernov spent much of his life before 
1917 in exile, involved in emigre politics. In April 1917 he 
returned to Russia and in May became Minister of Agriculture, a post 
in which he was condemned to be ineffective because of his party's 
commitment to leave any definitive decision on agrarian policy to the 
Constituent Assembly, of which he was elected President for its brief 
duration. Between 1918 and 1920 he continued to play an active part 
in S. R. politics but emigrated in 1920. For further reading, see 
O. H. Radkey, The Sickle under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist 
Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule (New York 1963) 
and M. Perrie: The Agrarian Policy of the Russian Socialist 
Revolutionary Party: from its Origins Through the Revolution of 
1905-7 (Cambridge 1977). 
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war, so that "each area is interested in holding its supplies, 
preventing exports and running its awn food and land policies. " This 
question, Price concluded, assumed a more general character "and is 
connected with the great struggle between the classes which is now 
beginning to overstep the boundaries of race and nationality. " 
Price's third article from Samara7 was written in a lighter vein 
and described a visit to a village, accompanied by a member of the 
local Council of Peasants' Deputies, to observe a meeting of the 
village Soviet. They were to discuss a report on decisions taken at 
the last meeting of the Samara Soviet and to endorse them or not as 
they chose. Recalling the occasion Price wrote later: "The Samara 
Soviet's word was not yet law. The village Soviet was still a happy 
one this Sunday afternoon. The process of splitting into classes had 
not yet come. "8 In his article Price described the proceedings as 
picturesque, if not exactly businesslike. Before leaving the area 
Price went alone next day to visit the local landlord, who was 
getting ready to depart for good to Crimea while his last remaining 
caw chewed up the ferns in his conservatory. No one in the village 
had wanted any changes, said the unhappy man, until "people came from 
the town and stirred it all up. Those stupid Kadets ought to have 
stopped this rabble long ago in the first days of the Revolution. " 
Price also went to a nearby monastery in which the monks, suddenly 
finding that they were "the monastic proletariat" had turned out 
their "bourgeois" Abbot and were working their land in an amicable 
arrangement with the local peasants. 
7 Manchester Guardian 6.12.17. Datelined Samara. 'The Revolut icn 
and Its Effects on Rural Life'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
8 Price papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller'. pp. 559-560. 
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Before writing his next article Price had moved on to Cossack 
territory9. Here he judged that the relationship between "the 
revolutionary masses" in the area, workers and peasants on the one 
hand, the Cossacks on the other, had deteriorated since March. 
Price interviewed the elected chief or Ataman of the Orenburg 
Cossacks and asked if he could account for this. The answer he got 
made it clear that the Cossacks, too, were afraid of immigration into 
their territories by landless peasants. Individual Cossack land 
holdings before the revolution were on average seven times the size 
of those of peasants in neighbouring Samara, Price found, but "what 
our fathers won" said the Ataman "we shall not give up". Price then 
wrote an account of the causes and history of Cossack settlements, 
and showed how the Tsarist governments had traditionally taken 
advantage of Cossack privileges to gain their support against popular 
discontent. Eventually "their free nature revolted against this 
moral servitude" wrote Price, but the conversion to revolutionary 
principles had been skin-deep. Only in those Cossack territories 
where the land allotments were not so large and where industrial 
development was beginning were the Cossacks starting to feel any 
sense of genuine solidarity with the proletariat. "Class 
consciousness has not yet penetrated the bulk of the Cossacks" and 
though economic pressures and the effects of the war would eventually 
bring them into line, Price thought this would take time, and 
"meanwhile the revolutionary democracy has a territorial problem no 
less difficult to solve than the Ukraine and Finland". 
9 Manchester Guardian 27.11.17. Datelined Orenburg 1.10.17. 'The 
Russian Provinces and the Revolution. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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Price wrote next about the general assembly (krug) of the Orenburg 
Cossacks which he was invited to attend 10. Although in theory all 
Cossacks had equal rights, Price was struck by the parade ground 
atmosphere which was in marked contrast to that prevailing in the 
various Soviets which he had observed elsewhere, in which soldiers' 
delegates were rarely officers. At least half the delegates at the 
krug were officers, and for the first two days "the initiative came 
entirely from the generals, colonels and officials sitting on the 
front benches". Speeches were made against the notion that the 
revolution had any international significance. "'The Cossacks are 
fighters and not diplomats. Away with revolutionary councils 
financed by Jews'. " A representative from the DonCossacks told them 
how deeply injured the Cossack leadership in the Don was feeling 
because of the suspicious attitude of the Provisional government. 
What had they done to deserve it? "We only stand for discipline, 
order and firm power, for the dissolution of the democratic bodies 
and no politics in wartime. General Kornilov was the man who knew 
the real needs of Russia and he is the man who still inspires the 
ideas of us Cossacks. " Price reported that there was wild applause 
from the front benches, but that the soldiers at the back "sat and 
looked stolidly in front of them, as if still waiting for the word of 
command". On the second day of the krug the threat to traditiorAL 
Cossack systems of land tenure was discussed, and it became clear 
that a movement was in the making towards some form of autonomy where 
the territorial rights of Cossacks were concerned. On the third day 
the back benches at last produced a speaker, as brave as he was 
diffident, who made a plea for solidarity between the Cossacks and 
10 Manchester Guardian 29.11.17. Datelined Orenburg 5.10.17. 'At a 
Cossack Provincial Assembly'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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soldiers in the Russian army. "A dead silence came over the hall as 
the speaker finished. The generals in the front row were too 
astounded to utter a sound. " A representative of the Cossack section 
of the Council of Workers and Soldiers' Delegates in Petrograd now 
also found his voice. This was too much for the front bench, and a 
number of irregularities were conveniently found in the procedures by 
which the delegates from the ranks had been elected, which enabled 
the more vociferous to be excluded. 
With the sixth article in this series the Manchester Guardian gave 
Price the benefit of an excellent topographical map showing the types 
of soil and general ecology of the areas he was describing: Siberia, 
the northern Cossack territories, the Kirghiz steppes and 
Turkestanll. He showed how the nature of the land was influencing 
the nature of the different regional revolutionary governments. He 
paid particular attention to the treatment of the Kirghiz, whose 
territories had been reduced by half through the colonisation policy 
of the Tsarist government in the past ten years. Price reported that 
when the Kirghiz had protested about this half a million of them had 
been massacred in the summer of 1916 and another million fled to 
11 Manchester Guardian 28.11.17. Datelined Orenburg 1.10.17. 
'Asiatic Russia and the Revolution'. Signed M. Philips Price. (The 
dateline is probably an error as it is clear from the text that this 
article follows on from that datelined 5.10.17, describing the 
Cossack Assembly. ) 
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China12. He then dealt in some detail with the effects of the 
revolution on the Moslems of Turkestan, ranging from the anti- 
revolutionary influence of the emir of Bokhara to the Maximalism of 
12 On 25 June 1916 an Imperial Decree was issued calling up non- 
Russians in Turkestan and the Steppe regions for non-combatant duties 
in the army, from which the native populations of these areas had 
hitherto been exempt. The decree itself was so badly phrased that 
even those who could read could not be sure what was going to be 
expected of them, and to this uncertainty was added the suspicion 
that as soon as their backs were turned Russian colonisers would make 
even further inroads into the lands of those who had been called up. 
The Uzbeks began the rebellion in July, the Kirghiz followed in 
August and the Kazaks in September and October. No official report 
of the rebellion was ever published, partly at least because the 
revolutions of 1917 made the compilation of methodical statistics 
almost impossible. Russian losses were estimated by General 
Kuropatkin, who was sent to deal with the disturbances, at around 
4,000 but no reliable estimate of Muslim casualties has even been 
made. Price wrote in terms of half a million dead and another 
million fled to China. Zenkovsky (see below) estimated that only 
300,000 Kirghiz fled to China, but that even this number represented 
nearly one third of the total Kirghiz population of Turkestan. Price 
heard rumours of riot and massacres when he reached the Caucasus, 
soon after they began, but was only able to substantiate the rumours 
when he got to Orenburg a year later. His estimate of the number of 
dead cannot be taken as any more reliable than those quoted above, 
but that there was a massacre is not now disputed. Moreover the 
suppresion of the facts involved not only Russian but - apparently - 
British censorship. Price's account of the massacre was published as 
part of another article by him on 28 November 1917. Scott took it as 
his text for a leading article on the same day. "His is the first 
news of this terrible affair which has appeared in the English press. 
That the facts should have been kept out of the English press is not 
very surprising when one remembers that for many months not a whisper 
found echo here of the hideous persecutions and evacuations of the 
Jews of Russian Poland and Cilicia by the Grand Duke Nicholas. But 
the Kirghiz rebellion and slaughter, so far as we are aware, were not 
mentioned even in the American or enemy press which had at that time 
no special tenderness for the government of the Tsar, nor yet in the 
papers published in China, which could have got hold of the story 
from the Chinese end. Mr. Price has been on the spot and has learned 
the facts there, so that the authenticity of his account cannot be 
questioned. Under all the circumstances this Kirghiz affair will 
take a very high place in the records of censorship and concealment. " 
Recent research has revealed that the Grand Duke Nicholas, far from 
being to blame for the persecutions and deportation of the Jews of 
Poland and Galicia in 1915, did his best to put a stop to them. See 
Chp. 2 FIN 35. The best short account of the massacre of the Kirghiz 
is given by Geoffrey Wheeler: The Modern History of Soviet Central 
Asia (1964) pp. 92-96. See also Serge A. Zenkovsky: Pan-Turkism and 
Islam in Russia (Harvard 1964) and Richard A. Pierce: Russian 
Central Asia 1867-1917 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961). 
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cotton workers in Fergana. Price saw "as yet little sign of class 
struggle between native property owners and labourers and nothing 
approaching Pan-Islamism, but there is growing a simple 'Turkestan' 
nationalism". The S. R. slogan of Land and Liberty had little meaning 
for the inhabitants of Turkestan. "No one in Turkestan wants land 
because it is all desert. But everyone wants water, and no party has 
come forward promising 'Water and Liberty' ... 11 
The next article came from Tartar country, where the mixed population 
of Great Russians and Moslem Tartars were at least not afraid of 
imnigrants13. The small size of the average land holdings in this 
area made it more likely that the inhabitants would be wanting to 
emigrate eastwards themselves. Price noticed that the Tsarist policy 
of setting one element of the population against the other and of 
deliberately withholding education from the Tartars had been only too 
successful. The peasants in the Kazan government were "much slower 
and less effective in their organisation of revolutionary committees 
than elsewhere". On the other hand there was no movement, either, 
for territorial autonomy such as he had observed annng the Cossacks, 
the Kirghiz and in Turkestan. The Tartar National Council was 
sensibly concentrating on education. There was however a strong pan- 
Turanian movement among some Tartar intellectuals, who were "looking 
to Stambul as their cultural shrine and long to become the messengers 
of peace between Ottoman people and the Russian republic". On the 
other hand the pan-Turanian movement, being purely cultural, took no 
interest in progressive movements elsewhere in Asia, unlike the more 
educated Moslems, who saw themselves in a much more political light. 
13 Manchester Guardian 1.12.17. Datelined Kazan 15.10.17. 'The 
Russian Tartars and the Revolution'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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Islam for them was a means by which revolutionary class consciousness 
could be extended to "the whole world of Asia, sunk in mediaeval 
apathy and superstition, politically enslaved by the ruling classes 
of Europe". Price finally devoted some attention in this article to 
the success of the women's movement in this area, which had begun 
after the 1905 revolution but had only found a secure base against 
the reactionary influence of the mullahs since the revolution of 
March 1917. 
Price's eighth article described a night spent on a cold quay on the 
banks of the Volga together with a random sample of Russians waiting 
for the next boat14. He had been turned off an earlier boat for 
which he not only had a ticket but a ticket for a second-class 
compartment, by a group of soldiers shouting "'Hey, you bourgeois! 
Out with you all! Make way for the honest folk! ' It was no use to 
explain that although I had a second-class ticket I was nevertheless 
a sympathiser with the Russian Revolution. I wore a black coat and a 
felt hat and that was enough. " Waiting for the next boat Price 
listened all night to what his companions in misfortune were saying 
to each other about the events of the past six months. He wrote it 
down with no convent, making a picture which has not lost any of its 
ininediacy with the passage of time. 
In the last of the series, written at Yaroslavl on 24 October, Price 
attempted to sum up the ingressions and conclusions he had drawn from 
14 Manchester Guardian 7.12.17. Datelined Nijni Novgorod 21.10.17. 
'The Voice of the People on the Revolution'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
(The text of this article appears as Appendix 2 at the end of this 
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his journey15. The first thing that appears to have struck him was 
the drive "for the enlightenment of the masses": libraries, 
lectures, basic literacy courses were being organised everywhere by 
political parties, Soviets, town councils and Zemstvos. "A new type 
of intelligentsia is being created... It is this type that is now 
controlling the provincial democratic bodies. " He then went on to 
consider what these democratic bodies were. The local Soviets in the 
areas he had visited though still influential, were he thought to a 
large extent being replaced by other bodies. The trades unions were 
becoming more important. "It would seem that among the Russian 
proletariat consciousness of the need for political struggle came 
first and the desire for economic organisation later. It is the 
exact reverse of what has taken place in the Labour movement 
in England. " Price noted that elected town councils and rural 
Zemstvos, elected on adult suffrage, were taking over much of the 
work formerly done by the Soviets, although many of those elected 
were the same people who had formerly led the Soviets. Everything, 
Price thought, appeared to point to "a gradual deepening and 
broadening of the Revolution throughout the country " Against this 
impression, unfortunately, had to be set the factors making for 
anarchy: the havoc and dislocation caused by the war, and the 
separatist tendencies of the regions both in terms of land holding 
policies and reluctance to part with food. Price noted that in areas 
in which land holdings were small or non-existent but where an 
15 Manchester Guardian 8.12.17. Datedlined Yaroslavl 24.10.17. 
'How the Maximalists Have Come to Gain Control'. Signed M. Philips 
Price. It is probable that the title of this article was added in 
hindsight in Cross Street. Price appears to have used new-style 
dates himself when he dated his articles, but on 24 October the 
"Maximalists" had not yet "gained control", although by the time the 
article was published it had been overtaken by news of the Bolshevik 
Revolution. 
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organised and equitable attempt to redistribute land had taken place 
"there had been complete quiet". But where this had not happened 
there had been agrarian disorders and looting. The three main causes 
of anarchy were, in Price's view: the incapacity of the towns to 
supply the peasants with manufactured goods, leading them to hide 
their corn; the suspicion among the peasants that the Provisional 
government was not going to keep its promises where land reform was 
concerned: and, above all, "the endless prolongation of the war for 
objects which - to state the plain fact - nobody understands or cares 
about". 
Price went on to say that he had thought towards the end of the 
summer that the March Revolution had reached the "second stage", in 
which the class struggle would predominate. But this development had 
become complicated by arguments between Maximalists and Minimalists 
(read Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) on the question of tactics. The 
Maximalists had "an immense if amorphous following"; but Price 
thought that many of their supporters awng the soldiers and peasants 
did not really know what the Maximalists meant when they talked about 
"All Power to the Soviets". But "All the recent provincial elections 
have given immense majorities to this wing of the revolutionary 
democracy. " Price concluded by observing "no sign of any military 
enthusiasm like that which inspired the French Revolutionaries. 
There is, on the other hand, a great possibility of a Napoleon ... who 
will put an end to the war even at the cost of territorial losses to 
Russia and at the price of the political liberties won by the 
revolution. " The desire to end the war was the one thing that held 
together "this confused social mass" in the third stage of the 
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revolution, as Price perceived it. But as soon as that had been 
accomplished new combinations and conditions would emerge "for the 
political struggle in the fourth stage". 
In My Three Revolutions Price wrote that he gathered that his series 
of articles had created "a considerable sensation in the countries of 
the Western Allies, in the United States and even in enemy 
countries... Correspondents in Petrograd of the Western Allies were 
only too ready to listen to the reports of interested people who told 
them that if they dared to venture into these parts they would have 
their throats cut by the Bolsheviks and Red Terrorists. My articles 
showed that I had gone there, travelled widely and had been received 
in a most friendly manner. "16 
Price wrote one more account of the situation in Russia on the eve of 
the Bolshevik revolution which survives only in a carbon copy, with 
no indication for whom it was intended. (See Chapter 11 pp. 431-432) 
Since many of the observations and conclusions contained in it were 
derived from his journey through the Russian provinces it would seem 
appropriate to deal with them in the context of that journey, where 
they are relevant17. He headed his paper 'Memorandum on the State 
of Russia between August and November 1917' and it is dated 2 
November, from Petrograd. The memorandum began with a short account 
16 Three Revolutions p. 78. In fact, most of Chapter 7 of this 
book consists of either adaptations or direct quotations from his 
series of articles 'Through the Russian Provinces'. 17 Price papers. Price kept a carbon copy of this memorandum. 
There is no indication on it as to for whom it was intended. It 
could have been for Scott, Hirst, Trevelyan or all three, but no 
echoes from it are to be found in the Manchester Guardian, Couron 
Sense or U. D. C.. 
4 115 
of Kornilov's attempted X18. Price himself was already on the 
Volga when this was going on, but he described how he had seen for 
himself "the remarkably easy way in which the revolutionary leaders 
succeeded in instantly gathering round them all the live and active 
elements in the democracy". He noted also that after it was all over 
the revolutionary leaders with whom he talked had become distinctly 
more hostile to the Allies, some of them going so far as to allege 
that "England had 'got up the Kornilov affair in order to put down 
the revolution'. " Price went on to describe and account for in 
greater detail than he had been able to do in his Manchester Guardian 
articles the fissiparous tendencies he had seen as between soldiers, 
the urban proletariat and the peasants. He had seen with his own 
eyes Volga boats crowded with peasants from one province attempting 
to buy food from another before the river froze. Once that had 
happened they faced a diet of roots and nuts. Freight trains from 
the south carrying food for Petrograd were plundered long before they 
arrived. Each district was running its in food and land policy and 
18 Kornilov's attempted coup in August 1917 continues to attract 
speculation. There can be little doubt that the Allies - certainly 
the British - would have liked it to succeed, although they felt 
unable to support him openly. Having unnecessarily abandoned Riga 
(as the Germans pursued their summer counter-offensive) Kornilov, now 
Commander in Chief, declared Petrograd to be in the front line, in 
the hope of frightening the Provisional Government into resigning: a 
ruse which did not succeed. Kornilov was undoubtedly attempting to 
mobilise a march on Petrograd and the establishment of military 
dictatorship when Kerensky sacked him. The question remains whether 
there was ever a conspiracy between Kornilov and Kerensky - as some 
believe - designed to bring down the Petrograd Soviet and form a new, 
and less radical Provisional Government. An Extraordinary Commission 
of Enquiry into the Kornilov affair was set up, but Kerensky refused 
to appear before it. A member of the Commission, N. Ukraintsev, 
published a short memoir in the New York emigre paper Novoe Russkoe 
Slovoe (28 October 1956) which left open the question whether the two 
men were in not some form of collusion. The conspiracy theory is 
also discussed in Russian Review 29 (1970) 3 pp. 286 300: 'The 
Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation' by Harvey Asher. A good short 
account,, without speculations, is given by Marc Ferro in October 
1917: A Social History of the Russian Revolution (1980) pp. 50-58. 
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Russia was "splitting up into a number of economic areas in which the 
inhabitants, seeing the calamity threatening them, cling together for 
comron safety and cannot hear the cries for help from their 
neighbours... It literally strikes terror into one to move about 
Russia these days, not only because one does not know what unforeseen 
disaster may overcome one, but also because the sights one sees are 
such clear evidence of an even more terrible condition which is to 
come... And yet the Times and other organs of the English oligarchy 
accuse the revolutionary councils [Soviets] of being responsible for 
the anarchy and hope for another Kornilov to put them out of 
existence... I can confidently assert, after my recent journey in the 
interior of Russia in the last two months, that if it were not for the 
revolutionary councils in the towns, villages and wrong the soldiers 
of the garrisons, the anarchy would be fifty times worse. " Price 
proceeded to back up this assertion with many exanples of the role 
played by local Soviets in maintaining some kind of orderl9, 
19 William G. Rosenburg and Diana P. Koenker in 'The Limits of 
Formal Protest: Worker Activism and Social Polarisation in Petrograd 
and Moscow, March-October 1917' (American Historical Review Vol. 92 
(1987) pp. 296-326), corroborate that in the capital cities the 
Kornilov coup exercised the same radicalising and solidifying effect 
on the Left as Price observed in the provinces. 
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APPENDIX II 
THROUGH THE RUSSIAN PROVINCES 
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE ON THE REVOLUTION 
By our Petrograd Correspondent, M. Phillips Price. 
Nijni Novgorod, October 21. 
It was getting dark when I reached the quay on the banks of the Volga 
where the boats discharge and load for Kazan. The barge where the steamer 
arrives was crowded with every conceivable type of humanity that Russia 
is capable of producing. In the greasy, chattering throng I saw a large 
number of peasants with sacks of flour piled up in heaps around them. 
They had come from the northern governments of Vladimir, Yaroslav, and 
Kostroma to buy flour for their starving families. Their pinched faces 
and ragged clothes told eloquently of the state to which the war has 
reduced these forest dwellers of North Russia. In the half-darkness I 
stumbled over a confused mass of sleeping and squatting humanity and sacks 
of flour till I reached the ticket office. Here i bought a second-class 
ticket, and on the arrival of the boat settled myself comfortably in one 
of the cabins for the night. 
Presently I heard a commotion, and all at once there burst into the second- 
class department a number of "comrades" - revolutionary soldiers who are 
now acting as militia on the Volga quays. "Hey, you bourgeois! Out 
with you all! Make way for honest folk. " It was no use to explain that 
although I had a second-class ticket, I was nevertheless a sympathiser 
with the Russian Revolution. I wore a black coat and a felt hat, and 
that was enough. I was a bourgeois, and I had to clear out - bag and 
baggage. As I passed out, discomfited, I struggled through a mob of these 
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same peasants whom I had seen on the quay. They had been waiting two 
days and two nights for the steamer to come and take them north to their 
starving families, and in the faint light I could see a gleam of satis- 
faction on their thin faces that they were at last one step nearer home. 
Here on the ship they annexed the first and second class cabins and 
stacked their sacks in the third class and the hold. The ship sailed 
away, and I was left on the open barge that acts as a quay to take my 
luck for the next ship. 
It was pitch dark. A cold autumn wind was blowing. The city of Kazan 
lay five miles distant. There was nothing to do but to "stick it" out 
in the open till morning. On the barge I found a number of fellow- 
travellers in the same plight as myself. Several of the hungry peasants 
with their sacks had not succeeded in getting away. There were also some 
women from the villages near Kazan who were returning from market; there 
was a retail trader in skins or, to be more precise in these days, a 
speculator ("heeshehnik" is the Russian word); two mechanics from cotton 
factories further up the Volga, a Tartar fisherman, and an officer, the 
only member of the "intelligentsia" present. As comrades in misfortune 
we all got together. Someone lit a fire, and there was a general atmos- 
phere of companionship around it. Some lay on the sacks, some squatted 
near the fire. 
"The Kingdom of Hunger" 
The moon rose and half lifted the curtain of darkness, while the wave- 
lets lapped rythmically against the sides of the barge. I lay dawn and 
drew my coat over me, but the cold prevented sleep, and I listened to 
the conversation. Every discussion in a public place in Russia now 
Appendix ii : (iii) 
concerns food. It is the essence of politics. It looms larger even than 
the question of war and peace, for in international politics the stomach 
seems to be a more influential factor than the brain. Last year food, 
or rather the absnce of it, made the Revolution; this year it seems to 
be on the verge of destroying it. 
"You fellows down here in the south are living in paradise, " said one 
of the peasants from Vladimir, "with your flour at 30 kopecks a pound, 
and your eggs at 15 kopecks each. You come up north, my boys, and you'll 
find no honey that way. " 
"There is plenty of corn, " said one of the mechanics, "but it's hidden 
in the villages and the speculators have got hold of it. It will be no 
good until they are searched and made to give it up. " 
"We have only just got enough for ourselves, " said a peasant woman from 
the south. "In our village each 'izbi' (an old Russian term for a col- 
lection of families living under one roof) has not more than 50 poods 
(a pood equals about 36lb. ) each, and what can we sell from that when 
we don't know what will happen tomorrow? Perhaps next year there will 
be no machines, no horses, no labour to work. If there is no store in 
the 'ambar' (public village granary) we, too, shall see the kingdom of 
hunger. " "Take it from the landlords, " retorted the mechanics; "they 
are fat enough. Why don't the councils and the produce committees re- 
quisition their granaries? " "Ah! those committees, " croaked an old woman; 
"what do they do but take large salaries and live at our expense? " 
"Yes, " said one of the old peasants, "the Government of Nicolas had little 
bread to give us, but these 'comrades' have even less. " "But don't you 
see, " suddenly interrupted a young peasant soldier who had joined the 
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company in the meantime, "that the councils and committees are not to 
blame? They can't get workmen because they are all at the war; they can't 
make machines for you because the factories won't work; they can't get 
horses for the transport because they are all at the front. Talk about 
Nicolas if you like, but would he do any better if he came back to look 
after your souls? " "Anyway, " said an old peasant, "Nicolas could feed 
the army, but these fellows can't. Only yesterday I had a letter from 
my son at the front. He wrote imploring us to send them flour to bake 
bread with. " "But I replied, " said an old woman, apparently his wife, 
"That if he wants bread he had better come home. What are they fighting 
about? If the Germans come it could not be worse than it is now. " 
There was a general silence, and I heard the Tartar snoring on one of 
the sacks. He was doubtless dreaming about his native steppes away to 
the east. "They won't give us any boots or shoes, or cloth for our coats, " 
persisted the old peasant; "the workmen in the towns take an eight-hour 
day and double their wages, but we peasants have to work all day, live 
on air and clothe ourselves with straw mats; and then they expect us to 
feed them. " 
"Eh, little father, " retorted the mechanic, "under Nicolas they looked 
after us well; we had to work all day for 40 roubles a month, and if we 
complained they packed us off to the front and put us in the front trenches 
to get us killed as quickly as possible. It is time for us to get a 
little for our work. Ask the capitalists and factory owners why you don't 
get your boots and shoes. They want to produce small quantities, so as 
to sell them at high prices. They are living nicely off you peasants,? 
if you only knew it; but you don't know it, and you go blaming the revol- 
utionary committees. " 
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"But how are the factory owners to live, " said the leather trader, who 
had been silent up to now. "if you workers take all his profits in wages? " 
"Fix our wages and his profits and the price of the goods, " replied the 
mechanic, "and then these comrades in the villages will get their boots. 
But that song does not please the gentlemen speculators. The bourgeois 
want the workers' blood, and know how to get it while there is a war 
going. " "By the Mother of God, " said an old peasant, "this is not true. 
Viat is a bourgeois? He is a man like you and me. You ought not to call 
a man bad because he is a bourgeois. It is a sin to say evil things. " 
"If a man lives at other people's expense he is a parasite and nothing 
more. " retorted the mechanic. "If a bourgeois is a parasite, " replied 
the old peasant, "then he is bad, but if he is only a bourgeois and no- 
thing more, then he is a comrade like you and me. God forgive us if we 
say evil things about each other. The war began in the world because 
the rulers of the people said evil things about the rulers of other people. 
Now there is war in Russia among her own people because we say evil things 
about one another. " 
The Ignorance of Slaves. 
There was another silence, broken by the officer, who all the time had 
been intently staring into the fire and puffing a cigaratee. "The real 
truth is, " he said, "that Russia is being ruined because her people are 
dark and ignorant. They have no patriotism or love of their country. " 
"Yes, " said the leather merchant, "we are only fit to be serfs, because 
when we get liberty we don't know what to do with it. " "Of course we 
are dark and ignorant, " retorted the mechanic, "if landlords, speculators, 
and capitalists rule us, because they want us to be so. It serves their 
interest, just as it did that of Nicolas Romanoff. You say that the 
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Russian people have no patriotism, but what have they got to be patriotic 
about if they have no land and are wage-slaves, and are then told to go 
and fight for foreign allies, who want colonies? " 
"Why don't we follow the example of the English and French? " said the 
officer. "They are an enlightened and educated people. They have money, 
and they are coming here to put order into the country. " "And fill their 
pockets, too, " retorted the mechanic. "You talk like that, " replied the 
officer, "but don't forget that a few years ago we were the slaves of 
the Germans; now we are only living thanks to the benevolence of our 
English and French allies. Tomorrow we shall perhaps be the slaves of 
all three. " "And that is just what our bourgeois want, " said the young 
peasant soldier; "they want us to be slaves. They don't want us to have 
the land for ourselves; they want us to go on fighting, so that we shall 
be under the foreign capitalists. Only peace and a union between peasants, 
labourers, Cossacks, and soldiers can stop our sufferings and make us 
free and independent and give us bread. It was for these things that 
we made the Revolution. " 
"Yes, my son, " said an old peasant, "you have made it, and you have given 
us neither peace, nor freedom, nor independence, nor bread. You have 
only brought the black ravens over Russia. " And tears came in the old 
man's eyes. "Are we to blame for that, little father? " said the young 
soldier. "It is bad times now, but don't forget that it was worse before 
the Revolution. True, we had more bread than we have now, but then we 
had no hope in life. Now we have less bread but more hope. " 
The conversation ended, the fire died down, the Tartar continued snoring, 
and the waves of the Volga still rippled against the sides of the 
barge. 
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For a long time I lay gazing up at the stars and trying to understand 
the meaning of the words that I had heard uttered that night by the only 
true voice of Russia. 
Manchester Guardian, Friday December 7,1917. 
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Chapter 5. The November Revolution 
Price returned to Petrograd on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Although he had kept abreast of political developments in Petrograd 
throughout August, even if he did not write about them for the 
Manchester Guardian for the time being, he was out of reach on the 
Volga during the so-called Democratic Conference which met in the 
capital on 27 Septemberl. In the memorandum which he wrote on the 
state of Russia between August and November (see above, Chapter 4, 
p. 1ii) he attributed its failure to the fact that the parties of the 
Left 
"had allowed themselves to be browbeaten by the 
bourgeois class, the banks and the diplomacy of the 
Allies. The capitalists and the bankers were prepared 
to declare a strike if the democracy took over the 
Government... I was told on good authority that Kerensky 
spoke in this sense to the democratic leaders at a 
secret sitting of the Council. " 
Price naturally did not disclose his source. Nonetheless his 
memorandum went on to express his opinion that the agreement reached 
1 After the failure of the Moscow Conference in August 1917 the 
Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet convened what was known 
as the Democratic Conference, which met at Petrograd on 27 September 
1917. It consisted of representatives of the Left parties: Kadets 
and parties of the Right were excluded but even so its composition 
was devised so as to ensure an anti-Bolshevik majority. Trotsky and 
Stalin, supported by Lenin who was then still in hiding after the 
July Days, wanted the Bolsheviks to boycott the Conference but were 
overruled. Carr described it as having been designed to fill a gap 
until the Constituent Assembly should meet. Filling the gap meant 
the creation of yet another interim body: the Pre-Parliament to 
which, Kerensky had indicated, he would be prepared to hold himself 
accountable. Price, who only heard about the Democratic Conference 
after his return from his travels and who may at that time have been 
prepared to give it the benefit of the doubt, eventually wrote in 
Three Revolutions "From all I could gather it had accomplished 
nothing but engaged in endless talk and petered out. " It had, 
however, set the scene for the last act of the political shadow play 
which preceded the November Revolution. See Carr The Bolshevik 
Revolution Vol. I (pp. 92-93); Marc Ferro October 1917 (pp. 232-234); 
Deutscher The Prophet Armed (pp. 283-286); Sukhanov The Russian 
Revolution (Chapter 25); Price My Three Revolutions (p. 78). 
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by the Democratic Conference to establish what he called a teorary 
Parliament (the Pre-Parliament) was a worthwhile one2. Although he 
had, by now, come to realise that the real power in the country lay 
with the Petrograd Soviet, he was troubled by its lack of 
accountability; he thought the Pre-Parliament would have more "moral 
force". However the immediate boycott of the Pre-Parliament by the 
Bolsheviks made him equally uneasy. He now knew from his own 
observations that their following in the provinces was very great, 
and that soldiers and workers might "come out at any moment on the 
streets with arms in their hands and attempt to put down the 
'bourgeois government' as they call it". In the same memorandum 
Price wrote that he believed the financial and military oligarchies 
of both the Allies and the Central Powers were subconsciously hoping 
"that the prolongation of the war will bring the revolution to 
disaster". The only issue on which everybody: "peasants and 
workers... the army at the front and the army at the rear" was united 
2 The Pre-Parliament, or Provisional Council of the Russian 
Republic, met in the Mariinsky Palace in Petrograd on 20 October 
1917. It was composed of delegates selected by party organisers. 
Sukhanov described it as "... exceptionally brilliant. It 
concentrated within itself, indeed, the flower of the nation. It 
owed this precisely to the unprecedented method of its selection. 
All the political parties and other associations sent their best 
people... " At the first session Trotsky, just released from prison 
and newly elected Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, delivered a 
scathing attack on the Provisional Government for the betrayal of the 
Revolution and led the Bolshevik delegates out. In the ensuing 
political vacuum foreign policy and ideas for a general peace 
occupied frost of the discussions. Price, who did not get to the 
Mariinsky until early November, was there to hear the announcement 
that the British Government had decreed that the forthcaning Allied 
Conference, upon which the Provisional Government had pinned great 
hopes, would not discuss peace at all but only war aims. He was also 
present, and, indeed, talking to Martov, when Kerensky came in to 
announce the formation of the Military Revolutionary Committee, and 
heard Martov say that this was a step with which the Menshevik 
Internationalists could not go along. See Price My Three Revolutions 
pp. 78-81 and My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution pp. 141-142; 
Ferro October 1917 pp. 234-238; Deutscher The Prophet Armed (1954) 
pp. 294-297; Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917 Chapter 26. 
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was in the desire to end the war. He thought the Bolsheviks would 
probably do so more quickly than any other group if they achieved 
power, but he feared that a Bolshevik victory would lead, in the end, 
to the ruin of the revolution. However whichever party took power 
"there will be peace and the sooner the Western Allies wake up to 
this fact the better for them". 
Because of the supposed division of functions between himself and 
Soskice Price had written nothing for the Manchester Guardian about 
events in Petrograd throughout the early autumn of 1917. He was also 
- and remained to the end of his life - hurt by the fact that Scott 
had appeared to consider his reports insufficient. This was not so; 
as already noted, Soskice had proposed himself to Scott, not the 
other way about. But Price did not know it at the time and never 
found out. In a letter to his aunt, written on 22 December 1917, 
when Soskice had fled from Russia and everybody wanted to hear from 
Price, he described his mood during the period of Soskice's maximum 
influence as Kerensky's Secretary and Special Correspondent of the 
Manchester Guardian. "I retired in the shade while all this was 
going on and bided my time. " But time was obviously something that 
Soskice did not have for the Manchester Guardian during the weeks 
immediately preceding the November Revolution and thus the paper, 
with two correspondents on the spot, got nothing but agency reports 
and rumours during this critical period. A single message only was 
printed from Price: a short account which appeared on 15 November of 
reactions in Petrograd to Balfour's announcement that the forthcaning 
conference of the Allies in Paris would not, as had been expected by 
the Russians, discuss the aims of the war but only the methods by 
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which it was to be fought3. Scott took up a point made by Price 
in a leader on the same day, noting that although the spokesmen of 
the Soviet and of the Provisional government had very different views 
as to what Russia's war aims out to be, public opinion in Russia had 
been "staggered" to learn from Bonar Law that war aims would not be 
discussed at all. Scott went on to point out that this came on top 
of "a prolonged campaign in inportant sections of the Allied press" 
which was hostile to Russia, and that it was no wonder that public 
opinion in Russia was puzzled and disturbed. 
"The Russian Revolution is one of the finest and most 
hopeful achievements of this war... But a conference on 
war aims is needed by the peoples of England and France 
and the United States to only a less degree than by the 
people of Russia. " 
Price was at the Pre-Parliament in the Mariinsky Palace when Kerensky 
announced the powers which the Military Revolutionary Committee had 
arrogated to itself4; he was at the Smolny when power passed into 
3 Manchester Guardian 15.11.17. Datelined Petrograd Tuesday. 
Probably Tuesday 3, not 11, November. 'Russia and the Paris 
Conference'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
4 The Military Revolutionary Committee was first set up by the 
Petrograd Soviet to co-ordinate resistance to the Kornilov coup. It 
then, according to Sukhanov, "fell into suspended animation, to 
revive on different foundations later on and tower aloft in October". 
None of the sources used for this note can agree on a single date; it 
is only possible to put events in a rough chronological order. Early 
in October a Bolshevik-initiated resolution in the Petrograd Soviet 
was passed by the Executive Committee of the Soviet: that an 
apparatus should be created ready to take power. A few days later, 
and presumably to implement the resolution, the formation, or re- 
formation of the Military Revolutionary Committee was announced, also 
its composition. It was to represent the Soviet, the Soldiers' 
Committee of the Soviet, the Central Committee of the Fleet, various 
party military organisations, and a number of trade unions. Its 
ostensible purpose then was still the defence of the capital. At the 
end of October the Petrograd garrison announced that it no longer 
recognised the authority of the Provisional Government and would obey 
its orders only through the Military Revolutionary Committee. It is 
nowhere claimed that the Committee actually made the revolution, but 
Carr, in his remarkably sparse allusion to its existence, maintained 
that it was the body that had made the military preparations for it. 
See M. N. Sukhanov The Russian Revolution 1917 (1955) pp. 505,561- 
562; J. Reed Ten Days That Shook the World (1970) ed. pp. 71.187; 
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the hands of the Bolsheviks during the night of 4/5 November. When 
he got back from the Smolny he found a message at his lodgings from 
the Danish Telegraph Agency offering to convey his despatches5. It 
is almost inconceivable that he wrote nothing at this tine, but it is 
certain that nothing got through until 20 November, when a half 
column appeared in the Manchester Guardian headed 'Bolshevik 
Ascendancy'. It was the first authoritative and signed report to 
appear in the paper since the Bolshevik Revolution. In it Price gave 
his own explanation for the success of the coup: the many failures 
of the Provisional government, matched by the growth of support for 
the Bolsheviks throughout Russia, which he had just seen for himself. 
He pointed out, however, that "though supported by the masses" the 
Bolsheviks were isolated from the right wing of the Socialists and 
indicated that they were having difficulty in forming a government. 
Scott, in a leader published the same day, seized on this point and 
concluded that the Bolsheviks were "a clique who, after a fortnight 
in office have begun to disintegrate and have demonstrated the 
poverty of their authority". All the same, Scott concluded with a 
warning against interference. Russia would have to work her way 
through her troubles by herself. "Though efforts of ours may hanger 
they are hardly likely to assist the process of recovery. " At some 
point in late November or early December Price was appointed 
telegraphic correspondent for the Manchester Guardian as well as 
Special Correspondent, which he had always been, but it was not from 
Price Reminiscences (1921) pp. 156-557,186; Carr The Bolshevik 
Revolution Vol. I, p. 95. 
The same offer appears to have been made to Soskice, who at least 
once was able to make use of it. Among the Soskice papers is a 
handwritten despatch on Den Norske Rikstelegraf forms which is 
substantially what appeared over his name in the Manchester Guardian 
on 24 November. (Stow Hill papers, House of Lords. DS1. Box 4 
143/5. ) 
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him that Scott first learned of the Bolsheviks' proposal for a 
general armistice. This arrived in an agency report from Copenhagen 
which was printed on 22 November and on the strength of it Scott 
wrote a shocked and critical leader. But from now on reports from 
Price began to arrive fairly regularly, and a kind of 
_rapport 
grew up 
between editor and correspondent the extent of which Price himself 
did not appreciate until many years later. Although some of Price's 
reports were of a general nature and the material in them does not 
lend itself to easy classification, most of what he wrote in the next 
three months dealt in the main with four subjects and the effective 
collaboration of Price and Scott will be more clearly seen if they 
are again dealt with thematically. It is therefore proposed to 
identify them as the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Brest 
Litovsk, the publication of the Secret Treaties, the Constituent 
Assembly, and the origins of the civil war. 
(i) Brest Litovsk 
Within hours of its formation the Bolshevik government published an 
appeal to all nations and all governments to stop the war. Trotsky, 
as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs followed this up on 8 
November with a Note to all Allied Ambassadors which he asked them to 
regard as an official proposal for the immediate opening of peace 
negotiations. The Note was not answered by any of the Allied 
governments, and on 13 November Russian plenipotentiaries crossed 
over to the German lines to arrange for preliminary talks to begin at 
Brest Litovsk on 19 November. The first report from Price which 
mentioned the possibility of an armistice was written on 24 November 
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and printed three days later6. In it he said that the proposed 
armistice was being seen in Russia as the first step for carrying on 
revolutionary propaganda in the German army, but added that there 
would be no demobilisation of the Russian army at the front as yet. 
The armistice proposals were also, he said, connected with the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly which were then taking place, 
and were designed to secure the votes of the army as well as those of 
the proletariat and the peasants. Scott's comnent on this despatch, 
printed the same day, was surprisingly constructive in view of the 
reproachfulness of his leader on 22 November. Price's report had, he 
said thrown "much light on the procedure and aims of the Maximal ist 
Government". Their direct approach to "German democracy" was 
unconventional but their instinct was right. German democracy was at 
"the heart of the problem" and "the democracies of the Allies will 
respond instantly when the German democracy asserts itself and 
establishes itself". The Bolsheviks were seeking, he pointed out, a 
general and not a separate peace, but having no confidence that the 
Allied governments share their desire for peace, they were justifying 
their lack of faith by publishing the secret treaties. Scott 
concluded that the Bolshevik proposals should be studied objectively 
by governments "who have not always distinguished themselves by an 
intelligent understanding of revolutionary Russia". But the 
Bolsheviks, he said, "should also try to understand the Allied 
democracies, who know that they are in this war through Russia". 
Three days later (30 November) Scott again appealed to the Bolsheviks 
to consider not only their own interests only but to bear in mind 
6 Manchester Guardian 27.11.17. Datelined Saturday (24 November). 
'The Armistice Proposals'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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what repercussions peace with Germany might have on Russia's allies. 
As if in answer, a telegram from Price was printed next day 
(1 December)7 which consisted mainly of quotations from the ]Russian 
press on the subject of the proposed armistice, and concluded with an 
extract from Pravda (the official organ of the Bolsheviks) printed on 
28 November. "It is in our power to prevent German troops from being 
sent to the West and we will insist on this in the armistice 
negotiations. " 
Another discursive account of opinion in Russia insofar as he could 
assess it, was printed in the Manchester Guardian on 7 December 8. 
Price began by saying that he had just interviewed a delegate of the 
armistice commission: "the delegate told me that the composition of 
the Commission was the best guarantee that secret diplomacy had gone 
for ever so far as Russia was concerned". He then sunmiarised the 
line being taken by a number of journals, indicating that opinion on 
the desirability of an armistice was by no means unanimous. On 9 
December Price attended a meeting of the Central Executive Committee 
of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets (TsIK) 9 called to hear a 
7 Manchester Guardian 1.12.17. Datelined 'Petrograd Wednesday' 
(28 November). 'The Russian Press and the Allies'. Signed M. 
Philips Price. 
8 Ibid 7.12.17. Datelined 'Petrograd Tuesday. (4 December). 
'Opinion in Russia: Peace expected after Armistice'. Signed 
M. Philips Price. 
9 Russian acronyms and abbreviations are a linguistic study in 
themselves. A useful table of those most commonly needed in order to 
read modern Russian history is given on p. 429 in Vol. I of E. H. 
Carr's The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923. In this paper those 
organisations which will most frequently be noted by their acronyms 
are: the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russia Congress of 
Soviets: TsIK; the Council of People's Commissars appointed by TsIK 
to carry out its instructions: Sovnarkom; the People's Commissariat 
of Foreign Affairs: Narkanindel; the Supreme Council of National 
Economy: Vesenkha; the Communist International: Comintern; and the 
Central Executive Committee of the Russian Social Democratic/ 
Bolshevik/Communist Party: Politbureau. 
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report from the armistice commission. His short account was printed 
two days later. He devoted nearly a quarter of it to Kamenev's 
insistence that Russia was not deserting the Allies, though how far 
this position could be maintained "depended on whether the Allied 
democracies took a decisive step" between then and the opening of 
full peace negotiations'°. Price concluded his account with a 
description of the "confident" mood of the Executive Committee and 
noted that the soldier's and sailors' delegates had made it clear 
that they were determined to have peace. Scott picked this up in a 
leader the following day (12 December) and noted with approval that 
Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, at least and at last had 
been realistic enough to recognise that Russia could not be made to 
fight and to advise that no attempt should be made to constrain her 
to do soll. 
10 LEV BORISOVICH KAMENEV (1883-1936). Ramenev gained much of his 
revolutionary education in Paris and London or working underground in 
Russia. He was involved in starting or managing a number of 
newspapers, including Novaya Zhizn and Pravda. Married to Trotsky's 
sister, he and Zinoviev became recognised as Lenin's closest 
associates in exile. In March 1917 he returned from Siberia to 
assume direction, together with Zinoviev and Stalin, of the direction 
of Bolshevik strategy until Lenin's return. Although on the 
conciliatory wing of the party, he was elected to the Central 
Conmittee in April and used his position to question the validity of 
Lenin's tactics right until the November revolution had actually 
taken place. Nonetheless it was he who was in the chair of the 
Second Congress of Soviets on the night the Winter Palace was taken. 
Despite his conciliationist views Lenin continued to find uses for 
his diplomatic and linguistic skills, notably at Brest Litovsk. He 
was elected to the Politbureau in 1919 and was at the height of his 
power and influence until 1925, when he publicly denounced one-man 
rule at the 14th Party Congress. From then on his fortunes and 
influence declined and he perished after the first of the Show Trials 
in 1936. No detailed study of Kamenev has yet appeared in the 
Eng l ish language. 
1I Buchanan's telegrams 1878 and 1881 were discussed by the War 
Cabinet on 20 November. Unfortunately the originals have not 
survived, but Cecil reported that in them Buchanan had "urged the 
Government that as the situation was now desperate, it was advisable 
to set Russia free from her agreement with the Allies, so that she 
could act as she chose, and decided to purchase peace on Germany's 
term or fight on with the Allies. " This course, Buchanan, as 
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on 19 December a precis of the terms of the armistice agreement was 
printed in the Manchester Guardian, together with another short 
survey by Price of opinion in Russia12. He reported that the 
Bolsheviks were taking credit for ending the fighting on the eastern 
front, but that the Menshevik, Right S. R., and Kadet press had 
described the armistice as treachery to the Allies. The Left S. R. 
journal, while claiming a political and moral victory for the 
Bolsheviks admitted that the victory had not also been a strategic 
one "for the Germans had already made fresh dispositions" and in any 
case they had never had more than 35% of their troops on the eastern 
front. Meanwhile Scott had again (17 December) praised Buchanan, and 
welcomed the imminent release of Tchicherin from Brixton Gao113. He 
reported by Cecil, would "if adopted... make it impossible for the 
Bolsheviks to reproach the Allies with driving Russian soldiers to 
slaughter for their Imperialist aims. " War Cab. 286. 
12 Manchester Guardian 19.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Sunday (16 
December). 'The Armistice: Party Opinion in Russia. ' Signed 
M. Philips Price. 
13 Gmi3II VASIL' EVICH TCHICHERIN (1872-1936). Born of a noble 
family with strong diplomatic service traditions, Tchicherin was more 
reclusive than his ancestors and initially joined the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (1896) as an archivist. He began to take an interest 
in radical movements both in Russia and Germany, but his first 
political affiliation was with the Mensheviks. He was in England 
when the war broke out and soon came to oppose it with vigour, using 
his position as Secretary of the Committee of Delegates of Russian 
Socialist Groups in London as a platform for his denunciations. For 
his activities in support of the Committee (which was formed to 
prevent the deportation to Russia or alternatively conscription in 
Britain of Russian emigres) Tchicherin was in August 1917, arrested 
and imprisoned in Brixton Goal. By now he had become convinced that 
Menshivism was not enough and his increasingly well-known Bolshevik 
sympathies combined with his experience made him a valuable convert. 
Trotsky secured his release and he returned to Russia in January 
1918; within two months he had succeeded Trotsky as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. He had little scope for his talents as a 
diplomatist during the civil war but between 1921-24 secured 
widespread diplomatic recognition for the Soviet government. He was 
the architect of the Rapallo Treaty which produced a major 
realignment of European powers. Anti-British and pro-German, he was 
unimpressed by the League of Nations and often at odds with his 
Deputy, Maxim Litvinov. Never a member of the Politbureau, he lost 
his principal support with Lenin's death and resigned his post in 
1927. Though without influence, he was not disgraced and died 
in 
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called for the de facto recognition of the Bolshevik government. "We 
should... accept facts as they are and... treat the Bolshevik 
Government as the only one that is representative of Russia in her 
present mood ... We cannot prevent Russia from concluding peace if she 
wishes; we can prevent her from forming a friendship with Germany 
that will have a point directed against ourselves. " Earlier in the 
same editorial he had repeated his advice against interference in 
Russian internal affairs. 
For the remainder of 1917 references to the progress of the peace 
negotiations were of a rather scattered and fragmentary nature 
throughout Price's reports, which had to deal with a variety of other 
topics. But on 21 December a report from him was printed quoting 
Trotsky as having said that "the Russian delegates had only gained 
their two points - no transference of German troops to the West and 
the right of Russian troops to fraternise with German troops - after 
great difficulty. " On the following day a report appeared from Price 
stating that the Germans were taking advantage of "the desire of the 
Russian soldier for peace at any price", and it was desire which had 
"forced" the government in to negotiations for a separate peace. In 
a report printed on 29 December Price sumnarised the five points of 
retirement in Moscow in 1936. For further reading on Tchicherin in 
English see Richard K. Debo: 'George Tchicherin: Soviet Russia's 
Second Foreign Commissar' (Unpublished Ph. D dissertation, University 
of Nebraska, 1964; 'The Making of a Bolshevik: Georgii Tchicherin in 
England, 1914-1914' Slavic Review XXV No. 4 (December 1966) pp. 651- 
662; Louis Fischer: The Soviets in World Affairs (Princeton, 1951, 
2nd edition) ; Georges Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie (ed. s) Makers of 
the Russian Revolution (Ithaca N. Y. 1974) pp. 331-341; Theodore H. 
von Laue 'Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Tchicherin, People's Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs 1918-1930' in The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (eds) Gordon 
A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton 1953) pp. 234-281. 
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the Russian peace proposals to the Central Powers, which included the 
removal of troops from occupied territories, the independence and 
rights of nationalities to self-determination, and the forswearing of 
indemnities. He went on to point out that the acceptance in whole or 
in part by the Central Powers of at least some of these principles 
would automatically secure recognition for the same principles as 
applied to Belgium, Poland or Serbia. And in a report printed on 31 
December he pointed out that German acceptance (as it then seemed to 
observers) of these points had undoubtedly raised the prestige of the 
Bolshevik government, who could now "show the wavering democratic 
elements that they are the only people who can force foreign powers 
to recognise the Russian peace progranine". Scott challenged this 
conclusion in an editorial printed on the same day. "Fine words do 
not alter facts" he said, and the facts were that Russia had 
surrendered territories and people without securing for them 
"anything more than a colourable appearance of liberty" and no real 
freedom of choice for those concerned. Scott concluded that Russia 
was "lost as an ally". 
Yet on 3,4 and 5 January 1918 Scott wrote a series of editorials on 
the Russian peace negotiations which were as positive as his last had 
been negative. This could have been due to incomplete or misleading 
information that he had been getting. There is no evidence that 
Price's despatches were yet being censored except much earlier in the 
case of the appointment of the Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander in 
Chief noted above. He had, however, complained to all his 
correspondents that his letters to them did not seem to be getting 
through. Yet the first of Scott's trio of powerful editorials began 
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by admitting that it had "until very recently" been too readily 
assumed that the Bolshevik government had no cards in its hand and no 
alternative but to accept a dictated peace. "We ourselves were 
misled by the fragmentary form in which an important telegram reached 
us into believing that this is what had actually happened. " (My 
emphasis). This could easily have been Price's inu ediately preceding 
cable in which he made but completely failed to substantiate the 
Bolshevik claim to have had its peace programme recognised by the 
Germans. Such a claim would certainly have been inconvenient to the 
British War Cabinet. Scott went on to enumerate the various 
strengths in the Russian position: their very commitment to peace 
for a start; the potential influence of German Socialists, together 
with the known popular desire for peace in Germany and Austria and a 
recent mutiny in the Germany Navy14; Russia's most potent defensive 
weapon - winter; and the fact that Germany had more to gain from a 
peaceful penetration of Russia than from a continuation of the war in 
the east. Scott pointed out that the Allied publics had not yet been 
allowed to hear the Bolshevik proposals for a general peace, but 
insofar as the Bolsheviks appeared to be adhering to them "they go a 
very long way indeed" towards satisfying the Allied conditions for a 
post-war settlement. "It is for us to support, in so far as we may 
be able, the Bolshevik demands. " 
14 The suppression of news of a mutiny in the German Navy in 
December 1917 appears to have been very successful. What Scott 
actually wrote was "... the mutiny in the German fleet of which a good 
deal less has been heard in this country than its importance 
merits. " If this was a case of censorship policy at work, it 
is 
certainly consistent with the subsequent application of that policy 
to the Reichstag Resolution in July 1918. (See below Chp. 7 p. 228). 
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Next day (4 January) Scott addressed himself to the "war of 
principles" being waged at Brest Litovsk: the principles of no 
annexations and the right to self-determination of small 
nationalities. The Germans, said Scott (and here perhaps he was also 
speaking for himself) had not been quite prepared for the 
"extraordinary energy" with which the Bolsheviks had repudiated the 
German proposal that the territories already occupied by them should 
be considered as having already chosen not to be Russian. The 
Russian sheep was not after all a sheep: "it has fangs... it actually 
threatens to use them. " It might be supposed as certain that the 
Germans would reject the Russians' insistence on these principles 
"but for one supreme consideration. Russia holds the door of the 
prison house". Scott went on to list the vast resources which were, 
in his strange choice of metaphor, stored in that prison house: 
resources that Germany wanted. The moral of this tale, said Scott, 
was that whatever the Allies thought of other aspects of Bolshevik 
policy "the fact remains that they stand for freedom, not only within 
the Russian state but in every other state, and the policy for which 
they are now contending is broadly speaking our own policy and that 
of our Allies". 
In the third of this remarkable series Scott, perhaps thinking 
wishfully, noted that there had been a "curious and marked revulsion 
of feeling" in favour of the Bolsheviks for the stand they were 
taking, and that there had even been "credible" reports that the 
British government had decided upon de facto recognition. He would 
welcome such a step, particularly in view of the internationalist 
character of the Bolshevik philosophy. "It is a new thing, this 
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spirit of the people appealing to the cotton interests of all the 
peoples... it is in itself a fine thing, and destined to have some 
transforming results. " Scott reiterated his belief that the contest 
was not as unequal as it seemed. The Russians had strong moral and 
political weapons and they had friends too, even if many of them were 
now in German prisons. They should stand firm and the Allies should 
not stand aloof . 
The dialogue between Price and Scott was continued with Price's next 
message, printed on 8 January, in which he reported that the refusal 
of the Allies to join in the peace process was being taken by the 
Bolsheviks to mean that they need no longer insist on German 
recognition of the right of self-determination. He also reported 
that delegates to the peace talks had stated that the Germans 
appeared to show "great anxiety" to conclude them and to pass on to 
talks about trade, while the Russians, knowing the internal situation 
in Germany, were in no hurry. This appeared to prove that Scott had 
been right in his analysis of Russian strength. 
Price added, however, that the Bolsheviks were now expecting the 
Allies to approach the Central Powers "with a view to finding a 
common peace formula... in order to defeat the principles of 
the Russian Revolution". This could lead to an attempt by the 
Russians "to barter Russian conquests in Asia for German conquests in 
Europe" in order to prevent such an alignment against them. Scott 
was quick to take note of the threat to British interests implied in 
the "interesting and candid analysis of the Bolshevik policy" of his 
Petrograd correspondent. In a leader printed on the same day as the 
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report (5 January) Scott elaborated on Germany's internal 
difficulties and congratulated the Bolsheviks in having brought them 
about. He went on to deal with the possibility of bartering 
conquests. The British, he said, were not called upon to pronounce 
an opinion on the Bolsheviks but to defend the interests of their own 
country. "We know of no way of helping British interests except 
through the Bolsheviks. Whether they are politically wise or not is 
not the question. Did we ask that question when the Tsar was in 
power? " 
In the course of the following week the only report from Price to 
arrive in Cross Street dealt with the Bolshevik repudiation of 
Russia's national debt, and Scott had to depend on agency reports of 
developments at Brest Litovsk. On 15 January he began an editorial 
on the situation in Russia by deploring the fact that the British now 
had no-one to represent them at Petrograd. Buchanan had returned to 
London, and Lockhart had not yet arrived in Petrograd. Moreover the 
British had "apparently no policy except to stand aside in offended 
helplessness". Trotsky had drawn the conclusion, as reported not 
only by Scott's own correspondent but also by Arthur Ransomer who was 
described by Scott as "the able and well-informed correspondent of 
the Daily News" that Britain was now actively encouraging Germany in 
her annexationist policy in the east "in order to buy her off in the 
west". Yet on the vital question of the principle of annexations the 
Bolsheviks had taken a stand "as courageous as it is just and are 
fighting not only their own fight but ours". The British like the 
Germans might be surprised, but they should at least also be pleased 
"unless indeed" Scott concluded ominously "we were to suppose, as the 
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Bolsheviks believe and as we absolutely refuse to believe, that our 
Government in its heart desires that the Bolshevik effort should 
fail". 
on 31 January the Manchester Guardian carried an account by Price, 
written on 27 January, of Trotsky's speech to a meeting of the Third 
All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Delegates jointly with the All- 
Russia Congress of Workers and Soldiers' Delegates on 26 Januaryl5. 
The Central Executive Committee (TsIK) had already decided by then, 
though by only a narrow margin, to stop the war but not to conclude 
peace on the terms then offered by Germany16. Price quoted 
15 The Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets was summoned by TsIK 
(the creation of the Second Congress) to demonstrate where popular 
power really lay after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly. It 
included not only delegates from the provincial Soviets but also 
those delegates from the Assembly who were willing to recognise that 
final authority lay with the Soviets: in effect the Bolshevik and 
Left S. R. delegates. Its first plenary session was held on 26 
January, and Price, who was present, described it in some detail on 
pp. 222-227 of his Reminiscences, as well as in his account for the 
Manchester Guardian. After endorsing the previously agreed formula 
for the next stage of the negotiations at Brest Litovsk, the Congress 
went on to discuss and agree the final draft of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Toiling and Exploited Peoples. 16 Taking advantage of the presence in Petrograd of party leaders 
from all over Russia for the forthcaming Third Congress, Lenin 
invited a number of them to an enlarged meeting of the Central 
Committee of the Party on 21 January,, and put forward, in advance of 
the meeting of the Congress, his arguments against embarking upon a 
revolutionary war and in favour of signing a peace with Germany, 
however great the territorial losses entailed. His arguments were 
narrowly rejected, but before the next meeting of the Central 
Committee proper (due to be held on 24 January) Lenin discussed with 
Trotsky the relative merits of his policy formulation and Trotsky's 
I no war no peace' proposal. Having secured from Trotsky an assurance 
that if his own proposal failed he would not support a revolutionary 
war# Lenin agreed to give Trotsky's plan a chance. At the meeting of 
the Central Committee Lenin's views were again defeated by the 
proponents of revolutionary war, but Trotsky's scheme offered a face- 
saving alternative, with the rider added that the negotiations were 
to be dragged out for as long as possible. This formula, endorsed by 
SOvnarkam, was duly approved by the Third Congress on 26 January. 9&*--R-icKiid K. Debo: Revolution and Survival: Th 
Soviet Russia 1917-19i8 (Liverpool,, 1979) pp. 72-84; Price,? 
ý6.2-2 * ielii7n-iscýncýe--s,, pp. 20:: 227; Issac Deutscher: the Prophet Armed r PP 
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extensively, presumably from his own notes, Trotsky's denunciation of 
the attitudes of both the Central Powers and the Allies which, he 
maintained, proved his thesis that Russia was engaged not in a 
national but a class struggle. The Allies were hypocrites, Trotsky 
was reported to have said, ready to agree to an annexationist peace 
at the expense of Russia for what else had Lloyd George meant when he 
said Russia could make her own peace with Germanyl7. Trotsky had 
ended with the affirmation: "We shall never sign a disgraceful peace 
with the German tyrants but will carry on defensive Socialist war 
against all our class enemies". Scott added a rider to this report 
in a very short leader on the same day, which took note of the 
principled stand of the Bolshevik government and concluded that "at 
Brest Litovsk, as elsewhere, the struggle with German militarism and 
Imperialism is very far indeed from being over". It was, however, 
approaching what was widely perceived to be its end. The day after 
Price wrote his account of Trotsky's speech he spent time conversing 
"with party leaders in the lobbies" and in a despatch printed on 2 
February reported that wide divisions of opinion still existed on the 
question of signing a separate peace. The only common denominator 
between the factions appeared to be the recognition that much 
depended upon "the proletariat of the Central Eires". If the 
Trotsky 1879-1921 Chapter 11 'The Drama of Brest Litovsk'. 
By the end of 1917 the Lloyd George government was experiencing 
severe difficulties in mobilising sufficient manpower for the 
requirements of war industries, and lack of enthusiasm for the war 
had become so obvious that the Prime Minister invited the Trade 
Unions to a conference on the subject of war aims. This took place 
on 5 January 1918 at Caxton Hall. See Lloyd George: War Memoirs 
Vol. V, Appendix II, pp. 2515-2527. What Lloyd George actually said 
a ro s the possibility that Russia would sign a separate peace, 
was: "... if the present rulers of Russia take action which is 
independent of their Allies, we have no means of intervening to 
arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. 
Russia can only be saved by her own people". 
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moderate Socialists in Germany and Austria agreed to compromise with 
their governments, those governments might succeed in "forcing veiled 
annexations of the Russian Revolution". Before Scott wrote on the 
subject again, and in his last leader before the conclusion of the 
peace of Brest Litovsk, the Germans had resumed their invasion of 
Russia. On 19 February Scott recognised that the "new war" was 
"directed against the Bolshevik Government because the Bolshevik 
Government will not sign a peace". Only a formal peace would leave 
the German leaders free to concentrate wholly on the Western Front. 
Scott reminded his readers that these were men who had been "fighting 
dewcracy in Germany and outside Germany all their lives. " They had 
talked peace with the Bolsheviks for as long as it seemed that the 
Bolsheviks would comply with their plans and in so doing "demonstrate 
themselves as merely ridiculous. But the Bolsheviks instead have 
inflicted a heavy moral defeat on the Germany militarists and their 
principles, as the strikes show, menace Germany with infection. " 
(ii) The Secret Treaties 
In the first of his editorials to make any reference to an armistice 
(see above p. 123) Scott had observed that the Bolsheviks were 
publishing the secret treaties of their Allies because they had no 
confidence that their Allies had any intention in joining with them 
in the pursuit of a general peace. When he wrote that (24 November) 
the first translated texts had not yet arrived in England, but the 
existence of secret treaties or understandings between the Allies had 
been known about or at least guessed at for some time. One of the 
first acts of the Petrograd Soviet after the March revolution had 
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been to repudiate them in principle, but Miliukov had inmediately 
issued a statement on his own account to the effect that Russia would 
stand by her international obligations. In his interview with Price 
on 22 April he clearly intended to reinforce that statement. His 
subsequent downfall was an indication that not merely the Petrograd 
Soviet but now also the Provisional government were looking for a new 
style in diplomacy. After the November Revolution, and as soon as it 
became clear that the Allied governments were going to stand aside 
from the peace initi, ýc. of the Bolsheviks, the new government found 
in the secret treaties the perfect argument with which to demonstrate 
to the world why they should proceed with it anyway. Price heard on 
23 November that Izvestia was about to publish the texts of the 
secret treaties. He went to the Soviet Foreign Office and, on 
Trotsky's personal authority, was allowed to take copies home with 
him provided he returned them next day. He sat up all night 
translating the documents, and then sent off a series of despatches 
to the Manchester Guardian which appeared at intervals over the next 
ten weeks. The first was printed on 27 November and the second on 28 
November. The rest appeared on 5,7,19 and 20 December and 30 
January and 8 February 1918. 
Price has been generally credited with having secured a major 
journalistic scoop; certainly it was one which was remembered when 
much else of his work was forgotten. Certainly, also, the Manchester 
Guardian was the first British paper to publish any of the so-called 
treaties, many of which were not so much treaties as understandings 
or even exchanges of diplomatic correspondence. But as revelation 
followed revelation in the Russian press other British papers could 
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and did publish their own translations or epitomes of them. Scott, 
although he printed, so far as can be ascertained, everything Price 
sent to him on the subject, obviously did not personally regard this 
material as being quite as sensational as many other people did and 
have continued to do. He wrote only one major and one very minor 
editorial on the treaties, the first of which appeared with the 
second batch of translations of 28 November 1917. He declared 
against secret diplomacy and was all in favour of "re-writing all 
these secret agreements on a clean sheet of notepaper". But he added 
that the documents should be accepted "only under great reserve, for 
the object of the Maximalist Government is to present a case, not to 
tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth". He also pointed out 
with some justice that the documents, even at their face value, were 
not all of equal authenticity. Some appeared to be just proposals, 
others seemed to have been wrongly dated in the light of known 
events, yet others were already revised, irrelevant or obsolete. The 
disclosures were "partial and, we dare say, inaccurate and 
misleading". But he reiterated that they did make a case for open 
diplomacy; moreover men who were fighting had a right to know what 
they were fighting for. With the last of the treaty publications (8 
February 1918) he wrote another short leader pointing out that the 
account given in it of Rumania's bargaining at least gave the 1 ie to 
the rumour that Russia had forced Rumania into the war by an 
ultimatum. 
Despite Scott's cautious response, reaction to the publication of the 
treaties in the House of Commons was lively. On 28 November, the day 
ZrL 
on which the first translations appeared, Cecil, treply to a question 
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from R. L. Outhwaite M. P., merely denied that the Allies were secretly 
committed to "aims of vast territorial aggrand isement"18, But next 
day, perhaps when the information had had time to sink in, he was 
confronted with a flurry of oral questions from not just Outhwaite 
but also Richard Lambert, Joseph King and James Hogge19. He refused 
to answer any of them, and had to be rescued by the Speaker, who 
insisted that they should be presented in writing. They did not, 
however, appear in written form, suggesting that the Official Press 
Bureau had been busy (see below, Chapter 7 p. 225). On 3 December 
Cecil still refused to answer any question about the treaties on the 
ground that he had not yet received copies of them from the British 
Ambassador in Petrograd20. On 12 December Balfour himself replied 
somewhat testily to a question from the Irish M. P. John Dillon: "the 
documents in question should not have been published and I do not 
propose to republish them. "21 There is no doubt that the 
publication of the treaties embarrassed the British government. It 
also caused widespread popular resentment. Appendix III deals in 
greater detail with the repercussions of the publication of the 
treaties both inside and outside the House of Commons. 
It remains to summarise what the articles about the Secret Treaties 
which Price sent in to the Manchester Guardian actually contained. 
On 27 November readers learned that since 24 February 1916 Russia's 
right to Constantinople had been considered a settled thing, and that 
Russia was to have a free hand in Poland in return for the cession to 
France of Alsace and the Lorraine and Saar basins and the creation of 
18 Hansard 28.11.17. Col. s 1986/7 
Ibid 29.11.17. Col. 2191. 
20 Ibid 3.12.17. Col. s. 24/26. 
21 Ibid 12.12.17. Col. 461. 
5: 139 
an autonomous neutral state on the left bank of the Rhine, under 
French military rule for as long as was considered necessary. The 
terms of the Russo-Rumanian Convention of 1916 were disclosed on 28 
November. This gave Rumania Bukovina, Banat and Transylvania as the 
price of entering the war on the side of the Allies. On the same 
day, details were given of a Convention in London in April 1915 which 
provided concessions in Serbia and Montenegro for Italy in return for 
withdrawing from the Triple Alliance and joining the Entente powers. 
on the same day the existence was also revealed of an agreement made 
in the spring of 1916 between Russia, France and England for the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was to get the vilayets of 
Erzerum, Trebizond, Bitlis and Van and part of Khurdistan up to the 
Persian frontier. France got the Syrian coastline, the vilayet of 
Adana and part of Lesser Armenia. England was to have Lower 
Mesopotamia and special rights in the ports of Haifa and Jaffa. A 
number of independent Arab states were to be set up in the 
interstices of this settlement, and Palestine was to become the 
protectorate of all three beneficiaries of the agreement. Spheres of 
influence in Persia were divided between Britain and Russia. 
On 5 and 7 December the Manchester Guardian printed some of the 
correspondence of the Provisional government, also sent by Price. 
This included an account of Bulgaria's bargaining (at the expense of 
Greece and Turkey) for her support of the Central Powers; and Greek 
demands for Turkish and Serbian territory made during a long period 
of haggling which had continued throughout most of 1915 for her 
support of the Allies. Britain was deeply implicated, having at one 
stage offered Cyprus as an inducement. On 19 December the Manchester 
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Guardian printed evidence dating from August 1917 that the Charge 
d'Affaires of the Provisional government in London, Nabokov22 had 
passed on information from an unidentified American source to the 
effect that the Stockholm Conference was inspired by German 
propaganda, and that this alleged fact gave the Provisional 
government an excuse to pull out from the Conference. There was 
also, in this collection, a telegram from the Rumanian Minister in 
Petrograd to, his government, after an interview with Kornilov, in 
which he reported that Kornilov had admitted that he deliberately 
evacuated Riga because he thought the effect of the fall of the city 
would help to restore discipline in the Russian Army. Apart from a 
report in the Manchester Guardian of 20 December that Russia and 
Japan had agreed in July 1916 to keep the influence of any third 
power out of China, the rest of the Secret Treaty disclosures were 
22 Little is known about Constantin Nabokov and that little is 
mainly from his own account of himself during the relatively short 
period he was in Britain. He must have been a Tsarist career 
diplomat, and came to London as Counsellor to the Russian Embassy in 
December 1915. In January 1917 he was promoted Charge d'Affaires and 
held that post until the November Revolution. After that he formed a 
short-lived, anti-Bolshevik Russian Government Committee in London 
and refused to hand over the keys of the Russian Consulate General to 
Litvinov until called to heel by the Foreign Office, who solved the 
problem by closing the building down. The British Goverment 
continued, however, to pay Nabokov a salary (formally held to be part 
of a repayable loan to Kolchak) until the end of March 1919. He 
wrote incessantly and at length throughout 1918 to Cecil, Hardinge 
and Sir Robert Clerk, usually advocating intervention of one kind or 
another, and styling himself as 'Representative of the late 
Provisional Goverment'. The Foreign Office stuck strictly to 
protocol during this period and did nothing more than acknowledge 
receipt of his letters. They were not answered,, nor did he see any 
of the officials to whom they were addressed. Nabokov enjoyed a 
brief period of further usefulness later in the year when he was used 
by the Foreign Office as an intermediary for contacts with the Omsk 
Directorate, and was granted the use of a cypher again. But the 
Directorate sent its own representative, Sazonovy to the Paris Peace 
Conference and Nabokov found himself once more representing no-one. 
InSeptember 1919 Sazonov ordered him to leave London and to take 
charge of the Legation of the Omsk Directorate in Norway, but it 
seems unlikely that he did so for his book The Ordeal oLA2jpjTýt 
was published in London only two years later. 
5 141 
all further details about Rumania's entry into the war. On 30 
January 1918 the paper published a short account and on 8 February a 
very full account of the documents recording the extremely hard 
bargaining which had gone on for over two years after 7 August 1914, 
with the object of bringing Rumania into the war on the side of the 
Allies. Again Britain and France were deeply involved, having 
promised an advance on the Salonika front to counteract any possible 
pressure on Rumania from Bulgaria. There was also evidence that in 
May 1917 the Provisional government had undertaken to abide by the 
territorial concessions promised to Rumania, however much the 
Petrograd Soviet might, by then, be calling for a foreign policy of 
no annexations and no indemnities. 
(iii) The Constituent Assembly 
The third theme that runs through Price's despatches between November 
1917 and February 1918 was the rise and fall of the Constituent 
Assembly. The notion, which progressively became a fiction, that a 
Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage would eventually 
underwrite all the reforms proposed by the Provisional government was 
maintained at first by the Bolsheviks. Lenin, at the opening session 
of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets said that it would be 
for the Constituent Assembly to ratify the terms of any peace 
settlement that might be reached with Germany. The decree on land 
was also a provisional measure, pending "a final solution by the 
Constituent Assembly". Elections were called for 13 November and 
carried out in an atmosphere of considerable freedom, but the 
candidates' lists had been drawn up in the early autumn and the 
situation had changed. The results gave a distorted picture of 
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articulate opinion by any standards. The Social Revolutionaries, 
with their now quite inconpatible left and right wings combined, 
emerged with 58% of the votes and the Bolsheviks with 25%. 
Nonetheless the government announced that the Assembly would be 
opened as soon as the first 400 delegates had arrived in the capital. 
It was subsequently decided that the opening should take place on 18 
January 1918. 
During most of the time between the November Revolution and the 
opening of the Assembly Price had viewed the policies of the 
Bolshevik government with considerable reserve. In a report to the 
Manchester Guardian printed on 28 November he considered the 
possibility that the All-Russia Peasant Congress might decide to 
support the government23. The S. R. s were the traditional party of 
the peasants, and the Left S. R. s had been gaining ground even at the 
expense of the Right peasants. Nonetheless Price thought that such a 
support would have a "sobering effect" upon the government and 
strengthen the Bolshevik Right against "the demagogy of Lenin and 
Trotsky", which leaves little room for doubt as to what Price thought 
of them. When the Peasant Congress did decide to join the 
government Price inmediately saw this move in terms of its effect on 
the Constituent Assembly. In a despatch printed on 3 December24 he 
described the probable voting patterns in the Assembly on a regional 
basis: the Ukraine, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Cossack 
territories. Only the Ukranians, he thought, might agree to join a 
Coalition government with the Bolsheviks. The decisive factor in the 
23 Manchester Guardian 28.11.17. Datelined Petrograd Monday. 
(26 November). 'Russian Party Forces'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
24 Ibid 3.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Thursday. (29 November). 
'Russian Socialist Coalition'. Signed 'From Our Correspondent'. 
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Assembly would be the peasantry of the Central-and Volga provinces, 
who were sure to vote for the S. R. s. But the list of S. R. 
candidates had been made up before the revolution, at a time when the 
Right S. R. s were dominant in the party. The Left S. R. s would 
therefore have either to persuade the Right to support the coalition 
with the Bolsheviks which they wanted, or vote directly for the 
Bolsheviks. The possibility, said Prioe, had led the Bolsheviks 
"during the last few days" to adopt a more conciliatory policy 
towards other Socialist parties in the hope of forming a block in the 
Constituent Assembly which they could not otherwise hope to control. 
This impression was swept away when the Bolsheviks shortly afterwards 
dissolved the Petrograd Municipal Council and ordered elections for a 
new council to be run on soviet lines. Reporting this in an article 
printed on 5 December25 Price quoted Pravda of 1 December as having 
claimed that soviets "more truly express the will of the proletariat 
than any other assembly" and that any permanent constitution for 
Russia would have to be based on "a union of the syndicates or 
councils". Price concluded: "This shows clearly the inner character 
of the Bolshevik movement, based on the theory of anarchy and 
syndicalism preached during the last century by Bakunin. It is not 
socialism at all but syndicalism. " In the same article Price 
predicted that Russia would now become "the arena of a great class 
struggle". 
25 Manchester Guardian 5.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Saturday. 
(1 December). 'The Russian Class Struggle'. Signed M. Philips 
Price. 
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Price began the next despatch in which he referred to the Constituent 
Assembly, (printed on 15 December) 26 by stating that interest in the 
armistice negotiations had now been "overshadowed by the conflict 
between the Soviet and the Constituent Assembly". The results of the 
election had made the support of the Centre parties, discredited by 
their association with the Provisional government, necessary to the 
Bolsheviks, "but instead of having a sobering effect it is making 
them increase the policy of terrorism". Newly elected Kadet members 
of the Assembly were being arrested as they arrived in Petrograd. 
Even the Left S. R. s were "powerless to arrest the mad career of the 
Arnarcho-Syndicalist dictator" and the country was becaning more 
divided every day: "the classes and the masses... It is a terrible 
lesson in what happens when a people, tortured by 3 years of war, 
turns on the ruling classes who have exploited and tormented them. " 
In a half column printed two days later (17 December) 27 Price 
reported that at a meeting of the Central Executive ConTnittee the 
previous evening he had heard Lenin say "The Constituent Assembly can 
only meet under the guarantee of the Soviet, which alone is capable 
of protecting it from becoming a tool of the reactionaries". Lenin 
had also justified the arrest of the Kadet delegates because, he 
alleged, they were going to try to use the Assembly to incite civil 
war. Price reported that there had been some opposition to Lenin, 
mainly from the Left S. R. members, but that the majority of the 
Executive had supported him. In his next reference to the Assembly 
26 Manchester Guardian 151.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Thursday. 
(13 -December) 'Bolshevik Terrorism: How the Russian Electors 
VOted'. Signed M. Philips Price. 27 Ibid 17.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Saturday afternoon. (15 
December) 'Bolshevik Ascendancy: Merciless War on Kadet Traitors'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
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(28 December) 28 Price stated that "The whole of Russia from 
Bessarabia and Siberia, is breaking up into chains of autonomous 
republics, resisting the Bolshevik Government and protecting the 
Constituent Assembly". The provinces were refusing to send food to 
Petrograd unless the Bolsheviks recognised the Assembly, and there 
was only food for seven days left in the city. "The Bolshevik 
oligarchy, ruling in the name of the proletariat, is faced with the 
alternative of concession to the provinces or capitulation before the 
spectre of starvation. 11 
On 8 January the Manchester Guardian printed a report from Price to 
the effect that the Bolsheviks were now prepared to allow the 
Assembly to meet provided it agreed "to recognise the authority" of 
the Soviet29. Price thought such an agreement unlikely. "It is as 
if the question were raised, who should rule England, Parliament or 
the Trade Union Congress? " But the Assembly did finally meet on 18 
January. On that day a long article appeared, written by Price three 
days earlier30. In this it became clear that somewhere between 
28 December 1917 and 15 January 1918 Price had begun to change his 
mind about the nature of Bolshevism and Bolsheviks. His fluent 
Russian and the fact that he now attended so many meetings and 
habitually talked to people about them afterwards make it seem likely ' 
that watching and listening were now playing a greater part in 
forming his opinion than reading the Russian newspapers. The article 
28 Manchester Guardian 28.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Wednesday. 
(26 December) . 'Bolsheviks and the Ukraine'. Signed 
M. Philips 
Price. 
29 Ibid 8.1.18. Datelined Petrograd Wednesday. (2 January 1918). 
'BOfs-hevik Peace Alternatives'. Signed M. Philips Price. 30 Ibid 18.1.18. Datelined Petrograd Tuesday. (15 January) - 
'FUiiian Revolutionary Developments. Titanic Struggle' . Signed 
M. Philips Price. 
5 : 146 
began with an analysis of the voting results for the Assembly, of the 
factors which had determined them, and a suiinary of the arguments 
which were being advanced as to whether or not the Assembly was 
representative of the current climate of opinion. The Bolsheviks had 
announced that they were calling another All-Russia Congress of 
Soviets "to test the opinion of the proletariat and exercise moral 
pressure on the Constituent Assembly to recognise the principle of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat". Price now saw that the 
Bolsheviks were neither demagogues nor anarcho-syndicalists but were 
simply convinced that the war could not be ended until society was 
reconstructed on a socialist basis. This could not be done without 
first breaking up class coalitions all over the world and bringing 
the control of the machinery of government into the hands of the 
"labouring masses". The Constituent Assembly was regarded by the 
Bolsheviks as the embodiment of the principle of the class coalition. 
Price noted that "the process of proletarisation of the Russian 
economy" was already going on the provinces although it remained to 
be seen if local soviets could summon enough managerial and technical 
skills for the task. But, said Price, writing as if he had received 
a revelation, "an attempt is being made to reconstruct society on an 
entirely new basis... The October revolution, which began as an 
anarchical adventure, seems now developing into an attempt to bring 
about a revolution of ideas in the whole theory of human 
government. " 
Price appears to have been present throughout the short-lived 
Assembly for his next message to the Manchester Guardian, printed on 
22 January, is full of quotations from speeches and in one instance 
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described the manner in which a speech was made31. He noted that 
even on the basis of the disputed franchise of the Assembly,, the 
centre of gravity of the Revolution had obviously moved to the left, 
and the atmosphere was heated "in the absence of the sobering 
traditions and precedents of the western democracies". Tseretelli32 
speaking on behalf of the Mensheviks (now reduced to a very small 
group) had protested at the Bolshevik ultimatum on the question of 
conceding power to the Soviet and argued that the break-up of the 
Assembly would only serve the interests of the bourgeoisie. But, 
said Price, his speech "sounded like an apology for the eight months 
in which the Russian Revolution wandered in the wilderness under 
Menshevik guidance". On the same day (22 January) the Manchester 
Guardian printed a second despatch f rom Price, this tire reporting 
lenin's speech in which he moved f or the dissolution of the Assembly 
on the grounds that the parliamentary phase of the revolution was 
already over and the time for the dictatorship of the proletariat had 
come. Price clearly found the speed of this development difficult to 
accept and comnented that "the methods of high-handed coercion and 
31 Manchester Guardian 22.1.18. Datelined Petrograd Saturday. (19 
January). 'Bolshevik Assembly Parties'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
32 IRAKLI GEORGIEVICH TSERETELLI (1881-1959). The leading Georgian 
Menshevik (though opposed to Georgian nationalism) , he was only briefly active in Social Democratic politics before 1917, spending 
most of the years between 1902 and 1917 either in exile or disabled 
by ill health. In Siberia he became the central figure in the 
Siberian Zirmrerwaldist group of Social Democrats opposed to the war. 
He served as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the first Coalition 
Government and rapidly established himself as an inveterate believer 
in the possibility of a non-Bolshevik but socialist alternative 
government after the November Revolution. He led the opposition to 
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, after which he retired 
to Georgia and reluctantly played a small part in the government of 
the Republic of TransCaucasia. He abandoned political activity in 
1929 and died in New York. For further reading see W. H. Roobol: 
Tseretelli: A Democrat in the Russian Revolution: A Political 
fi ýra ; ý'ýHague, 1976); and S. G. y Garda: 'The Origins of 
Revolutionary Defensism: I. G. Tseretelli and the Siberian 
Zimrierwaldists' 
. Slavic Review Vol. 41 (1982) pp. 454-470. 
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terrorism which the Bolsheviks adopt to carry out their ideas are an 
inevitable result of the bitter class war that makes conciliation 
between two factions in such bodies as the Constituent Assembly 
impossible". He could see, and went on to explain, why the rx)derate 
socialists had forfeited the confidence of workers, soldiers and 
poorer peasants, but he was clearly worried by the outcome. By their 
action the Bolsheviks had "created the Russian counterpart of Sinn 
Fein". 
Earlier in the second of his articles printed on 22 January Price had 
sympathetically reported a speech by Ryazanov, a Bolshevik, who was 
also the president of the All-Russia Union of Trades Unions33. 
Ryazanov had challenged the right of the Executive Committee of the 
Soviet to dissolve the Assembly before the meeting of the All-Russia 
Congress which was due to meet the following week, and to which 
alone he was prepared to ascribe the right to dissolve. Price 
naturally attended the Congress, and in his first account, printed in 
the Manchester Guardian on 26 January, it seemed as if his recurring 
33 DAVID BORISOVICH WAZANCIV (1870-1938) .A Social Democrat f rom his early days, Ryazanov joined the Mensheviks af ter the Second 
Congress. He worked for the Menshevik fraction in the Duma and as a 
Trade Unionist. He would have supported a Menshevik - S. R. coalition 
with the Bolsheviks af ter the November Revolution had such a colation 
been on offer. The episode described by Price is therefore in 
character. Debo, also described how Ryazanov's was the only voice 
which protested, at the 4th All-Russia Congress of Soviets, against 
the Sweeping powers over the economy which the Party had assumed at 
its 7th Congress the preceding week (Revolution and Survival, p-176). 
RYazanov left the party after Brest Litovsk and was dismissed from 
his Trade Union work in 1921,, but in the same year was made Director 
Of the Marx-Engels Institute, a post which he held for ten years. 
During that time he edited the f irst editions in Russian of the works 
Of Marx, Engels, Plekhanov and Hegel. He remained a Delegate to 
Party Congresses from the 7th to the 16th, but was finally expelled 
in 1931 on account of his ties with Mensheviks abroad. The year of 
his death strongly suggests that he was a victim of the Purges. 
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doubts about Bolshevik tactics had again been somewhat dispelled34. 
"Instead of an atmosphere of suspicion ... there was now enthusiasm". 
The Third Congress was "a Parliament without landlordst capitalists, 
small bourgeoisie or intellectuals". However he could not resist 
pointing out that the Congress had spent the whole of its first day, 
in true Slavic mood, discussing plans for "Internationalism",, while 
the banks were closed, the bread ration was down to 1/41b. a day, and 
"we sit in icy rooms in fur coats and have sixteen hours of darkness 
buoyed up, however, by the hope that humanity will one day hear 
Russia's bitter cry and awaken to the true meaning of her 
revolution". The Congress did, however, eventually get down to the 
business of constructing a socialist order. On February 2 the 
Manchester Guardian printed a final short account by Price of its 
work35. He summarised its programme of political and economic 
organisation without comment, concluding "Thus is being formed a new 
Goverrunent of the working classes aiming to reorganise society on a 
Socialist basis". 
The experienoe of reporting the Constituent Assembly probably took 
Price some way along the path to the Marxism which he subsequently 
professed. In his article of 26 January (see last paragraph) he had 
recognised that the Bolshevik goverment had the support of the 
social elements represented at the Third Congress: "bayonets and 
land, labourers and factory workerst forming two thirds of Russia" - 
It was true that the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the peasants 
34 Manchester Guardian 26.1.18. Datelined Petrograd Thursday 
(24 ry). 'A Parliament without Privilege'. signed M. Philips 
Price. 
35 Ibid 2.2.18. Datelined Petrograd Thursday (31 January) 
'Russia's Democratic System'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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of the eastern provinces were not represented, but the "most active 
and virile elements of Revolutionary Russia" were all there. "To 
regard them as representative of all Russia would be a mistake, 
but... not to recognise them as the greatest force in Rissia today 
would be a greater mistake, and one f raught with the gravest 
consequences for the relations between Russia and Western Europe. 11 
Scott wrote only three leading articles on the Constituent Assembly, 
and the first was only a disguised plea for proportional 
representation. On 8 December 1917 he wrote that as the Russians had 
the benefit of that system the voting would "pretty fairly mirror the 
strength of the various parties". He believed that the "astonishing 
regularity" with which the elections had been held were "evidence 
that the new Russia does respect at least the democratic vote". In 
his other two editorials Scott wrote more in sorrow than in aryger. 
On 21 January he summarised the Bolshevik programme which the 
Assembly had been called upon to endorse and noted that the objects 
of the Right and Centre S. R. s did not differ markedly from it. But 
the Bolsheviks,, said Scott, "in killing the Constituent Assembly 
have, in fact, adopted in internal affairs that principle of power 
which at Brest they are cambating in external affairs". Worser they 
had left their opponents with no constitutional means of self- 
expression, only the appeal to force. If the Bolsheviks failed to 
bring about peace at Brest Litovsk they would probably be overthrown, 
but "it need not be concluded that the work of the Bolsheviksr even 
after their defeat, would have been fruitless ... They are busy 
carrying out economic changes in Russia some of which at any rate no 
succeeding Goverment will ever be powerful enough to undo. For the 
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restr they are injecting certain ideas into the world, confident that 
they will ferment. " Scott believed that Lenin and Trotsky would have 
to go, "but they will not budge a second earlier or waste an instant 
of the scanty weeks of their power to establish their conception of 
Utopia". 
on 23 January Scott made a serious attempt to understand the 
Bolshevik principles which had led to the dissolution of the 
Assembly. "They do not want to keep alive the goose which lays the 
golden eggs of private property". But he thought that Marx would 
disapprove of their timetable. The stage of capitalist growth was 
missing. "Is it to be seriously contended that the Russian peasant 
and Russian workmen are the most highly developed and the most class- 
conscious in the world? " Scott f eared that, given the human material 
with which they had to work, "Lenin and his f riends are building not 
an enduring fabric but a ramshackle hut which is likely to collapse 
even before the roof is on. " Scott was inclined to agree that their 
labours would not have been entirely wasted, but more positive, 
constructive results might have been achieved if the Bolsheviks had 
been prepared to collaborate with "other sections of the 
revolutionary denmracy". Scott's main criticism of the whole 
episode was, again, that it had "entrenched force and violence at the 
heart of society" and in so doing carried on the tradition of 
Tsarism. 
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Undertones of Civil War 
The last theme with which Price began to deal in the period November 
1917 - February 1918 was the first intimation of civil war. He did 
not personally report the outbreak of the revolts on the Don and the 
Ukraine; Scott heard of them through an agency message which he 
printed on 10 December. On 12 December he wrote a short perceptive 
leader in which he questioned the assumption that the actions of 
Generals Kaledin and Dutov automatically constituted civil war36. 
Had not his Petrograd correspondent told him that the desire for 
36 Dutov,, the Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks (at whose election 
Price had been present) and Kaledin, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, 
were only two of the recusants in South Russia on whom the Allies 
were to pin their hopes of bringing about a counter-revolution. But 
at this stage they had little in common except protecting the 
interests of their own Cossack constituencies. There was even less 
to bind them to the Tsarist generals Alexeiv and Kornilov, who 
reached Novocherkassk early in December 1917. There is a voluminous 
literature on the origins and development of the civil war in Russia, 
although much of it is partisan and most of it written in terms of 
its relationship to the subsequent Allied intervention. For further 
reading see M. J. Carley: Revolution and Intervention: The French 
Goverment and the Russian Civil War 1917-1919 (McGill 1983); George 
A. Brinkley: A Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South 
Russia 1917-1921 (Notre Dam 1966) ; Janes Bunyan: Intervention, 
Civil War and ConTrunism. in Russia, April-Decerriber 1918) (Baltimore 
1936); W. P. and Z. K. Coates: Armed Intervention in Russia 1918- 
1922 (1935); Robert Jackson: At War with the Bolsheviks: the Allied 
Intervention in Russia 1917-1920 (1974) ; Peter Kenez: Civil War in 
South Russia 1918: The First Year of the Volunteer Army (Berkeley 
1971) and Civil War in South Russia 1919-1920: The Defeat of the 
(Berkeley 1977); also by Kenez: 'A. I. Deniken', Russian 
Review Vol. 33 (1974) pp. 139-152 and 'The Ideology of the White 
Wvement' 
, Soviet Studies Vol. 32 (1980) pp. 55-82; John Silverlight: The Victor's Dilenm: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War 
(New York 1970); Eugene P. Trani: 'Woodrow Wilson and the Decision 
to Intervene in Russia: A Reconsideration', Journal of Modern 
Vol. 48 (1976) pp. 440-461; Richard H. Ullman: Anglo- 
Soviet Relations 1917-1921: Vol. I Intervention and the War 
(Princeton and Oxford 1961), Vol. If Britain and the Russian Civil 
War November 1918-February 
_1920 
(Ibid. 1968) ; J. A. White: The TI'S'erian Intervention (Princeton 1950) ; Appleman William: 
containment and Revolution: Western Policy Towards Social Revolution 
ýStudies--i-n-iiýýe-ril'a-lism-and the Cold Wa-r Series, ed. David Horowitzr 
1967. ) and David R. Woodward: 'The British Government and Japanese 
Intervention in Russia during World War V, Journal of Modern Hist2ry 
Vol. 46 (1974) pp. 661-685. The most recent addition to the 
bibiography is Evan Mawdsley The Russian Civil War (1987). 
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peace was particularly strong among soldiers? But "as Mr. Price has r-- 
illuminatingly explained" Scott went on, the interests of all sections 
of the country were not identical. If there were to be civil war it 
would probably be occasioned "by differences as to internal 
politics". Scott appeared to have concluded that soldiers who were 
tired of fighting would be unlikely to fight about such differences. 
Although Price referred in passing to civil war in his report of 
Lenin's speech to the All-Russia Congress on 15 December (see above 
p. 144), when Lenin had defended the arrest of Kadet delegates to the 
Constituent Assembly on the grounds that Kadets had "forced" Kaledin 
into action it was not until 22 December that the Manchester Guardian 
had a major article by him on this subject37. Price now gave a long 
account in which for the first time he appeared to take seriously the 
danger of civil war in Russia. Like Scott before him, he identified 
the danger as an aspect of the class struggle,, complicated by 
intense differences of self-interest between the populations of North 
and South. The North had suffered most from war and famine; the 
South had more food and the land question was not acute. But (and it 
inust be remembered that Price was at the time of writing this piece 
still unimpressed either by Bolshevik strategy or Bolshevik tactics 
except in relation to peace) the government in Petrograd was trying 
to apply the same "syndicalist experiments" to the South as to the 
North. "Instead of realising the strength of ... Southern opposition 
the Petrograd oligarchy and a revolutionary hotheads have sent an 
ultimatum to the Ukrainian and Cossack republicsl and civil war is 
37 Manchester Guardian 22.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Tuesday 
(20. ý12.17) 'Dangers of Bolshevik Dictatorship: Growing 
OPPOSition'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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iminent. " At this time Price still thought, however, that 
"opposition to the revolutionary oligarchy" was growing even in 
Petrograd, "and the near future may see its fall". 
on 24 December Price wrote again,, a piece entitled Cleavage in Russia 
and printed with remarkable speed - Price now being the paper's 
official telegraphic correspondent - on 26 December38. By this time 
he was in a position to give a detailed account of the Kaledin 
revolt. He pointed out that Kaledin's supporters were mainly 
"reactionary refugees" and not Cossacks, "for the Cossack rankers 
have no wish to interfere with the Revolution in North Russia and are 
only desirous of being left alone in possession of their lands". 
Kaledin, on the other hand, by arresting the leaders of soviets in 
the Rostov coal basin had declared war not only on the Bolsheviks but 
"against all the revolutionary democracy". The action of the ;I 
Ukrainian Rada in refusing passage to Bolshevik troops but allowing 
Don Cossacks who wished to join Kaledin to pass through their 
territory had been declared a breacb of neutrality by the governmnt, 
in Petrograd. Price noted that there appeared to be two factions 
among the Don Cossacks, one of which opposed Kaledin's offensive 
against the soviets "as long as the latter create no disorder". In 
this article Price again castigated the Bolsheviks - it should be 
remembered that at this time he was still sceptical about their 
ideology - for having failed to appreciate the genuine differences of 
interest between northerners and southernerst and for trying to aPPlY 
the same solutions to both. "... the northern Bolshevik leaders are 
38 Manchester Guardian 26.12.17. Datelined Petrograd Monday Night 
(24.1-2-. 17). 'Cleavage in Russia: South Against Social Upheaval'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
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little better than Jacobins and have no capacity for constructive 
social reform". But even so Price went on to point out that their 
strength lay in the fact that they were "the first people who had the 
courage to see that peace was the first necessity for Russia and to 
act accordingly". 
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Chapter 6. The Breathing Space 
In 1962 Price was asked by a group of people with whom he happened to 
be sharing a table at an hotel in Moscow how he would? in the last 
analysis, have defined himself politically if he had been a Russian 
in 1918. After a long silence he eventually said, with something 
like reluctancer "Menshevik"1. Like many Russians in the winter of 
1917/18 he supported the November revolution but not necessarily the 
Bolshevik party. Like many Russians he used revolutionary 
catchphrases without necessarily understanding them. Thus in a 
letter to his aunt as early as 30 November 1917 he said: "We have 
got the dictatorship of the proletariat with a vengeance this time!! 
But I rub my hands and chuckle with glee. May the day soon come when 
the proletariat of Western Europe does the same. " In the few letters 
to his family which survive from this period he spoke of civil war as 
a fact of life already; he could understand it as a conflict between 
regional interests but he could not understand it as a class 
conflict, which he deplored. On 22 December he wrote to his brother 
that in the f ace of f amine "organisation is the sole hope; it is 
clear that only a widespread acceptance of Socialism will save us 
all". But he still did not think the Bolsheviks were the people to 
bring about Socialism (as he understood it and how he understood it 
was not clear) . "They will have to go and make way 
for more 
constructive people. " 
Very quickly af ter the November revolution Price was overwhelmed with 
offers of work. He wrote to his uncle on 30 November: "I have now 
1 This episode was witnessed by Price's daughter. 
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got the correspondence for three newspapers - the Manchester 
Guardian, the Labour Herald2 and an Anerican newspaper, the New 
York Tribune. It keeps me pretty well OCcupied. Evidently my work 
here is known in the journalistic world, because I am continually 
getting letters and cables from England and America from editors whom 
I have never known or met,, asking me for an article or for 
information about this or that subject. I am beginning to demand a 
price for my information now!! " Not much of this work can be traced, 
but a few articles by him appeared in the New York Tribune, and in 
these he was clearly trying to present an explanation of the 
revolution which would be acceptable to Amrican readers. The first 
of his articles for this paper, written on 13 November and printed on 
23 December, was little more than a travelogue based on his recent 
journey in the Volga provinces, but he ended it by making an attempt 
to account for the peculiar nature of "the communism of the Russian 
peasant" as "a simple and noble philosophy of labour". The second 
article, written on 1 December and printed the following day, again 
drew on his travels, but this time he attempted to account for the 
2 Price may have been confusing two titlesr Labour Leader and 
Herald (in the case of the latter using the word "labour" 
adjectively. He wrote nothing from Russia for the former journal 
andt in the event, only one piece for the latter. on 24 November the 
Herald published a 300-word telegram,, sent on 17 November, from 
Price, who was described as "Our Special Correspondent in Petrograd". 
It consisted of a curious mixture of straight reporting in prose that 
was sometimes quite heavily loaded, and which does not accord well 
with anything else that Price wrote about the Bolsheviks, even when 
he was at his most critical. He described the "Maximalists" as 
having isolated themselves from the right wing Socialists as the 
result of having made "unreasonable demands" and having 
Systematically terrorised the Petrograd bourgeoisie. A few sentences 
later he wrote that despite "differences over tactics... the two wings 
Of the Socialists are agreed in principle on a common programme" 
which he defined as peace and land. However, he concluded gloomily,? 
"Telegrams from all over Russia indicate that the condition 
everywhere is desperate". It is perhaps not surprising that the 
Herald did not use any more material from him while in Russia. 
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revolution in terms of the experiences of factory workers and 
soldiers with whom he had talked on a Volga steamer. The theme 
ruming throughout the piece was the unreality and irrelevance of the 
war to these peopler who could see in it only "a disturbanoe going on 
somewhere f ar away in the West... indissolubly connected with 
goverment that oppresses". The longing for peace amng ordinary 
Russians was deeply rooted and was "not due to the agitation of a few 
fanatical Bolsheviki with Jewish names in Petrograd". This was, 
perhaps, the most unpleasant thing he ever wrote about the Bolshevik 
leadership. It nust be balanced against a piece which appeared in 
Common Sense on 1 December. This was as usual not attributed to him, 
only to "a correspondent" but it bears the hallmarks of his style and 
it is also unlikely that Hirst had any other correspondent in Russia 
at that time with as much inside knowledge. Hirst introduced the 
extract by explaining that his "correspondent" had been disturbed by 
the distorted accounts of the November revolution which had been 
appearing in the British press. He then quoted f rom the letter in 
question: "When will our press realise, that the Bolsheviks are not 
necessarily blackguards nor Trotsky and Lenin scoundrels (however 
much certain people on this side may consider their methods 
unfortunate). " And in his last letter to his aunt in 1917 (28 
December) , after describing his frugal Christmas dinner (a small 
sausage,, 1/41b. of black bread and af ew sweets) he added that 
although physically starving he was "mentally fed with the joyful 
news that Russia,, Red, Revolutionary triunphant Russia had overthrown 
her capitalist tyrants, burst her chains and had set out on the road 
to peace". 
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During this period,, when Price was attempting both to describe and to 
understand the consequences of the November revolution,, he was living 
under great difficulties. For a while, during the closure of the 
bankS3 in December/January he was unable to get hold of any money, 
earned or uneamed. He existed on the starvation rations of the Food 
Commissariat: one eighth to one quarter of a pound of bread a day, 
tea, potato skins, and a few smoked herrings. He lost two stone in 
weight in little over a month and became so weak that he had to sit 
down on a doorstep every hundred yards on his way from his f lat in 
Fontaka to the Smolny. Nonetheless it was during this period that he 
made up his mind to stay in Russia. He could have got out at that 
time. But he had no family ties and he felt it was his duty to stay. 
He also realised that he was, above all, "immensely lucky to be where 
Iwas during this great upheaval. So I decided to set my teeth and 
carry on, '4. He was rescued from starvation by Tchicherin,, whom he 
went to see one day in January, shortly af ter Tchicherin had returned 
from England. He found that Tchicherin had already been asking about 
him and had apparently told Lenin that he ought to be given every 
facility to continue his work because his despatchesi, together with 
those of Ransome in the Daily News, were the only fair and objective 
reports on Russia appearing in the West. In My Three Revolutions 
3 Although the Russian State Bank had legally become an agency of 
the Goverment when the Bolsheviks took powers, the private banks held 
out against the government, remaining closed or opening only for a 
few hours occasionally, and refusing to supply cash either for the 
government or for private depositors. On 27 December the private 
banks were nationalised, but a strike of bank clerks prolonged the 
cash crisis until towards the end of January 1918. See E. H. Carr, 
The Bolshevik Revolution,, Vol. II, p. 75 and pp. 131-138. During this 
period the British Goverment had already embarked on a series of 
covert dealings aimed at buying out a number of major private Russian 
bmks, to enable them to finance the opposition groups forming 
in 
SOUth Russia. See Michael Kettle, The Allies and the Russian 
ýOllaPse: March 1917-March 1918 (1981) pp. 176-219. 
IPrice papers. Ms. 'Back Bench Traveller' p. 646. 
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Price wrote "I thereupon asked if I could have facilities to receive 
money from England at one of the banks. He was horrified to hear 
that I was suf f ering in this way and saw the appropriate people at 
once. n5 Relievedi, still confused but now basically sympathetic to 
the Bolsheviks, Price addressed himself to the task of reporting the 
final stages of the negotiations leading up to the treaty of Brest 
Litovsk. His accounts of these events for the Manchester Guardian 
were, however, fragmentary and discontinuous, as information cam 
through in a piecemeal fashion and could not always be easily or 
accurately interpreted. His account of Brest Litovsk in C-hapter XV 
of his Reminiscences gives a much clearer account than anything that 
appeared in the paper, with the exception of a mysterious article 
"From a Correspondent" which could have been by him, but did not, in 
any case, appear until 9 April. 
Price had last mentioned the negotiations in an article written on 28 
January when he referred briefly to Trotsky's formula of "no war no 
peace",, itself the subject of a compromise with Lenin as the basis of 
1001shevik policy in the next round of negotiations6. He did not 
write about the subject again until 14 February. In the meantime the 
talks at Brest Litovsk had been resumed. These took place on 30 
January, when the wave of anti-war strikes and demonstrations which 
1-3 
had swept through Germany and Austria during January and which had 
lent some colour to Bolshevik hopes of an imminent world revolutiont 
was beginning to recede. But there was cause for optimism f ran 
another direction: in the Ukraine, where it seemed possible that a 
5 Price. My Three Revolutions. p. 110. 
6 See above Chapter 5 FIN 16. 
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soviet-style goverrunent might be about to wrest control f rom the 
purely nationalist, autonomous government, the Rada7. By now both 
the Rada and the Ukrainian Soviet had representatives at the peace 
talks, but the Central Powers recognised only the Rada as having the 
right to speak in the name of the Ukraine. On 9 February the Rada 
signed a separate peace with the Central Powers. The German military 
influence, taking advantage of the failure of the strike movement at 
home and drawn by the prospect of Ukrainian corn, now greatly 
increased the territorial demands to be made on Russia as a condition 
7 In 1917 the population of the Ukraine was one fifth of that of 
the whole of Russia and its major source of corn,, coal and iron. its 
industrial manpower was mainly imported, its peasantry not so much 
anti-Moscow as anti-landlord (mainly absentee Poles) and its 
nationalist movement largely led by intellectuals isolated from 
either of the other main groups. All three came together for the 
first time after the March Revolution to create a Ukrainian Rada, or 
Council which initially had no formal political character but 
gradually acquired one. In June 1917 the Rada proclaimed an 
autonomous Ukrainian Republic, which the Provisional Government had 
little alternative but to recognise. After the November Revolution a 
Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed, although - again 
originally - with no immediate secessionist objectives. At the same 
time the emergence of a Ukrainian Soviet, encouraged by Petrograd, 
resulted in confusion, anarchy and ultimately civil war. The origin 
Of these developments is described by Price in his Reminiscences'T pp. 
160-163,, and by E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 289-307. 
More recent studies of the Ukraine during this period include Steven 
L. Gunther: 'The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917' 
(Slavic Review 38 (1979) pp. 30-47) ; Taras Hunczak (ed. ) The Ukraine ý91 7-- A Stud 
_in 
Revolution (Harvard 1977); Michael Paly: 'The 19-21: _ýe; ýoiution ý_ tugy *1 
Anarchism of Nestor Makhno 1918-1921. An Aspect of Ukrainian 
Revolution' (Slavonic and East European Review (56) 1978 pp. 307- 
308). 
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of peace8. A territorial sub-committee was created to discuss them 
but, not surprisingly, could not agree. On the day after the Rada's 
defection (9 February) Trotsky announced "We are going out of the 
war but we feel ourselves conpelled to refuse to sign the peace 
treaty". The Germans interpreted this as giving them the right, 
under the terms of the armistice of 15 December 1917 to renew 
hostilities after a seven-day period of grace. They counted this 
period as having begun on 10 February but omitted to inform the 
Soviet goverment of the basis of their calculations until 16 
February, when they announced that they would be resuming their 
offensive in two days. While the citizens of Petrograd celebrated 
what they thought was peace and soldiers left the trenches, the 
Germans prepared to strike, and on 18 February began an unhindered 
advance on Petrograd and Kiev. That evening the TsIK decided by a 
majority of one vote to send word to Berlin that the Soviet 
government was willing to sign peace on the terms presented to them 
on 10 February, and a message to that effect was radioed to Berlin 
during the night of 18/19 February. 
8 By the original terms proposed by the Germans at Brest Litovsk, 
Russia would have lost Poland, Lithuania and Courland. On 21 
February 1918, while those terms were still being discussed, Germany 
sent what was in effect an ultimatum demanding further territorial 
concessions: Livonia and Estonia; the evacuation of Finland and the 
Ukraine and Russian recognition of their independence; in addition: 
the demobilisation of the Russian Army and the Red Guards; the 
disarmament of all Russian warships; and the restoration of the terms 
Of the trade treaty of 1904 (subsequently amended to the terms of the 
treaty of 1903, which were even more favourable to Germany) . An Outstandingly detailed and clear account of the negotiations at Brest 
Litovsk is given by Richard K. Debo: Revolution and Survival: The 
!, orei n Poli LLa_. 2f s Eovi, eýt R sia 1917- 8 (Liverpool 1979). Sir John 
W. Wheeler Bennett: Brest Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918F 
first published in 1939 and reprinted in 1963, is also well worth 
reading. 
6: 163 
of the first three telegrams that Price sent in February 1918 only 
one was about the peace negotiations9. From its content it was 
obviously written af ter the Rada had signed a separate peace but 
before the news of the German ultimatum had reached Petrograd. 
Datelined "Thursday (Delayed)" this would appear to place it as 
having been written on 14 February, but it was not printed until 7 
marchr when the information contained in it was thoroughly 
misleading. The f irst section was a short essay on the question 
whether food from the Ukraine was more likely to go north or west. 
Price described the conflicting interests in the Ukraine and 
accounted for the Rada's hurry to sign a separate peace by the fact 
that pro-Soviet forces in the Ukraine were gaining ground. Price 
stated that the Allied governments had been mistaken in supporting 
the Rada and had "backed the wrong horse". He went on to refer so 
obliquely to Trotsky's method of bringing the Brest Litovsk 
negotiations to an end that it would seem that Price, like many 
Russians, actually thought the war was over. He merely referred in 
passing to "the refusal of the All-Russia Soviet Goverment of 
Petrograd to sign an Inperialist peace with the Central Powers". 
What interested him, and what he proceeded to write aboutt was the 
alliance now forming between "the Austriant German and Rumanian 
governments, the Ukrainian Rada and General Alexeiv against the 
Russian Revolution. 1110 This was,, indeed,, precisely the area from 
9 Manchester Guardian 7.3.18. Datelined 'Petrograd Thursday. 
Deliy-ýF (14 or 21 February 1918) . 'What They Fight 
for in the 
Ukraine'. Signed Signed M. Philips Price. 
10 Rumania entered the war on the side of the Allies in August 1916. 
By the end of 1917 the Germans controlled a large area of Rumania but 
there were many Russian troops in the territory still under the 
control of the Rumanian Goverment. In January 1918 it was learned 
in Petrograd that the Rumanian High Comnand was secretly negotiating 
with Germany for the possessio of (Russian) Bessarabia. In reprisal 
the Bolshevik Goverment ordeWthe arrest of the Rumanian Ambassador, 
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which at that time the main threat to the Bolshevik government was 
likely to arise, due in no small measure to the support of the 
British government for Alexeiv. From now on it is reasonable to 
assume that Price's cables began to be "looked at sharply" (see below 
p. 290). By coincidence it was also at this time that Price began to 
keep copies of all the cables he sent to the Manchester Guardian. 
Thus from 20 February 1918 it is possible to conpare the original 
text of what he wrote with what was actually published, and to 
distinguish between cuts which can reasonably be attributed to the 
hand of a sub-. editor and those which show signs of political 
censorship. The whole question of British censorship, with special 
reference to press reports from Russia will be dealt with in Chapter 
7. What follows imnediately will be confined to what readers of the 
Manchester Guardian actually saw over Price's signature in the spring 
and early summer of 1918. 
Price began his first articlell about the resumed negotiations at 
Brest Litovsk (written on 20 February 1918 and printed only three 
days later) by noting - incorrectly, as a comparison with his own 
despatch of 28 January shows - that the decision to accept the peace 
terms of the Central Powers had not come as a total surprise. 
Trotsky, wrote Pricer had already been authorised to sign an 
"'unfortunate peace' if all other solutions should fail". But he 
went on to give an accurate sumary of the continued split in both 
the party executive and in the Central Executive committee as between 
Count Diamandi, although he was soon released as the result of Allied 
Pressure. However, Rumanian troops did occupy Bessarabia, and on 28 
January 1918 the Bolsheviks broke off diplomatic relations. "Manchester Guardian 23.2.18. Datelined Petrograd Friday. (20 
February). 'Failure of Bolshevik Hopes'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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those who favoured revolutionary war and those who recognised the 
need for a separate peace. He showed how the strike wave in Germany 
and Austria during January had at first helped Trotsky in his attempt 
to get the best possible terms, but that their defeat had enabled the 
Central Powers to stiffen their demands. Price interpreted the 
Russian capitulation as a recognition by "the Russian 
revolutionaries" that "they cannot emancipate mankind from 
nationalist wars by the development of the class struggle" and went 
on to make it clear that by this he meant the development of the 
class struggle outside the boundaries of Russia. He described the 
grim conditions prevailing in North Russia; the "sole hope is the 
fear which the Germans must have in occupying such a country". Price 
concluded by not7lng that the treachery of the Rada had given the 
Central Powers a pretext not only to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Russia in order "to prevent the agitation from spreading 
into Central Europe", but also to help themselves to Ukrainian corn. 
On 22 February Price, who had not previously mentioned the Geman 
advance begun on 18 February - presumably because he had not known 
about it - wrote another long article which was printed in the 
Manchester Guardian on 25 Februaryl2. In it he referred for the 
first time to preparations for the defence of Petrograd and noted 
that the Germans were apparently ignoring the Russian reply to their 
ultimatum because they hoped to occupy more territory first, and 
above all territory in the Ukraine. Price again described the 
economic background to the political and militarY situation in the 
12 Manchester Guardian 25.2.18. Datelined, Petrograd Friday. (22 
February). 'Russia and Ukraine: Influences of Hurxger and Plenty'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
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Ukraine in considerable detail. He also drew attention to the 
consequences for Poland of the terms of the German peace treaty with 
the Rada, which by ceding the province of Cholm in the Ukraine would 
effectively encircle Poland. "But if the Revolution is in danger in 
the west" Price continued "it is advancing victoriously in the east. " 
It wasp of course, in the south-east that civil war, counter- 
revolution and preparations for Allied intervention were all already 
in the making. But on 22 February 1918 the view f rom Petrograd was 
clouded by hope and ignorance, as Price described the impending 
defeat of General Alexeiv near Rostov, the suicide of General 
Kaledin, the defection of the Don Cossacks to the Soviet and the re- 
establishment of Soviet control on the Caucasus. On the basis of 
this position, he concluded, the '"safe background in the east is 
evidently influencing the Soviet Government in Petrograd to patch up 
peace in the west with the Central Powers". 
This leisurely, almost complacent interpretation of af fairs was 
shattered within five days. on 23 February Pravda published a series 
of theses by Lenin in which he set down the arguments in favour of 
concluding peace with Germany. These had formed the basis of his 
thinking since he f irst. wrote them down to clarify his own mind in 
January, but he had acquiesced in Trotsky's "no war no peace" formula 
for the sake of making, as he himself put it, a good peace with 
Itotsky. Price swmarised them two days later in a despatch which 
appeared in the Manchester Guardian'on 27 February, but within hours 
Of their appearance in Pravda on 23 February events had overtaken 
arguments when the Geman reply to the Soviet government's radio 
message of 18/19 February reached Petrograd. The p4Aýe- terms of 10 
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February were again savagely increased and the Soviet government was 
given 48 hours in which to take them or leave them. Half of that 
time had already been used up in transit. Af ter a series of 
preliminary party meetings, the TsIK met at the Taurida Palace on the 
night of 23 February. Price was present and wrote two accounts of 
the meeting, one for the Manchester Guardian (written next day and 
printed on 26 February) and one later in his Reminiscences (published 
in 1921). Both are of considerable historical interest since it 
seems that no official record of this meeting was ever published, 
although other memoirs exist and Lenin's speeches are on recordl3. 
The account in the Reminiscences14 is fuller and more personal than 
that in the Manchester Guardian15 but the two do not dif f er in any 
material respect. Both give pride of place to the arguments with 
which Lenin supported his case for signing the peace "in order" Price 
quoted him as saying "to obtain breathing space to recuperate f or a 
further struggle". In his account for the paper Price had only room 
to single out the counter -arguments of Radek and Ryazanov who were 
for continuing the "revolutionary war" at all costs. In the 
Reminiscences he also reported Alexandra Kollontails opposition to 
13 E. H. Carr: The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23 Vol. 31 p. 401 FIN 3. 
No official record of this session of VTsIK was ever published; the 
text of Lenin's speech is in Sochinenya xxill 280-283, a graphic 
account of the meeting in M. Philips Price, My Reminiscences of the 
of Rissian Revolution (1921) pp. 247-249'. K. L. Seleznev: History of Ee- USSjý 3 (Moscow 1974). 'He (Price) noted down Lenin's inportant 
speech of 23 February 1918 to the meeting of the United Bolshevik and 
Left S. R. fractions of the Supreme Central Executive Committee about 
the question of the signing of peace; no other records of this speech 
have been discovered. ' Selezriev himself gave the following reference 
for this statement: E. V. Klopov. Lenin at the Smolny. Moscow 1965. 
P14 431-433. 
15 
Price. Reminiscences. pp. 246-248. 
Manchester Guardian 1.3.18. Datelined Petrograd Wednesday. (27 
FebiUary) 'Defense of the Russian Revolution'. Signed M. Philips 
Price. 
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Lenin16 and he described Lenin's confident manner of speaking and 
general demeanor in greater detail. Price's account of the outcome 
of the debate was, of course, the same in both versions but in his 
Reminiscences he conveyed a greater sense of the bitterness of the 
struggle between the opposing points of view, even if only in 
general isations, than he did in his article for the Manchester 
Guardian. On the other hand the latter also contained sorw 500 words 
of speculation as to what would happen next, including the 
16 ALEKSANDRA MIKHAILOVNA KOLLONTAI (1872-1952). Born Domontovich, 
Aleksandra enjoyed an unusually good education and then married her 
cousin, Vladimir Mikhailovich Kollontai. She bore one son and, 
although the marriage did not last, she always retained the name 
Kollontai. The debate on Brest Litovsk was neither the first nor the 
last time that Kollontai found herself in opposition to the party 
leadership, but a more frequent cause of disagreement was the 
official party line on the feminist question. Although she agreed 
with the party that the pre-r evolutionary feminist movement in Russia 
was primarily a middle-class movement (and she had nothing to do with 
it) she ardently believed that the liberation of women purely as the 
by-product of the liberation of all people in a Marxist revolution 
was not going to be enough. She fought long and hard to get 
political education for working women on to the Bolshevik agenda. 
After the November revolution Kollontai was appointed Commissar of 
Social Welfare and secured more legal rights for Soviet women, in the 
few months she was in off ice, than were available to any other women 
in the world. Having resigned after Brest Litovsk and withdrawn from 
party work, she was allowed in the autumn of 1918 to organise a 
national conference of women workers which resulted in the 
establishment of Zhenotdel, the Departmentof Work Among women Workers 
and Peasants. of which she became (after the death of its fi rst head, 
Inessa Armand, in 1920), the director. It may be presumed that she 
was, in the interval, somewhat underenployed, and that this, together 
with her considerable reputation as a writer, may account for her 
election to the Anglo-American Group in January 1919 (see Chapter 10 
P. 326). In 1921,, her combative instincts unabated, she joined the 
Workers' Opposition movement, and in February 1922 was removed from 
ZhenOtdel. She was sent to Norway, orginally in a junior position on Flie Soviet trade delegation, but spent the next 23 years gaining 
considerable international respect as a diplomat, mainly in 
Scandinavian countries. Although many of her friends perished in the 
purgesi, she did not renounce the party and was able to spend the last 
7 years of her life in retirement in Moscow. For further reading see 
U) Kollontails own works: Selected Writing of Alexandra Kollontai 
(ed. Alix Holt) (Westport, Conn., 1977) ; Love of the Worker Bees (ed- 
Cathy Porter) (1977) ; (ii) biographies: Barbara Evans Clements: A 
Bolshevik Feminist: The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai (Bloomington , -- iý W) :, 
-z 
ýrice caii : ýgýatTil-ce -Farnsworth: A41exa-n-3--rai--Kollontai d E6iWn 
(Stanford, 1980) ; Cathy Porter: Alexandra Kollontai (1980). 
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possibility of the construction of "a new political centre for 
obtaining peace" under the aegis of a revived Constituent Assembly. 
bit he recognised that the Soviet Government had immense power in 
terms of the class struggle and - signif icantly, in terms of Price Is 
own thinking - that this was the struggle that was "now the central 
factor of the Russian Revolution". 
The vote to capitulate was taken at 5 o'clock in the morning of 24 
February and Price described in his Reminiscences that he returned 
how "at 6 o'clock on a bitter winter Is morning and slept f rom a 
combined feeling of weariness and hunger". It seems reasonable to 
presume that he did not file his copy until much later that day, and 
possibly not until after he had talked to Arthur Ransame17 and 
Raymnd Robinsl8, which he described doing in his account of this 
17 ARrHUR MITCHELL RANSOME (1884-1967) . Ransome wrote an 
autobiography which was edited by Rupert Hart Davis and appeared only 
after his deatah. In 1984 Hugh Brogan's Life of Arthur Ransome was 
published, giving a much fuller account of Ransom's activities in 
Russia than Ransome was able or prepared to give himself. A letter 
from Ransome in the Stow Hill papers indicates that in 1919 he was 
" working on a big history of the revolution on which I expect to 
spend the next five years of my life". But sadly he did not fulfil 
that expectation. An extended footnote appears as Appendix IV and 
attempts to give an account of the curious relationship that existed 
between Price and Ransome. 18 RAYMOND ROBINS (1878-1951). In early life Robins' activities 
ranged from coalmining to the Congregationalist ministry. He was 
qualified as a lawyer, and worked for 14 years as a social worker in 
the Chicago slums. In politics he was a member of the Progressive 
party and a personal supporter of Theodore Roosevelt#, on whose 
reCOMendation President Wilson appointed him to be a member of 
the American Red Cross mission in Russia in the summer of 1917. By 
the autumn of that year he had been put in sole charge of it. Quick 
to recognise the irreversibility of the November Revolution, he 
worked tirelessly to promote the recognition of the new regime and 
for economic co-operation with it. As the official U. S. Ambassador 
Francis became increasingly locked into a role which was at best 
neutral and at worst hostile, Robins was nonetheless encouraged by 
him to act as an unofficial intermediary between the U. S. Government 
and the Bolsheviks, although little notice was taken of Robins' 
advice in Washington. He was in constant touch with Lockhart and the 
Policies which they advocated were clearly the result of consultation 
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period in My Three Revolutions. Price recalled that he ran into them 
in the lobby of the Taurida Palace and that they all agreed "that now 
was the time when the Western Allies might use the situation to bring 
Russia round to offer resistance in some way to the Germans. The 
hatred of the Prussian military system knew no bounds now in Russia 
and some way must be found to turn it to the advantage of the Western 
Allies. "19 Perhaps this was why, in the concluding paragraph of his 
despatch to the Manchester Guardian on that day Price argued that the 
Allies should now "redouble all efforts to secure the sympathy of the 
Russian people in their hour of sore trial", counting on their anti- 
German feeling to "make a rapprochement between Russia and Western 
Europe more possible now than ever, provided that the whole policy of 
the Allies towards Russia is radically revised and made more in 
synpathy with the new spirit in Russia". 
Owing to the dislocation caused by the swift advance of the German 
army, the Soviet peace delegation took four days to get to Brest 
Litovsk, where the final stages of the surrender began to be enacted 
on 28 February. The Germany army, having set 3 March as the date on 
which the peace was to be signed, continued their advance to the 
bitter end. Price wrote (on 1 March) an account printed only three 
days later in which he reported that preparations f or the defence of 
and co-ordination. Af ter his death his papers were presented to the 
University of Wisconsin and are housed in the Archives of the State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin. There is unfortunately as yet no 
serious published account of Robins' life. In 1920 a book entitled 
! ýýnd Robins Own Storyý was written by William Hard and published in 
New York. The facts in it tally, where it is possible to compare 
them, with those in the Raymond Robins papers, but the style of the book is so enthusiastic as to make an unsatisfactory source of dOcUffentary information. 
19 P. 107. 
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Petrograd were proceeding "with feverish haste"20. "The 
'Del to 
., -volution , as 
he still described the Government, while ready to 
sign a humiliating peace would "perish rather than allow Prussian 
imperialists to prescribe the form of government under which the 
Russian proletariat shall live. " It was now being widely felt, wrote 
Price, that Russia was being invaded for political, not strategic 
reasons. He went on to note that the Austrian army had not yet 
moved. This was thought in Petrograd to be because of "grave 
internal complications" involving the conflicting nationalist 
aspirations of Ukrainians, Poles and Czechs. He also reported that 
the Czech volunteers in the Ukraine had gone over to the support of 
the Ukrainian Soviet2l. Price concluded by pointing out that Allied 
diplorpacy appeared to have missed a golden opportunity of isolating 
the Prussian oligarchy by not taking advantage of the separatist and 
demcratic tendencies now manifesting themselves in the eastern 
provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Soviet Goverment, on 
the other hand, was "fully alive to these possibilities". 
In his article of 1 March Price also described the continued advance, 
virtually unopposed, of the German army in the Baltic provinces. 
They were he reported, apparently leaving the peasants alone in the 
occupied territories but arresting members of soviets and other 
revolutionary organisations and shooting Red Guards "on sight" - 
This, Price considered, confirmed his view that the Germans were 
20 Manchester Guardian 4.3.18. Datelined Petrograd Friday. (1 
Marc7hý). 'Russian Revolutionary Tactics'. signed M. Philips Price. 
21 For an account of the origin and development of the Czech 
inVolvernent in Russia in this period, see below pp. 246-247. 
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pursuing purely political objectives. He went on to describe 
developments in the south west whereo, he admitted, "the national 
complication... is inpossible to disentangle". The anti-Soviet 
Ukrainian Volunteers advancing on Kiev included Galicians, and were 
officered by Germansr while the Czechs were supporting the Ukrainian 
Soviet. Poles who in the Baltic provinces were supporting the 
Germans for class reasons were in the Ukraine supporting the Soviet 
for nationalist reasons. The Rada was thoroughly unpopular both 
among the Ukrainian peasants (because of their land policy) and the 
soldiers (because of their anti-democratic policies). In the same 
article Price also reported the fulfillment by Lenin of his promise 
to the TsIK to consult by telegram the soviets outside Moscow and 
Petrograd on the question of continuing the war22. "It is clear" 
wrote Price "that Lenin, in his policy of acceptance of the German 
terms, expresses the real desire not only of the soldiers but of the 
peasant masses, who are worn out by suf f ering and hunger as much as 
other elements of the country. " Price ascribed to the peasant "the 
most truly Russian element in the Revolution" the Tolstoyan spirit of 
non-resistance. The urban proletariat, on the other hand, with 
"f iery Marxism" was still "ready with arms to defend freedom or die". 
By an inversion of the norm Lenin, the Marxist,, was now voicing the 
pacifism of the peasants while the Left S. R. S, the traditional party 
22 On 23 February 1918, in a conciliatory gesture towards Lef t 
Bolsheviks who disagreed with him about the absolute necessity for 
accepting the German terms of the Treaty of Brest Litovskj, Lenin 
undertook to consult the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets before 
ratification. In fact he did better, and sent identical messages to 
every Soviet and revolutionary organisation throughout Russia in 
which he stated the German terms, outlined the conflicting views 
regarding their acceptance, and asked for the opinion of all the 
bodies consulted as to whether the peace, once signed (which was by 
then inescapable) should be ratified. When these replies came in 
theY showed 262 in favour of ratification and 233 opposed to it. See 
Richard K. Debo: Revolution and Survival pp. 144-147 and 173. 
6: 173 
of the peasants,, stood for the position of the urban proletariat. 
But the difference, Price concluded, was really one of tactics. 
Lenin only want to sign peace "in order to continue the underground 
struggle politically and morallyn. 
A peace treaty between Russia and the Central Powers was signed on 2 
March but in the north the Germany army continued to advance until 
they reached the line Narva-Lake Peipus-Mogiliev. It was decided to 
transfer the goverment to Moscow and the evacuation of Petrograd 
was accoWlished in the f irst two weeks of March. Price, who was 
unable to get space on any of the off icial evacuation trains, wrote 
only one more despatch f rom Petrograd before making his own 
arrangements. On 3 March, with the Germans still advancing, he 
reported that Petrograd was outwardly calm, but that urban workers 
were "pouring into the Red Armyv'23. (This was not printed until 6 
April and again gave a misleading impression of the state of affairs "r 
in north Russia. ) Price described having gone down the railway 
towards Pskov and seeing trains packed with recruits. He reported 
that preparations were also being made "to retire, if necessary, into 
the interior of Russia, resisting the invaders step by step". He no 
longer oversimplified the intentions of the Germans and now said that 
they were not purely political. They were going to try to occupy all 
the chief industrial centres of north Russia, and by last-minute 
demands made at Brest Litovsk on behalf of Turkey 24 to gain control 
23 Manchester Guardian 6.4.18. Datelined Petrograd Sunday. Q 
MarcF-)-. ' Russia Is Unratified Peace'. Signed M. Philips Price. 24 At the f irst meeting of the parties to the f inal stage of the 
negotiations at Brest Litovsk, the Germans simply announced that on 
t0P Of all the other additional demands which they had made on 21 
Februaryl Russia was to surrender Kars, Ardahan and Batum to the 
Turks. 
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of the mineral wealth of the Trans--Caucasus also. Price reported 
that rumours were circulating in Petrograd that Japan was negotiating 
with the Allies to agree to her OccuPying the Siberian railway "thus 
creating the impression that the powers of Western Central Europe are 
tacitly agreeing among themselves for the partition of Russia". But, 
he concluded, the ideals of the Revolution would never be more than 
temporarily eclipsed. "The tragedy of the Revolution is that while 
the mind of the Russian people is ready for it, the material 
resources are not at hand to realise it, since the war ruined the 
economic life of the country and left it helpless to foreign 
tyrants. " 
Price wrote two articles in February 1918 which did not directly bear 
on the peace negotiations or the German aggression, but which threw 
an interesting light on the internal situation in Russia at that 
time. One of them was a report of an interview with the former Prime 
Minister (now Minister of Food) of Finland, Olaf Tokoi, who he had 
already interviewed once in July 1917 (see above P. 89) and who he 
interviewed again on 4 February 1918. His account of the interview 
was printed five days later25. Tokoi described the predominantly 
bourgeois conplexion of the Finnish Diet which had been elected in 
the autumn of 1917, its socially repressive nature, and the 
irresponsible way in which it had allowed the propertied classes to 
send their money out of the country,, mainly to Sweden and Germany. 
The sons of the rich had also been sent to Germany and had returned 
to Finland "with arms and armunition to put down the Finnish 
revolution" said Tokoi. But Finland asked only for ammunition and 
25 Manchester Guardian 9.2.18. Datelined Petrograd Tuesdsay (5 
February). 'The Class War in Finland'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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food f rom the Petrograd government. "We, can deal with our bourgeois 
guards ourselves. " The White Guards were, he said, being driven 
northwards and the railways and industrial centres of South Finland 
were in the hands of the Red Guards. Price reported that he had 
asked Tokoi what had become of the Diet, and that Tokoi had replied 
"it no longer functioned" but that fresh elections would probably be 
held during the year. Price added a rider to his account of the 
interview in which he predicted that the same kind of conflict would 
take place in Finland as had taken place in Russia between the 
Constituent Assembly and the Soviet, but "the Fimish Parliamentary 
tradition is very strong ... so that the abolition of the Diet and the 
establishment of a proletarian dictatorship will be a more difficult 
task than in Russia". 26 
26 Price was correct about the difficulty of establishing a 
proletarian dictatorship in Finland. The "bourgeois" (or White) 
guards to whom Tokoi referred were German-trained Finns who had taken 
part in the German advance to Riga during the summer of 1917 and 
proceeded to stir up hostilities within Finland against left-wing 
elements inside the country. A "Guard of Popular Liberty" (the Red 
Guards) was formed to counter their activities and a small group of 
Finnish Bolsheviks attempted to seize power by setting up a Finnish 
Soviet in January 1918. The Petrograd Government, having recognised 
Finnish independence under the non-socialist government of Svinhufvud 
in December 1917, now also recognised the Finnish Soviet without 
withdrawing recognition from the other. When Price interviewed Tokoi 
a state of civil war already existed in Finland. Two months later (3 
April 1918) German troops invaded Finland and cambined with the White 
Guards under Mamerheim to overthrow the Finnish Soviet after ten 
days. A state which was neither war nor peace now came about between 
Finland and Soviet Russia. Territorial concessions on the Pecheneg 
Peninsula made to the Finnish Soviet were of course retained by the 
Whites. The Whites, however preferable their politics might have 
beent were nonetheless perceived by the Allies to be agents of 
Germany. The presence of White Guards on,, and German sutmarines off 
the Pecheneg peninsula was one of the main pretexts for the 
reinforcement in May 1918 of British troops in Murmansk. Price 
describes this not very clearly in his Reminiscences (pp. 300-302). 
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The last of the articles which Price wrote in February 1918 was 
written on 16 February and printed f ive days later27. This was 
towards the end of a brief period of euphoria in the streets of 
Petrograd between the day that Trotsky left Brest Litovsk for the 
last time and the arrival of the German ultirnatum. Price described 
how the Soviet government was consolidating its position in the 
country by transferring power to local soviets in "the rewter 
districts" where "the masses ... had not reached the same level of 
revolutionary consciousness as in the industrial centres". As the 
result of this consciousness- raising policy many improvements were 
"automatically" following. The railways were beginning to work again 
and food to be distributed. Banks and goverment offices were being 
run by an "intellectual staff " created by the Bolsheviks. The only 
cloud on the horizon was on the Don, where Alexeiv was forming an 
army of officers and cadets, the sons of the propertied classes, and 
counter-revolutionary agents. But he was not getting the support of 
the Cossacks. 
Everything pointed to "a period of slow,, steady reconstruction" - 
Even the Kadet party, Price wrote, applauded the success of the 
UfN 
Bolsheviks, because they saw in them grounds for hope that a 
goverment would one day develop which would be "sufficiently 
powerful ... for subjugating Russia once more to the capitalist 
system". Price ended by alluding brief ly to sOMe Of the other 
subjects which had been discussed by the Third Congress, including 
the reform of the judicial system and to the Land Law which it passed 
before it dispersed. "All this shows that the Russian people are 
27 Manchester Guardian 21.2.17. Datelined Petrograd Saturday (16 
Febrýuary). 'Russian Restoration' . Signed M. Philips Price. 
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entering upon an intensely interesting social and economic 
experiment, and the Soviet Government of Petrograd is the instrument 
created to carry out their desires and aspirations. As such it is 
the only government which can guide the destinies of the 
country. "28 
Three weeks after writing those words the goverment was in the 
process of moving to Moscow and, as has been noted, Price was unable 
to get on to any of the official evacuation trains. Hearing that 
there was space on trains going to Vologda and food to be had there, 
he decided to go there for a few weeks, until Moscow had settled down 
as the new capital. Vologda stood at the intersection of the north- 
south- and east-west railway systems and was therefore ideally 
situated for escape if the Germans continued to advance; for this 
reason most of the Allied diploTmtic corps had already gone there. 
But by going to Vologda, inevitable as it almost certainly was, Price 
missed the last major meeting to be held in Petrograd: that of the 
Seventh (or Extraordinary) Party Congress (at which among other 
28 In his Reminiscences (pp. 253-259) Price described in some detail 
the work of the 'Land Commission set up by the Third Congress,, of 
whose discussions he was probably the only outside observer. The 
form in which the Land Law of 1918 emerged represented a tactical 
victory for the Left S. R. s which, Price thought, was deliberately 
contrived by Lenin who did not want to alienate them at that stage by 
insisting too strongly on the Bolshevik formula of state farming. 
But it was a strategic victory for the Bolsheviks nonetheless, as 
they succeeded in inserting clauses which provided at least in 
principle for the establishment of state farms in certain 
circumstances. Price was, however, generally impressed with the Land 
Law because "it clothed with some substance the rather nebulous 
utterances which generally characterised the Left S. R. s" and managed 
to embody practical proposals which ensured that the principle of the 
equalisation of land allotment could be translated into action 
according to the innense variations in conditions which prevailed 
throughout the territory under Soviet control. 
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things that Party charyged its name f rorn Bolshevik to Courunist) 29. 
He missed the 4th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in Moscow (14 March) 
which was called to ratify the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. He also 
missed the chance of being involved , as were Robins and Ranson*, in 
the last unavailing efforts of a handful of English-speaking 
observers to prevent the ratification of the treaty and stave off 
intervention. 
Price left Petrograd on 4 March 1918 and was in Vologda next day. 
During the relatively short rail journey he watched the evacuation 
trains "laden with the treasures of museums,, the gold reserves of the 
banks, the valuable metal stores of the great factories" on the move 
and stations crowded with refugees and demobilised soldiers30. Son-e 
units o Red Guards,. despite goverment orders, were continuing to 
wage guerl a war against the Germans and occasionally commandeered 
trains for their own purposes. But Price reached his destination 
without incident, found himself a room at vologda and made it his 
base for the next f ive weeks. During this time he appears to have 
written only three articles copies of all of which he kept. He wrote 
on the top of the first "Copy of a telegram dispatched from Vologda 
by courier March 12". The others bear no such legend,, and it is, 
indeedi, puzzling that a courier should have been needed at all,, since 
29 The 7th Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party 
met in Petrograd on 6 March. Its chief business was the question of 
the ratif ication of the terms of the Iteaty of Brest Litvosk, the 
vote being 30 to 12 in favour, with four abstentions. Discussions 
continued, however, and on 8 March Lenin apparently surprised the 
delegates with his proposal, which was also endorsed, that to 
disassociate themselves from the fatally ccompromised Social 
Denwratic parties of France and Germany the Russian party should 
thenceforth be known as the Russian Convnunist Party of Bolsheviks. 
Richard K. Debo Revolution and Survival pp. 171-175. 30 Price, Reminiscences p. 259. 
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there is no indication that telegraphic conmnications between 
vologda and the rest of the world were ever disrupted. The fact that 
price wrote so little during this period is not so surprising, since 
it had always been characteristic of him when travelling to travel 
first and write afterwards. Scott, perhaps not realising that his 
correspondent was in Vologda as rruch f rom neoessity as f rom choice 
referred to him in a short leader on 18 March (see below) as "our 
Petrograd correspondent who is travelling in the provinces". There 
are four entries in Price's engagement diary for the Vologda period 
one of which indicates that he left Vologda for several days, and a 
description of another journey appears in his Reminiscences3l. His 
articles for the Manchester Guardian certainly took a more wide- 
angled view of Russian affairs than might have been expected from a 
man cut off from the main stream of Russian politics in a small 
31 Price's engagement diary shows that while he was at Vologda he 
attended meetings of both the local and the provinicial Soviets. His 
accounts of these meetings appear only in his Reminiscences (Chp. 7) 
and describe how small had been the impact of the new Land Law in the 
Vologda area. During the last week of March 1918 he had attended two 
meetings of the Vologda Zemstvo "whose members admitted openly that 
they did not recognise the Soviet authority and were going to carry 
on as if the November Revolution had not taken place". When some of 
the more cautious Right S. R. members of the Zemstvo had suggested 
that the Land Law could hardly be so ignored, the landlord members 
replied that they would soon be back on their estates, and would then 
"settle accounts with the Soviets". Price went on to recount that 
this particular body was dissolved by the Vologda Soviet while he was 
still in the town, but even so, Vologda had remained "a little 
revolutionary island in an anarchic sea of peasant apathy". Even 
where rural soviets existed, they tended to be dominated by Left 
S. R. s, whose interpretation of the Land Law was far from identical 
with that of the Bolsheviks. In the same chapter he described being 
taken a day's journey along the railway towards Archangel to observe 
what should have been the foundation of a farming commune by an 
%dealistic Left S. R. ". But the peasants had already divided the 
land between them and were now reluctant to see the village turned 
into a commune. Not a single Bolshevik was present at the meeting he 
attended, although the younger, more recently demobilised peasants 
favoured the idea of a commune,, and their notions prevailed. Having 
formed the commune, Price described how the Left S. R. s. who dominated 
the meeting, then refused to apply to the Bolshevik-controlled Soviet A in VOlogda for much-neecf cash, seeds or stock. 
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provincial town. 
The f irst of the Vologda articles, written on 12 March (two days 
before the ratification of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk) describes 
"the shifting of the centre Of Political gravity in the country 
eastwards towards Moscow and the Upper Volga provinces, 132. But if 
anything Price thought the revolution was now taking deeper root than 
before. "What happened in Petrograd in October is happening now in 
the provinces" he wrote. Vologda itself was being run by a Soviet of 
workers, soldiers and peasants, and public opinion there was divided 
about the peace on exactly the same lines as in Petrograd. But, 
Price went on, the Russian proletariat was "setting its teeth". 
Recruitment was being "seriously taken up" for a Red Army which was 
to stand equally against counter-revolution at home and Imperialist 
aggression "whether from Western or Central Europe or the Far East". 
Under these circumstances, Price concluded, the forthcoming decision 
of the 4th Congress would have little effect on the development of 
the Revolution. The Bolshevik goverment would continue to wait f or 
revolutionary forces in Germany to "acquire more impetus than they 
have at Present, and meanwhile to arm to the teeth to assist their 
comrades in Central Europe against the tyrants who dictated the Brest 
Litovsk treaty at the point of the bayonet" - 
Scott, in a short leader already referred to which was published on 
the same day as this article (18 March) also saw in the return of the 
capital to Moscow the symbol of "a policy of concentration and 
reorganisation". But Scott added a note of caution. The German 
32 Manchester Guardian 18.3.18. Datelined Vologda Tuesday (12 March 
191C)ý-'Russian Revolution and Peace'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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peace had resulted in cutting off from Great Russia most of the 
people of non-Russian stock who traditionally provided "the 
revolutionary and progressive element in the Russian state". Scott 
then advanced the theory that an underlying cause of the expansionist 
policies of the old Russian Liberals had been the belief that the 
prospects for political freedom would be increased proportionately as 
the number of non-Great Russians diminished as against the numerical 
predominance of Great Russians. "Well,, " concluded Scott rather 
dramatically, "at Moscow the Great Russian will be able to show 
whether he is capable of liberty. It is an interesting experiment. " 
Price wrote nothing more for the Manchester Guardian until the last 
few days of his time at Vologda, when he wrote two articles in three 
days. The first, written on 12 April, was not printed until 2 May 
and marked "Delayed in Transmissionn33. By now the delay would 
almost certainly have occurred in the of f ice of the Of f icial Press 
Bureau in London. A remarkable printers' error occurred in the first 
sentence. In Price's original copy of the cable he began by stating 
that the signature of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk had caused 
'revolutionary leaders replace irresponsible demagogy by 
statesmanship substitute for statesmanship stop'. The typesetter can 
hardly be blamed for not knowing which version to choose, but the 
effect of his choice, ("for" instead of "by") was not apparently 
picked up by any sub-, editor, and contradicted everything that Price 
had been saying about the Bolsheviks for the past two months. 
HOWever the rest of the article left no room for doubt,, as Price went 
on to show an increasing grasp of the basis of Bolshevik policy. 
33 Manchester Guardian 2.5.18 Datelined 'Vologda. April 12. Delayed 
in Transmission'. 'Bolshevik Policy'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
6: 182 
Civil war, he now argued, had been an inevitable consequence of 
"sweeping away the political rubbish left by Tsarism". But the 
nf% , olshevik press, he noted, was now full of articles emphasising the 
need for reconstruction and "impressing on the proletariat its 
responsibilities as well as privileges". This policy had caused even 
the Kadets to cone round, and their paper R4ých now took the line 
that only the Bolsheviks could "drag Russia out of its present 
condition", as Price put it. The Mensheviks alone feared that a 
proletarian dictatorship would generate a bourgeois dictatorship. 
Price recorded that Lenin's personal influence was growing among the 
urban proletariat. He illustrated another point: that the practice 
of replacing zemstvos by -3oviets was spreading in the provinces. He 
had, he wrote, recently attended a meeting of thesoviets of the 
Northern Provinces at Vologda, and he saw "peasants f rom distant 
arctic regions who declared that they recognised the Soviet as the 
sole authority in Russia. " 
The third telegram which Price sent from Vologda suffered an even 
greater delay in transit, sent on 14 April but not printed until 19 
july34. In it Price returned to the struggle between zemstvo and 
soviet as the basis of elected democracy in Russia. Goverrment by 
soviet had, he said, taken root quickly in North Central RusSia but 
" national complicationsn had caused delays in the Don, the Ukraine 
and Asiatic Russia. Theses delays had been used by the Central 
Powers "to realise plans for the partition of Russia" and 
cOnsequently "the hatred of revolutionary Russia against the Central 
34 Manchester Guardian 19.7.18. Datelined 'Delayed Telegram Vologda 
April 141. 'Russia and the Allies: Internal Interferenoe Resented'. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
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Empires knows no bounds". If the Allies had any sense they would 
have made usr-of this emotion; instead they were planning their own 
form of intervention in Eastern Siberia. Price described in 
considerable detail, which he must have obtained from the Russian 
press, the origins of the counter-revolutionary movements led by 
Horvat and Senenov, supplied with arm by the Japanese and now 
invading Transbaikal f rom their base in Manchuria. 35. He also noted 
35 Price bracketed together the names of Semenov and Horvath in a 
manner not wholly warranted by their activities then or later. The 
connecting link between them was the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
General Dmitri Leonidovich Horvath (1858-1937) had been the first 
General Manager of the railway, which ran through territory which was 
technically part of China but had been, under the Tsars, administered 
virtually as a Russian protectorate governed from Harbin. After the 
November revolution Horvath prevented the seizure of the railway by 
the newly-formed Harbin Soviet by allowing Chinese troops into the 
railway territory to restore order. From February to April 1918 he 
was in Peking, discussing the preservation of Russian interests on 
the railway, as he saw them, and these discussions undoubtedly 
involved representatives of Allied powers. In April he returned to 
Harbin, reorganised the railway and raised a Far Eastern Volunteer 
Corps. After the Czechs began to advance along the Trans-Siberian 
Railway in May he proclaimed himself Provisional Ruler of Russia. 
His only real authority remained, however, in the region of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway. He agreed to serve under Kolchak in the 
Omsk Directorate, but after Kolchak's capture and death return to 
Peking, where he died. No major works have been written about him. 
Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov (1890-1946) was a much more flamboyant 
character. A TransBaikal Cossack Atamans, he announced in January 
1918 that he intended to seize the junction of the Chinese Eastern 
and Trans-Siberian Railways as a base for driving the Bolsheviks out 
of Siberia and moving down the railway to capture Irkutsk and 
Krasnoyarsks, with the ultima* objective of joining forces with 
Kaledin. Throughout January 1918 the British Government had been 
considering ways of persuading the Japanese to intervene in the Far 
East and when Senmov, backed up by the British Military Attache at 
Peking, asked for money and supplies to do more or less exactly what 
the British wanted the Japanese to do for thems, they were ready to 
give him what he wanted. They did not knows, at firsts, that the 
Japanese were also supplying him with money and arms, on a far 
greater scale and with quite different motives: to inplement their 
Own plans for the control of Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. 
Gradually the British Government came to realise that Semenov was 
little more than a bandit with notoriously cruel habitss, and an agent 
Of the Japanese. They gradually withdrew their support. After the 
Soviet government had regained control of the Far East Semenov fled 
and lived the rest of his 1 if e in Japan, China, and f inally 
Mmchuria, where he played a minor political role in the 1930s. He 
was captured by the Red Army in 1946 and shot. References to Horvath 
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that "the Bolshevik press refers in much milder terms to America". 
But Bolshevik policy, he concluded,, seemed to be to gain a respite in 
which to prepare for a future revolutionary war by utilising "the 
mutual jealousies of the three financial world-groups of America, 
Western Europe and Central Europe". 
After his return to Moscow on 17 April 1918 Price discussed his 
experiences at Vologda with the American journalist Albert Rhys 
Williams36. He told Williams that, in his view, "the time was 
r ipe ... for Lenin's 'second revolution' to take place; nothing else 
could change the relation between city and town and by no other means 
he could see would the needed grain and other farm products flow to 
the hungry city workers". He also apparently told Rhys Williams - 
what he does not appear to have written anywhere himself - that the 
Left S. R. s in the villages were, as Rhys Williams then put it, "under 
the guise of a patriotic hatred of the Germans ... steaming up the 
are nominal in the main histories of this period, but reference to 
Semenov are frequent,, if scattered. See Richard H. Ullman: Anglo- 
Soviet Relations 1917-1921 Vol. 1 (1961) Intervention and War pp. 98- l-O-Ol138-143; Vol. 11 (1968) Britain and the Russian Civil War pp. 
38-40,, 233 and 252; see also i. A. White: The Siberian Intervention 
(Princeton 1950) pp. 195-199. Louis Fis6er in The Soviet in World 
Affairs (Vol. 1,1930 p. 106) mentions a pamphlet by Tchicherin: 
Two Years of Soviet Foreign Affairs (Moscow 1920) which refers to Yc-hi-cherin's knowledge of Allied support for Horvath and Semenov. 36 A 'MEFe MiyS WILLIAMS (1883-1962) was a Non-Conformist Minister in Boston with a strong interest in American Labour and Socialist 
affairs. He was in Europe on leave of absence in 1914,, and became a 
journalist in consequence of the outbreak of war. He was in Russia 
from June 1917 to September 1918, during which time he,, like John 
Reed, wrote for the Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganday 
which at that time was directing its messages mainly towards the 
Germans. After his return to America he wrote and spoke throughout 
the country against the Intervention,, and continued to write about 
Soviet Russia (to which he returned a number of times, the last being 
1959) throughout his life. His books include Through the Russian 
Revolution (New York 1921) , The Soviets (New York 1937) and Journey 
een ýn 
__ý%ý17--Ii9ýi: 
i (Chicago 1969),, which was s to Revolution. 
into print af ter his death by his widow Lucita. 
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peasants to oppose the Bolsheviks - in each case to protect their 
petty-bourgeois followers against the growing organisation of the 
poor peasants by the Bolsheviks". On the same occasion Price also 
apparently described the hostile reception with which the first 1; & 
detachments of city workers had been met when they came to the 
villages in the Vologda, area to exchange food for clothing. In some 
villages the poorer peasants had already begun to organise in April 
1918, and had forced the middle peasants to give up at least some of 
the land they had taken in 191737. But the signs were that peasant 
uprisings against the soviets were inevitable. "Price and I agreed" 
wrote Rhys Williams "that things looked dark indeed. u38 39 
37 The desperate food situation in Petrograd in the early months of 
1918 led to desperate measures. Armed detachments were sent to the 
villages to attempt to extract grain by force but they failed, as did 
barter experiments between towns and villages. When Price referred 
in his talks with Rhys Williams to the second stage of the 
revolution, he was referring to Lenin's 'Two tactics of Social 
Democracy in the Democratic Revolution', which envisaged that in the 
first stage the proletariat and peasantry would unite, but that in 
the second it would be necessary to split the peasantry, and for the 
industrial proletariat to work with the 'semi-proletarian' poor 
peasants against the 'semi-bourgeois' rich peasants or kulaks. In 
May 1918 TsIK approved a decree conferring powers on the People's 
Commissariat of Supply (Narkomprod) to extract concealed grain from 
the rural bourgeoisie. This was to be a crusade on behalf of the 
industrial, socialist proletariat. On 11 June 1918 another decree 
established elected ' Committees of Poor Peasants' (for which any 
peasant except a kulak was to be eligible), which were to be 
responsible not only for the extraction of grain but for its 
distribution. Lenin himself described this move as the first time 
that the countryside began to experience the November revolution 
(Sochineniya xxiii 393) and as a turning point in the revolution. It 
was also to provide the agricultural base of war communism. The 
Committees also had the effect of denting the hitherto continued 
predominance on land comittees of Left S. R. sv and of assisting the 
transition from individual peasant farming towards collectivisation. 
Having fulfilled their function of splitting the rural proletariat 
and improving the supply of food to the towns, the Committees of Poor 
Peasants were, later in 1918, relegated to the role of Iginger 
groups, within the local Soviets. E. H. Carr. The Bolshevik 
Revolution Vol. II,, pp. 49-551,1471,1541,157-159. 
S 
k1liams 
: Journey into Revolution (pp. 272-274). RhYs 
-38 ý 
Williams went on (P. 274) to quote a passage from Price's 
Reminiscences (p. 260) in which he had described the apocalyptic 
Spirit of the times. 'The spirit of rebellion still stalked the 
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Price left Vologda on 16 April 1918 and arrived in Moscow next day. 
The only entry in his engagement diary for that month shows that he 
went to a performance of "The Cherry Orchard" on 28 April. His few 
surviving letters to his family from the spring and early sunmer of 
1918 all conpare favourably the living conditions in Moscow with 
those he had lef t in Petrograd. and the f act that he went to the 
theatre for the first time in 1918 illustrates the point. It would 
have taken him a little time to relocate himself and discover the 
whereabouts of his friends and contacts,, and he wrote nothing for ten 
days. His first despatch to the Manchester Guardian from Moscow was 
written on 26 April. He left no other record of his movements or 
activities in the second half of April except for a reference to the 
fact that he visited the Moscow headquarters of the Anarchists the 
day af ter the Red Guards had driven out its occupants, and that was 
land ... Cyclopean fires, smouldering for centuries beneath the 
surface, were burning themselves out. The primitive instinct for 
revenge on age-old oppressors was strong, and did not shrink from 
theft, murder, rape and outrages on the now defenceless 
bourgeoisie 
... these symbols of rebellion were also the symbols of the 
very lack of discipline which made the proletarian dictatorship 
e long run, and against which the Bolsheviks had to 
commence a now relentless struggle. " In quoting from Price, and duly 
attributing the passage,, Rhys Williams omitted the words printed in 
italics without any indication that he had done so. His book was 
published in 1969. Price wrote the words in 1920. 39 An undated article by Price appeared in the December 1918 edition 
Of U. D. C., "long delayed in transmission but much of it is still of 
tOV11-c-al -iýd vivid interest". Judging from the subject matter it 
appears to have been written at about the same time as his 
Conversations with Rhys Williams. It began with an account of 
Lenin's reasons for signing the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and went on 
to itemise the weaknesses of the Bolshevik Goverment and the reasons 
for them. Only two factors, Price thought, were at work on its side. 
()ne was that "the financial oligarchies of the rest of the world" 
were "bleeding each other to death"; the other was that capitalist 
interests in Russia were unable to offer any serious opposition to 
the Bolsheviks "unless supplied by foreign bayonets". Price 
concluded that there was less to fear from an armed intervention than 
from the effects of famine and anarchy on a State without an 
apparatus of goverment. 
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in his ReminiscenceS40. It is significant, indeed, that whereas he 
devoted a whole chapter of the book to the challenge f rom the Lef t 
which the Soviet government was now experiencing, he barely touched 
on the subject in the articles which he now wrote f or the Manchester 
Guardian4l. This can hardly have been because he was not aware of 
it at the time, and is more likely to have been because his main pre- 
occupation now was the developing threat of Allied intervention. His 
last cable f rom Vologda,, written on 14 April, had been devoted almst. 
entirely to this subject and its publication was to be held up until 
19 July. As will be show! 1, the censor Is hand began to f all with 
increasing heaviness upon his material, and it fell most heavily - 
whether by cutting, delaying or suppressing - on passages dealing 
with the prelude to intervention. 
In his conteuporary letters, in decades of oral reminiscence and in 
his book My Three Revolutions written half a century later, Price 
gave the strong impression that throughout the spring of 1918 he had 
talked, thought, written and acted in some kind of concert with 
Arthur Ransome and Raymond Robins; and that the three of them had 
agreed in their dif f erent ways to use what inf luence they had to the 
same end. This was, of course, to persuade the Western Allies to 
take advantage of the enormous hostility prevalent in Russia in the 
aftermath of Brest Litovsk by providing economic help and not by 
themselves intervening, or allowing the Japanese to intervene 
militarily. Yet there is no reference to Price either in RansOM's 
40 Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution p. 270. 41 Ibid Chp. XVIII 'The Breathing Space - Bolshevik Challenge to 
left and Right'. 
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autoblography42 nor in the Raymond Robins paperS43. The conscious 
co-operation of the three men may have been a figment of Price's 
1wgination, although there is no doubt that they knew each other 
well enough. Another explanation may be that although they all 
sincerely desired the same end and worked for it, Price had by now 
already moved so f ar to the Lef t as to have been an embarrassment to 
the other two, at leasts in retrospect. Robins' attitude, certainly, 
was entirely pragmatic; he was a convinced capitalist but he wanted 
Russia back in the war against Germany. Price, on the other hand, 
had at that time lost the last of his reservations about the 
Bolsheviks, both in terms of political theory and in practice. The 
fact remains that, whether acting in concert or not, Price now 
proceeded to write a series of articles for the Manchester Guardian 
which were too perceptive for the comfort of the Foreign Office. 
Most of those he wrote in May 1918 were published,, and some that he 
wrote in June, but all were censored, and with increasing severity. 
Just before the end of June he was silenced altogether, although he 
continued to write and cable articles (and fortunately to keep copies 
of thein) until the eve of his departure from Russia at the end of 
November 1918. 
In order to understand why and how Price came to be silenced it will 
be necessary to outline the development of British foreign policy 
towards Russia af ter the Bolshevik Revolution,, and to show how the 
Official Press Bureau in London was used in support of that P0licY- 
42 The Autobiography of Arthur Ransome editedr with Prologue and 
N ilogue Rupert Hart Davis. Jonathen Cape. 1976. 
3 Raymond Robins papers. Archives Division, State Historical 
Society Wisconsin. Micro 567 and 579 
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Chapter 7. Prelude to Intervention 
The British Government and Russia 
on 19 Deoember 1917 Arthur Ponsonby M. P.,, an active member of the 
U. D. C. who was also a former career diplcmatl,, told the House of 
Camns that on three separate occasions before the war he had 
endeavoured to call the attention of Members to the danger of relying 
on "reactionary autocratic elements" in Russia2. "The whole of our 
policy during that tine" he said "and for many years past has been, 
unfortunately, made for us by two men,, Lord Hardinge and Sir George 
Buchanan... From first to lasts, unfortunately,, our policy in 
comection with Russia has been dictated - and alas! is still being 
dictated - by two men who know nothing about the needs of the British 
Emire... We have, from first to last for the last twelve years, 'K 
relied on Lord Hardinge and Sir George Buchanan for our information 
about Russia, for all our dealings with Russia and at the present 
time we are still, unfortunately, relying on them to represent us 
and... to be the authors as well as the administrators of our Russian 
diplomacy. " Another M. P. with scarcely less experience of the ways 
of the Foreign Of f ice, Col. Josiah Wedgood declared af ter the end of 
the war that the Foreign of f ice had "always wanted af irm hand to 
control its reactionary tendencies... Looking back on the history of 
the relations of our Foreign Office with the Russian Revolution,, hon. 
MWbers will see that we have every ground for supposingr if there is 
a Choice between right and wrong, that they will go wrong. "3 
1 The plethora of advisers - and critics - on the Government's PO'Ssian policy is such that in order not to interrupt the sense of the Paragraphs in Chapter 70. all biodata relating to thern has been 
Placed, in alphabetical order, at the end of the chapter. 2 Hansard. 19.12.17. Col. 2000. 
3 Ibid. 16.4.19. Co. 2972. 
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Lord Hardinge and Sir George Buchanan weret however, not the only 
people involved in creating British policy on Russia,? although 
ponsonby was not entirely exaggerating the situation. If there was 
one thing Lloyd George was not short of it was advisers on Russia, 
but unfortunately they did not always, or even often agree. As he 
complained to C. P. Scott4 "I never knew a subject on which the 
best opinion differed so completely". 
Itmight have been expected that Lloyd George's chief adviser on 
Russia in 1917-1918 would have been his Foreign Secretary,, Arthur 
Balfour. But Balfour was not a member of the War Cabinet, though 
allowed and indeed of ten sLu=ned to attend its meetings. But so 
also were both his cousin and Parliamentary Under Secretary Lord 
Robert Cecil (who happened to be Minister of Blockade as well) and 
his Permanent Under Secretary, Lord Hardinge. Cecil 's influence was 
further enhanced when he was made Assistant Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs in July 1918: a critical time in Anglo-Russian 
affairs. Cecil dislikeiboth Lloyd George and Sir George Buchanan 
personally,, and the Cabinet tended to take Cecil's advice in 
preference to Balfour ' s. On the other hand Balfour, who tended to be 
active only in subjects which interested him - and Russia was one of 
them - somtimes took his revenge by drafting his own telegram. At 
the top levelp Lloyd George also listened to the Secretary of State 
for War,, Lord Milner , to General Smuts,, to the Secretary of the 
Cabinet Sir Maurice (later Lord) Hankey and to his Private 
4 Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1928 (Edited with an 
introduction and conmntary by Trevor Wilson. 1970) The book shows 
hOW much Scott was consulted and respected in Westminster and 
Whitehall, even by those who disagreed with him. 
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Secretariat, known as the Garden Suburb, at Downing Street, the 
influence of which was strongly resented at the Foreign Office. The 
specialist on foreign affairs at the Garden Suburb was Philip Kerr 
(later Lor Lot lan) . Thus Lloyd George had at his disposal the 
ffeans by which he could, as The Nation was to express it some years 
later conduct his own foreign policy without the inconvenience of 
Foreign Of f ice intervention5. He was, of course, notoriously given 
to making decisionson any and every subject and telling his 
specialist advisers about them later6. 
Nonetheless the Foreign Office was not entirely disregarded, and in 
the course of the war it generated a number of specialist departments 
most of which had something to say about Russia. The first of these 
to be created was the War Department which, by the time of the 
Russian Revolution had been moved into the area of responsibility of 
the Ministry of Blockade. That Ministry had itself grown out of 
another specially formed f or war purposes: the Contraband Department 
(the others being the Foreign Trade, War Trade Intelligence and 
Finance Departments) . The two most concerned with Russian POlicY 
formation were the Russia Department of the Foreign off ice and 
Russian Section of the War Department of the Ministry of Blockade. 
Lord Hardinge was the Permanent Under Secretary in charge of both. 
His Assistant Under Secretary in the Foreign Off ice was Sir Ronald 
Graham, but in the Ministry of Blockade it was Sir George Clerk who 
was also,, to conplete the picture of confusiony head of the Russia 
5 The Nation 14.10.22. 
6 TWe -R. M. warman: "The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the 
Making of Foreign Policy 1916-1918", Historical Journal Vol. 15 
(1972) pp. 133-159; Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Ed. s) The 
D'PD110ýmats 1919-1939 (Princeton 1953); and John Tilley and Stephen 
Gaselee The Foreign Office (The Whitehall Series, 1933). 
7: 192 
Department of the Foreign Off ice. The coments and initials of these 
men criss-cross the mewranda on Russia which shuttled between the 
two Departmentsi, not to mention those of individuals in Military 
Intelligence and the Official Press Bureau (see below p. 211), and it 
is not always obvious which Department they were representing at any 
given time, or indeed, whether that mattered. In the lower echelons, 
J. D. Gregory, who also appears to have had a position in both the 
Russia Department and the Russian Section, stands out as having been 
particularly busy and in the Russian Section the most prominent 
initials were usually those of T. H. Lyons and E. H. Carr. In 
addition, most of the memoranda dealing with Russia were commented 
upon by the ubiquitous Stephen Gaselee (later Sir Stephen) ,a rwmber 
of the Foreign Office News Department who was liaison officer with 
the ministry of Blockade, the Official Press Bureau and the Political 
Intelligence Department, the functions of which will also be dealt 
with below. But in the context of naming the advisers of whose 
abundance Lloyd George complained, it seem appropriate to note here 
rather than later that P. I. D. Is main experts on Russia were Rex 
T 
Leeper, Professor J. Y. Simpson, Professor Bernard (later Sir Bernard) 
Pares and Arnold Toynbee. 
In addition to the men in Whitehall there werer of courser the men on 
the spoty headed by Sir George Buchanan. Despite his fondness for 
monarchs and monarchy Buchanan was not entirely unrealistic and broke 
all the rules of diplomacy by trying to persuade the Tsar to pay more 
attention to liberal public Opinion7. Ponsonby was, however, 
7 Sir George Buchanan described these meetings,, which took place 
in November 1916 and January 1917,, in Chapters 20 and 22 of his book 
! "ission to Russia (1923). It was on the second occasion, when he 
hM urged the Tsar to take steps to recreate confidence in the 
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perfectly right in thinking him essentially reactionary in his 
political ideas. Considerable notice was taken of the views of three 
other British diplomats in Russia, although their advice was not 
necessarily taken. These were the Hon. Francis Lindley, who was 
first Counsellor at the British Embassy at Petrograd then, from 
January 1918, Commissioner in Russia and finally Consul General for 
Russia at Archangel from June 1918. The Consul General in Moscow, 
John Oliver Wardrop, sent in lengthy reports. Finally there was 
Robert Bruce Lockhart,, at the time of the March revolution merely 
vice-Consul in Moscow, who became British Special Agent in Russia in 
January 1918. 
The military advisers to whom most attention was paid in Whitehall 
were probably Major General Alfred Knox, Chief Adviser on Russian 
Affairs at the War Office, and Major General F. C. Poole, Head of the 
British Supply Mission to Russia at the time of the March revolution 
and eventually commander of the Allied forces in North Russia. 
Poole, initially the most realistic of the military, had eventually 
to be relieved of his comnand because of his political ineptitude. A 
man whose views were studiously ignored was Comander Harold 
Grenfell, British Naval AttachI19 at Petrograd since 1912, who made the 
mistake of openly supporting - or at least appearing to understand - 
the revolutionary elements in the Baltic Fleet. He was quickly 
recalled to London. 
country,, that he reported the following dialogue: ", Do you mean that 
I am to regain the confidence of my people or that they are to regain 
TZ confidence? ' 'Both, Sir' I replied... " On 15 May 1917 Milner 
wrote to Buchanan: "It must be some personal satisfaction for you to 
feel that you have been absolutely right about this Russian 
situation, and that if the former rulers of the country had only had 
the wisdom to take your advice, the catastrophe would certainly have 
been postponed and perhaps altogether averted. " Milner papers: The 
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From August 1914 onwards British policy to Russia appeared to be 
dominated solely by strategic considerations: how many German troops 
could the Russian Army keep occupied on the Eastern Front? All the 
early exanples of censorship of news f rom Russia that can be found 
point in that direction (see below p. 229). Thus any indication that 
the Tsar's goverroent. was becoming unstable was suppressed, and other 
news f rom Russia was, as far as possible,, so selectively presented as 
to be positively misleading. This was particularly damaging in the 
case of the Milner Mission to Russia in January 1917 (see Appendix 
V). It was therefore symptomatic as much of ignorance as of 
indifference that, when news of the abdication of the Tsar was 
formally given in a statement in the House of Conmns by Bonar Law, 
the House was so empty that a group of M. P. s had twice to prevent it 
from being counted out8. And it was certainly evidence of 
continuity of foreign policy when, on March 19 1917 the Prime 
Minister attributed the first Russian Revolution to "discontent at 
the inefficiency of the Government in its conduct of the war". "It 
is satisfactory to know" Lloyd George went on "that the new 
Goverment has been f ormed for the express purpose of carrying on the 
war with renewed vigour. " 9 Although a formal motion of 
congratulation to the Russian people was proposed by Bonar Law on 22 
March, praise for the Provisional governmnt from the Front Bench in 
Westminster was faint. Ponsonby was later to describe the reception 
given to the Russian revolution in Britain as "so chilling as to 
spread a feeling of amazement in Russia". 10 it was also remarkablej, 
Great War. Private Letters, Vol. 6. 
8 Hansard. 15.3.17. Col. 3 419-422. 
9 Ibid 19.3.17. Col. 1538. 
10 - 19.12.17. Col. 2000. 
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as Ponsonby pointed out at the tinell that whereas criticism of the 
Tsarist government had hitherto been played down, in March 1917 
"our Press, no doubt under instructions, emphasise the keen desire of 
the new Government in Russia to prosecute the war with increasing 
vigour ... That is not my reading of the event. " In May 1917 Asquith, 
the former Prime Minister, referring to the formula of no annexations 
and no indemnities, begged in vain for a message to be sent to the 
Provisional government and the Petrograd Soviet assuring them that 
the British government supported their joint "statement of the terms 
for which they and we are fighting this war". 12 
Pressure was instead put on the Russian High Command to launch its 
ill-fated July offensive. British irresolution over the sending of a 
delegation to the Stockholm Conference and the subsequent humiliation 
of Arthur Henderson in August 1917 did nothing to improve matters. 
The British did not overtly support the attempted Kornilov coup in 
September,, but little effort was made to conceal a certain syrrpathy 
for it in official circles. The last straw was widely believed by 
those M. P. s who took an interest in Russia to have been the 
insistence of the Western Allies that the Allied Conference due to be 
held in Paris in October 1917 should discuss only military matters 
and not war aims. Soskice gave this as the "last but not least" of 
the reasons for Kerensky's clownfalll3. If the Allies had been 
11 Hansard 22.3.17. Col-S 2085-2091. 12 Ibid 16.5.17. Coles 1675-1679. 13 In an article published in the Manchester Guardian on 15 
December 1917 Soskice gave four reasons for Kerensky's downfall: 
(i) the Kornilov mutiny had paved the way for the Bolsheviks; 
(ii) Kerensky was afraid that a general massacre of officers might 
take place; (iii) the officers of the Petrograd garrison were 
aPathetic to the point of disloyalty in November 1917, and (iv) the 
attitude of the Allies and their neglect of public opinion in Russia. 
He added that a clear declaration by the Allies of their war aims 
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willing to make a clear declaration of their war aims, Soskice 
believed, v Kerensky's hand might have been strengthened. "The 
declaration that was needed was one demonstrating with absolute 
clearness that the Allies were fighting not for territorial gain but 
for the triurnph of democratic principles in Europe. " But that was 
not a declaration that the Western Allies,, bound at that time by a 
tangle of secret commitments, were in a position to make. 
For the better part of two weeks af ter the Bolsheviks took power no 
reliable news from Russia reached London. In the tezporary policy 
vacuum that inevitably ensued the Cabinet learned on 21 November, 
that the King of Rumania had proposed that if the Allies could help, 
remants of the collapsing Rumanian army would be prepared to try to 
join up with the Don Cossacks in southern Russia and possibly even 
with the British in Mesopotamial4. The war in the West was going 
badly for the Allies and they wanted to keep Rumania in the war. If 
they were to translate this proposal into action they would have to 
deal with General Kaledin, the Ataman of the Don Cossacksl5. The 
"mýight have strengthened Kerensky's hand considerably". 1 Michael Kettle: The Allies and the Russian Collapse (1981) 
pp. 118-119. 
15 ALEXEI MAXIMIVICH KALEDIN (1861-1918) was the son of a Cossack 
officer and rose rapidly in a military career. In May 1916 he 
succeeded General Brusilov as Connander of the 8th Army. Initially 
he supported the Provisional Governmentg, but became increasingly 
alienated from it in the course of its various moves to democratise 
the army. He was elected Ataman of the Don Cossacks in June 1917 and 
as Ataman his record was far from anti-democratic,. his conservatism 
being confined to military matters. He did not welcome Alexeiv and 
]Kornilov when they arrived in the Don after the November revolution 
but was unable to create an alternative power base himself. When the 
Red Army began to recapture the Don early in 1918 he reluctantly 
appealed to the Volunteer Army for help,, but when iti, too, was driven 
back to re-form in the Kuban Kaledin resigned as Ataman and shot 
himself. His career is dealt with in the context of that period only 
by Peter Kenez: Civil War in South Russia: The First Year of the 
10-lunteer Army. (Berkeley 1971). 
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war Cabinet decided to ask General Berthelot, the head of the French 
military Mission in Rumania, to look into the feasibility of this 
idea. In the meantime the former Russian Chief of Staffr General 
Alexeiv, had arrived on the Don with the intention of forming a 
volunteer army to oppose the Bolsheviks. Kaledin did not make him 
welcome, and Alexeiv was only eventually and reluctantly allowed to 
base himself in an area which was traditionally a Cossack sphere of 
influence. But the Allies, clutching at a Rumanian straw, decided 
that Kaledin was the key man for their purpose of keeping some kind 
of Eastern Front in being. On 3 December the War Cabinet agreed that 
the Treasury should meet "any reasonable demands for money" f rom the 
forces which they thought were now coming together in south Russia,, 
and which included the old Caucasus Army, which had remained loyal to 
the Provisional governmentl6. Although Sir George Buchanan had by 
now twice cabled London advising the British government to release 
Russia from her obligation not to sign a separate peace this was not 
and was not seen to be the same thing as advising them to recognise 
the Bolsheviksl7, and Cecil was instructed by the Cabinet to inform 
him that British policy was to support "any responsible body" in 
Russia that would "actively" oppose theml8. This directive preceded 
bY some three weeks the official Allied formulation known as the 
Accord Fran! pis Anglais and indeed actually went beyond iti, as Lord 
Hankey, Secretary of the War Cabinet, later pointed out. In his 
words, a "British policy of secret support to partisans in the 
Political life of Russia" had already begun early in December 
16 War Cab. 299. CALB 24.43, GT 3705. See also Kettle, The Allies 
1 an d the ssian,, Colla e p. 142. 
r, n r rn CAB 286. Buchanan's telegrams nos. 1878 and 1881. 
18 Ibid 24.43. 
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191719. And now the "partisans" in the south were reinforced by the 
arrival in the Don area of Generals Kornilov and Denikin and the 
formr Kadet Foreign Minister Miliukov. 
On 10 December, at the suggestion of the Prime Minister Balf our wrote 
a memorandum for circulation to his Cabinet colleagues before a 
meeting which was to take place the following day and which he was 
not going to be able to attend20. In it he summarised his own view 
of what British policy objectives in Russia should now be. These 
were (i) the safety of the British Embassy and of British subjects in 
Russia; (ii) the interests of the Rumanian army; (iii) the 
minimisation of any advantages which the Germans might hope to derive 
"from the dissolution of the Russian Army as a fighting force". With 
regard to the first, Balfour realistically observed that there was 
very little the British government could do except avoid "the active 
malevolence of the Bolshevik party". He stated that he entirely 
disagreed with those of his Cabinet colleague who already regard the 
Bolsheviks as "avowed enemies". Although he personally thought them 
"crazy",, "fanatics" and "dangerous dreamers", he also recognised that 
they "would genuinely like to put into practice the wild theories 
which have so long been germinating in the shadow Of the Russian 
autocracy". In his view it was in the best interests of Britain to 
avoid an open breach with the Bolsheviks. (In this connection he 
advised that Tchicherin and Petrov should be deported back to Russia, 
noting that he was "inperfectly acquainted" with the reasons for 
their detention in the first place. ) He had, he said, already 
19 CAB 24.43. Hankey, in a memorandum of 23 February 1918 used the 
words in a recapitulation of foreign policy decisions taken since the 
fall of Riga on 3.9.17. 
20 David Lloyd George War memoirs VoL 5 pp. 2573-2578. 
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"instructed Sir George Buchanan to abstain conpletely from any action 
which can be interpreted as undue interference with the internal 
affairs of the country to which he is accredited, and I am unable to 
think of any other step which would help to secure his safety". As 
to the Rumanian Armyj, there was nothing to be done since "for the 
moment no such forces appear to exist". 
Balfour then turned to the question of the advantages that Germany 
stood to gain by Russia's going out of the war. The first of these 
was the redisposition. of troops to the Western Front about which, he 
said, the British could do nothing "and I say no more about it". The 
second was the acquisition by Germany of resources in Russia which 
would in effect break the Allied blockade. This, in his view, was a 
nuch more serious threat. The disorganisation of transport in Russia 
would probably make it difficult for Germany to get much in the way 
of cereals. But he was concerned about oil. "We want to know what 
means of transport there is in the Black Sea available to the Germans 
and how far the anti-Bolshevik elements in the Caucasian regions can 
be utilised to interfere with the supply on land. " 
That was as far as Balf our was prepared to go at this time in laying 
down, let alone endorsing a blueprint for Allied intervention in 
Russia. He concluded that nothing could be more f atal "both to the 
imediate conduct of the war and to our post-war relations" then a 
POUCY calculated to drive Russia in the hands of GermanY. "A wre 
Armistice between Russia and Germany may not f or very many Months 
prowte in any important fashion the supply of German needs f rom. 
Ibissian sources. It must be our business to make that period as long 
as Possible by every means in our power. " 
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Lloyd George, af ter including the Balfour Memorandum in its entirety 
in his War Memoirs, added "I strongly supported the sagacious counsel 
given in this document" butj, he went on,, Balf our Is views were not 
acceptable to several members of the Cabinet,, and Lloyd George's 
support, if strong, remained silent, or at least ineffective. Yet at 
this tine many of the advisers of whose abundance he had conplained 
were like-minded in at least one respect: they believedthat the 
Bolsheviks were effectively in control and there was no point in 
needlessly antagonising them2l. 
On 26 December another memorandum22 was circulated to the Cabinet 
which had been prepared by Milner and Cecil on their way to Paris and 
discussed by them with Clemenceau and Pichon on 23 December. This 
came to be known as the Accord Franggýis Anglais. The memorandum 
began by proposing sensibly enough that the Allies should "get into 
relations with the Bolsheviki through unofficial agentsr each country 
as seems best to it". Sir George Buchanan should be sent on leave 
21 Sir George Buchanan cabled on 5 December that it was "useless" to 
found exaggerated hopes on the promises of emissaries from the 
Cossacks (CAB 27/189). Sir George Clerk, commenting on 14 December 
on a memorandum from John Buchan (FO 371.3018 p. 05) about the views 
relayed to him at second hand of Col. Robins in Petrograd, noted 
N whatever happens to Lenin and Trotsky the Bolsheviks will have the 
control for some time at all events, if not for ever... should we not 
therefore make the best of it if we can and strengthen all the 
Passsive factors against our enemy, whatever our feelings about 
Russia's betrayal of the Allies". General Poole wrote from Russia on 
19 December (CAB 27/189) advocating de facto recognition of the 
Bolshevik goverment. Without that, he wrote,, "we are practically 
Powerless as everybody is too afraid of them to work for us without a 
government order. If only we could go round to Trotsky we could 
square it all in ten minutes. It is pure folly to count on any more 
fighting on the part of what people at home now call the South 
Eastern Federation of Russia. If we count on this we are counting on 
a broken reed I fear. " 22 The statement that Milner and Smuts drew up this memorandum on 
their way to Paris is contained in CAB 234, War Cab. 306. 
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for reasons for health; he was now a liability. being too "indelibly 
associated" with the Kadets to be acceptable to the Bolsheviks. And 
the British should "represent to the Bolsheviks that they had no 
desire to interfere in the internal politics of Russia; "arry idea 
that we favour a counter revolution is a profound mistake n. But the 
Allies should keep in touch with the "Semi-autonomus provinces" of 
Possia in which alternative governnents were already taking shape, 
above all with the Ukraine, if only because Rumania was dependent on 
that area for food. While not condoning Russian "treachery" in 
opening peace negotiations with the Central Powers, the Allies should 
endorse the principles of self-determination and of no annexations or 
indemities. In southern Russia the Allies must do what they could 
to save Rumania and to prevent Russian supplies from reaching 
Germany. The "remnant" of the Armenians must be protected, united if 
possible with Georgia in an autonomus, stater not only to protect the 
Allied flank in Mesopotamia, Persia and the Caucasus, but also to 
prevent the developrwnt of a Pan-Turanian movemnt. under German 
influence which would be more, dangerous to the Allies even than 
German control of the Baghdad Railway. 
The mencrandum then considered the means by which these objectives 
were to be realised,, expressed in a few words which sealed the fate 
of Anglo-Russian relations for decades. First, money was needed: to 
reorganise the Ukrainev pay the Cossacks and Caucasian forces and 
bribe the Persians. "If the French could undertake the finance of 
the Ukraine we might find money for the others. it is understood 
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that the United States will assist. v, 23 
Nextr agents and officers must be found nto advise and support the 
provincial officers and their amies". But this must be done "as 
quickly as possible so as to avoid the i"Putation - as far as we can 
- that we are preparing to make war on the Bolsheviki". And, again, 
there was to be a division of labour. The French would "deal" with 
the Ukraine while the British "would take the other South-east 
provinces. " 
On 2 January 1918 Buchanan, by now aware that he would shortly be 
cming home, conplained in a telegram to the Foreign Off ice that it 
was difficult for him "to proclaim our strict neutral attitude while 
we were actively supporting Cossacks and Ukraine. All I advocated 
was f rank explanation with Bolsheviks, and I see no reason whatever 
why when we establish unofficial relations with the Bolshevik 
Government of the North we should not appoint unof f icial agents at 
other centres of activity". 24 In this cable Buchanan epit0mised the 
less simplistic view of the Bolsheviks which the diplomats tended to 
hold as conpared with the politicians. The former were prepared to 
23 On 2 January 1918 Cecil wrote a letter to O. T. Crosby an off icial 
at the U. S. Embassy in Paris, in which he summarised the decisions 
which had just been reached in Paris regarding the division of 
spheres of influence in south Russia as between the British and the 
French. He added "It had been intimated to us confidentially that 
President Wilson is in favour of the provision of Allied support for 
the above elements,, and that while he has no power to lend money 
direct for' such unorganised movements, he is willing to let France 
and England have funds to transmit to them if they consider it 
desirable. You will realise that if anything is to be done it will be necessary for us to act with all expedition, and that 
the possibility of indirect assistance from the United States is one 
Which will have a very inwiediate bearing upon the whole question. " 
(ED 371.3283) 
24 FO 371.3296. 
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support alternative governments while not denying the possibility 
that the Bolsheviks might prove capable of consolidating their 
position. By now, however, the Military Advisers to the Suprem War 
Council in Paris were adding their voices to those of the 
politicians25. In their Joint Note V of December 1917 they advised 
that "all national groups who are determined to continue the war must 
be supported". They pointed out the danger to the Allies if the 
Germans obtained control of the Black Sea as the result of a separate 
peace with Russia, which would enable them to get Russian wheat 
through Odessa and Batum. They proposed more direct connunication 
between the Allies their "friends" in Russia, either by way of 
Vladivostock and the Siberian Railway or by operations in Turkey 
which might open a direct road to Tiflis and lead to a separate peace 
with Turkey and the opening of the Dardanelles. 
Robert Bruce Lockhart was at this time on his way to Petrograd. The 
decision to appoint him as British Special Agent had been taken over 
the heads of permanent of f icials at the Foreign Of f ice by Lloyd 
25 During the autumn of 1917 Lloyd George had taken the initiative 
in persuading the Western Allies to create, for the first time, sow 
form of organisation which would co-ordinate the strategy and tactics 
of the British,, French and Italian High Connwds. This resulted in 
an agreement,, on 7 November 1917,, for the setting up of a Supreme War 
Council with Permanent Military Representatives from each powerr 
usually sitting at Versailles. The Military Representatives were to 
receive from their governments and military authorities all 
proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the 
war, to hold a watching brief over the disposition of Allied forcest 
and to profer advice in the shape of Joint Notes. The Americans were 
to attend as observers. The setting up of the Supreme War Council 
was described by Lloyd George in Chapter 67 of his War Memoirs. Most 
Of the decisions of the Supreme War Council, whether or not based on 
the Joint Notes of the Military Representatives, are to be found in 
CAB 25.121 and CAB 25.127, CAB 28.3, CAB 28.4 and CAB 28.5. By no 
means all of the Joint Notes have survived. Ullman,, who quotes 
Joint Note V (Anglo-Soviet Relations Vol. I, p. 56) found his copy in 
the U. S. National Archivess, Modern Army Branch. 
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,,,,. rge and Milner personally. Lockhart himself realised later that 
the permanent officials "resented having stray missions headed by a 
junior Vice-Consul, f oisted upon them" and came to feel, with 
hindsight, that he should perhaps have adopted a more "placatory" 
approach26. He believed that his failure to do so was detrimental 
not only to his career but to the prospects of success for the policy 
in Russia that he initially advocated. As it was, he lost no time in 
striking out on a new line, and within a week of arrival had cabled a 
recommendation that the British should offer at least partial 
ed 
recognition of the Bolsheviks before Trotsky return to Petrograd from 
Brest Litovsk27. On 6 February Lockhart cabled again: "In my 
opinion Russia is even at the moment more powerful Ally to us than 
she has yet been owing to influence Bolsheviks are exercising in 
Germany. "28 But when the War Cabinet came, on 8 February, to 
discuss Lockhart's first telegram Balfour opposed taking his advice 
on the grounds that the Bolsheviks were not in f ull control and that 
even partial recognition was hardly compatible with British support 
of the Ukrainian separatists and the Don Cossacks. Lloyd George 
disagreed, with the usual lack of result. His own opinion of 
Lockhart, he said, would cause him to hesitate before rejecting any 
advice he offered. But Cecil replied "my view is that we have taken 
too much the views of the man on the spot. It was a mistake not to 
back Kornilov. n29 By now Cecil was clearly emerging as the hawk in 
26 R. H. Bruce Lockhart Memoirs of a British Agent (1932) p. 207. 27 FO 371.3298. 
28 Ibid 371.3316. 
29 ýCAB 233, War Cab. 340. 
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the War Cabinet where policy on Russia was concerned, although he was 
willing to make allowances for Lockhart's youth30. He had created a 
new committee under his own chairmanship at the Foreign Of f ice: the 
Russia Comittee, and saw to it moreover that this was where the real 
formulation of policy took place. The War Office, the Foreign 
office, the Ministry of Blockade and the Treasury were all 
represented, though not always by the same men3l. Against this 
lobby Lockhart stood no chance. Nevertheless Lockhart continued 
throughout March and April 1918 to send cables to the Foreign Office 
giving advice in a sense diametrically opposed to that of the Russia 
Committee. They were written in a pleading, almost emotional style 
which, unfortunately made it all the easier for them to be written 
off in Whitehall as the hysterical outpourings of an inexperienced 
and impress ionable young man. 
30 Thamas Jones, then Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, recorded the 
following fragment of dialogue between Milner and Cecil which he 
overheard after a Cabinet meeting on 10 April 1918. Milner: 
"Lockart does not keep our end up with Trotsky. n Cecil: "He is a 
very young man where everyone is a little mad. " (Whitehall Diary 
(1969) pp. 48-52) . Jones I unof f icial records of CQ; 17-n-et meetings on Russia at this time are illuminating. He recorded Lloyd George as 
having said, on 8 February 1918: "The criticism of the Bolsheviks 
n always comes from those 3,000 miles away from them. Jones also gave 
an account of the line-up within the Cabinet. nMilner and Cecil 
utterly disbelieve in Trotsky while the PM holds that there is 
s0filething to hope from the Bolsheviks. The Government's advisers are 
similarly divided, General Knox being on Cecil's side, Lockhart on 
the PM's side, and General Poole leaning to Lockart's side. " Ubid 
P3i 59-61). 
War Cab. 308. A rare copy of the Minutes of a meeting of the 
Russia Committee (the 59th, on 8.8.18) is to be found in FO 371-3327. 
It Shows that the Chairman was Lord Robert Cecil, and the members 
present were Sir George Buchanan (former Ambassador to Petrograd) 
Sir George Clerk (Foreign Of f ice) , Mr. Dudley Ward (Treasury) j, and Lt. Col. the Hon. S. Peel (War Of f ice) . The Secretaries were Major P-H. Kisch (shown as also representing the D. M. I. ) and E. H. Carr. 
AmOng the matters discussed on this occasion was how much support the 
Allies could give to the creation of "a Russian government in the Far 
East". See also Kettle: The Allies and the Russian Collapse p. 174. 
206 
Throughout this time the only f orces even theoretically capable of 
contesting Bolshevik control of Russia were in the South East, as 
identified in the Accord Franqýis Anglais. The Allies were,, however, 
quick to take hold of the idea that the best, indeed the only way to 
get reinforcements or supplies anywhere near them was via the 
siberian railway. A proposal that the Siberian railway should be 
seized from the Vladivostock end by either Japanese or American 
troops was first made by General Foch at an Allied conference in 
Paris in the first week of December 191732. Although the nearest 
point of contact on the railway with the Don Cossacks was at the end 
of a spur line f rom Cheliabinsk to Samara, and Samara was 600 miles 
from the Cossack centre at Novocherkassk, the pros and cons of 
intervention by or not by the Japanese, with or without American 
participation or approval, were discussed interminably and 
inconclusively by the Allies among themselves for the next four 
months, each in turn blowing hot and then cold. 
On 1 March Lockhart met Lenin for the first time, and Lenin told him 
that the Bolsheviks were prepared "to risk co-operation with the 
Allies". 33 Lockhart at once cabled London saying that there were 
"still considerable possibilities of organising resistance to 
Germany". 34 On 5 March Lockhart and Robins saw Trotsky together, 
and Trotsky outlined to them the sort of terms which might induce 
Russia to remain in the war35. These included non-intervention: 
whether by the Japanese in the east or the British in the north. 
32 CAB 283,, War Cab. 294. See also Kettle: The Allies and the 
Russian Collapse p. 209. 3-1 Lockart, Memoirs p. 339- 34 ED 371.3285. 
35 Richarad Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations Vol. 1,, p. 123; Kettle 
The Allies and the Russia Col p. 262. 
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n^ voth men subsequently cabled their governmnts -recomending 
acceptance of the conditions,, and there seem to be no doubt that 
they were deliberately co-ordinating their actions at this point. 
The fate of Robins' cables is obscure; the only thing that seem 
fairly clear is that they were ignored36. Lockhart appealed: 
"Empower me to inform Lenin that the question of 
Japanese intervention has been shelved... that we are 
prepared to support the Bolsheviks insofar as they will 
oppose Germany and that we invite his suggestions as to 
the best way in which this help can be given. " 
In a second cable he said: 
"I shall send you irmediately full particulars of 
agreement I have come to with Trotsky in eventuality of 
your being able to stop Japanese intervention. I have 
achieved far more than I thought possible. Why will 
you not give me a chance to prove my conclusions when 
you risk nothing by determination which at present is 
totally unnecessary. " 
On this cable Hardinge minuted: "It is dif f icult to comment on a 
hysterical telegram of this kind" and Balfour added: "Mr. Lockhart 
is an able man but he never answers an argument and his suggestions 
are always negative. His faith in Trotsky is touching. "37 
Neither Robins nor Lockhart received any reply to their messages. On 
14 March Robins had tea with Lenin, who cormlented: "You will not 
hear. Neither the American government nor any of the Allied 
governments will co-operate, even against the Gernians, with the 
36 George Keman (Russia Leaves the war Vol. 1 (1956) Chp. 24 
'Robins and Ratification' and Ullman (Anqlo-Soviet Relations Vol. 1 
P. 127) suggests that Robins overestimated the iq: )ortance of his 
endeavours to bring about direct contact between Washington and MOBCOw. The picture that emerges from the Raymond Robins papers in 
the Archives of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin (P45935 
and P45937) is one of a sincere, probably genuine, but certainly frustrated attenpt to do so. 37 FO 371.3290. 
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Workmen's and Peasants' Revolutionary Government of Russia. n38 The 
next day, on the very steps of the platform at the meeting of the 
Fourth Congress called to decide upon the ratification of the Treaty 
of Brest Litovsk,, Lenin saw Robins and asked him for the last tine if 
either he or Lockhart had heard anything f rom their respective 
governments. On being told that neither of them had, he said: "I am 
now going to the platform and the peace will be ratified. "39 
Lockhart still did not give up. One of the pretexts being advanced 
by the British to support a Japanese landing was the alleged arming 
by the Bolsheviks of German prisoner s-of -war in Siberia. Lockhart 
did his best to discount the rumour by arrangirxg, with the full 
support of Trotsky, for an investigation of the camps by a British 
and an American off icer. They found "no trace" of armed 
prisonerS40. Later in March Lockhart reported that he had discussed 
with Trotsky the possibility that the Allies might send troops to 
Siberia, and these might include Japanese troops provided they were 
38 See Kennan, Russia Leaves the War p. 513; Debo, Revolution and 
Survival p. 237; and Louis Fischer The Soviets in World Affairs: A 
HiStori-of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the 
World, Vol. 1 (1930) p. 74 39-Sýe Kennan, Russia Leaves the War p. 513 and E. H. Carr, Bolshevik 
Revolution Vol. 3 pp. 47-48. 40ý -Captain William Hicks was one of the officers personally chosen 
by Lockhart to be a member of his mission. He had already been to 
Russia (as a poison gas expert) and knew a little Russian as well as 
fluent German. Lockhart sent him, together with Captain W. B. Webster 
Of the American Red Cross mission in Russia, to look for evidence 
that the Russians were arming German prisoners of war in Siberia, as 
alleged. His report to the effect that they were not doing anything 
Of the kind was transmitted by Lockhart to London, and the 
disCORTiture of the Foreign Office is evident in M 371.3290. One 
iMirediate reaction was a telegram from the War Office ordering Hicks 
to return to Britain at once. It needed the private intervention of 
Sir George Clerk to get the order countermanded. (Lockhart,, MeMirsr 
P. 252) The armed prisoners myth is briskly disposed of by J. A. 
White The Siberian Intervention pp. 233-236. 
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not the only troops involved4l. On 1 April he sent to London again, 
asking whetheri, if he could obtain an undertaking that the Bolsheviks 
would declare war on Germany in the next six weeks and invite the co- 
operation of the Allies, they would agree to "suspend action in 
japan". (Cecil noted on the cable: "An undertaking... is in itself 
useless and may be dangerous. m) 42 As late as 21 April Lockhart was 
still trying to persuade London that joint action against Germany was 
possible. Trotsky and Tchicherin, he said, agreed with most of the 
British ideas (by which he probably meant his own) and the only real 
difficulty was Japanese participation. But they also realised that 
if they declared war on Germany straight away they would be crushed 
before Allied help could arrive. "Would the British Goverrment be 
prepared to play the card of recognition? n43 But in the same cable 
he asked for a time limit for intervention by consent, for if that 
consent were not given, "Allies will have to intervene in any case" - 
Lockhart was beginning to change his mind. 
While Robins and Lockhart were trying to bring their respective 
governnents round to a more realistic and more constructive attitude 
towards the Bolshevik government,, Price was in vologda. Although 
V0109da had becorne a kind of asylum for refugee Allied Embassies,, 
Lockhart and Robins had managed to remain with the government and to 
move with it to Moscow. Nonetheless there was obviously a 
considerable amount of diplomatic activity in Vologda and Price 
Cannot have been totally oblivious to it, although he appears for the 
moment to have been more interested in the activities of the Vologda 
41 FO 371.3285. 
42 Ibid. 371.3290. 
43 "Ibid. 371.3288. 
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soviet. He had yet to see Robins for the last time (af ter his own 
return to Moscow),, and it is dif f icult to believe that Robins did not 
then tell Price about his own and Lockhart's efforts to avert 
intervention in the form it f inally took. Indeed Prioe had 
considerable respect for Lockhart, as he recorded in My Three 
. 
ReVOlutions, and this too can only have been due to an awareness of 
what Lockhart had been trying to do44. But by the time of his 
return to Moscow Price was probably more committed to the defence of 
the Bolshevik government even than he had been when he left 
Petrograd. He would quickly have found out how Allied policy had 
developed. And he was about to become - as a reporter- one of the 
victims of that policy. It remains to be shown how the British 
Foreign Office made ustof what Price was to describe as "one of the 
ffost deadly weapon wielded by the ruling classes of all 
countries ... their power to censor the press. n45 
(ii) The Censorship of the Press in Britain, 1914-18 
During the nineteenth century war correspondents became reluctantly 
accepted by the military as part of the apparatus of war. But 
experience accumulated in the course of the Crimean,, Franco-Prussian 
and Boer Wars that telegrams sent by war correspondents to their 
papers at home also f ound their way into enemy hands and sometimes 
disclosed vital military information46. In the first decade of the 
twentieth century the Service Departments in Whitehall considered 
f rom time to time the creation of some mechanism for controlling 
44 ! 11 2ThrKee Revolutions p. 127. 45 - This was the opening sentence of The Truth About the Allied 
Intervention in Russia, the pamphlet written by Price in August 1918. 
See ChP. 10 P. 322 et seq. 46 HO 139.17. Army Memorandum on Censorship, CnO 7679. HMSO 1915. 
See also Sir Edward Cook The Press in Wartime (1920) pp. 39-40. 
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press reporting of military and naval operations in any future war. 
Nothing was actually done until 1912 when, as the result of 
negotiation between the press and the Service Departments a Committee 
known as the Admiralty, War Office and Press Connittee was set up47. 
its function was to oversee the working of a voluntary agreezent by 
which the press undertook "to respect warnings" given by the Service 
Departments "and to withhold f rom publication information of which 
the exclusion f rom the papers appeared to the departments concerned 
to be desirable in the national interests". 48 
The Official Press Bureau 
When war broke out on 4 August 1914 the Service Departments in 
Whitehall for several days refused absolutely to give any information 
whatever to the press. In the absence of news rwnour naturally 
flourished, and on 8 August the Home Secretary,? (The Rt. Hon. 
, of% , 
, ginald McKenna M. P. ) announced the establishment of an OffidkLPress 
Bureau under the direction of F. E. Smith M. P. (the future Lord 
Birkenhead) , adding that the public now had "a reasonable right to 
expect that no news will be published in the press except such news 
47 Hansard 31.8.14. . Col. 451. The Milner Papers at the Bodleian 
contain a letter written in September 1918 by the Director of 
Military Intelligence,, Major General Sir G. M. W. MacDonagh, asking 
Milner to use his good offices to get him posted away from 
intelligence duties, in which he had been involved since 1909. He 
pointed out that he had been the War Office representative on the 
committees of the Imperial Defence Committee which "assembled and 
worked out the details of our present Aliens' policy,, censorship 
etc .. The Defence of the Realm Act and Regulations are based on a 
Paper by me on Martial Law. I had, therefore, sow responsibility for 
getting our intelligence service ready for war. " (The Great War, 
Private Letters 1918, Vol. 7). A very detailed recent account of 
preparations for censorship in wartim is given by Nicholas Hiley: 
'Counter Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First 
World War. ' English Historical Review Vol. 101 (1986) pp. 635-670. 
48 Ho. 139.17. Hansard 8.8.14. CoLs 2202-3. Cook: The Press in 
! La-rtime pp. 39-40. 
212 
as is furnished through this Bureau. n49 On 27 August the Prim 
Minister, enlarging on the functions of the Bureau, stated that "the 
principle upon which information is given to the public is that all 
information which can be given without prejudice to the public 
interest shall be given f ully and at once ... The Director of the 
Bureau has access for consultative purposes to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, and in matters of special 
doubt to myself. n50 On 10 September the Home Secretary announced 
that he had assumed departmental responsibility for the Bureau5l. 
But Sir Edward Cook, one of the future Directors of the Bureau, wrote 
in 1919 that he doubted if the Cabinet had ever formally decided what 
the precise duties and limits of the Bureau were. Having been 
created the Bureau was, in his view, "left to work out its scope and 
methods as experience might suggest". 52 He went on to note that the 
existence of the Bureau was not mentioned in any Act or Regulation 
until April 1916. Sir Stanley Buckmaster, who succeeded F. E. Smith 
as Director on 30 SepteMber, gave his own view of the limitation of 
the powers of the Bureau to the House of Commons on 26 November 1914 
when he said: "This office does not withhold and according to my 
views of its powers cannot withhold? any news excepting pursuant to 
the Defence of the Realm Act and to the rules and directions laid 
down by one of the Departments of State ... It has been and will 
continue to by the policy to publish everything that can be made 
Public without danger to the state. n53 Buckmaster held the office 
until he in turn was succeeded by a joint Directorate of Sir Edward 
49 Hansard 8.8.14. Col. s 2202/3. 
50 Ibid 27.8.14. Col. s 150-151. 
ý'I HO 139.17. Hansard 10.9.14. Col. 646. 
52 Cook: The Press in Wartime p. 42. 
53 HO 139.17. Hansard 26.11.14. Col. s 1310-1311. 
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Cook and Sir Frank Swettenham in May 1915. Buckmaster ampl if ied his 
relatively libertarian view of the role of the Bureau in what appears 
to have been an internal memrandum, dated 15 December 191554. 
"There is no censorship on internal political criticism and 
censorship of all matter is exercised with an anxious desire to allow 
as free a publication as is consistent with public safety. " But 
whatever the notional restraints upon the activities of the Bureau, 
it quickly became evident that the real f orce behind it was the 
defence of the Realm Act; and that this Act,, together with the 
governnent's definition of public safety at any given moment, could 
be used to impose a degree of political censorship which went far 
beyond any possible consideration of military security. 
The Defence of the Realm Act (DORA). August 1914.4 and 5 Geo. V. c. 29 
The first draft of the Act was prepared before the war by the 
committee of Imperial Defence and the War Office for use in case of 
emergency. It was introduced into the House on 7 August and passed 
through all its stages without discussion. Regulations continued to 
be added to it and consolidated versions of the Act and its attendant 
Regulations produced at intervals throughout the war. The original 
Act had consisted of only three clauses, enabling the King in Council 
to make regulations designed to prevent cormunication with or 
assistance to the enemy,, to take whatever measures were needed to 
secure the safety of troops, ships and military installations, and to 
prevent any activity likely to cause disaffection or to prejudice His 
Majesty's relations with foreign powers. But by 28 February 1917 
there were 400 pages of Consolidated Regulationst many of them with a 
54 HO 139.17. 
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large number of sub-sections which covered mst aspects of public 
lif e in a country at war. The Regulations by which the press was 
most affected were those dealing with the unauthorised collection and 
cowunication of information or reports (Sections 18-27A) ; and after 
1917, Regulation 9A (control Of meetings) and 51 and 51A (powers of 
search, interrogation and arrest and seizure of prohibited documnts) 
which were also invoked against the press. 
Cable Censorship 
At the outbreak of war Britain either already had, quickly acquired 
control of or sirnply cut all the submarine cable systems available to 
the Central Powersý5 The speed with which this was done was pronpted 
as much by economic considerations - blockade - as military 
necessity. The blockade of the Central Powers was organised by a 
55 H. W. Carless Davis: History of the Blockade: Emer2ency 
Departments (H. M. S. O. 1920). Germany possessed four cables which 
passed through the North Sea or the Straits of Dover, and all were 
cut by the British within hours of the outbreak of war in August 1914 
leaving Germany the use only of cable routes which connected with 
those of British cable companies or which converged on British 
stations. In fact the British Government had already (3 August 1914) 
issued a notification that telegraphic and radio-telegraphic 
communication throughout the British Empire was suspended, acting 
within reserved powers contained in the International Telegraph and 
Radio-Telegraph Conventions. Neutrals were allowed,, as an act of 
grace, to continue to use the cable services controlled by the 
British provided their telegrams were sent in English or French and 
on the understanding that they would be subject to censorship by the 
Allies. However both the Swedish and (until shortly before her entry 
into the war) American cable companies allowed Germany the 
surreptitious use of their own cable facilities,, using a code which 
the British soon discovered how to decypher. (See B. W. Tuchman: The 
Zimmermann Telegram (1959). ) On two occasions involving this 
pra. ce the British used "D" notices (588 and 591) to restrain the 
press from drawing embarrassing conclusions about the fact that the 
government knew that it was going on, but did not want to let the 
Germans know that they knew. Conmnications between Britain and 
Russia depended heavily upon Sweden and the Swedes couldr and 
sometimes did, take diplomatic advantage of this fact by holding up 
transit cables. 
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co, nmittee known initially as the Contraband Committee, on which both 
the Admiralty and the Foreign Office were represented,, but which soon 
be. -ame known as the Contraband Committee of the Foreign Off ice. In 
March 1916 the Contraband Comittee was upgraded to becone a special 
wartirm Department of State,, and Lord Robert Cecil,, already 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, became 
in addition Minister of Blockade. Thus cable censorship and foreign 
policy were ef fectively - if not of f icially - connected f rom the very 
beginning56. 
Cable censorship was actually done by a staf f under the direction of 
the War Office and originally located at the Central Telegraph 
Off ice. On 25 October 1914 the Cable Censors were moved into the 
same building into which the Press Bureau had itself moved on 17 
September: The Royal United Services Institution. The Cable Censors 
retained a direct line of Commnications -a "tube" - with the 
Central Telegraph Off ice and censorship policy was determined by the 
War Of f ice , but the operational management of the cable censors 
passed to the Press Bureau. The Cable Room received all inward, 
outward and transit press cables, as well as such inland press 
telegrams as the Post Office considered to be connected with the war,, 
and all wireless messages (after the Admiralty had finished with 
them, see below) . In the Cable Room, according to Cook, a press 
56 H. W. Carless Davis,, History of the Blockade pp. 6-7. The 
Official History of the Blockade made no secret of the fact that the 
Contraband Committee,, because of its unique overview of trade 
Patterns in Europe, began to draw conclusions and to make policy 
recommendations which "exercised a considerable influence on the 
Tinion of those who helped the Foreign Office in shaping policy 
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ressage "met with such f ate as it might"57 
Although only cabled press material was subject to corrpulsory 
censorship, material arising from other sources could be submitted 
for voluntary censorship to the so called military Room of the Press 
Bureau58. Everything that was published without having been so 
submitted rendered the editor, or whoever was considered responsible 
for publication, liable to prosecution if the matter in question was 
held to have offended under one of the DORA Regulations. Although 
nominally under the control of the Home Office the Bureau was in 
practice in closer and more continuous touch with the Service 
Departments that with any other government, departmnt except - in the 
57 Cook: The Press in Wartime pp. 32-53. Postal censorship was not 
a part of the duties of the Press Bureau. Like cable censorship it 
was seen at first purely as a matter of military necessity but 
gradually became an instrument of policy. As in the case of cable 
censorship, several goverment departments were involved. In 
practice postal censorship was operated by the Postmaster General on 
behalf of the War Office, and he was responsible for opening, 
detaining, delaying and submitting to the military authorities "such 
classes of letters as the Home Secretary might direct". (History of 
the Blockade. ) Intercepted letters were undoubteldy used by the 
Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign office. In November 
and December 1917 Price observed three times in letters to members of 
his family that they did not appear to have received his recent 
letters. "I don't know whether the German submarines send them to 
the bottom of the North Sea or whether I express my opinions on the 
current topics too frankly to suit the authorities. " (A. M. P. 
30.11.17. ) A year later (see below Chapter 11 p. 397) several of his 
letters turned up in P. I. D. Intelligence summaries. 58 In the early days of the war, editors submitted as little as 
possible for voluntary censorship, but as time went on they tended 
increasingly to play for safety, and by the time Swettenham and Cook 
wrote their report to the Cabinet (March 1917) they noted that there 
was "less reason for complaint on this score". (HO 139.17). The 
services of the Military Roan of the Press Bureau were also available 
to publishers of books,, and in December 1915 the Directors wrote to 
the Publishers' Association reminding them of this fact. As the 
result,, the manuscripts of over 1,000 books were subsequently sent in 
f0rvoluntary censorship. See INF 4 l/B and Cook The Press in 
! artime p. 56. 
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case of Russia - the Foreign Of f ice. In 1917 the Bureau Is most 
important contact at the War Off ice was with M171 which had been 
created as the result of a reorganisation of the Imperial General 
Staff in December 1915 and the creation of the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence under Major General George McDonagh. The 
Directorate consisted of 8 sections one of which, M15, was under 
Brigadier General George Cockerill, whose operational 
responsibilities included the Press Bureau, postal and cable 
censorship and the Secret Services59. But it was another section 
M17 (a), which had responsibility for creating, with the Bureau, the 
general policy on censorship and "for indicating to the Press Bureau 
categories of news the suppression of which is desired by some branch 
of the War Off icen60 The Bureau also deferred to the Directorate of 
Naval Intelligence, in wbich Admiral William R. Hall ran what was 
described by Cook as an i rium in imperio in Room 40, where 
wireless intercepts were decoded and analysed. The role of the 
Admiralty in the area of censorship became most important, so f ar as 
news f rom Russia was concerned, in the spring and summer of 1918, 
59 Cockerill had worked with McDonagh (see above F/N 47) and see 
also Nicholas Hiley, 'Counter Espionage in Great Britain during the 
First World War'. English Historical Review 101 (1986) pp. 635-670. 60 The overlapping and rivalry among the various departments within 
military intelligence, not to mention that between military 
intelligence and the secret service, between the secret service and 
the Police, and between the military intelligence agencies and the 
Political intelligence agencies is described by Nicholas Hiley: 
'Counter Espionage and Security in Great Britain during the First 
World War'. Swettenham and Cook deplored the situation in their 
report to the Cabinet of March 1917 (HO 139.17). John Buchant then 
Director of the Department of Information of the Foreign Office,, did 
his best to make sense of it in a report to Sir Edward Carson which 
was circulated to the Cabinet in September 1917 (INF 4 I/B) . See also INF 4/9: 'The Organisation of the Services of Military Secrecy,, 
Security and Publicity' (October 1917) and WO 32/10776: 'Historical 
Sketch of the Directorate of Military Intelligence during the Great 
War, 1914-19191 (1921). 
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when all cable links with Russia were broken and all news both going 
or coming out from Russia could only be sent by wireless6l. 
"DII Noticest Instructions and Advice 
In addition to the Cable Room and the MilitarY ROOm the Bureau also 
contained what Cook euphemistically called an Advising Department62, 
to which in his account of the Bureau he did not assign a room but 
which, wherever it was physically located, performed one of the most 
critical - and criticised - functions undertaken by the Bureau. The 
advisory function could be and of ten was presented as a way of 
protecting editors from the consequences of their own follies or 
indiscretions. It was also a means of conveying to them intimations 
or "hints" as to government policy on any matter. At first this was 
61 The increased use of wireless telegraphy was a direct 
consequence of the cutting of cable lines,, and the Directorate of the 
Intelligence Division of the Admiralty was quick to realise the 
political implications of this fact. Room 40 of the Admiralty was 
initially set aside as a place in which the naval cryptographers 
could work, since the British by one means or another had obtained 
the key to all the German codes bef ore the war was a year old. Hall 
was put in charge of Room 40 from the start, but he did not acquire 
his virtually independent control of it until May 1917, when it 
became a separate section of Naval Intelligence: ID25. By now Room 
40 had succeeded in involving itself in what had hitherto been the 
War Office preserve of mail censorship, and had created a War Trade 
Intelligence Department of its own as well as separate departments 
dealing with diplomatic and Mediterranean traffic. Hall was promoted 
Rear Admiral in October 1917, possibly as the result of pressure on 
the Admiralty by the Foreign Office,, which had greatly benefited from 
the high degree of co-operation between Room 40 and Russian Naval 
Intelligence before the Bolshevik revolution. This may account for 
what might otherwise be considered the unusual extent of naval 
involvement in subsequent British counter-revolutionary activitieso, 
the full history of which is unlikely ever to be revealed. The first 
Of Room 40's files reached the PRO in 1976 (ADM 137.3956-3962) and 
another set arrived in 1980 (ADM 137.4057-4189). There have probably 
been other releases since that time, but they are likely to have been 
considerably pruned. For further reading, see Christoper Andrews The 
! 4kinq of the British Intelligence Comimnity (1985) pp. 86-95 and 106: T10w'9__#, Cook The Press in Wartime pp. 39-40; and Patrick BeeslY ROOM 
42_British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918 (1984). 
Cook: The Press in Wartime p. 57. 
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done by means of personal interviews with editors, but it was soon 
found less time-consuming to send out noticesy prefixed by various 
letters of the alphabet, of which by f ar the most inportant in the 
context of the censorship of news f ram Russia was undoubtedly the "D" 
notice. It has not been possible to discover when the first "D" 
notice was issued. The f ir st that has been found, "D"24, is undated 
but f rom its content appears to have been issued in the late winter 
of 1914/15. Few "D" notices were sent on the initiative of the Press 
Bureau itself. most at the request of one or other Department of 
State, and surviving copies are scattered throughout the archives of 
those Departments. The fullest set knownto exist are in four bound 
volumes at the Imperial War Museum but these deal almost entirely 
with military subjects. The first number in this archive is "D"279 
and is dated 24 September 1915. By the end of the war over 700 "D" 
notices had been issued, but even Cook did not know the precise 
nc, number. In addition to "D" notices the Bureau also sent out "B", 
"T and "W" notices but, again, very few have survived. It is the 
merest inference from very slender evidence that "C" notices may have 
been intended more for information than direction and that "W" 
notices related to wireless intercepts. There is too little 
available on "B" and "G" notices to justify hazarding even a guess 
as to the objects they were intended to serve, and Cook provided no 
enlighterment. 
In addition to the notices the Bureau also sent out, f rom tim to 
tirm, confidential letters of explanation and advice to editorso, who 
were grouped for this purpose in lists: the "40", v the "100" and the 
"140". From such evidence as remains,, it would appear that the mre 
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confidential the advice, the shorter the list63.. Such letters, 
according to Cook, were sent to an editor nnOt as presuming to 
dictate to him but in order to make sure that the message should 
receive special attentionn64. "Dn notices, on the other hand, 
received a very wide distribution, being sent by messenger to London 
editors and by post to no less than 1,580 editors of provincial 
papers. When "D" notices related to matters covered by DORA they 
were called "Instructions" and were often "couched in more or less 
mandatory terms"65 In themselves they had no binding force,, but 
disregard of them was held to aggravate an offence under the Act. If 
the offence was considered serious the case was sent to the Director 
of Public Prosecutions for him to determine whether a prosecution was 
"advisable". In 1915 one prosecution a month, on average, was 
proposed, but the Bureau was asked on average three times a week to 
"admonish" offending editors66. Prosecution was considered 
"advisable" in only a very few cases because, as Cook pointed out67, 
"though a case might in part be heard in camera yet the nature of the 
charge and perhaps other particulars would have to be mentioned in 
public. Hence arose the anomaly that the more serious the 
63 HO 139.31. 
64 Cook The Press in Wartime p. 152. 65 Ibid -p. 58. 
66 INF 4 l/B. FO 371.4363. 
67 Cook The Press in Wartime pp. 83-84. In addition to getting off 
without a prosecution, an of fender might also gain an unfair 
advantage over his rivals. The f act that "D" notices did not have 
the force of law resulted in some newspapers publishing material 
which their more scrupulous rivals dutifully suRressed. In the words 
Of John Buchan (INF 4 1/8): "Unless the offender had comitted a 
very serious breach of the Regulations he would receive no punishment 
but an admonishment from the Director of the Press Bureau, whereas 
the newspaper which observed the regulations lost a valuable piece of 
n news and suffered for its rectitude. Buchan went on to note 
regretfully that n the representatives of the Press showed a strong 
aversion to any legal sanction being given to the notices issued by 
the Bureau or to any system of punishments (such as the withholding 
n Of Official information) for Press Offenders. 
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indiscretion was, the more reasons there might be for letting it go 
unpunished. " 
Information and Intelligence 
Yet another function of the Official Press Bureau was performed by 
the Issuing Department. The Bureau was responsible for putting out 
news in the form of cowuniques, bulletins, wireless intercepts and 
briefing material. in his speech to the House of Commons on 26 
November 1914 already noted,, F. E. Smith described the Issuing 
Department as the outlet "for all information relating to the war 
which any of the Departnents of State think it right to issue". The 
Bureau had no power to collect news or to compel its publication, but 
the Issuing Department was lined with telephones with direct lines to 
riewspapers and news agencies, many of which kept representatives on 
duty there round the clock. 
The Bureau thus naturally intersected functionally with the various 
departments which eventually came together in February 1918 as the 
Ministry of Information under Lord Beaverbrook. The Foreign Off ice 
had had its own News Department since the beginning of the war. This 
was later renamed the Department of Information of the Foreign Office 
and later still the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign 
Office (P. I. D. ). P. I. D. was initially subsumed within the Ministry 
of Information when it was created as a Department in its own right, 
indePendent of all other Departmnts. But within three mnths 
P. I. D. had been transferred back to the Foreign Officer presumably 
because its sources of information and its influence were considered 
tOO valuable and too confidential to risk association with a 
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department which? by definition, was concerned with the dissemination 
of new for public consumption. 
obtained its information from War Office and Admiralty 
Intelligence Services, the Secret Service, reports from British 
Embassies and Consulates,, private correspondents and correspondence, 
British propaganda agents overseas, and the foreign press. Its 
reports and briefings based upon these sources were written primarily 
for the benef it of the Foreign Of f ice but were, in f act, more widely 
circulated. They were seen by the War Cabinet, the War Department of 
the Foreign Of f ice, the Intelligence Department of the War Of f ice . 
the American Ambassador in London and the Agents General of the 
Dominions. P. I. D. Is influence was considerable, and the 
interdependence of P. I. D. and the Press Bureau, in terms of the use 
it made of material intercepted by one or other departments of the 
Bureau, can be clearly documented in the case of Price (see below 
pp. 397-400) . 
Censorshipof Material dealing with Foreign Affairs 
For the first seventeen months of its existence the official Press 
Bureau was responsible for the censorship of material dealing with 
foreign af f airs on behalf of the Foreign Of f ice. But in December 
1915 Cecil, who believed that overt censorship in foreign PolicY 
matters did more harm than good and said so on every possible 
occasion,, f inally succeeded in bringing the cabinet round to his 
POint of view. He argued that facts withheld f rom the press would 
core out in the end but probably in a distorted f orm; that the 
attempt to suppress them would simply make the press bad-tempered; 
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and that disaffected newspapers would use any such opportunities as 
weapons with which to attack the government. He maintained that 
editors should be allowed to publish what they liked on the clear 
understanding that responsibility for not infringing the provisions 
of DORA lay with them 66. Accordingly at midnight on 19/20 December 
1915 the censorship by the Press Bureau of incoming matter relating 
to foreign affairs came to an end: in theory. The censors were, 
however, instructed by the Directors of the Bureau to make copies of 
any telegrams, whether inward or outward bound, if they contained any 
statement "which in the opinion of the censor is highly mischievous" 
(Directors' emphasis)67. The instructions did not specify what was 
to be done with these copies, but the fact that liaison officers from 
the Foreign Of f ice not only continued to f reguent the Bureau but 
continued to express their opinion on intercepted material,, suggests 
that the Foreign Off ice continued to be involved in the censorship of 
material dealing with foreign affairs. Gaselee later disclosed that 
the Press Bureau simply continued to send the Foreign Office "copies 
of dangerous or doubtful telegrams and it was of ten possible, in the 
case of inward messageso, to telephone any given newspaper that they 
were about to receive a message on this or that subject but that it 
would be better that they should not publish ity or a part of it, for 
the following reason, the true state of affairs being... "68 In any 
66 HO 139.35. War Cab. 286. 67 Ho 139.2. 
68 John Tilley and Stephen Gaselee: The Foreign office (The 
Whitehall Series. 1933). Gaselee wrote Chapter XII: "The Foreign 
Office the Press and the News Department". His admission (p. 282) 
concerning the practice of telephoning newspapers is corroborated in last of the four volumes of Instructions to the Press preserved at 
the Imperial War Museum. This consists mainly of scrawled and often indecipherable notes gathered frcm various provincial newspapers 
which show every sign of having been taken down over the telephone. 
ScRe of them clearly relate to "D" notices which received a general 
circulation but some do not,, and could well be the result of the kind 
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event, Cecil's appointment soon af ter this as Minister of Blockade 
ensured that he could effectively do what he liked with the contents 
of the Cable Room. 
In April 1916 a slip was devised, in co-operation with the Director 
of Public Prosecutions, to be affixed to all telegrams and articles 
about which the censors felt any doubt. The slip read: 
"With regard to the enclosed message we think that,, 
though its publication might be deemed ill-advised,, 
there is no sufficient reason for us to interfere with 
its publication should you, having regard to the 
national interest, decide to take that course. 1,69 
The message was clear enough if the method was not. Swettenham and 
Cook were not at all happy with this arrangement. In their report to 
the Cabinet in March 1917 70 they stated, in this connection, that 
"... we never did and we do not now agree with the 
change.. Whilst the press are told that Foreign Affairs 
are not censored but left to the discretion of editors, 
messages and articles which unquestioningly deal with 
foreign affairs in whole or in part are often referred 
to the Foreign Off ice. Sorm are censored or stopped 
there on military or other grounds which are not nearly 
so obvious as their bearing upon foreign affairs ... In 
other cases, where the Foreign office deems that 
publication would be detrimental to the national 
interests, the Directors are asked to write to a 
certain number of editors deprecating publication. " 
The Directors considered that this state of af fairs was "unsuccessful 
and misleading" and it is dif f icult to conceive whom Cecil thought he 
was deceiving by this charade. 
Of informal practice described by Gaselee. 69 Ho 139.2. 
70 Ibid. 139.17. 
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(iii) Parliament and Censorship 
The great majority of Meabers of Parliament appear to have acquiesced 
with little dif f iculty - even if they were not deceived - in the 
operation of the formidable apparatus of control available to the 
Governmnt through the Press Bureau. But some did not, and it can be 
no coincidence that the most persistent questioners were all, by 
1917, either members of the U. D. C. or Irish M. P. Is. In the swmL-r of 
1914 M. P. s had merely grumbled at the inefficiency of the Bureau, but 
as time went on and the Bureau became more ef f ective, the questions 
in the House became more searching. Cook in his book The Press in 
wartime stated rather vaguely that it had been laid down at a very 
early stage that the Press Bureau was not to censor Parliamentary 
reports, but that editors sometilms asked for advice about publishing 
printed notice questions. 
"Means were often found within the House itself for the 
withdrawal of dangerous questions, and this was a 
matter upon which the Bureau was asked for advice". 
But he added, "... the role of whipping boy was 
cheerfully accepted, but we did chafe a little at the 
privilege of Parliamnt. n7l 
The Bureau clearly also gave advice unasked. On 13 December 1917 one 
of Sir Edward Cook's Letters to Editors read: 
Dear Sir, We have been asked to transmit to you the 
following: - the Government desires that no reference 
should be made to Mr. King's speech in the House of 
Commons today, for reasons which will be known to 
editors. The subject which he raised might have a 
prejudicial effect upon the safety of British subjects 
in Russia. n72 
71 Cook The Press in Wartime p. 124. 72 Imperial War Museum: Instructions to the Press. The subject of 
King's speech on 13 December 1917 (Hansard C019S 1483-1487) will 
never be known because as he rose to his f eet Cecil had recourse to 
the strategem of spying strangers, and the House went into Secret 
Session. Earlier the sam day King had twice tried to ask questions 
regarding the Government's policy towards Russia during the previous 
WO months and had been told by the Home Secretary that it was not in 
the public interest to raise the matter. He then tried to raise the 
subject in a debate on a Vote of Credit and was appealed to by the 
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Even Cook's statement that Parliamentary reports were not censored is 
cast into doubt by "D" 681 which stated: 
"A question will be put today in the House of Commons 
asking whether certain Russian ports on the White Sea 
are occupied by British troops. It is requested in the 
National interest that the Press will not discuss this 
matter or give prominence to the question and answer. " 
The pretext for "D" 681 was the question put by the Labour M. P. Frank 
Jowett, on June 1918, who wanted to know whether certain Russian 
ports on the White Sea were at that time occupied by British troops. 
Cecil replied that it was not in the public interest to answer 
questions relating to the disposition of any of H. M. forces73 
Fortunately for the press a handful of M. P. s made good use of their 
privileges, however much Cook may have chafed under them, and after 
the Coalition goverment came into power in 1916 those who concerned 
theaselves with the freedom of the press rose to their feet 
increasingly often. On 27 March 1917 the Irish M. P. John Dillon 
raised a debate on a Resolution that 
"the greatly increased stringency of censorship which 
has come into force during the last six months, the 
one-sided and unfair method in which censorship is 
applied, and the practice of directing the Press as to 
the views and opinion which they should cultivate 
amongst their readers are injurious to the State and 
ought to be discontinued. "74 
In his speech Dillon accused the Goverment of suppressing 
"... the publication of facts with regard to the truth 
which would tend to make the public take the view that 
the Goverranent do not desire them to take and it does 
not prevent the publication of untruths so long as they 
tend to create public opinion in favour of the 
Government. " 
SPeaker to refrain on patriotic grounds. He persevered, however, and 
had begun to make a speech bitterly critical of the influence of 
Hardinge and Buchanan on goverment policy when Cecil called out 
SPY strangers" and the galleries were cleared. 73 Instructions to the Press. Iniperial War Museum. Hansard 6.6.18. 
C01 - 1745. 74 Hansard 27.3.17. Col,. 3 295-311. 
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Moreover, Dillon went on, it was no longer simply a question of 
censoring special items of news; newspapers got orders to suppress 
allnews whatsoever in respect of certain subjects. He cited the 
state of the British expeditionary force at Salonika and the success 
of the German submarine canpaign as exanples of this type of news 
blackout. Not quite a year later (11 March 1918) the Liberal M. P. 
for N. W. Lanark,. William Pringle, gave chilling examples of press 
campaigns against individuals which, he implied, had been instigated 
by the Press Bureau and then used by ministers as excuses for getting 
rid of them. The fates of Arthur Henderson and Admiral Jellicoe were 
adduced as cases in point75. And on 18 June 1918 A. J. Sherwell, the 
Liberal M. P. for Huddersfield observed: 
"I do not think the Government yet appreciate the great 
disquietude which has been created by the withholding 
of information of all kinds from the nation... and 
notably within the last few months. n76 
75 Hansard 11.3.18. Col. s. 108-110. Arthur Henderson had been 
violently attacked by the press as unpatriotic over his role in the 
negotiations for the Stockholm Conference (Chap 31, F/N 32). Admiral 
Sir John (later Earl) Jellicoe was another victim. His biographer 
believed that Jellicoe's personal aversion from publicity had led him 
to under-estimate the power of the press and to have done nothing to 
get the Admiralty to correct the misleading impression it had given 
in its first communique about the Battle of Jutland. This had led to 
a "Campaign of innuendo, criticism, mistrust and suspicion which 
dominated the press for weeks to core". Jellico, was dismissed six 
ronths later, and wrote in his diary: "The assumption in my mind is 
that Lord Northcliffe was pressing the Prime Minister to get rid of 
met the Prime Minister was pressing Geddes (the First Lord of the 
Admiralty). I know frcm Carson that Northcliffe had frequently 
pressed both him and the Prime Minister during his tenure of office 
to get rid of me. " Admiral Sir R. Bacon: The Life of John Rushworth 
Earl Jellicoe (1936). -7ý wsýa-rý--1-8.6.18. Col. s 263-4. 
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Another instance of censorship to which a number Of M-P-s took strong 
exception was the attenpt to withhold information about the Reichstag 
v-solution of 19 July 1918 77. , L%V- In a debate on the Consolidated Fund 
a week later Ramsay MacDonald noted that the Resolution 
"was only given praninence in the early edition of one 
evening newspaper and subsequently relegated to a very 
obscure corner. " 
Trevelyan added: 
%,, very few newspapers, except the Manchester Guardian 
as far as I saw, even stated what the resolution was. 
It was hidden from the British public. " 
He had found,, he said, that many of his fellow members had never 
hear o it. Ponsonby added: 
"It appeared in leaded type on Monday afternoon of last 
week in one evening paper at 3 o'clock,, but by 5 
o'clock it was in none of the evening papers and the 
next morning it was tucked away in two newspapers in 
abbreviated form. " 
The bureaucracy of press control had got out of hand, he went on. 
"Goodness knows what goes on. I am sure the Government 
do not ... The result is that the Government live in a fool's paradise and do not know what the people of the 
country are thinking at all. n78 
77 on 19 july 1917 Mathias Erzberger, a right wing radical Catholic 
Deputy, leader of the Centre Party in the Reichstagr introduced a 
Resolution which,, although fiercely opposed by the Junker party,, was 
carried by 214 votes to 116. The Resolution included the words: 
"The Reichstag desires a peace of conciliation and a lasting 
reconciliation of all peoples" and insisted that Germany was not led 
by any desire for conquests. But it concluded that Germany would 
fight "until the Allies stop threatening her and her allies with 
Conquests". In his War Memoirs (Vol. 4 Ch. Ml pp. 2043-2055) Lloyd 
George did his best to discount the significance both of the 
Resolution and of the ensuing debate in the House of Conmns. 
Erzberger (1875-1921) had previously been noted for his opposition to 
unrestricted U-Boat warfare. Klaus Epstein, in his account of 
Erzberger in Neue Deutsche Biographie (Vol. 4,, 1957) stated that in 
April 1917 Erzberger met a Russian agent (whether of the Provisional 
Government or of the Soviet is not made clear) in Stockholm, and discussed with him the possibility of a separate peace. Erzberger 
was made a member of Prince Max von Baden's government in october 1918 and led the German delegation to the Armistice talks at 
CcxrPiegne. He held a number of high offices under Scheideman and Bauer before being murdered by two naval officers in August 1921. 78 Hansard 26.7.18. Col. s 1479-1495. 
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(iv) Press, Parliament and the Russian Revolution 
The earliest surviving evidence to have been found of the way in 
which the Press Bureau manipulated news f rom Russia is an undated "D" 
notice, D24, which read: 
"Russian exertions in advance on East Prussia and 
Austria. Press directed to give prominence to. n79 
This seems likely to refer to the Russian campaign in the autumn of 
1914.. The next surviving reference (253) is in strong contrast: 
"Russian army. Nothing to be published re want of arms 
and ammunitionl, 80. 
Since the first surviving notice to have been found with a date, 
D195, was issued on 2 April 1915, D253 probably refers to conditions 
in the winter of 1915/16 on the Polish or Galician fronts, since on 
the Caucasus f ront the Russian army was at that time giving a very 
good account of itself. The next surviving mention of Russia is one 
of the Directors' Letters to editors, written on 3 January 1917. The 
editors were informed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Af f airs 
felt sure that they would 
"appreciate the importance of avoiding, in any cominents 
they may publish on the past career of Rasputin any 
reference to the highest personage in Russia. n81 
On 17 February Joseph King, the Liberal M. P. for North Somerset and 
chanpion of every libertarian cause to receive an airing in the House 
of Conwns during the war82 attacked the Government for withholding 
"for weeks" news of Miliukov's speech in the Duma in November 1916 
(see Chapter 2 FIN 23). "The amount of restriction put upon the 
infOrMation coming from Russia" he said "is really appalling. " The 
suppression of Miliukov's speech was the subject of an altercation 
79 Ho 139.48. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Hansard 17.2.17. Col. S 1282-1289. 
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between John Dillon and Cecil on 6 March 1917, when Cecil denied that 
there had been any interference by the censor but could not explain 
the absence of any reports of the speech83. 
politically selective censorship of news from Russia was particularly 
evident in the period imediately before the March revolution. Its 
main objective appears to have been to prevent British newspaper 
readers from finding out what Lord Milner said in Russia (See 
Appendix V "The Milner Mission") . One of the few reporters who 
managed to get anything back - he was said to be favourite in Russian 
Court circles - was the Morning Post correspondent who wrote hone 
that in the course of his speeches in Russia Lord Milner had done his 
best to disabuse Russian Liberals of any idea that "the people of 
England synpathised with the democrats, the liberals of Russia"84. 
Dillon, in the speech already quoted f rom (6 March) noted that 
reports of Milner's speeches in Russia had been almost totally 
suppressed in Britain and that, when he had first tried to ask a 
question about them in the House he had received "a preposterous 
answer to the ef fect that the Foreign Of f ice knew nothing about it" - 
The Liberal M. P. W. Liewelyn Williams later described the same 
speeches as a turning point in Anglo-Russia, relations. "From that 
mment the liberalising and revolutionary forces in Russia have 
distrusted this country and the Allies generally. "85 
Another victim was John Dillon's namesake (no relation) , the 
TeLegKShls expert on the Balkans and Russiaj, Dr. E. J. Dillon. In a 
83 Hansard 6.3.17. Coles 189-90. 
84 ýqrning Post 1.3.17. 
85 Hansard 18.6.18. ColeS 222-28. 
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debate on the Consolidated Fund on 20 February reference was made by 
three M-P-Sr John Dillon, Joseph King and Robert Outhwaite,, to the 
fact that Dr. Dillon's despatches were increasingly less often to be 
found in print86. But, added Dillon, this was not really 
surprising. 
"They were full of information, information which I am 
not very surprised that the Government should be 
annoyed about, because it often showed that the 
Government were wholly misinformed as subsequent events 
have proved ... But now - it is almost incredible - the 
whole of the press of this country and all the 
magazines have been forbidden to publish anything from 
Dr. Dillon ... On what ground has the censorship been 
tightened up in this extraordinary and utterly 
indefensible way, and particularly tightened up against 
Dr. Dillon, who is one of the best informed men in 
Europe? " 
He was answered by Outhwaite, "not in the least surprised" at the 
he- 
suppression of Dr. Dillon's articles, sinceýhad been one of the first 
to give out the uncomfortable truth that in April 1915 the British 
Government had entered into a commitment "which gave Constantinople 
to Russia and to show how it would prejudice our interests in the 
Near East". Af inal instance of the attempt to silence Dr. Dillon is 
amially remrkable. On 19 January he wrote a letter to the editor of 4- 
the Dail Te122raph in which he said: 
"Russia is on the verge of revolution. For two years 
the country has been in a condition of fernent. The 
revolutionary elements are all set to act, just as a 
mine might explode if the spark were applied. " 
The only reason the mine had not exploded,, Dr. Dillon went ont was 
the effective suppression of all forms of dissent by the Tsarist 
goverment. The letter was eventually allowed to be printed two 
86 Hansard 20.2.17. Cols. 1281-1299. 
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months af ter it was written and ten days af ter the outbreak of the 
revolution which it had predicted87. 
As news of the March revolution began to f ilter into Britain, the War 
off ice decided on 14 March that 
"for the present a strict censorship should be imposed 
on any details that might escape the Russian censorship 
and that the Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs 
should initiate the necessary action. n88 
on the same day an Instruction was issued to the censors: 
"Russian internal troubles: nothing relating to any 
internal trouble is to be passed. Any cable on such 
matter should be shown to the Director for reference to 
the Foreign Office. As soon as anything on the subject 
appears in the German Wireless the Foreign Office 
should be informed. n89 
On the same day the British Ambassador in Petrograd twice cabled in 
London asking that it should be made known in Britain that the 
British conmnity were safe and well, and being shown "striking 
consideration... both troops and public". But as one of the clerks in 
the Russian Department,, Laurence Oliphantj, minuted on the second of 
these cables: 
"The War Cabinet having decided that events at 
Petrograd are not to be mentioned in the Press, such an 
announcement will, if published, require careful 
'dressing'. " 
Lord Hardinge added: 
87 Daily W122raph 19.3.17. The final turn of the screw on Dr. 
Dillon was yet to come. on 10 May 1917 Dillon wrote to af riendy a 
Mr. Frewen, and told him that a message had been passed to him by "an 
iqxrtant personage" asking him "either to spread cheerful tidings 
about Russia in private or to say nothing at all. " Dillon had 
concluded his letter: "... it is symptomatic of the tenper of the 
governing class that,, not content with the censorship of the written 
word, they should strive to exercise control over our private 
conversations. " Mr. Frewen forwarded Dillon's letter to Milner who 
had the grace to reply agreeing that this had, indeed, been a 
dePlorable episode. (Milner Papers: The Great War, Private letters 
1917 
F Vo. 6) . 88 CAB 232.34. 
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"It seems to me that a decision should be taken by the 
War Cabinet as to the continued suppression by the 
Censor of news from Petrograd. A large number of tel. s have arrived and are held up. Continued suppression of 
news may react disadvantageously for the Government. " 
Af inal note on the cable recorded that "The Prime Minister's consent 
to releasing the telegrams was subsequently obtained. 1190 On 15 March 
Buchanan cabled again suggesting that all cables to and f rom the 
United Kingdom should be censored since there was now no censorship 
in Russia. On this Hubert Montgomery,, one of the Foreign Off ice 
Liaison Officers with Press Bureau noted on 16 March: "We have 
arranged with the Press Bureau to refer any doubtful messages to 
us. 1191. On 20 March the Directors of the Bureau wrote one of their 
private and confidential letters to editors to the effect that the 
Foreign Off ice had asked them to say 
"that they feel sure that Editors will appreciate the 
need of great care and discretion at the present moment 
in the publication of matter relating to Russian 
affairs. n92 
How this advice was interpreted is indicated by Sardonyx of the New 
Statesman in the first edition of that journal to be published after 
news of the revolution had been confirmed: 93 
"Quite a large section of the English press have been 
nervously busy during the past week advising the 
Russian nation not to embrace democracy too suddenly 
and above all not to sever relations altogether with 
the Romanov dynasty. " 
89 FO 371.2995. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ho 139.39. 
93 New Statesman 24 March 1917. Sardonyx was almost certainly 
Arnold Bennett. The marked contributors copy in the New Statesman's library has his signature scrawled in the margin. one letter, the V is shaky,, but the rest are clear. (Bennett shared the colum 
With J. C. Squire, who called himself L)nyx, and who was an old CWbridge friend of Price's. ) Sardonyx returned to the British cult 
Of the Romanovs on 12 May 1917 when he referred to the "sinister 
effect in Petrograd of Northcliffe's utterances in favour of the ex- Tsar and the all-too chivalrous silences in favour of the ex- Tsarf-iaa n 
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in aletter to Charles Trevelyan his father, Sir. George, remarked: 
"I have just received the Nation for March 15, r the Ides of March, the day the Czar abdicated. From the 
first word to the last there is no mention in it - of 
such a countr as Russia. Such are the surprises of 
this epoch. "9 
on 23 March Buchanan forwarded to the Foreign Of f ice a message f rom 
Lockhart, then still Vice-Consul at Moscow, in which he coirplained: 
"the curtain of incense smoke which certain English 
writers have systematically spread before the eyes of 
the British public has already done sufficient 
harm",, 95 
and again on 30 April: 
"I cannot help feeling that a large section of the 
English public has entirely misunderstood the 
psychology of the Russian revolution. This is 
especially the case with regard to the English press 
and more particularly the Times ... and as the vast 
majority of the Russians seem convinced that the Times 
is the official organ of the Government a most 
unfortunate impression has been created. " 96 
"Spreading incense smoke" was a perceptive and quite an accurate way 
of describing what the Times was doing between March and June 1917. 
Very little that was overtly hostile to the Revolution was printed, 
but what was printed was nonetheless misleading. For instancer it 
was surely misleading to have given the Tsar most of the credit f or 
the revolution in that he had the decency to abdicate before very 
much blood was shed97. And the despatches of the Times 
correspondent, Robert Wilton,, during this period were misleading and 
liable to create misunderstanding in the minds of readers in the 
sense that he consistently portrayed the new government as one 
CORxsed entirely of honest liberals who were continually being 
haq*red in their ef forts to create a new dewcratic regime by the 
94 CPT papers 76. University of Newcastle upon Tyne Library. 95 ED 371.2998. 
96 Ibid. 371.2996 
97 The Times 15.3: 17. Leading article. 
7: 235 
interference of the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional governments 
were given every benef it of the doubt; the Left were portrayed more 
as irritants than a factor to be taken seriously,, and Wilton never 
missed an opportunity to attach- the word "Jew" to any socialist 
name. "All the German gold in the world n said H. H. Lees Smith in the 
House of Commns on 7 June nhaS not done as much harm in Russia to 
the cause of f reedom as the insulting series of articles in the Times 
directed against the revolution98. Read in 1987 what appeared in 
the Times in the spring and early sumner of 1917 seems less insulting 
than insufferably patronising. The key words in Lees Smith's speech 
were surely "in Russia". The Times appears totally to have 
misunderstood the situation, and thereby increased the alienation of 
the Russian moderate Lef t which had begun at the time of the Milner 
Mission. British diplomats in Russia at that time knew very well 
that the situation was a great deal more serious that the British 
press, or rather the Press Bureau, wanted the British public to 
understand99. 
Price was less moderate in his choice of language about the Times 
than Lockhart. In a memorandum to Trevelyan written on 11 April and 
published in the July edition of U. D. C. he said: 
"I am doing all I can to tell the soldiers' and 
workers' leaders here about the nature of the 
abominable Northcliffe press in England ... I have 
written an article in one of the Russian papers about 
it ... I only hope that they will turn the, Times 
correspondent out of Petrograd. " 
98 Hansard 7.6.17. Col. S 294-5 * 99 Philip Knightly: The First Casualty (1975) pp. 141-142,7 144-146" 
suggests that Wilton was more sinned against, by Printing House Square, than sinning, and that his often very accurate warnings and desPatches were ignored. His anti-Bolshevik bias was obvioust but in 
that he was not unique amng correspondents. It was not until the 
summer and autumn of 1918, when Wilton was not in Russia, that the 
Ti Mes began to show signs of hysteria. 
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The Liberal M. P. Robert Outhwaite went so far as to imply that the 
Northcliffe press enjoyed some form of iHRUnity from the attentions 
of the Press Bureau when he asked the Foreign Secretary if he was 
"aware that when attacks are made on the Russian 
Government in these newspapers he is not aware of them, 
but that when any attack or criticism is made by any 
other organ the Public Prosecutor takes action. "100 
In two long letters to The Nation Michael Farbman recapitulated the 
occasions of the disappointment of Russian liberals in the British 
presslOl. British newspapers, he said, had failed to take up the 
cause of those Russians who had protested against the Russif ication 
of Poland and the maltreatment of Polish Jews in 1915. They had 
remained silent when corrupt or inefficient Ministers in the Tsarist 
goverment were eventually sacked. They had failed to report 
speec es in the Duma critical of the Tsar, notably Miliukov's speech 
of 1 November 1916 which,, wrote Farbman,, 
"to the best of my recollection ... has not yet appeared in the London daily press, although it was published in 
France and throughout the world. " 
All this restraint, went on Farbmanr was explained as being non- 
intervention in the affairs of another nation but "the curious thing 
is that with the Revolution, this attitude has been abandoned". He 
added that his own outgoing cables (as London Correspondent of Nov! ýya 
Zhizn) appeared to have been as badly affected as incoming news. 
"Every quotation from a conservative newspaper or 
speech that illustrates dislike of the Revolution has 
been let through by the British censor. All reference 
Of an opposite kind has been deleted as if 
automatically and inevitably ... How then is the British Censorship to be explained. I put it again to English 
Liberals. It is blundering or is it a tendency? "102 
100 Hansard 12.11.17. Col,, S 10-11. 101 The Nation 24.3.17 and 10.11.17 102 It is difficult not to hear an echo in Farbman's question of Miliukov's famc)us attack on StUrmer in the Duma when he ended every 
(ýOunt of the indictment with the question "Is it stupidity or is it 
treason? " 
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Evidence that British Censorship was, indeed, tendentious continued 
to accumulate. Labour Leader noted on 29 November that it had been 
obliged to take its text of Trotsky's appeal for a general peace from 
the columns of Humanite- On 19 January 1918 The Nation alleged that 
news from Brest Litovsk was being doctored. The Press Bureau had 
held back Trotsky's declaration that the negotiations were being 
interrupted for ten days in order to allow other Allies to join in 
them. 
"Eventually, five days late, one paragraph of this long 
message was released, but one paragraph only. " 
on 26 January 1918 the Irish MP Arthur Lynch asked the Home Secretary 
whether it was 
"correct to say that whereas his department keeps back 
telegrams from M. Trotsky yet it allows currency to be 
given to the wildest rumours detrimental to the present 
rulers of roissia. " 
Sir George Cave's only answer was: "I do not know anything about 
that. n103 
In Labour Leader for 29 August 1918 T. P. Conwil Evans pieced together 
remarkably accurate picture of the way the Press Bureau used both 
the cable censorship and its so-called advisory functions to tilt the 
news from Russia in any direction favoured by the government. 
"Careful readers of English newspapers will have 
noticed that for the last five or six weeks only 
official news has been allowed to appear from day to 
day. There have been no independent despatches from 
special correspondents of particular newspapers, but 
only official reports issued by the Press Bureau, or 
despatches sent by such agencies as Reuter - that 
agency which (one learns from the recent debate on the 
Ministry of Information) was subsidised last year to 
the extent of E126,000 of public money. " 
103 Hansard 28.1.18. Colo 5 1277-8. 
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Evans went on to point out that the British press was in any case 
heavily dependent upon foreign newspapers for its information about 
Russia. These were usually weeks old before they arrived in Britain. 
News taken from these sources and combined with official press 
releases designed to release as little infOrMation as possible led to 
the creation of an ever more confused and distorted picture of events 
in Russia. A further point was raised by the New Statesman on 21 
December 1917, when it ref erred to f or the f irst time to self - 
censorship. It is, of course, impossible to determine the degree to 
which this factor operated, but it would appear that not even a 
liberal journal like the New Statesman was immune. In an unsigned 
article entitled 'Drifting into Another War' the writer referred to 
"the self-imposed silence with regard to the British 
Government's attitude towards Russia" 
which the New Statesman had been keeping, and called on Labour to 
insist on a change of policy which would enable the positive results 
of Bolshevik policy to be made known. 
(v) The Press Bureau and Leading Articles, with special reference to 
Scott 
In his book The Press in Wartime Sir Edward Cook made the point that 
it was in leading articles that statements likely to prejudice His 
Majesty's relations with foreign powers were most likely to appear, 
and that 
"such articles were seldoms, if ever, subject to any 
censorship. The possible prejudice would be greater if 
they were supposed to have passed an official 
censorship and less if they were known not to have done 
so.,, 104 
104 Cook The Press in Wartime P. 124. 
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Writing in 1919 Cook might well have been thinking about the way in 
which the editor of the Manchester Guardian had contrived to turn 
this convention to advantage. Enjoying, in every sense of the word,, 
his role as one of Lloyd George Is conf idantesl05,, Scott must have 
been reluctant to prejudice that relationship. He would have 
received the same "hints", "D" notices, Instructions and telephone 
calls as every other editor. Yet he was never prosecuted under DORA 
for the aggravated offence of ignoring one of them. When he went to 
see Lloyd George he met all the other policy makers: politicians, 
generals, admirals and high-ranking civil servants. He knew 
perfectly well what the official line on Russia was yet he 
consistently opposed it in his leading articles and went his own way. 
In a letter to Soskice just af ter the November revolution Scott 
wrote: "the censorship here seems to me to be partly misguided, 
partly just stupid. nl06 A year later, on 27 December 1918, in a 
leading article protesting at continued censorship of foreign press 
cables after the end of the war, Scott declared that there had been 
"a persistent, though hardly avowed, positive effort to 
cultivate, both by the suppression and by the colouring 
of news, a particular kind of opinion. Russian news 
has been throughout the war the classic object of this 
process of distortion. In the days of the Tsar the 
English people were allowed to hear only that all was 
well with Russia, so that the Revolution came to them 
as a conplete and wholly inexplicable surprise. " 
It seems possible that one reason that Scott was in a position to 
flout the authorities with such conviction was the access he had, 
limited as it was, to the information which Price had been sending 
him. For when, on 29 November 1917 the War Cabinet had considered 
105 Scott's evident enjoyment of his relationship with Lloyd George is apparant in the pages of The Political Diaries of C. P. SCOtt 1911- 
1928. 
TUrStaw Hill paperst House of Lords. DSI. Box 4. MG/5. 
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Sir Frank Swettenham's advice to the effect that the Only way to deal 
with messages froin Russia - "chiefly Bolshevik propaganda" - was to 
authorise the Press Bureau to pass, stop or censor them all, the 
cabinet had agreed, but subject to the proviso that the Bureau 
"should be allowed to show the messages to the 
newspapers to which they were addressed,, at their 
discretion. 1107 
It was undoubtedly the vigilance of Scott's Lobby Correspondent, 
Harold Dorel08, , Who took full advantage of that "discretion", which 
enableg Scott at least to get some idea of what Price was trying to 
107 HO 139.35. 
108 HAROLD DORE (1878-1943) After a short apprenticeship as a 
contributor to the Bury Times Dore, who was born in Lancashire and 
educated at Manchester Grammar School and Brasenose College Oxford, 
was taken on as a "learner" by the Manchester Guardian in 1904. He 
soon took over the 'Miscellany' column and when he was transferred to 
the London Off ice in 1911, he took it with him. In September 1914 he 
became Lobby Correspondent. Described in the Manchester Guardian's 
obituary as a "strongly Left Wing Liberal" who was "on the unpopular 
side of most controversies", he was gently chided by Scott in 
December 1916 for letting his "strong personal leanings" show in his 
work. It may well have been these "leanings", however, which 
motivated him to make such excellent work of memorising and 
sLmmarising for Scott Price's cables, which he was allowed to see but 
not to copy at the Official Press Bureau. Scott's letter referred to 
above concluded: "I hope that in this and other ways it may be 
possible for us to get into closer harmony. " This was probably an 
oblique reference to Dore's already established tendency to 
alcoholism. In September 1919 he was, by his own account, spending 
nearly half his salary on drink. He was knocked down by a car twice, 
in 1922 and again in 1930. But his work was clearly so highly 
regarded by three successive editors, C. P. Scott,, E. T. Scott and W. P. 
Crozier,, that his medical expenses after both accidents were paid by 
the Manchester Guardian,, which also paid for him to go for a cure to 
a German watering place and later to the Hospital for Nervous 
Diseases. In 1931,, at the suggestion of J. R. Scott (the managing 
director of the paper) he exchanged the post of Lobby Correspondent 
for that of Parliamentary Sketch Writer, on the grounds that it would 
involve less physical strain. In 1936 he was given a pension but 
continued to contribute occasional articles until at least 1940. 
David Ayerst described him as "a quizzical, loveable little man with 
unmanageable pince-nez; glasses and a consuming passion for English 
grammar. " He also had, as emerges very clearly from his personal 
correspondence with C. P. Scott,, a consuming passion for the 
Manchester Guardian,, and without it his life appeared to become 
mealifinigless. (David Ayerst, Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper 
(1971) p. 377; John Rylands University Library of Manchesterl Scott 
Papers A/D44/1-83) . 
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send f ram Russia in the summer of 1918. One well-documented example 
of this process has survived (see below pp. 312-315), but there is 
reason to believe that there were other occasions of which no trace 
remainsl09. 
Scott's leading articles during the period of the Brest Litovsk 
negotiations have already been noted (see above pp. 128-135) . At 
that time Price's reports were getting through almost intact and the 
leading articles are virtually interwoven with them. By the time of 
the Intervention none of the reports were getting through and Scott 
was dependent on his Lobby Correspondent's ability to read, memorise 
and summarise them. His leading articles of this period cannot be 
readily integrated into the text of this thesis, but are referred to 
again in Chapter 11 (pp. 394-397). How much Price contributed to the 
knowledge and insight which they display can only be inferred. 
109 As noted in FIN 108 above,, Dore was sometimes incapacitated, and 
it is therefore a possible indication of the importance which Scott 
attached to receiving his summaries of Price's despatches that, when 
necessary he used other people to take Dore's place. On 19 May 1932 
there appeared in the IIA)ndon Letter' of the Cork Examiner a short 
account of a lecture recently given by Price in London, on the 
subject of the Russian Revolution. The author of the column had 
Obviously been to hear it, and used his short account of the lecture 
as a peg on which to hang his own - entirely accurate - version of 
Price's conflicts with the Press Bureau. He went on to describe, at 
some length, an occasion when Scott had sent for him and asked him to 
go to the Press Bureau, read one of Price's cables or wireless 
messages, and give him an account of it. He had pleaded a poor 
Mmry but Scott had been adamant, and the writer recalled with 
Pleasure that he had been able to reconstruct a 400-word long account 
of a 500-word long cable. The London Editor of the Cork Examiner at 
that tire was liouis McQuillan, a former official of the old IrisF 
Parliamentary Party. His successor (frm 1951) was James Whelant who 
fregUently did extra work for the Manchester Guardian. It seems 
highly likely that in so doing be was carrying on an existing link 
between the two newspapers. I am indebted for this information to 
former members of the staff of the Cork Examiner, Walter McGrath and 
JaMes Whelan himself,, and also to Ge good offices of the Cork City 
Library. 
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Biographical Notes of the chief British political and military 
advisers on Russia, 1917-1918, and of the main critics of British 
nt 
HERBERT HENRy ASQUIM (1852-1928), First Earl Oxford and Asquith. 
A Gladstonian 1 iberal , Asqu ith was elected M. P. for East F if e in 
1886, remaining in the House of Commons until 1924, when he accepted 
a peerage. He was Home Secretary from 1892-1895y Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in the Campbell-Bannerman goverment frcm 1906-1908, and 
became Prime Minister in 1908, appointing Lloyd George Chancellor to 
succeed him as Chancellor. He remained Prime Minister for the next 
nine yearsf going to the country twice in 1910 over the related 
issues of the 1909 Budget and the ref orm. of the House of Lords. In 
1912 he attempted to introduce Home Rule, and it was because of the 
Curragh Mutiny that he was acting as Secretary for War in August 1914 
as well as Prime Minister. He remained in that position throughout 
the first Coalition Ministry but late in 1916 the Unionist members of 
the Cabinet transferred their support to Lloyd George. Throughout 
his political life he remained committed to Home Rule; he also 
refused to support a Liberal-Conservative coalition to keep Labour 
from forming a goverment in 1924. Though no radical, his attitude 
to Russia in debates in the House of Commons in 1917-1918 are in line 
with his generally progressive brand of liberalism. J. A. Spender 
wrote the account of his life for the Dictionary of National 
B; Roy Jenkins wrote his biography, Asquith, in 1964. 
Asquith himself published two books: Fifty Years of Parliament (2 
volumes, 1926) and The Genesis of the War (1923). 
ARWR JAMES BALFOUR O. M. (1848-1930),, First Earl of Balfour. 
First elected to Parliament in 1874, his first governmental post was 
as Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1887. In 1902 he succeeded his 
uncle, Lord Salisbury,, as Conservative Prime Minister but resigned 
the post in December 1905. Although opposed to the 1909 Budget he 
resigned from the Conservative Shadow Cabinet when his advice not to 
press opposition to a division was rejected. He was made First Lord 
of the Admiralty in the 1915 Coalition government after which he 
became Foreign Secretary. He was known to be privately unhappy with 
the final draft of the Versailles Treaty and resigned from the 
Foreign Office in October 1919, but remained in the Cabinet as Lord 
President of the Council, which post he again occupied in Baldwin's 
administration from 1925-1929. His own Chapters of Autobi2aEVh 
edited by E. C. Dugdale, were published in 1930, and Dugdale published 
a full life: Arthur James Balfour,, First Earl of Balfour in 1936. 
More recently a new biography by Max Egremont has appeared: Balfour: 
A LjLf e (o Lf Ar,. -thur james pýjfýýur (1980). 
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SIR GBORGE WILLIAM BUCHANAN Bart. (1854-1924). 
Buchanan entered the diplomatic service in 1876. A posting as Charge 
d'Affaires in Darmstadt ensured that he became personally acquainted 
with members of most European royal families who came there on 
holiday before 1914: a fact which influenced his attitude to royalty 
later in his career. As Ambassador to Russia from 1910-1918 he 
attained a position of great personal influence with the Tsar. 
Although realistic in the advice he sent to London from Petrograd 
early in 1917 he did not believe that the Bolsheviks could succeed in 
holding on to power. He was a strong advocate nonetheless, after his 
return to England in January 1918, of action designed to ensure that 
they lost it sooner rather than later. His last posting was to Rome 
in 1919; he retired in 1921. His book, My Mission to Russia and 
Other D lomatic Memories, was published in 1923 and if allowance is 
rode for his personal royalist bias, it also contains a valuable 
account of Russian politics during his period as Ambassador to 
Petrograd. 
STANLEY OWEN BUCKMASTER (1861-1934),, First Viscount Buckmaster. 
Buckmaster was called to the Bar in 1884. An ardent Liberal . he was first elected to Parliament in 1906. In 1913 he was appointed 
Solicitor General and, shortly after the outbreak of war, Director of 
the Press Bureau, a post he held only until, in the Coalition 
Ministry of May 1915,, he was offered the Lord Chancellorship. Before 
the end of the war he returned to the law and spent the rest of his 
life as a Lord of Appeal and a member of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council. 
EDWAM RALLET CARR (1892-1982) 
Unfit for military service, Carr entered the Contraband Department of 
the Foreign Office in 1917, where he was a junior member of the small 
team concerned with Russian affairs. Although he himself claimed to 
have become convinced at an early stage that the Bolsheviks would be 
able to retain power,, this claim is not always born out by his 
youthful Minutes in the Foreign office archives at the P. R. O. 
Nonetheless his interest in Russia developed rapidly. He remained in 
the Foreign Service until 1936, having learned Russian when he was 
POSted to Riga in 1925. He began to study nineteenth century Russian 
intellectuals and wrote biographies of Dostoevsky, Marx and Bakunin. 
In the early 1930s and until the Stalinist purges he became convinced 
that Soviet economic ideology was the answer to the decay of 
caPitalism. From 1936-1947 he was Woodrow Wilson Professor of 
International Politics at University College, Wales, and published 
Lr. ý. L_qri. ýjLis in 1936 which he himself described as ! ýt-Týývent L)Lea strongly influenced by Marxist thinking. In 1940 he became a leader 
writer for the Times and was Assistant Editor fram 1941-1946. He 
then concentrated his energies on the history of Soviet Russia which 
he had begun to write in the last winter of the war, and which 
appeared in 15 volumes in between 1950 and 1982,, latterly assisted by 
Tamra Deutscher. In 1955 he was elected a Fellow of Trinity College 
Cwbridge and in 1956 a Fellow of the British Academy, from the 
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ýL pr22t(ýqirx s of which this note is taken: (R. W. Davies: Proceedings 
of the British Academy Vol. 69 (1983) pp. 473-511). See E. H. Carr, 
The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923,3 volumes (1950-1953) ; The 
Int 24 (1954) Socialism in One Country, 1924--1926,4 
volumes (1958-1964); Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926-1929 
(Summary) (1979) ; The Twilight of the Comintern 1930-1935 (1982). 
The Right Hon. SIR GBORGE CAVE (1856-1928) r First Viscount Cave of 
Richmond 
A barrister by profession, Cave was first elected m. p. for the 
Kingston Division of Surrey as a Unionist in 1906 and held the seat 
until 1918. Prior to this he had also obtained valuable experience 
in local goverment as Vice Chairman of Surrey County Council in 
1893. He was appointed legal adviser to the Price of Wales in 1914 
and made Privy Councillor in 1915. He was Solicitor General from 
October 1915 to December 1916 and Home Secretary, with a seat in the 
Cabinet, fram 1916-1918. Elevated to the House of Lords in 1918 he 
was appointed Lord Chancellor in 1922, a post he held, except during 
the 1924 Labour government, until a few days before his death. He 
was also Chancellor of the University of Oxford from 1925-1928. 
EDGAR ALGER40N ROBERT GASCOYNE (1864-1954) Viscount Cecil of Chelwood 
Son of the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, Cecil was called to the Bar in 
1887 and entered Parliament for the first time in 1906. He was 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1915-1918, 
combuiWi9that post with that of Minister of Blockade from 1916-1918; 
in 191T he became also Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. It was widely recognised that he often did not see eye-to- 
eye with his cousin, the Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour. In 
strong contrast with the extraordinarily hard line which he was to 
take over Russia, he had begun as early as 1916 to circulate within 
the Cabinet memoranda on proposals for the avoidance of future wars. 
In the Baldwin government he was given a watching brief for the 
League of Nations,, f irst as Lord Privy Seal and then as Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster. In 1927 he resigned from the Government 
because of the Cabinet's refusal to endorse proposals for U. K. -U. S. 
naval parity, and never again held government off ice although he 
continued to hold influential posts concerned with the League of 
Nations under both Labour and Conservative governments. He organised 
the Peace Ballot in 1934 and in 1937 was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize. See Viscount Cecil of Chelwood: A Great Experiment (1941) 
and All The Way (1949). 
Sir GEORGE RUSSELL CLERK (1874-1951) 
Clerk entered the Foreign Service in 1898 and af ter service abroad 
was made head of the newly-created War Department of the Foreign 
Office in 1914. He was also Assistant Under Secretary to Lord 
Hardinge in the Ministry of Blockade and head of the Russia 
Department of the Foreign Office. In 1917 he acconpanied Lord Milner 
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to Russia. After the war he became the first British envoy to the 
newly created Republic of Czechoslovakia. In 1926 he was appointed 
Ambassador to Turkey,, in 1933 to Belgium and in 1934 to France. He 
retired in 1937. His cormnents on Minutes and Memoranda in the 
Foreign Office Archives at the P. R. O. are very much those of a career 
diplomat supporting an established policy line, and do not suggest 
that he had any very strong views of his own. 
Sir EDWAM WAS COOK (1857-1919) 
A strong Liberal from boyhood,, Cc*k was President of the Oxford Union 
in 1879 and entered the profession of journalism as a contributor to 
the Pall Mall Gazette, becoming a member of its staff in 1883 and 
editor in 1890. He resigned as editor in 1892 when the journal was 
sold to the future Viscount Astor,, and helped to found the 
Westminster Gazette. In 1895 he edited the Daily News and in 1901 
became a leader writer for the Daily Chronicle. Between 1903-1911 he 
edited a standard edition of the works of John Ruskin. In 1915 he 
was app ointed Joint Director (with Sir Frank Swettenham) of the 
Official Press Bureau and died only a month after the post came to an 
end in 1919. His bland account of the work of the Official Press 
Bureau (The Press in Wartime) is in striking contrast to the tenor of 
his earlier work. J. Saxon Mills published a biography in 1921 (Sir 
Edward Cook: A Biography) . 
JOHN DILLCN (1851-1927) 
Elected M. P. for Tipperary in 1879, Dillon took an active part in 
Irish Party politics after the Liberal pledge to introduce Home Rule 
in 1906. He made common cause with the anti-war Liberals, strongly 
attacking the British naval building programme and the foreign policy 
of Grey and Hardinge, which he denounced for making "England the ally 
of Russia and the enemy of Freedom in the West" (letter to C. P. 
Scott, 3.2.1911). He refused to consent to the goverment's 
partition proposals in 1916 and was briefly Chairman of the Irish 
Party in 1918. In the General Election of 1918 he was defeated by De 
Valera. He combined strong libertarian and anti-censorship views 
with an equally strong anti-Bolshevik stance, and was critical of 
those Irish politicians who looked to Russia for support. See F. S. L. 
LYonsj, John Dillon (1968). 
EMILE JOSEPH DILU)N (1854-1933) 
After studying linguistics under Renan,, Dillon obtained his doctorate 
in oriental languages but was fluent in many modern European 
languages as well. He began to contribute articles on Russian 
affairs to the Fortnightl Review while working as a tutor in Russia,, 
and lectured on conparative philology at the University of Kharkov 
before the Revolution. From 1887-1917 he was correspondent in Russia 
for the Daily Telegraph and he continued to write articles, smetirms 
under a pseudorrym,, for the Contenporary Review,, the Fortnightly 
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,, view and the National Review. His life Of TOlstoy was published in 
1934. 
Sir STEPHEN GASELEE (1882-1943) 
Except for the years 1916-1920, Gaselee's life was mainly devoted to 
scholarship and librarianship, but during those years his 
multifarious activities as a Liaison Officer in the Foreign Office 
involved him closely in the decision-making process where British 
policy in Russia was concerned. In 1920 he was made Librarian and 
Keeper of Papers at the Foreign Office: a position which he held 
until his death. 
Sir RONALD WILLIAM GRAHAM (1870-1949) 
A career diplomat from 1892, Graham's foreign postings included 
Teheran,, St. Petersburg and Fqypt before he returned to the Foreign 
Office in 1916 as Assistant Under Secretary. He continued in the 
service fram 1919 until his retirement in 1933, succeeding Sir George 
Buchanan as Ambassador in Rome as his final posting. 
J. D. GREGORY 
Un Held to be one of the pre-war "brilliant men" in the Foreign Office, 
Gregory's obituary in the Times does not state his date of birth. By 
1911 he was already a senior enough figure in the Consular Department 
to be in a position to befriend Lockhart when he entered that 
service. After postings in Poland, Rumania and the Mission to the 
Holy See during the war, Gregory became an Assistant Clerk in the 
Russian Section of the War Department of the Ministry of Blockade in 
1917. His book On the Edge of Diplomacy (1929) revealed his belief 
that the Bolshevik Revolution was "a master blow dealt by Germany at 
her foes". Gregory went on to argue that Britain was bound to 
support her non-Bolshevik "friends",, thus becoming "logically 
arrayed" against the Bolsheviks. 
OOMWDER HAROLD GRENFET-I (1870-1948) 
Harold Grenfell entered the Royal Navy in 1883 and served as Naval 
Attache to the British Embassy in Petrograd from 1912-1917. A fluent 
Russian speaker, his assessments of the situation in Russia were not 
welcome in Whitehall,, but Milner asked to see him in January 1917 and 
"seemed interested" in his views. Unfortunately nearly all 
Grenfell's personal papers were destroyed after his death, but a few 
surviving letters to his mother, together with his marginal comments 
in his own copies of Buchanan's My Mission to Russia and Lockhart's 
Memoirs make it clear where his sympathies as well as his in-teMligence lay. In the turbulent and dangerous state of the 
Russian Baltic Fleet in April 1917 he personally visited "8 or 9" of 
the ships and spoke to the men in Russian, pointing out that without 
order their new freedom could not be defended. In a tribute to 
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Grenfell published in the Times after his death Lord Strabolgi 
(formerly Cannander Kenworthy) wrote that it had been a well- 
concealed fact that, as the result of Grenfell's speeches the Baltic 
Fleet had gone out to sea again and engaged the German Navy in the 
Gulf of Riga in such a way as usefully to hold up the German advance 
eastwards in the summer of 1917. After this episode Kerensky, as 
Grenfell later discovered, personally asked for him to be allowed to 
remain in Russiar but he was recalled to London on the eve of the 
Bolshevik revolution. From December 1918 to June 1919 he was posted 
Head of the British Naval Mission to Finland, but resigned his 
position when Britain ordered a naval squadron to Helsingfors as a 
base for operations against the Soviet government. In the 1920s and 
1930s he was continuously active, as a civilian on the British Left 
and gained the respect of all who worked with him. In 1939 he 
rejoined the Navy to work in the Hydrographic Department, where he 
found that he was literally the oldest serving officer in the Royal 
Navy. Such of his papers and books as remain are in the possession 
of his son Vladimir. 
ARMJR HENDERSON (1863-1935) 
Henderson entered politics via trade union activity. He attended the 
meeting of socialists and trade unions which, in 1892, set up the 
Labour Representation Committee. He was elected as an ILP candidate 
for Barnard Castle in 1903 and became Secretary of the Labour Party 
in 1911. In August 1914 he replaced Ramsay MacDonald, who opposed 
Britain's entry into the war, as Leader of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party. After holding various minor goverment posts in the Coalition 
goverment he became a member of Lloyd George's first War Cabinet in 
December 1916 with the office of Minister without Portfolio. In the 
early summer of 1917 he was sent by Lloyd George on a fact-finding 
mission to the Provisional government in Russia with a secret 
understanding that if he thought it desirable or necessary he should 
replace Sir George Buchanan as Ambassador; but each man made a good 
impression on the other, and no changes were made in British 
representation until January 1918. He resigned from the Cabinet over 
the issue of British participation in the proposed Stockholm 
Conference in August 1917 (See Chp. 3 F/N 32) . In 1918 he guided the 
reform of the Labour Party's constitution and became successively 
Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary in the f irst Labour goverment 
in 1924, during which time Britain resumed diplomatic relations with 
Russia, He led the Labour Party in opposition to MacDonald in the 
1931 crisis, and presided over the World Disarmament Conference at 
Geneva. In 1934 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Mary Agnes 
Hamilton published his biography,, Arthur Henderson, in 1938. 
MAURICE PASCAL ALERS HANKEY (1877-1963) , First Baron Hankey. 
After serving in the Royal Marines frcm 1985-1902F Hankey transferred 
tO Naval Intelligence and in 1908 was appointed Assistant Secretary 
tO the Committee of Imperial Defence. In 1914 he was made Secretary 
Of the War Council and, when the War Cabinet Secretariat was 
established in 1916, became Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. He 
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retained this position, together with those of Secretary to the 
Comittee of Inperial Defence and Clerk to the Privy Council until 
his retirement in 1938. Before Hankey created the machinery of the 
Cabinet Secretariaty the only official record of Cabinet meetings had 
been the Prime Minister's letters to the Sovereign. There is no 
biography of Hankey; his entry in the Dictionary of National 
Bi2qLý2ha was written by George Mallabj. 
CHARLES RARDINGE (1858-1944) , Baron Hardinge of Penshurst. 
Hardinge joined the Foreign Service in 1880 and served in several 
European capitals before first going to St. Petersburg as Secretary 
of the Embassy in 1898. He returned there as Ambassador in 1904. In 
1906,, after a brief period of service as Permanent Under Secretary at 
the Foreign Office he was appointed Viceroy of India, remaining in 
that post until 1916, when he returned to his previous position in 
the Foreign Office. He remained in Whitehall until 1920, when he 
took up his last foreign posting as Ambassador to Paris before 
retiring in 1922. His book,, Old Diplomacy, was published 
posthumously in 1947. 
Admiral JOHN RJSHWO= JELLICOE (1859-1935) , First Earl Jellicoe. 
As Third Sea Lord in 1908 Jellicoe was responsible for the pre-war 
British naval construction programme. On 4 August 1914 he was 
appointed CoTmriander in Chief,, the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow,, from 
where the blockade of Germany was mounted. The German fleet made no 
move until May 1916 when it attempted to attack a detached British 
naval force scouting near the Skagerrack. The outcome of the 
resulting naval battle of Jutland, was allowed to appear inconclusive 
largely as the result of inferior public relations by the Admiralty 
and Jellicoe, who refused absolutely to speak on his own behalf, was 
pilloried by the press and criticised by the politicians. Although 
subsequently responsible for setting up the convoy system to 
counteract the U-Boat war, Lloyd George readily succumbed to pressure 
from the Northcliffe Press to have him dismissed in December 1917. 
These and other details of his life and career are given by Sir 
Regional Bacon: The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe (1936). 
THOM JONES (1870-1955) 
Born in a mining village, Jones joined the ILP and the Fabian Society 
in 1895. His work as first Secretary of the National Health 
COMMission (Wales) brought him to the notice of Lloyd George, who 
made him Assistant Secretary (1916) and then Deputy Secretary of the 
Cabinet, which office he held until 1938,, when he retired in the same 
Year as his chief, Lord Hankey. Jones was active in a wide range of 
VOluntary organisations. set up for the relief of distress during the 
Depression of the 1930s; among his later official posts were those of 
the first Deputy Chairman of the Arts Council of Great Britain and 
President of the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, from 1945- 
1954. His biography, Lloyd George,, was published in 1951. His 
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political diaries f rom 1916-1930 were edited by Keith middlemas and 
published in two volurres as Whitehall Diary (1969). 
PHILIP HENRY KERR (1882-1940) , Lord Lothian. 
Philip Kerr was the youngest member of Milner's kindergarten, and as 
private secretary to Lloyd George f ram 1916-1921 was also a member of 
the group known as the "garden suburb" , the Prime Minister's private 
secretariat housed in the garden of 10 Downing Street. Kerr 
succeeded to the title in 1930, and represented the Liberal party in 
the National Government of 1931 as Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and then as Under Secretary of State for India. Fran 1939- 
1940 he served as British Ambassador to Washington. 
JOSEPH KIM (1860-1943) 
King left instructions in his Will for all his private papers to be 
destroyed, and as a result it has proved impossible to find out very 
much about the facts of his life. Educated at Uppingham. and Trinity 
College Oxford, he went on to study at Giessen and Berlin University, 
and clearly retained an interest in Germany, since his writings 
include a book: The German Revolution: Its Meaning and Menace 
(1933). After unsuccessfully contesting various seats in the 
elections of 1892,1904 and 1906 he was finally elected Liberal MP 
for North Somerset in January 1910. He held the seat until 1918, 
when he joined the ILP, but never succeeded in re-entering 
Parliament. King was the main spokesman in Parliament for the 
Russian Political Prisoners and Exiles Relief Committee set up by 
Tchicherin in London in the summer of 1915, ostensibly to collect 
money for relief but in fact an anti-Tsarist agitational body. This 
was almost certainly one of his main sources of information about 
current events in Russia; another was the UDC, of which he early 
became a member. He wrote a number of pamphlets in 1919 and 1920 for 
the UDC and the ILP including The Russian Revolution,, Bolshevism and 
Bolsheviks, Russian and her Allies, Soviets in Russia and Elsewhere, 
and Why does the Killing Go On in Russia?. His courage and 
persistence in questioning the spokesmen of the Coalition government 
in the House of Commons on the related questions of British policy in 
Russia, and censorship, were truly remarkable, and if a monument to 
himis to be found, it is in the columns of Hansard. 
Sir REGINALD LEEPER (1888-1968) 
Born in Australia, Leeper completed his education at New College 
Oxford and in 1916 joined the Intelligence Division of the Department 
Of Information of the Foreign Office. In 1917 he moved to the newly- 
created Political Intelligence Department. He learned Russian from 
Litvinov and in 1917-1918 was undoubtedly one of the best-informed of 
the younger advisers on Russian af f airs in the Foreign Of f ice - He joined the permanent Foreign Service in 1920 and af ter various 
Postings abroad became head of the Foreign Office News Department in 
1933. In 1939 he was put in charge of a revived Political 
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Intelligence Department where he developed the Political Warfare 
Executiver a group which specialised in propaganda warfare. It is 
tempting to speculate that he may have learned something about the 
efficacy Of this weapon from the Bolshevik propaganda which he 
studied as part of his duties in 1918. In 1943 he was appointed 
Ambassador to Greece, in which capacity he became involved in another 
British intervention seeking -more successfully than in Russia - to 
prevent the establishment of a Cormrunist government. His last 
Ambassadorial post before his retirement in 1949 was to the 
Argentine. 
RASTINGS BEFMRD LEES SMITH (1878-1941) 
Educated for the army, Lees Smith changed direction and went to 
Queens College Oxford. He was later to become one of the founders 
and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Ruskin College. Elected 
Liberal MP for Northampton in January 1910, he enlisted as a 
Corporal in the RAMC in 1915. He joined the Labour Party in 1919 and 
became MP for the Keighley Division, Yorkshire from 1922-1931 and 
again frcm 1935 until his death. He was Postmaster General in the 
1929 Labour government, and President of the Board of Education after 
Trevelyan's resignation in 1931. He was also Actirxg Chairman of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party from 1931 until his death. 
Sir FRANCIS OSWALD LINDLEY Bart. (1872-1950) 
Lindley entered the diplomatic service in 1896 and after various 
postings in Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East became Counsellor 
at the British Embassy at Petrograd in 1915. On Buchanan's return to 
Britain in January 1918 and before Lockhart's arrival he was in 
charge of British interests in Russia,, and a somewhat uneasy dyarchy 
subsequently existed between Lindley and Lockhart.. a situation which 
was not improved when Lindley was appointed in June 1918 as HM 
Commissioner to take general charge of British interests in Russia. 
His instructions were to supervise Lockhart's work but to allow him 
to retain the measure of initiative originally entrusted to him (FO 
371.3299). Lindley's reports from Russia reveal his total hostility 
to the Bolshevik goverment. Between the breaking off of diplomatic 
relations between Britain and Russia in 1918 and his retirement in 
1934, Lindley continued to serve mainly overseas, his last two 
Postings (Portugal and Japan) being as Ambassador. 
Sir ROBERT HAMILTM BRUCE LOCKRAW (1887-1970) 
Lockhart entered the diplomatic via the consular servicer and was 
sent to Moscow in January 1912j, where he was Acting Consul General 
until his appointment as special British Agent in Petrograd in 
January 1918. In his Memoirs he expressed the belief that his 
aPPOintment over the ýeads of the career diplcmats had made enemies 
for him in Whitehall. The book gives an engaging account of his 
experiences in Russia in 1918; and taken in conjunctions with such of 
his memoranda as survive in the Foreign Office archives at the PRO 
there can be no doubt of the sincerity of his efforts,, for several 
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monthst to improve relations between Whitehall and Petrograd/Moscow 
and to avert a war of intervention. The reasons that made him change 
his mind are still the subject of speculation. He left the foreign 
service in 1922 and took up a career in banking and journalism, but 
was recalled to become Deputy Under-Secretary and Director General of 
the political Warfare Executive of the Political Intelligence 
Department of the Foreign Off ice (under Leeper) in 1941. Vol. I of 
his Diaries, 'edited by Kenneth Young (1973) deals with the period 
1915-18 but adds little to the material or the interest contained in 
his Memoirs. 
ARTHUR LYNCH (1861-1934) 
Born in Australia, Lynch was educated at Melbourne and Berlin 
Universities and went on to qualify as a doctor in Paris and London. 
In the Boer War he fought against the British, becaming Colonel of 
the 2nd Irish Brigade on the Boer side, for which he was convicted 
for Hig 
'h 
Treason and condemned to death in 1903. During this time he 
was elected M. P. in Galway City, but naturally did not take his seat. 
He was awarded af ree pardon in 1907 and elected M. P. for West Clare 
in 1909-1918. He became a Colonel in the British Army in 1918 and 
did not stand for Parliament again. Lynch was the author of books 
on an extraordinary variety of subjects, including poetry, geometry 
and psychology. 
JAMES RAMSAY MACDONALD (1866-1937) 
MacDonald's political education began in Bristol, where he went in 
1883 to work at a Young Men's Guild, and encountered and joined a 
branch of the SDF and (in 1886) the Fabian Society. In 1888 he also 
became Secretary to Thomas Lough, a Gladstonian Liberal parliamentary 
candidate, and through him came into contact with middle-class 
progressive Liberals. In 1894 he joined the newlyý-formed ILP. From 
1900-1912 he was Secretary of the Labour Representation Committee, 
and from 1901-1904 represented Central Finsbury on the London County 
Council. In 1906 he was elected Labour M. P. for Leicester. He was 
Chairman of the ILP from 1906-1909 and Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Labour Group from 1911, but resigned that position on 3 August 1914 
Out of protest against Britain's entry in the war. He was closely 
involved in the foundation of the UDC and also a spokesman for the 
NCCL- During this period he managed to gain and retain the respect 
Of both wings of the Labour Party for the courage with which he 
maintained his unorthodox views on war, since he was not a pacifist. 
In the summer of 1917 the Seamen's Union refused to man a ship that 
would have taken him to Russia on a mission to the Provisional 
government. After Henderson's resignation of office in August 1917 
there was a further closing of ranks within the Labour Party in 
OPPOsition to the war. MacDonald lost his seat in 1918 but was re- 
elected in 1922; as Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party he now 
became the official leader of the Opposition and Prime Minister 
designate. 
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Maude went to Russia 
for 23 years, during 
did not subscribe to 
his life translating 
Intervention forces 
as an English tutor in 1874 and remained there 
which time he got to know Tolstoy. Although he 
most of Tolstoy's ideas, he spent the rest of 
his works. In 1918 he went to Russia with the 
as a YMCA lecturer. 
ALFRED, VISC(XJNT MILNER (1854-1925) 
Milner made his reputation as an administrator in Egypt and returned 
to chair the Board of Inland Revenue from 1892-1897, after which he 
was sent to South Africa as High Canmissioner. After the outbreak of 
the Boer War he was appointed Administrator of the Orange River 
Colony and the Transvaal. He made known his disapproval of the worst 
aspects of British military rule in South Africa, and between 1902- 
1905 worked for the restoration of the South African economy. While 
on leave in London in May 1901 he began to recruit young men for his 
kindergarten. After leaving South Africa Milner became steadily more 
influential in public affairs. In 1916 he was included in the War 
Cabinet,, where his responsibilities included the leadership of the 
British Mission to Russia in January 1917 (see Appendix V) . and the 
negotiations which led to the creation of the Supreme War Council. 
In March 1918 he was made Secretary of State for War, and after the 
December 1918 election, Secretary of State for the Colonies, a post 
which he held until he retired from public life in 1921. Most of 
what has been written about him deals with his period in South 
Africa, but Lloyd George's dependence on him in the latter years of 
the war is made clear in the War Memoirs. The Milner papers at the 
Bodleian contain a number of telegrams between Whitehall and 
Petrograd/Moscow in 1917/1918 which are not preserved in the Foreign 
Office archives for the period, but do not otherwise throw any new 
light on Milner Is view of Russia at that time. Milner Is role in the 
Great War is described by Christopher Addison in Four and a Half 
Years (1914-1919) (1934). 
E. D. MDREL (1873-1924) 
Morel's reputation as organiser of the Congo Reform Association, 
which had inaugurated the campaign to get the Congo removed from the 
misrule of the King of the Belgians, made him an obvious choice for 
the founders of the UDC when they were looking for someone to create 
an effective organisation and publicity campaign. He was highly 
successful in both respects, and there can be no question that the 
imPact made by the UDC on liberal opinion during the Great War owed 
much to him. He was imprisoned for a purely technical offence under 
the Defence of the Realm Act (another tribute to his success as a 
Publicist and his unpopularity with the authorities), and his health 
was undermined by this experience. In 1918 Morel joined the ILP and 
was elected M. P. for Dundee,, holding the seat in 1922,1923 and 1924. 
During this time he campaigned against the Versailles Treaty and in 
favour of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia. He 
wrote for Labour Leader, the Daily Herald, Forward and Foreign 
Affairs. See also F. Seymour Cocks: E. D. Morel, The Man and His 
Work (1920) and Chp. 8 of Catherine Cline's Strategies of Protest 
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(1980). Morel's personality as well as his work are also well 
described by Marvin Swartz in The Union of Democratic Control in 
British Politics During the First World War (1971). 
RMERT LEONARD OUTHWAITE (1868-1930) M-W 
Another Australian-born nember of the House of Commons during the 
First World War, Outhwaite was a journalist before becaming a 
politician. He sat as Liberal M. P. for Henley from July 1912-1918. 
His name appears as a member of the UDC in the Minute Book of the 2nd 
meeting of the UDC General Council in 1915. Little else is known 
about him except that he was interested in Land Reform movements, but 
it is obvious from Hansard that he was also one of those most 
concerned by censorship in Britain. 
SI R BERNARD PARES 
See Chapter 2, FIN 21. 
Amm AUGUST WILLIAM HARRY PONSDNBY (1871-1946),, First Baron 
Shulbrede. 
The third son of Queen Victoria's Private Secretary Sir Henry 
Frederic Ponsonby, Arthur Ponsonby entered the Diplomatic Service in 
1894 but resigned in 1902 in order to begin a life of political 
activity, initially as a Liberal. By 1907 he was in all but name a 
socialist, and in 1914 was one of the first to join the Union of 
Democratic Control. He spoke frequently on foreign policy in the 
House of Conmons, and because he undeniably spoke from direct 
experience he was listened to with less disrespect than was the fate 
of many of his UDC colleagues. In 1918 he joined the ILP and the 
Labour Party. In the first Labour goverment he was made Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and in 1929 Under Secretary of 
State for Daminion Affairs and then Parliamentary Secretary at the 
Ministry of Transport. He was elevated to the peerage in 1930 to 
become Leader of the Labour Party in the House of Lords from 1931- 
1935. Though remaining a socialist he was first of all a pacifist, 
and he resigned from the Labour Party when it joined the Coalition 
goverment in 1940. Although there is no biography of Ponsonby his 
Outspokenness in the First World War is well documented in most 
accounts of the radical movement in those years,, notably by Marvin 
Swartz in his Union of Democratic Control. The Ponsonby Papers are at 
the Bodleian Library. 
MAZOR GENERAL SIR FREDERICK POOLE (1869-1936) 
Poole first saw active service on the North West Frontier in 1897 and 
served as an artillery officer in the Boer War and in both East and 
West Africa before retiring in 1914 in protest against the slow 
Prowtion practices of the Royal Garrison Artillery. He was recalled 
in AUgust of that year,, promoted to Brigadier General in 1916 and 
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sent to Russia as a member of the Milner Mission in 1917. He 
remained in Russia in charge of British supplies, and in May 1918 was 
sent to command the British reinforcements which then arrived in 
Murmansk. In August 1918 he was put in charge of the Allied 
intervention forces at Archangel, but being no diplomat he caused 
widespread offence among the very people whose support the Allies 
were hoping to enlist,, and he was superceded in October 1918 by 
General Ironside. He briefly reappeared in the Caucasus as British 
envoy to the anti-Bolsheviks in South West Russia,, but returned to 
Britain in February in 1919 and was not employed again. He retired 
for the second time in 1920, and between then and his death in 1936 
stood three times unsuccessfully for Parliament as a Unionist. 
WILLIAM MATHER R(JTHER. MRD PRINGLE (1874-1928) 
Very little is known about Pringle except what can be deduced from 
his speeches in Parliament. He attended Glasgow University, was 
called to the Bar,, stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate for 
Camlachie in 1906 and was elected for North West Lanark in January 
1910. He appears to have lost his seat in 1918 but was back in the 
House of Coumns as M. P. for the Penistone Division of Yorkshire from 
1922-1924. Although not, apparently a member of the UDC, his name 
was often to be found in the division lists as having voted with the 
UDC members on libertarian and foreign policy issues. 
ARTHUR JAMES SHERWELL (1863-1942) 
Even less is known about Sherwell,, except that he was educated at 
Handsworth College,, Birmingham,, and was elected Liberal M. P. for 
Huddersfield in 1906,, retaining the seat until 1918. A much- 
travelled man, he wrote widely on temperance, economic and social 
questions and sat on a number of goverment committees and 
comissions. However like Pringle he made an important contribution 
to the work of that small group of M. P. s who constantly questioned 
the government over its attitude to Russia and on censorship issues. 
PROFESSOR J. Y. SIMPSON (1873-1934) 
Author of numerous books and articles of a scientific and religious 
nature, Simpson also travelled extensively in both European and 
Asiatic Russia and the Baltic states. His publications Sidelights on 
Siberia (1898) and The Self Discovery of Russia (1916) were 
considered to qualify him as a Russian expert in the Political 
Intelligence Departmient of the Foreign Off ice frcm 1917-1919. 
Information about him is scarce, and there is no indication in his 
Obituary notice in the Times (22 May 1934) as to where and in what 
subject he was a Professor. 
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F. E. SMITH (1872-1930),, First Earl Birkenhead 
After obtaining a scholarship to Wadham College Oxford in 1891, Smith 
was elected Fellow of Merton in 1896 and taught law at Oxford from 
1897-1900. At the same time he began to practice in Liverpool. In 
january 1906 he was elected Conservative M. P. for the Walton Division 
of Liverpool. A flamboyant character he was at the same time deeply 
conservative. Yet while opposing the 1909 Budget in the Conwns he 
urged the Lords to let it through on tactical grounds. Under Bonar 
Law he was promoted to the Front Bench and in 1912 he "galloped f or 
Carson" on Home Rule. His first official post was as Director of the 
Press Bureau in August 1914. In 1915 he became Solicitor General and 
then Attorney General. From then on he had a seat in the Cabinet. 
In the General Election of 1918 Smith was returned for the West Derby 
Division of Liverpool but was almost inuediately offered the 
woolsack, and created Baron Birkenhead in January 1919. He proceeded 
- perhaps surprisingly - to play a constructive part in the 
negotiations for the creation of the Republic of Southern Ireland. 
In the Baldwin government he was Secretary of State for India, and 
died not long after its defeat. 
JAN CHRISTIAN SKJTS (1870-1950) 
Smuts' role in the South Af rican War is well documented. He went on 
to participate in the British invasion of the German colonies in 
East Africa in 1915, was made a Lieutenant General in the British 
Army, and in 1917 came to London to represent South African interests 
in the Imperial War Cabinet. This led to his appointment as Minister 
without Portfolio in the War Cabinet and his involvement in policy- 
making on Russia. In the inter-war years he continued to be 
perceived as an international statesman as well as a South African 
politician, and exercised considerable influence over Churchill in 
favour of policies designed to contain Russia. See also J. C. Smuts: 
Jan Christian Smuts (1952) ; Frank Owen: Tempestuous Journey (1954); 
Sir Keith Hancock: The Smuts Papers (1955) ; John Ehrman: Grand 
Strategy (Volume 5) (1956). 
PHILIP SNOWDEN (1864-1937) , First Viscount Snowden. 
A weaver's son, Snowden studied socialism while recovering from a 
cycling accident which lamed him for life. He joined the ILP, 
becoming its Chairman in 1903,,,, and in 1906 was elected M. P. for 
Blackburn. His interest in the temperance movement took him on a 
world tour in 1914 and he was out of the country when war was 
declared. He strongly opposed the war and on his return worked 
tirelessly for conscientious objectors. He was certainlyr by 1915F 
also a member of the UDC. Having made a study of f inance he was an 
Obvious choice as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the f irst Labour 
government and again in 1929. In 1931 he stayed with MacDonald and 
was made Lord Privy Seal in the National goverment. His 
Autobiography was published in 1934. 
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Sir FFMK ATHELSTANE SWETI9ENHAM (1850-1946) 
After playing a prcminent part in the creation of the Malay States, 
Swettenham, was appointed Resident General of the States in 1895 and 
in 1901 High Commissioner and Governor of the Straits Settlements. 
He retired in 1904, but in 1914 was brought out of retirement by F. E. 
Smith to become his Assistant Director at the Press Bureau. In 1915 
he was made Joint Director, together with Sir Edward Cook. 
ARNOLD JOSEPH TCYNBEE (1889-1975) 
Toynbee's early travels in Greece and Italy undermined his health and 
We him unfit for military service in the First World War. He was 
an obvious choice of assistant for Lord Bryce when he made his 
investigation into the Armenian atrocities of 1915 which resulted in 
the Papers Presented by Lord Bryce to Lord Grey of Falloden on that 
subject. This work led to Toynbee becoming involved in the 
production of propaganda issued by the News Department of the Foreign 
office, including some work of which he later said he was ashamed, 
e. g. a pamphlet entitled The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks. He 
subsequently joined the Political Intelligence Department of the 
Foreign Office and was the author of several important and remarkably 
inpartial briefing papers on the Caucasus and Asiatic Russia. 
Toynbee is, of course, renowned for his twelve volume Study of 
History (1934-1961). From 1925-1955 he was Director of Studies at 
Chatham House and Professor of International History at the 
University of London. An account of his life by W. H. McNeill is to 
be found in the Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 63 (1977) 
pp. 442-469. 
OLIWR WARDROP (1864-1948) 
A commissioned of f icer in the 19th Middlesex Royal Volunteer Corps, 
Wardrop became an Army Interpreter in the Russian language but 
subsequently joined the Consular Service, with postings in Kertch, 
Sevastopol and St. Petersburg. He retired in 1910 but was recalled 
in 1914, becoming Consul General f irst in Bergen and then (1917) in 
Moscow. His reports to the Foreign Office after both revolutions 
were extensive, wordy, but well-informed, and he showed considerable 
grasp of the realities of the situation. He became Chief British 
Canissioner, Transcaucasus, from 1919-1920 and British Delegate on 
the Inter-Allied and International Commission for the Relief of 
Russia in 1921. 
JOSIAH CLEmENT wEDGEWOOD (1872-1943) , First Baron Wedgew00d 
An early recruit to the Milner kindergarten, WedgewOod was Resident 
Magistrate in the Transvaal from 1902-1904, but chose a political 
life and entered Parliament as a Liberal in 1906, remaining in the 
Sam seat (Newcastle under Lyme) until 1942,, when he was elevated to 
the Peerage. Before the First World War he was associated with a 
nuMber of libertarian causes, notably anything concerning the 
freedom of the press. In 1914 he volunteered and fought in Belgiumi 
at Gallipoli and in East Africa. In 1916 he was appointed to the 
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1 Commission on the Mesopotamian canpaign. In 1918 he was sent loo a 
to Russia by the War Office to make contact with any rem-iants he 
could find in Siberia of the Provisional government. On his advising 
the War Office to try to retrieve their stores there rather than 
supply them to counter -revo lu tiona r ies,, he was recalled. Although 
not a member of the UDC his speeches criticising the goverrment's 
foreign policy (on the rare occasions that he was in London) were 
listened to with the respect normally accorded to a serving officer, 
despite their tenor. In 1919 he joined the ILP and the Labour Party, 
but always retained considerable independence of mind. His chief 
interests in public life were the taxation of land values, India, and 
the creation of a Jewish Homeland. See his own Memoirs of 
_a 
Fighting 
Life (1940) and the biography of him by his cousin C. V. Wedgewood: 
The Last of the Radicals (1951). 
W. LLEKELYN WILLIAMS (1867-1922) 
W. L. Williams was elected Liberal M. P. for the Carmarthen District 
from 1906-1918. From 1912-1915 he was Recorder of Swansea and in 
1915 was made Recorder of Cardiff. He was the author of many books 
and essays on Wales and editor of Froude's History of England in the 
Everyman Series. 
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chapter 8. Price Versus the Censor 
In May and June 1918 Pr ice sent 23 cables to the Manchester Guardian 
and kept copies of the originals of all but three of these. With the 
exception of those three, it is possible to identify precisely the 
passages ic were censored. It is not difficult to deduce which 
cuts were likely to have been purely editorial. Broadly speaking, 
the Press Bureau cut or suppressed everything with a bearing on the 
possibility of Allied intervention or which accused the Allies of 
camplicity in the civil war in Russia, although references to the 
fact that there was a civil war were passed. Any suggestion that the 
Allies had missed opportunities for positive as opposed to negative 
action in Russia was also invariably cut. Straight reporting on 
political developnents within Russia or on Russian foreign policy 
were still, during these months on the whole allowed. 
Before showing in detail how Price's cables were affected it will be 
necessary to describe how the policy evolved of which censorship was 
at first a reflection and then an integral part. 
In the aftermath of Brest Litovsk the Foreign off ice,, the Quai 
d and the Supreme War Council at Versailles spent a great deal 
of time and energy in seeking to devise what amounted to the best way 
of punishing the Bolsheviks under the pretext of keeping open a 
second front against the Germans. Inevitably the choice of options 
was dominated by geography. There were three areas in which pressure 
Might be applied: in the Far East, in the South East and in the 
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North West. In the South East covert support for the counter- 
revolutionary forces of Kaledin and Alexeiv, combined with 
recognition of the Ukrainian Rada, had already laid down the lines 
and limitations of Allied intervention in the spring and early summer 
of 1918. In the Far East the Japanese seemed willing enough to do 
what the French and British wanted them to do (though for their own 
reasons) , but the Arnericans continued unwilling for several more 
months to be seen to use the Japanese as catspaws. In the North West 
events played into the hands of the Allies, as will be shown. 
At Versailles the Military Representatives of the Allies at the 
Supreme War Council continued to generate ideas for intervention. At 
their meeting on 15/16 March the Supreme War Council had asked them 
to address themselves to the possibility of landing forces at 
Archangel. A draft note of their deliberations on 29 March suggests 
that they f ailed to do so, having other ideas. 
"Any resistance to the German conquest or absorption of 
Russia or of any part of the Russian Empire must ... be 
preceded by the suppression of the purely destructive 
activities of the Bolsheviks, a task which the more 
patriotic and stable elements of the Russian population 
can only take on with assistance from outside. " 
Sinoe this did not actually answer the question they had been asked 
to deal with, the draft was obviously reconsidered but the final Note 
- Joint Note 20 - still only called in general terms for "an 
immediate Allied intervention" and the American representative 
refused to sign itl. This Note was considered at a meeting of the 
SuPreme War Council on 1-2 May at Abbeville together with Joint Note 
25j dated 27 April, which dealt primarily with the future disposition 
Of Czech troops in Russia. It was at this meeting of the Council 
1 CAB 25.121. 
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that a resolution was agreed emphasising the necessity for an early 
transfer of Czech troops in Russia to the Western Front, the British 
undertaking to do their best to get as many of them as possible to 
Vladivostock and to approach Trotsky about getting permission for 
those not already en route to Vladivostock to be allowed to 
concentrate at Archangel and Murmansk2. 
While the Supreme War Council was coming straight to the point, the 
British Foreign Office was still uncertain what to do for the best. 
An instruction went to Lockhart on 4 April which said: 
"We favour the policy of Japanese intervention as being 
the best if not the only means of saving Russia from 
enemy domination and of preserving the rights and 
liberty of the Russian people, but there is still 
uncertainty as to the moment at which this policy will 
mature. In the meantime you should use every effort to 
obtain an undertaking from Lenin and Trotsky to accept 
and co-operate with Allied assistance ... The Bolsheviks 
should carry on every sort of operation, regular and 
irregular, against the Germans until the latter are 
forced to declare war upon them. n3 
(Balfour used the word "shall" instead of "should" in an earlier 
draft of this cable. ) Lockhart continued to demur and to canvas 
energetically against the Japanese option, but by the middle of May 
he had begun to change his mind,, at least about the necessity for 
obtaining prior consent for it f rom the Bolsheviks. In a cable to 
London sent on 13 May he said: 
"I frankly admit that situation so changed that 
Bolshevik consent is no longer as inportant as 
before. " 
On which Cecil minuted: 
"Mr. Lockhart has now reached the conclusion at which 
some of us arrived three or four months ago. n4 
2 CAB 25.121. SWC 151/1. 
3 FO 371.3290. 
4 FO 371.3285. 
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Lockhart's change of mind, which was never adequately explained 
either from a reading of the telegrams or from his Memoirs, may have 
been partly caused by the conparative ease with which the British had 
been able, on 9 May, to land reinforcements of troops to the small 
garrison already stationed at Murmansk to protect the stores there. 
This had been made possible without much more than a formal protest 
by the Bolsheviks because of a panic which had seized them at the 
height of the last phase of the negotiations at Brest Litovsk, when 
German interference with communications between the Russian 
delegation and Petrograd had made it appear that the negotiations had 
broken'down5. At that time the Murmansk Soviet was instructed by 
5 The port of Archangel, closed down by ice for more than half the 
year, was until late in 1916 the only port available to Russia. In 
September 1915 work began under British direction and with British 
assistance, on the construction of an ice-free port at Murmansk on 
the Kola Inlet and of a single-track railway connecting it with 
Petrograd. The protection of Russia's northern sea lanes had from 
the start been assumed by the British Navy. There were considerable 
stores (ordered by the Tsarist goverment) at Archangel, as well as 
British naval personnel. After the November revolution the Admiral 
in Charge, Kemp, ordered all British naval and comercial personnel 
hitherto stationed at Archangel to move to Murmansk. The already 
considerable importance of Murmansk to the British was thus enhanced, 
and the more so when the German advance into Russia continued 
throughout and after the last stages of the negotiations at Brest 
Litovsk. Although the Admiralty had defined British interests at 
Murmansk to consist in the preservation of the (unpaid-for) stores at 
Archangel, the safety of Russian warships in harbour at Murmansk, and 
the repatriation of Allied refugeeso, Kemp decided on his own 
initiative to land, on 6 March 1918, a company of marines from the 
battleship "Glory" (the only British battleship then in those 
waters). This action took place not because of but coincidentally 
with a request from the Murman Soviet to Petrograd for instructions 
as to what to do in the event of, a German attack at a time when 
Petrograd itself was feared to be in great and imminent danger. This 
in turn was due to the fact that two telegrams sent by the Bolshevik 
delegation at Brest Litovsk were forwarded by the Germans in the 
reverse order,, which resulted in giving the Soviet goverment the 
impression that the talks had broken down. Trotsky had thereupon 
telegraphed the Murman Soviet (on 1 March) to "accept any and all 
assistance from the Allied missions". It is not clear and will 
probably never be exactly known whether the Murmansk Soviet actually 
did appeal to Kemp to land troops, but the landing of the marines 
five days later unquestionably took place with its consent. See 
Ullman Anglo-Soviet Relations Vol. I pp. 109-119; Debo, Revolution 
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Petrograd to accept any help that was offered, as a German invasion 
of the area was considered imminent. An agreement to co-operate was 
reached between the Murmansk Soviet and the Commander of the local 
British forces. British troops were even involved in skirmishes with 
Finnish White Guards, who fought with the Germans when they invaded 
Finland in April. Early in May the British War Cabinet ordered the 
despatch to North Russia of additional troops for the defence of 
murmansk against further attacks from the Germans and the Finnish 
White Guards. Two weeks after their arrival General Poole arrived 
with the title of British Military Representative in Russia, and the 
cable which informed Lockhart of this fact also told him that 
Lindley, previously Commissioner (and temporarily on leave in London) 
was to return to Russia to take charge of all British interests in 
Russia. Lockhart cabled his "considerable astonishment" at this 
development, and with Cecil Is approval Hardinge concocted a telegram 
designed to "soothe him down" and "promote a calmer atmosphere', 6. 
It appeared,, nonetheless, that the decision had been taken in favour 
of intervention in the North West of Russia. 
There now entered into the situation an unexpected factor which had 
not apparently been under active political consideration, although 
the Supreme War Council had been fully aware of its military 
Potential. This was the existence on Russia soil of the Czech 
Legion: the equivalent of a full army corps on the Western front, 
made up of prisoners of war and deserters from the Austro-Hungarian 
arMy. At that time they had only one objective: to secure a 
national homeland out of the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and Survival pp. 153-155. -I-F'-O-" iii. j3 13. 
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when the war was over. On 26 March the Bolsheviks had agreed that 
the Czechs should be allowed to leave Russia with the object of 
getting to the Western front, where the French were only too eager to 
deploy them. Those stationed west of Omsk were to proceed via 
Archangel and the remainder via Vladivostock. Some of the latter 
imediately began to move eastwards,, and the first contingent of 
Czech troops arrived in Vladivostock on 6 April. During May the 
government in Moscow began to receive uneasy signals from some of the 
Siberian Soviets about the presence in their territories of so many 
Czech troops. Orders were sent f rom Moscow to halt and re-route, to 
Archangel all Czechs still on the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Czechs 
imediately sent representatives to Moscow to discuss the order; they 
also arranged a meeting among themselves at Cheliabinsk. Here, on 14 
May, an incident took place which may or may not have been provoked. 
What is certain is that a Hungarian prisoner-of-war in a west-bound 
train also halted at Cheliabinsk threw a brick into one of the Czech 
trains, killing one of the Czechs, and that the resulting f racas 
completely changed the timing and strategy of Allied intervention. 
It is only against this background that the significance of what 
Price was trying to send to his paper can be judged- In what follows 
everything printed with underlining is taken from passages deleted by 
the censor f rom despatches which were otherwise passed for 
Publication. 
The f irst of the cables of which Price kept a copyr that shows clear 
evidence of censorship, was one he sent from Petrograd on 20 February 
1918 which was printed on 23 February. There are a number of minor 
changes and cuts as between the cabled and printed versions which 
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suggest the hand of the sub-editor rather than the censor, but the 
omission of the last sentence of the cable was Obviously a censorship 
cut. Coming af ter a sentence about the treachery of the Rada in 
signing a separate peace with Germany - which was passed - Price 
interAed to go on: 
"It is interesti remember that ever since October 
revo. iution Fuiles nave t)een supportinq Ukrainian Rada 
which has now behaved so tr 
recently intercepted by Soviet b 
and French General at Kiev publi 
ously stop Letter 
tween General Alexeiv 
last week 
General Alexeiv relying su rt allied military 
representatives with Rada stop Now latter betrayed both 
Allies and revolution and once again Allies have backed 
wrong horse. "/ 
The next example occurred in his cable of 22 February, printed three 
days later, sent when the Germans were continuing to advance into 
Russia despite the Bolshevik government's stated willingness to sign 
a peace treaty on Germany's terms. The censored passage dealt 
entirely with the possibility of intervention, again indirect and 
again in the South East. Price had already noted that a threat was 
perceived from Rumania, caught 
"between two fires, namely fear Russian revolution from 
east and fear Roumanian Germanophil bourgeoisie who 
wish depose Ferdinand set up establish new dynasty stop 
Diplomatic documents which I telegraphed recently show 
that ever since outbreak European war Roumanian 
Goverment played double game between Central Powers 
and Allies stop Present moment seems GerTýpýoil party 
forcing its policy on Goverment which is more 
frightened spread revolutionary ideas from Russia than 
it is from Austro-German imperialists stop thus 
Russian revolution attacked all along west front by 
German armies Rada Roumanian Government. " 
The third cable to show evidence of selective cuts was sent on 25 
February (printed 27 February) and is merely a summary of Lenin's 
%. W, u "Welve theses on the necessity for signing the treaty of Brest 
7 Manchester Guardian 23.2.18. Datelined Petrograd Wednesday (20 
Febr'uary) 'Failure of Bolshevik Hopes'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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Litovsk. In the printed version of this despatch part of the tenth 
and virtually the whole of the twelfth thesis were Omitted. The 
omissions might however have been purely editorial, as for example 
the missing sentence (from the tenth thesis): 
"While England Germany are two examples capitalist 
worlds bleeding each other to death exhibiting 
themselves as lastinq sham to Civilisation" 
And again, in the case of the twelf th thesis, its omission might 
have been because it undermined the basis of Scott's strongest 
argment in defence of the Bolsheviks' handling of the peace 
negotiations: the fact that they were standing for the rights of 
small nationalities no less effectively than were the western Allies. 
The missing part of Price's cable read: 
"If Russian revolution abandons its comrades in Poland 
Lithuania Esthonia Finland it only does so in obedience 
maxim safety of revolution is highest law and 
preservation Russian revolution even more irnportant 
than guarantee self-determination small nationalities. " 
The case against the censor in the matter of this cable is not 
proven. 
The next example, a very short one, again relates to intervention, 
and is more likely than the last to have been a censor's cut. It 
occurs in the f irst cable that Price sent from Vologda (12 March) and 
is mainly about the extent to which the revolution was taking hold in 
the provinces, and the increase in popular consciousness that the 
revolution would have to be defended with arms. 
"For the moment Japan assumed to be chief enemy" 
Price wrote, and in view of what is known of Lockhart's battle with 
the Foreign Off ice at this time and on this point, the omission is 
nOt surprising. 
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The last three articles which Price sent from Vologda were all 
written after Scott's dramatic leader of 4 March in which he for the 
first time and with no preparation referred to a proposed invasion of 
Russia by the Allies. Only the third of these,, sent on 14 April,, 
appeared to have caught the attention of the censor. It was not cut, 
but it was delayed for three months, finally appearing in print on 19 
July. In it, Price drew attention to trouble brewing between the 
siberian Soviets and "Russian monarchist bands in Manchuria" under 
Horvath and Senenov who were being supplied with arms by the 
Japanese. His description of Allied policy in the Far East as "the 
exact counterpart of the policy of the Central Empires in Western 
Russia" closely echoed Scott's leader, although this could not 
possibly have been deliberate. It was, however, not surprising that 
publication of this despatch was held up, for what would have seemed 
an alarmist report on 14 April, possibly even causing inconvenient 
questions in the House, could safely be disregarded by 19 July, when 
the piece was eventually allowed to be printed, by which time Allied 
preparation for intervention in the north as well as the east of 
Russia were irreversible. 
The first despatch that Price sent after his return to Moscow was 
written on 26 April and based on an interview Vdf-. Tchicherin. Rather 
more than a third of his account of the interview was stopped 
altogether,, and the remainder was tacked on to another piece,, sent on 
16 May,, which had itself been significantly cut. The rump of the two 
despatches was printed as one article on 1 June8. What was cut 
from the 26 April piece was the statement by Tchicherin that: 
8Manchester Guardian 1.6.18. Datelined Moscow May 16 'Germans in 
RuSiIT- 
. 
-SignedM. Philips Price. 
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"Sov iet Goverment now Posses 
sZý: ýlled Siberian Goverment 
reactionar 
refuqe Far 
and Frencb 
officers monarc 
East has been ne 
diplomatic agent 
aid against Siberian Soviets stop Japan put forward as 
condition sqýporting arms disarmament Vla-divostock and 
apparently negotiations continuing among allies who 
cannot aqree about share plunder. " 
Tchicherin also told Price that the French goverment agent had told 
the Horvath/Kolchak government that 
"although open recognitionby allies present moment 
impossible still in event slightest success militar 
offensive against Soviets he could imagine no other 
authority but theirs worthy recognition. " 
In another of the documents from which Tchicherin derived the facts 
which he related to Price, and to which all reference was deleted, it 
appeared that the French Government was also in the process of making 
arrangements between Horvath and Russian bankers in the Far East that 
would 
"remove all fear allies interfering internal affairs 
Russia. " 
Tchicherin then pointed out to Price that the French Ambassador in a 
statement recently made to the Russian press had said: 
"if the Allies took action in Siberia this would not 
entail interference in the internal affairs of Russia 
stop I leave you said Tchicherin to reconcile this 
statement with facts disclosed in documents. " 
9A great deal had happened between 26 April, when Price wrote the 
first of these articles, and 1 June, when parts of them were allowed 
tO appear. What the British censors were preventing Price from 
describing were early intimations of the existence of one of the most 
far-reaching, if also the worst co-ordinated conspiracies of modern history. Already in February 1918 the British had succeeded in 
buying the Siberian Bank, considered particularly important to the 
Allies because it controlled the grain, platinum and gold trades of 
Siberia. The so-called Bankers' Conspiracy is described by Michael 
Kettle in The Allies and the Russian Collapse (1981), pp. 205-208" 242-244 a 246 being those which deal with the Siberian Bank. (In Kettle's view it is probable but not yet certain that it was through 
their control of this bank that the British were able to f inance Koicnilov and Alexeiv. ) Throughout the early months of 1918 a member 
Of the French Military Mission, Col. Pichon, was travelling about Siberia actively looking for the best candidate for Allied support 
against the Siberian Soviets. Price wrote the censored passage about Siberia just one day after the meeting in Peking at which Horvath 
agreed to become titular head of what f inally emerged, six months 
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The other component of the article written on 16 May and printed on 1 
June was also almost certainly based on an interview with Tchicherin, 
as Price's diary shows that he had another interview with the Foreign 
Minister on 9 May. The most s ignif icant, cut was Pr ice Is statement 
that he had been told that 
"semi-official statements reaching here from Paris that 
America has agreed with rest Allies to allow Japan free 
hand Siberia are interpreted in Soviet oovernment 
circles as meaning that the Allied governments see in 
Russia class enemy more dangerous to them than their 
national enemy German Imperialism stop As proof of 
this is cited recent article in German official 
Nordeutscher Allgemeine Zeitung which openly hints 
possibility agreement between Germany Japan over 
spheres of influences in Far East stop Among other 
friendly acts which Allies are committing towards 
Soviet Republic is seizure four Russian ships Far 
Eastern waters and purchase all tea in China normally 
sold for Russian market thus depriving starving people 
of Russia of their last comfort. " 
It is instructive to compare what was stopped in these two cables 
with what was passed for publication. For whatever reasont the 
passages which were allowed were printed in reverse order but all 
datelined 16 May. The first part of the article which appeared on 1 
Jme thus dealt with German dif f iculties in carrying out their plans 
for the Ukraine. Their forces were over extended because of the 
hostility of the peasants and only a fraction of the hoped-for corn 
had been obtained. "Instead of finding a beehive of honey" in the 
Ukraine, wrote Price,, the Germans had stirred a hornets nest instead. 
He was also allowed to report that the recently appointed German 
latero, as the Omsk Directorate under Kolchak. J. A. White (see below) 
notes (p. 104) that it was in April that documents disclosing the 
efforts of the precursors of the Omsk Directorate to obtain foreign 
aid were discovered in Vladivostock, giving as his source 
Z. Karpenko: Grazhdanskaia Voina v Dalnevostochnom Kraer 1918-1922 
(Khabarovsk 1934). The most comprehensive account of the origins and 
develolpent of Allied intervention in the Far East and its 
relationship with the Civil War is still that of J. A. White: The 
Siberian Intervention (Princeton 1950), especially Chps 3 and 6. The iý071FU-j-ion 
of American policy in the Far East and its repercussions on 
the other Allies is described by Ullman: Anglo-Soviet Relations Vol. 
T 
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Ambassador, Count Mirbach, had visited Lenin at the Kremlin on 15 May 
but "an authoritative Soviet source" (again probably Tchicherin) had 
told him that the interview was "characterised by coolness". By a 
skilful piece of editing and with no indication that the rest of the 
article had been written some three weeks earlier, what followed 
appeared to be continuous. Tchicherin (now identified) had told 
Price that although Gennany had formally recognised the Bolshevik 
goverment 
"in practice she shows no more inclination to establish 
sincere relations with us than the Allies" 
who he (Tchicherin) would have expected by now to have recognised the 
Bolshevik goverment. That goverment, he stated, was clearly the 
only authority capable of establishing the degree of order in Russia 
which the Allies claimed to desire. Tchicherin had gone on to state 
that the Bolshevik goverment had recognised the Rada only because 
conpelled to do so by "force majeure" and that the Rada was becoming 
increasingly unpopular with the Ukrainians. Asked by Price if the 
Bolshevik government recognised the independent government of the 
Caucasus Tchicherin had replied that it had not yet received a reply 
to its enquiry as to whether that government considered itself 
independent. But, Tchicherin had gone on, 
"we cannot think the Caucasus people wish to separate 
themselves from Russia, for that would leave them at 
the mercy of Turkey. " 
Tchicherin had been at pains to make it clear that the Caucasus 
AO 
90vernment was free toýwhat it chose except in the matter of laying 
claim to Baku, which had established its own Soviet "with which we 
work in close contact". He thought that in any case the growing 
agrarian movement in the Caucasus promised "to alter the political 
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outlook of this part of the east". 10 
Because of delays both in transmission and on arrival, as well no 
doubt, because of editorial judgement, much of the material that 
price was sending at this time did not appear in the order in which 
he wrote it, and it is impossible to give a coherent account of his 
despatches in a literal date order. Thus before sending the cable 
just summarised (16 May) he had, on 3 May, sent off an account which 
was printed virtually intact only four days laterll. Again, it is 
instructive to observe what was passed by the censor with so little 
10 At the end of November 1917 national councils in Tif lis, Batum, 
Kutais, Erivan, Elizavetopol and Baku met and formed a TransCaucasian 
Commissariat composed of Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians and local 
Russians, which proclaimed itself the de facto authority in the area 
until the Constituent Assembly should have met. After the 
dissolution of the Assembly the delegates of the various 
nationalities comprising the Commissariat formed a representative 
government, the Seim. This government repudiated the treaty of Brest 
Litovsk insofar as the cession of provinces to Turkey was concerned, 
tried unsuccessfully to negotiate directly with the Turks and then 
declared war on Turkey, but was quickly defeated. In order to put in 
place a body capable of negotiating peace with Turkey, an Independent 
Democratic Federative Republic of TransCaucasia was formed on 22 
April 1918. It was short-lived. Disagreements as to the nature of 
the respective national interests of Georgians, Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis which became apparent in the course of the negotiations 
resulted in the dissolution of the Federation within a month. 
Georgia made a separate peace with both Germany and Turkey, by the 
terms of which Germany acquired the use of Georgian railways and the 
Black Sea port of Poti, and Turkey gained recognition of her gains 
under the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Armenia declared itself 
independent but continued to lie at the mercy of Turkey. Azerbaijan 
also declared itself independent, but the existence of this republic 
was complicated by the formation in April 1918 of a Soviet in Baku 
which alone in the TransCaucasus area recognised the Bolshevik 
government in Petrograd. For further reading see Richard G. 
HOvanissian: Armenia on the Road to Independence (Cambridge 1967), 
especially Chps. 10 and 11; Firuz Kazemzadeh: The Struggle for 
TranS--Caucasia 1917-1921 (Oxford 1951) ; Ronald G. Suny (Ed. ) 
Trani tiucasia: Nationalism and Social Change : Essays in the HistoEy 
Of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (East European Series Michigan, 
19V3); and Ronald G. Suny: The Baku Cormrune 1917-1918: Class and 
Nationalit in the Russian Revolution (Princeton 1972). iii: Mcheýsster 
Guardian 7.5.18. Datelined Moscow Friday (3 May) _'Ir 
'S0%i'1F; e_tainid_ the Allies: Attitude to England and America. 
Signed M. Philips Price. 
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difficulty- Price described the May Day celebrations in Moscow in 
this despatchr where he saw banners bearing the inscription "Remember 
Brest Litovsk". From this he deduced that 
"all the conscious proletarian elements in Russia 
believe that there is only one problem before the young 
Soviet Republic - to prepare for future war against the 
forces of world capital which they think is attacking 
it on every side. " 
Germany and France, he went on, were the countries most feared; 
France was suspected of abetting Japanese designs on Siberia. 
England and America were regarded with least dislike, and the basis 
existed for a" possible rapprochement" with them. This he had from a 
"well-informed source". But he warned that any attempt by either 
country to 
"bolster up the counter-revolution bands defeated in 
square fights by the Soviet troops would meet with the 
strongest resistance. 11 
. A. S. Sistance would have to take a "disinterested" form, in the shape, 
for instance, of "railway organisers,, engineers, instructors of a new 
army, arms and munitions". He went on to claim that the Red Army was 
not to be compared with the old, indisciplined Tsarist. army. A new 
revolutionary discipline had been established because "the Russian 
masses feel themselves responsible for their own destiny". But if 
the Allies persisted in mistrusting the "proletariat Government of 
Russia" the whole of the food stores of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia were in danger of falling into German handst and "all the raw 
ffeterials which Germany can draw from the East will be used against 
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England and America in the West". 
The next cable Price sent did not get off so lightly, although it was 
printed only three days af ter he sent it on 8 Mayl2. What the 
censor allowed was his account of German plans for the Ukraine, which 
amounted to re-establishment of a Tsarist regime. 
"Under the circumstances it would seem the best policy 
for the Allies to aim at saving those parts of Russia 
north and east of the Volga" 
Price wrote; and went on to report that he had just been told by a 
member of the Finnish Soviet that 3,, 000 Finnish Red Guards were at 
Kandalaksha on the White Sea, ready to co-operate with Soviet trooPs 
for the protection of Murman. What Price also intended to say was 
that these Red Guards were ready to co-operate with Soviet and 
British (my emphasis) troops at Murman,, but these two crucial words 
were cut, as well as the whole of the last two sentences of his 
message: 
"Ground now well prepared co-operation English Amrican 
democracies with revolutionary forces Russia Finland in 
task holding territories north and east of Volga and 
prevent German penetration central and northern Asia 
till such time as process internal disruption ripens in 
Central Empires stop Uneasiness Prussian war party at 
Possibilities Analo-Russo -Finnish co-meration shown 
by fact that German representative here today demanded 
disarming British troops Murman. " 
Although none of this was allowed, Scott seized upon Price's earlier 
accounts of German objectives and activities in the Ukraine as his 
thwe for a leading article on 11 May on the danger to Britain of 
having in the Ukraine a "pro-German reactionary government" astride 
the Overland route to India. "The Germans" said Scott "look like 
teaching even the blindest among us that by virtue of India we are an 
12 Manchester Guardian 11.5.18. Datelined Moscow Wednesday (8 May) 
'GerMan Aim in Russia: a Monarchy based on Kiev'. Signed M. Philips 
8: 257 
Eastern as well as a Western power ... That in any conprehensive scheme 
replYing to the German Turkish threat we must seek the friendship if 
not the active co-operation of Great Russia is self-evident. 
Unfortunately our Government and the French Government seem 
determined to close their eyes to this fact. " 
Price's next two cables, one sent on 10 May and one on 11 May,, were 
printed as one article on 22 May, the first being passed uncut but 
about half of the second being cut outl3. As often happened, the 
remains of the two despatches were put together in reverse order. 
That part of the censored cable which was passed dealt with the 
establishment under German protection of a joint military 
dictatorship in the Ukraine under Generals Skoropadsky and 
Price. 
13 Manchester Guardian 22.5.18. Datelined Moscow May 11. 'Ukraine 
GOVýFn-mene 
. Signed M. Philips Price. 
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EichhOM14. The missing part described the strength of Kadet 
influence in that goverment and pointed out that the 
"patriotic Russian bourgeoisie which stood last sunwer 
for war to bitter end 
Bolsheviks as German ts are now p 
ficially b 
ect restor 
and denounced 
ej? ýred to enter 
goverment established art 
military V-% oligarchy with ob 
landlords. " 
The uncensored cable which formed the other part of this article 
consisted mainly of a statement "from an authoritative source" (and 
as has already been noted, Price had an interview with Tchicherin on 
9 may) calling for recognition of the Soviet Goverment by the Allies 
if they seriously wanted to assist Russia. This would not only give 
Russia the 
"moral support necessary for the establishment of 
discipline and order" 
14 As the Ukrainian Rada (see Chp. 6 FIN 7) was signing a separate 
peace with Germany at Brest Litovsk on 9 February 1918, Red Guards 
were on the outskirts of Kiev. A Ukrainian Soviet which was 
subsequently set up lasted for an even shorter time that the Rada, 
the rump of which positively welcomed the German advance into the 
Ukraine, which continued for some time after the signature of the 
treaty of Brest Litovsk. At the end of April 1918 what remained of 
the Rada was replaced by the Germans with a puppet government 
ncminally under the hetman Skoropadsky but in fact a military 
dictatorship under the German General Eichorn. These two presided 
over a regime which E. H. Carr described as offering "little to the 
Ukrainian nationalists and nothing to the advocates of social reform" 
(The Bolshevik Revolution Vol. I p. 299). The Skoropadsky regime 
survived the assassination of Eichorn (probably by Left S. R. s) in 
late July and lasted until the German collapse in November 1918. The 
situation in the Ukraine throughout this period was enormously 
complex and accounts of it match the situation. Carr made frequent 
references to the usefulness of Price's Reminiscences as a 
contemporary source, noting particularly pp. 162,198-203,233-255, 
273 and 297-98 in his own section on the Ukraine during this period 
(Vol. Ir pp. 292-300). Price does indeed appear to have taken a 
Particular interest in the Ukraine and to have had a good 
understanding of the social,, cultural and economic factors at worki, 
but commiunications, between Moscow and what can only be called the 
Ukrainian front in the spring of 1918 left a great deal to be 
desired, and when he wrote his Reminiscences Price still only 
had his 
Own records on which to base his account. A clear overview of the 
tortuous diplomatic and military relationships between Moscow, Kiev 
and Berlin at this period is provided by Richard K. Debor Revolution 
ýýSujrvival pp. 199-200. 
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but would also lay the foundation for a proper contractual 
relationship between the two countries in respect of supplies and 
trade. The policy of the Soviet government, according to the 
"source", was to keep Russia neutral , 
"but if either of the great world groups shows more 
hostility than the other it may be compelled to act 
with the less hostile one". 
The next two cables which Price sent were, in effect, an elaboration 
upon this theme. Both were sent on 15 May; one was published without 
cuts on 31 Mayl5; the other was published on 23 May but as this is 
one of the few of which he did not keep a copy it is impossible to 
know if anything was deleted16. But both contained accounts of a 
debate on foreign policy in TsIK on 14 May and since they neither 
overlapped nor contradicted each other they will be summarised as 
one. On the day of the debate Price was given an interview by an un- 
named but "prominent Bolshevik", who pointed out that there were "two 
tendencies" in the Government. One, led by Lenin and Trotsky,, wanted 
to continue a policy of strict neutrality so long as both the Central 
Powers and the Western Allies,, with Japan,, continued to show "an 
equally hostile attitude". The other, led by Sokolnikov17 held that 
15 Manchester Guardian 31.5.18. Datelined Moscow May 15. 'Russian 
Foreign Policy'. Signed 'From a Correspondent'. 16 Ibid 23.5.18. Datelined Moscow May 15 'Soviet Government. 
Leninrs Policyl,, Signed M. Philips Price. 
17 GRIGORII YAKOVLEVICH SoKoim[KOV 1888-1939. A Bolshevik from 
1905, Sokolnikov spent many years in exile, and though firmly 
associated with Lenin he devoted much time to attempting to reconcile 
the Marxist factions of the RSDLP. With Zinoviev, Kamenevy Trotsky, 
Stalin and Bubnov he became a member of the first Politbureau and was 
also on the editorial board of Pravda and a member of the praesidium 
Of Vesenkha (the Supreme Council of Public Economy) . He supported le"In -Over Brest Litovsk and headed the delegation which signed the 
final treaty. Active in the Civil War,, he became Commissar of 
Finance in 1922 and one of the architects of NEP. From 1925 his 
fortunes began to decline and in 1937 he was one of the chief 
defendants in the show trials. He either died or was shot in 1939. 
There is no study of him in English,, but extensive coverage of his 
activities appears throughout the volumes of E. H. Carr's History of 
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the respite gained by Brest Litovsk was over, týhat the military party 
in Germany had definitely won and that the time had come for closer 
contact with the Allies. Lenin, while determined, according to 
Price's informant, 
"to keep clear of the two struggling groups of world 
capital till the crash should come" 
hadr however, conceded that if the Germans were determined to tear up 
the Treaty of Brest Litovsk they would find they had the Red Army to 
deal with. The Left S. R. leader Kamkovl8 had pointed out that the 
Germans had not scrupled to occupy the Don and the Crimea and that 
if the Soviet goverment were equally prepared to ignore the treaty 
by, in their case, giving aid to the Ukrainian revolutionaries they 
would succeed much faster in brirxging about their objectives. 
Sverdlovl9, speaking for the Bolsheviks,, claimed that the struggle 
The Bolshevik Revolution. 
18 BORIS DAVIDOVICH KAMKOV (1885-1938) was active in Left S. R. 
circles from an early age and forced to live in exile in France and 
Sweden until the March revolution. He then returned to Russia and 
was invediately elected to the Petrograd Committee of the party. At 
the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets he was elected to TsIK,, and 
to the Central Committee of the (Left S. R. ) Party at its first 
Congress in December 1917. He opposed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk 
and argued against the continuation of the alliance between the Left 
S. R. s and the Bolsheviks. He was involved in the Left S. R. revolt in 
July 1918 and continued to oppose the Soviet government, serving 
three years' imprisonment for anti-Soviet activity. He survived to 
work, in his later years, as a statistician in Voronezh. 19 YAKOV MIKHAILOVICH SVERDLOV (1885-1919) joined the RSDLP in 1902 
and in 1903 sided with the Bolsheviks. From then on he was 
ceaselessly active as an agitator and underground organiser. He 
remained in Russia but for much of the time until 1917 he was in 
internal exile, despite which he was co-opted a member of the Central 
Committee of the Bolshevik party in 1912. In April 1917 he took over 
the Party Secretariat at Lenin's request and was largely responsible 
for holding the party together until the Bolshevik revolution. 
Appointed to the Military Revolutionary Committee he became the main 
link between it and the Central Committee. He was then made Chairman 
Of TSIK in succession to Kamenev. He presided over the Constituent 
Assembly and supervised its dissolution. He supported Lenin over 
Brest Litovsk. He set up a system of provincial Secretariats to 
reinforce the apparatus of centralised party control. He died in 
March 1919. There is no biography of Sverdlov in English but a 
sketch of his life appears in Georges Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie's 
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ý-,, -tween the military and bourgeois parties for predominance in &-. V- 
Germany was not yet over; the Russian revolution still had its 
breathing space, and should use it to create a new army and 
revitalise the country by discipline and hard work. As if to 
exemplify Sverdlov's (and the majority Bolshevik) view, a telegram 
had been received from Joffe in Berlin20 and was read to the 
meeting. The telegram stated that the German government had agreed 
to stop the advance of their troops in the Ukraine and had admitted 
that the Don and the Crimea lay outside the jurisdiction of the 
Ukraine. Af ter reading the telegram, the President of the TsIK had 
said that this did, indeed, suggest that the military party in Berlin 
had not yet secured the upper hand. Perhaps the most interesting 
piece of information buried in the texts of these two despatches sent 
by Price on 15 May is the fact that these differences of opinion had 
Makers of the Russian Revolution (Ithaca N. Y. 1974). The leading 
authority cn Sverdlov is Charles Duval, author of the following 
articles: 'The Bolshevik Secretariat and Yakov Sverdlov: February to 
October 19171 Slavonic and East European Review 51 (1973) pp. 47-57; 
'Iakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov: Founder of the Bolshevik Party 
Machine' in Ralph Carter Elwood (Ed. ): Reconsiderations on the 
1hissian Revolution (Cambridge Mass. 1976) ; 'Yakov M. Sverdlov and the 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets (VrSIK). A 
Study in Bolshevik Consolidation of Power, October 1917 - July 1918' 
Soviet Studies 3 (979) 1 pp. 3-23. 21ý j5CEF ABiTkMOViCH JOFFE 1883-1927. Jof fe joined the RSDLP in 1902 
and spent most of the next 15 years in exile in Europe or Siberia. 
On returning to Petrograd after the March revolution he was elected 
to the Soviet and became an active member of the Military 
Revolutionary Committee. He was Chairman of the armistic 
negotiations and of the f irst stage of the peace negotiations at 
BreSt Litovsk. He supported Trotsky's "no war no peacen formula but 
did not vote against the treaty. In April 1918 he became the first 
Soviet Ambassador to Germany but was expelled in November for his 
tOo-visible Bolshevik propagandist activities. For the rest of his 
life he was given mainly diplomatic assignments. He became a close 
friend and supporter of Trotsky and shot himself in 1927 in protest 
against Trotsky's expulsion from the Comnunist party. There has so 
far been no biography of Joffe but further information about him is 
tO be found in Louis Fischer: Men and Politics (New York 1966) and 
inIsaac Deutscher's The Prophet Armed (New York 1954) and The 
Prophet Unarmed (New York 1959). 
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nott apparently, emerged in the debate although their existence was 
clearly well-known to Price's informant. But, Price wroter the 
majority Bolshevik view 
"on grounds of party discipline was the only one 
expressed yesterday in the debate on foreign 
policy ... The second view is held by an influential 
minority. " 
on 19f 20 and 24 May Price wrote three articles which might have been 
designed to illustrate Scott's leader of 11 May (see above p. 256) 
which had emphasised Britain's Eastern interests. The first two were 
published in reverse order on 28 May2l and 3 June22; the third did 
not appear at all. This was a pity, because although all three were 
self-contained they f ormed, when taken together, a remarkably 
conprehensive picture of what was happening on the borders of Soviet 
influence. The first article to be written was given the title 
"German Road to India", and in it Price laid out what he called the 
stepping-stone strategy in the Pan-German scheme of conquest. The 
puppet regime in the Ukraine had been the f irst. to be established of 
a proposed chain of buffer states under the suzerainty of the Central 
Powers. The next were to be in the Caucasus: Georgia and Armenia. 
In all three areas German POlicY was to support the forces of 
reaction, whether landlords, mullahs or khans. In the Caucasus both 
the Armenian and the Georgian Volunteers had refused to accept the 
terms of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk which returned to Turkey 
iqxrtant areas in the south west in which the Moslems were in a 
majority. The Turks had, nonetheless, occupied Batumf Kars and 
Ardahan. The Georgians had responded by setting up an independent 
21 Manchester Guardian 28.5.18. Datelined Moscow may 20 'South 
Eastern Russia. Conflicting Forces'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
22 Ibid 3.6.18. Datelined Moscow May 19. 'German Road to India'. 
Sign7ed-m. Philips Price. 
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state of Transcaucasia, similar to the first Ukrainian Rada in that 
it tried to steer a middle course between invaders f rom abroad and 
agricultural reformers at home. At first it appeared to be more 
rather than less pro-Petrograd in orientation, but the success of the 
Bolsheviks in creating an independent Soviet at Baku had frightened 
the Georgian bourgeoisie, and the governmnt of Transcaucasia was now 
dminated by Mensheviks. But Price concluded by warning the Allies 
not to place their hopes in the government of Transcaucasia. It was 
being bribed by the Central Powers,, who had offered to return Batum 
to Georgia in return for permission to send a German expeditionary 
force across its territories into Persia. "The same drama is now 
being enacted in Tif lis as has recently f inished in Kiev. " 
The second article set out to show how the Germans were hoping to put 
down another stepping stone by creating an independent state out of 
the muntain and steppe territories in the North Caucasus. Taking 
advantage of the age-old rivalry between the Cossacks, many of whom 
had formed themselves into Soviets after the death of Kaledin, and 
the mountain tribes of Daghestan, the Central Powers were stirring up 
trouble wherever they could. Under the influence of Pan-Islamic 
leaders the richer tribesmen were mobilising to resist the spread of 
revolutionary ideas while the poorer were more attracted by 
Bolshevism: class warfare complicated by religion. In the Caspian 
Oilfields the proletariat of Armeniant Russian and Tartar descent had 
(he reported, inaccurately) buried their differences and formed 
workers' Soviets at Baku and Grosni, but the Tartar Khans surrounding 
them were co-operating with the Central Powers and had cut the 
railway from Baku to Tiflis in order to prevent Russian Mi itary 
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supplies from reaching the Georgian and Armenian Volunteers still 
holding out against the Turks in the CaucasuS23. "Once again" 
Price concluded the article "the Bolshevik Soviets in the oilf ields 
and the Armenian peasantry are the sole bulwarks against Turco-German 
Imperial ism -" 
The third article was stopped, perhaps because it was marginally more 
critical of Allied policy in this area than the other two. Price 
pointed out in it that whereas the Soviet government had withdrawn 
Russian troops stationed in Persia under the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907., the British had informed the Persian goverment,, in March 
23 In March 1918 a massacre of the Azerbaijani Muslim population of 
Baku by the city's Armenians ensured that ethnic and religious 
differences would continue to dominate events in that area. The Baku 
Soviet proclaimed itself in April 1918, while the rest of Azerbaijan 
joined the short-lived Independent Democratic Federative Republic of 
Transcaucasia. After its collapse, the Baku Soviet was seen as 
inimical by the residual independent state of Azerbaijan. While 
Turkish troops advanced towards Baku, the behaviour of (mainly 
Armenian) Baku Soviet troops in the course of their campaign to 
capture Elizavetopol further alienated support for the Soviet, and 
the Azerbaijani population tended to co-operate with the Turks. 
Although the Baku Soviet itself did not regard the Turks as a 
particular threat., the Armenian and non-Bolshevik Russians in the 
city began to look to the British for help. The Baku Soviet was 
disbanded in July 1918 and its members exiled. On 17 August a 
British force landed at Baku. This was Dunsterforce, a unit 
consisting of 41 cars and 1400 men under the command of General L. C. 
Dunsterville which had been sent to Mesopotamia in January 1918 with 
the object of preventing the passage of Turkish or German forces 
through the Transcaucasus to India, and to prevent the oilfields of 
Baku from falling into Turkish hands. By the time Dunsterforce 
reached Baku it was irm-ediately obvious that the British forces were 
too small to prevent the besýeging Turks from seizing the town, and 
within a few days it had retreated. On 15 September the Turks let 
Azerbaijani troops in to Baku and stood aside for two days while they 
took their revenge on the Armenians for the March massacres before 
stepping in to re-establish an independent government of Azerbaijan. 
One of the many damaging legacies of this episode was the fact that 
the British failed to prevent, even though they probably did not 
instigate, the shooting of the members of the Baku Soviet, after 
their dispossession, by the British-protected, anti-Bolshevik 
government of Transcaspian which was set up after the deposition of 
the Tashkent Soviet earlier in the year. For further reading see 
above Up. 8 FIN 10. 
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1918, that they intended to remain. Public opinion in Persia had 
turned against the Western Allies once again and was divided, more or 
less on class linesi, between supporting the Soviet Goverment and 
supporting the Central Powers. On the whole Russophil tendencies 
were in the ascendent. 
"If England to secure confidence Persians prevent 
Turco-Geman influence spreading into east she must 
adopt same ILolicy to Persia as Soviet Government naml 
recognise in fact as well as name Persian integrity. " 
Price went on to describe the danger to the Allies in Turkestan, the 
last of the "stepping stones", where the reactionary Emir of Bokhara 
was looking to the Central Powers to save him from the revolutionary 
Young Sart party24 
24 Bukhara was one of five independent principalities in Turkestan 
after the Russian corxpests of the 1860s, with a population primarily 
of Uzbeks and Tadzhiks. The word Sart, used by Price, had no ethnic 
meaning and was one usually used out of ignorance by Europeans, being 
a word originally employed to describe merchants as opposed to nomads 
in the area. The feudal rule of the Emir of Bukhara, strongly 
supported by a fanatically reactionary Muslim clergy, began to be 
questioned as the result of the introduction of compulsory education 
throughout the Tsarist Empire early in the twentieth century, 
combined with the new right of the inhabitants of Bukhara to 
representation in the Duma. A liberal nationalist movement (Djadism) 
began to emerge throughout Turkestan. In Bukhara its leaders came 
mainly from the sons of wealthy merchant families who had sent their 
children to be educated in Turkey, and from Uzbek intellectuals. 
The Young Bukhariot movement began as an underground bourgeois- 
revolutionary movement between 1905-1909. As the result of the March 
revolution, a Soviet was set up at Tashkent which claimed to 
represent the whole of Turkestan. Early in 1918 the Young Bukharians 
attempted to get constitutional reforms from the Emir. confronted by 
the extreme hostility of Islam they sent for help from the Tashkent 
Soviet. A brigade of troops was dispatched to reinforce their 
negotiations but to no avail. The Emir actually succeeded in 
improving his territorial position viz-a-viz the Provisional 
government. Many Young Bukharians then went to Tashkent and 
Samarkando, where they began to take part in Russian political 
movements, but a few remained and joined Communist cells in Bukhara. 
The Emir tried but failed to get recognition of the indepndence of 
liukhara from Britain; he undoubtedly was in contact with British 
Intelligence at meshed (which may have been why the reference to him 
in Price's article was cut) . He was eventually 
driven out of Bukhara 
in 1920 by a successful combination of Young Bukharians and 
Communists. Bukhara was proclaimed an Independent People's Republic 
in 1921 but reincorporated into the Soviet Union in 1924/25. The 
8: 266 
"in conclusion iven may be said if Soviet Government 
adequate support it could effectively resist 
imperialist designs Central Powers in Asia. ýýNo 
other native Russian element capable of this for 
bourgeois parties since events Ukraine have shown 
treacherous complicity with imperialist PanGermanism. " 
Until late in May 1918 most of the speculation about Allied 
intervention in Russia had been predicated upon the idea that Japan 
would do the intervening on behalf of the Western Allies. On 25 May 
Price sent a cable, most of which got into print on 28 May25 about 
the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement which had been signed on 16 
May26, under the terms of which the Japanese were later to claim 
they were acting when they landed in Siberia, Manchuria and the 
Chinese Eastern Railway zone in August 1918. This despatch is also 
interesting for the light it throws on the continued relative 
independence, at that tine, of two "bourgeois" papers,, Zarya Rosseya 
most detailed account of events of 1918 in Bukhara is to be found in 
Seymour Becker: Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and 
Khiva 1865-1924 (Harvard 1968), pp. 242-253,265-268,280-288,292- 
294,303-305. 
25 Manchester Guardian 28.5.18. Datelined Moscow Saturday (25 May) 
'Chi_n6ýja_panese Treaty. Russian Suspicions. ' Signed M. Philips 
Pr ice. 
26 The Sino-Japanese agreement of May 1918 was made at a time when 
the Peking goverment was dominated by a pro-Japanese so-called Anfu 
clique. It was supposed to ensure that Japan and China would take 
concerted military and naval action "against the common enemy". It 
was so unspecific that a supplementary agreement was needed in 
September 1918, to spell out what Japan,, at least,, expected from it. 
This was that Chinese troops under Japanese command should take part 
in joint operations in Transbaikalia and Amur. From the Chinese 
Point of view the agreement was only intended to provide for co- 
operation if circumstances arose that required co-operation: for 
instance in the management or defence of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
Thus it seems that the Soviet-controlled press was quite accurate in 
Perceiving that Japan was intending to use the agreement as a fig 
leaf for the planned invasion of Russian territory. In fact 1600 
Chinese troops entered the Maritime Province in August 1918 under the 
terms of the agreement and remained,, as China's token participation 
in the Intervention, in the Kikol'sk Ussuriisk and Kharbarovsk area 
until the spring of 1920. See Tien-fong Cheng: A HistoKy of ýSl 
Russian Relations (Westportv Conn. 1957) ; Sow-Theng Leong: SinO- 
. 
2v--let Dip1matic Relations 1917-1926 (Canberra 1976) ; John 
Macguirray: Treaties and Agreements with and concernLng China Vol. 
2, pp. 1411-1414 (Washington 1921). 
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and Svoboda. Rossii27. The formerr which Price said had remained 
consistently pro-Ally,? was "bewildered" by the new situation created 
by the Agreement, and pointed out that Russia's vital interests were 
affected by it. Svoboda Rossii which Price described as having for 
sme time been "oscillating" between a pro-German and a pro-Ally 
orientation, r had also sounded a warning note. Price quoted from the 
paper: 
"The desire of certain groups for foreign interference 
though intelligible, is unjustifiable. We can only be 
saved by ourselves. " 
Price himself thought that the Russian bourgeois press, though not 
welcoming the prospect of a Japanese invasion, had "taken refuge in 
foggy platitudes" whereas the government press saw the agreement 
clearly as the first step to an invasion of Eastern Siberia which 
would, as he put it in his summary of their view, enable 
"Chinese forces to outflank the Soviet troops in the 
Trans-Baikal while the Japanese hold them at the mouth 
of the Amur. " 
Price went on to say that he had been informed by an authoritative 
source that the Goverment looked upon the agreement as 
"a provocative attempt to force the issue in the Far 
East before the Soviet Government can explain the 
situation to the Allies. " 
This was a reference, as he went on to point out, to the fact that 
Robins had recently left for American and had,, in agreement with both 
27 Zarya Rosseya (Price's transliteration) : Russian Dawn. The 
Bi ýLoý gKS, phý of Periodicals of Russia 1901-19 16 lists 22 newspapers 
the title of which began with Zarya followed by a different regional 
Place name, none of them purporting to be all-Russian. They may well 
have been local versions of the same paper (as with Izvestia now) 
In May 1918 conditions were so chaotic that one of them may have 
taken the name used by Price; it is unlikely that records for that 
Period are complete in any case. Svoboda Rossii (Price's 
transliteration) : Free Russia. The Bibliography of Periodicals 
lists one paper by that name,, founded in 1907. There are also a 
number of regional papers with the title beginning Svoboda followed 
bya regional place name, all founded between 1905-1908. 
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the Soviet Goverment and his own Ambassador,, Francis 
"undertaken to put directly before his government a 
picture of what has taken place here during the last 
six months, so that the democracies of the Allied 
countries may be in possession of the facts. "28 
So far, rather surprisingly, the cable had lost only one sentence, 
which referred to the cynicism of the Allies in pretending to be 
fighting for liberty and freedom, and that could have been an 
editorial cut. The whole of the last sentence, however, was not 
printed 
"Soviet Government interprets new situation Far East as 
meaning that there exists in London and Washington a 
circle that wishes to force the pace before arrival 
Colonel Robins in America. " 
The Soviet goverment was right, and there is good reason for 
believing that this sentence was cut by the censor. Relations 
between and within official circles in both Whitehall and Washington 
appear,, throughout the spring of 1918, to have been conducted at 
several different levels, some of them in direct conflict with 
others: a not unusual phenomenon. The Milner papers at the 
Bodleian29 contain copies of a number of telegrams which passed 
between London and Moscow which have not been preserved in the 
Foreign Office archives at the P. R. O. Unfortunately most of them are 
28 DAVID R. FRANCIS was appointed American Ambassador to Russia in 
March 1916 and remained in post until November 1918, when he was 
forced to leave Russia by reason of illness; he remained titular 
Ambassador until March 1921. Francis was a St. Louis banker who had 
been successively Mayor, State Governor and a member of the U. S. 
Cabinet but had absolutely no experience of international affairs and 
hadt indeed, never been out of America before he took up his post at 
the age of nearly 80. Lockhart admitted that he was a charming old 
Man but "he doesn't know a Left Social Revolutionary from a potato" 
(Memoirs p. 282). His relations with Raymond Robins are hard to 
decijýfi-er. By Robins, account he appears to have been accessible and 
reasonably co-operative. But in his own memoir Francismakes almost 
no mention of Robins except to record that he saw him on his way 
back 
to America in May 1918. David R. Francis Russia from the American 
o_ 1918 ted 1970). t: 2 November L (New York 1921, reprin 16 t; 
r 
7T 
11A Imp Milner papers. The Great War. Box D4. 
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undated, few numbered, and none signed: almost as if a deliberate 
attemPt were being made at the tine to ensure that none of these 
exchanges should be taken as official policy. From these it would 
appear that in late April or early May Lockhart had been given the j. & 
basis for an understanding with Trotsky. In what appears to be a 
reply to a query from Lockhart, cable No. 113 from London, dated 30 
A, pril (one of the few to be so identifiable) told him: "Policy 
outlined in my previous telegram still holds good and you should 
continue to do all that is possible to secure its immediate 
acoeptance by Trotsky. As you know, I am endeavouring to gain full 
concurrence of the US government on the subject and have requested 
that instructions shall be sent to Col. Robins to support your 
efforts. " The cable was unsigned and who the "I" was is likely to 
remain a mystery,, although the voice is hardly the voice of Cecil. A 
cable from Lockhart to London dated 8 May referred to an agreement 
with Trotsky concerning the disposition of Allied stores,, the export 
of flax to Britain and the use of Russian trawlers at Murmansk and 
Archangel. "These are not" observed Lockhart "actions of a German 
agent". But the very next day British reinforcements were landed at 
Murmansk. Meanwhile Robins, who left Russia on 14 May, had also been 
furnished with a set of proposals on the heads of a trade agreement. 
Both sets - or copies, if they were,? as seems possible, the same - 
would have been in breach of the terms of the Treaty of Brest 
Litovsk, which offers at least one possible explanation of the need 
for extra secrecy. The episode also suggests that Robins had indeed 
been given the support requested by the anonymous benefactor in 
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whitehall. But by the time he reached Washington that support, for 
what it was worth,, had apparently been withdrawn. 30 
After the end of May events dictated that both Price's cables and 
scott's leading articles would concern themselves with other aspects 
of British policy in Russia, but in the last days of May both of them 
continued to be primarily concerned with developments, or threatened 
30 The Foreign Office had known what Robins thought about the 
situation in Russia as early as December 1917, when his predecessor 
as head of the American Red Cross mission, Col. Thompson, called in 
and presented Sir George Clerk with a memorandum from Robins (FO, 
371.3018). Robins' attempts in February and March 1918 to get 
American recognition for the Bolsheviks (as well as help) in the hope 
of preventing the ratification of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk were 
made in some degree of co-operation with Lockhart and with the 
knowledge of his Ambassador. George Kennan describes these efforts 
at length, if sceptically, Russia Leaves the War (1956), Chapter 24. 
The extent of Robins' working relationship with Lockhart emerges from 
the Robins papers at Wisconsin (P 45935 and P 45936) and from the 
Lockhart Memoirs. Robins left Russia on 14 May 1918 and called on 
his Ambassador before he left. In his only published account of any 
of his meetings with Robins,, Francis recorded that he had afterwards 
"heard" that Robins had subsequently told the Associated Press 
representative at Vologda and a member of the Embassy staff that if 
he could get one hour with President Wilson he would be able to 
persuade him to recognise the Bolshevik goverment: "I have the 
goods on my person". Francis added that he also "heard" afterwards 
the the "goods" in question were proposals offering the U. S. 
Government the same concessions as those which had been forced from 
the Soviets by the Germans at Brest Litovsk. Francis must have known 
this and not just "heard" it, and it certainly a fact that when 
Robins reach Tokyo on his way home he wrote, on 6 June, a memorandum 
to the American Ambassador to Tokyo which was copied to Washington 
and London. It was read without comment by Leeperr Gregory, Clerk 
and Hardinge in the last week of July 1918 (FO 371.3287) - In it 
Robins reported that before he lef t Lenin had personally handed him a 
statement on the possibility of economic co-operation based on an 
inventory of resources prepared for the Germans under the terms of 
the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (and therefore in direct contravention of 
it). Robins added that it was his belief that co-operation on the 
lines proposed would not only enable the Bolsheviks to take a 
less "hard line" politically but could result in a redeclaration of 
war on Germany. William Hard, (Raymond Robins p. 215) recorded that 
on his return to the U. S. A. Robins received a message from the State 
Department desiring him not to talk for publication. He went 
straight to Washington nonetheless but the President did not send for 
him. Robins wrote to Wilson on 7 July and again on 8 July but 
received no reply (Wisconsin, P 45936). Francis' hearsay account of 
the message that Robins was carrying is given in his book Russia from 
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developuents in the Far East. SCOtt wrote four leaders on Russian 
affairs between 22 and 31 May. On 22 May he noted that the terms of 
the Sino-Japanese agreement had not been published, and that its 
existence had been made 
"by certain English newspapers the excuse for a renewed 
campaign to.. let Japan go in and save Russia from 
Germanyll, 
But not even the Japanese, said Scott, were going to believe that 
Japanese intervention in Russia would be a disinterested act. He 
returned to the point on 27 may: 
"No one has attempted to show how Japanese troops at 
Vladivostock could save Moscow,, or how even by 
advancing as far as Laike Baikal they could prevent the 
Ukrainian peasants from being robbed of their 
wheat. n3l 
On 28 May, the same day as Price's article on the Sino-Japanese 
agreement was published, Scott stated that he himself disagreed with 
the official Russian reading of it as given by Price. He personally 
thought that the ef fect of the treaty would be to "tie Japanese 
policy to China rather than deflect it to Siberia", and with 
uncharacteristic naivete he professed to believe a "recent report" 
that the European Allies and America had agreed that there was to be 
no intervention in Siberia. He concluded by referring to "our 
correspondent's" mention of Robins. Price had, after all, been 
allowed to report that Robins was returning to America and hoped to 
be able to give there his own interpretation of events in Russia. 
All that had been cut was that there were those who hoped that he 
the American Embassy, April 1916 to November 1918 p. 302. 
31 Miiiiei papers: The Great War, Box Cl. On 21 may 1918 Sir 
Carelton Green,, the British Ambassador at Tokyo, sent a report of his 
Most recent discussion with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairso, 
who had told him that if the Allies invaded Siberia the Japanese 
would advance to the Urals, but he conceded that "it was a military 
Problem". 
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would be - as he was - overtaken by events. Scott, perhaps not 
knowing of the cut, wanted to believe that 
"this marks the beginning of a new and better period in 
Allied diplomacy where Russia is concerned". 
In his leaders on both 22 and 27 May Scott had miade his usual plea 
for the de facto recognition of Russia, but in the last of the series 
he made recognition the main them of his argument. In ef f ect he 
accused the Foreign Office of splitting hairs over terminology. 
"Surely it ought not to be beyond diplomatic metaphysic 
to invent a formula which, if it is not 'recognition' 
gives the two countries the benefits which would flow 
from it. " 
He went on: 
"While we are on the subject we would beg the 
Government to make what arrangements are practicable 
for enlightening public darkness with regard to the 
profoundly important happenings in Eastern Europe and 
the borderland of Asia. A good news service is one 
essential. " 
Price did not hear of the incident at Cheliabinsk until 28 May, 
according to his diary, two weeks after it had occurred. On 30 May 
Martial Law was declared in Moscow in the face of what was seen by 
the Soviet Goverment and reported by Price on 30 May as "counter- 
revolutionary attempts from two quarters". It will be recalled that 
under pressure from the Siberian Soviets orders had been given in 
Moscow to re-route the Czechs still held up at on the Trans-Siberian 
railway. After 14 May the Czechs still held up at Cheliabinsk had 
decided to disregard the change of plan proposed for thern and to 
proceed to Vladivostock anyway. The goverment in Moscow now ordered 
their immediate disarmament: an order that wasy in practice, 
unenforceable. The Czechs then seized key points along the length of 
the railway and by the end of May controlled it f rom Samara to 
Irkutsk. In his cable of 30 May it is obvious that Price at that tim 
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considered that the Czechs represented no more of a threat to the 
Soviet goverment (if also no less of one) that the formation in 
Kiev, under German protection of a South Eastern Alliance of Don and 
Kuban Cossacks and Tartars under Krasnov which he reported in the 
sam telegram32. It is interesting to note, however, that while the 
very full account of the South Eastern Alliance that he sent in was 
passed uncensored, his reference to the Czechs was cut to the bone. 
He was only allowed to mention that their seizure of points on the 
32 As soon as it became apparent that the Bolshevik revolution was 
not going to be easily reversed,, Cossack military leaders still in 
Petrograd went down to Novocherkassk to work out with the Ataman of 
the Don Cossacks, Kaledin, ideas which he had alrady discussed with 
them for the formation of a South Eastern Alliance of Don, Kuban and 
Terek Cossacks. Their objective, as expressed by Price in his 
Reminiscences (p. 163) was to "unite for political and military 
purposes the agricultural population of the black earth territories 
of the south east against northern Bolshevism. The Cossacks were the 
dominating element in it, for ... they formed a privileged agrarian 
caste under the control of an officer corps". Price went on to point 
out that even on the Don they were opposed by a mainly immigrant 
proletariat (miners from North Russia) and by the landless peasants; 
moreover the Don Cossacks themselves were more concerned with the 
issue of their own independence than with thoughts of creating an 
alternative government for the former Russian Empire. This 
ramshackle alliance nonetheless proved to be a first focal point not 
only for armed resistance to the Bolsheviks over a wider ideological 
frontt but also for allied assistance to that resistance. On 3 
December 1917 the War Cabinet in London offered Kaledin virtually 
unlimited support, (see Chp. 7 p. 197). But the Alliance quickly ran 
into every kind of trouble. Rumania, which should have formed its 
left flank, signed peace with Germany. Former Tsarist generals, 
notably Alexeiv and Kornilov,, began to arrive at Novocherkassk with 
entirely diffferent ideas from those with which Kaledin started out. 
It required all the diplomatic skills of Miliukov to bring about a 
temporary leadership triumvirate between Kornilov, Alexeiv and 
Kaledin. In January 1918 Red Guards and Red Sailors took the 
Offensive in the Don and captured Novocherkassk and Rostov. Alexeiv 
retreated, with such forces as he had been able to musterr to the 
]Kuban. Some of the Don Cossack regiments formed themselves into a 
Soviet. Kaledin shot himself (and was succeeded as Ataman by 
Krasnov). Kornilov was killed in action at Ekaterinodar. The South 
Eastern Alliance collapsedr which is not, f course, to say that the M civil war on this front was anything otherflust beginning- The 
recent literature on the civil war in Russia is considerable, but not 
Unnaturally the South Eastern Alliance is generally seen as only one 
element in it, and not a very important one at that. 
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railway had been proopted by the order to disarm them. The censor 
cut: 
"Soviet Government circles say they have discovered 
contact between certain Czechoslovak regiments and 
French and Japanese counter-revolutionary propaganda 
agitating for overthrow of Soviet Government thus 
making it clear that as far as Siberia is concerned 
Russia is threatened not by Germany by by certain of 
IffTe-allies stop Goverrment is sending large forces to 
disarm these regiments. 
on the day that those parts of this cable which were passedr were 
printed, (12 June) 33 Scott referred to it in a leader from which it 
is clear that he,, too, was more worried about the South Eastern 
Alliance than about the Czechs. He pointed out that the Germans 
clearly had more than one motive in "setting up this new puppet" 
(Krasnov) since by this act Russia was deprived of access to the 
Black Sea. He also took up a point made by Price elsewhere in his 
cable: that the official German explanation for their part in 
setting up the alliance had been that the Soviet goverment was about 
to conclude a new agreement with the Allies, and that the Central 
Powers were entitled to protect their interests under the treaty of 
Brest Litovsk. Thisi, commented Scottr "may not represent the facts 
but it represents German f ears ... But what are the Allies 
doing to 
Strengthen the only anti-German f orces in Russia, the 
Soviets? ... Surely the least the Allies can do is to enter 
into direct 
camnication with the Soviet goverment and find out what measures 
can be devised between them. " 
Scott's reiterated plea for conuon sense did not appear in print 
until two more cables from Price had arrived on the censor's desk. 
33 Manchester Guardian 12.6.18. Datelined Moscow May 30. 'To 
Star-Ve -Russia. Monarchist South East'. Signed M. philips Price. 
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Both were stopped. The first, sent on 5 June,, began with a 
frightening catalogue of the disparities between the needs and 
available resources of the Soviet government in terms of coal, wood, 
iron, cotton and food. Of food there were still stores in Siberia. 
"But Siberian railways now torn up ýy Czechoslovaks who 
together with counter-revolution army bands financed by 
Prench and Japanese agents in Eastern Siberia are 
trying sever Muscovite Russia f rom last com 
reserve ... Present allies policy drift refusal recognise 
goverment of the day only makes task restoring order 
and mobilising what stores food remain inpossible. 11 
Price went on to sumarise a report which had appeared the previous 
day in Izvestiya. about the discovery of documents showing that 
"foreign finance has been planning overthrow Soviet 
Governmnt" 
and that the only reason action had been delayed was because some of 
the off icers involved were pro--German and wanted German help - as in 
the Ukraine - while others 
"favoured rebellion in one of Volga provinces where in 
Czechoslovak uprising planned by French agents they 
should unite with Japanese forces advancing across 
Siberia". 
On 7 June Price devoted an entire cable to the history of events 
leading up to the current activities of the Czechoslovaks. In his 
diary for 6 June he noted "Radek gives me account of C-Ss and policy 
of Soviet goverment to them" - The cable, not one word of which was 
allowed to be printed, consists of information which has since been 
entirely corroborated, although it is necessarily incowlete. In 
order to follow the development of Price's thought it is worth 
qUo Ing the last two sentences: 
"I am in position assert categorically that action 
Soviet Goverment against Czechoslovaks signities no 
ýýl hostile policy towards allies but was dictated ýo 
absolute necessity secure safety Russian proletarian 
republiC BtOp Soviet goverment is ready consult allied 
representatives about future of Czechoslovaks". 
8: 276 
on 10 June,, only 3 days after sending this last cabler which it was 
not considered in the public interest for the British to read, Price 
sent another piece which,, in remarkable contrast, was printed in full 
on 26 June34. It began: 
"In connection with the rumours of the impending Allied 
intervention in Russia on the pretext that the Soviet 
Goverment has ceded part of Murman to the pro-German 
Finnish Goverrunent, it would be well if the following 
facts were made known. " 
He went on to explain that although Pecheneg, on the western coast of 
Murman, had been ceded to the then revolutionary goverment of 
Finland in February, that government having been overthrown the 
Soviet goverment now considered the cession of Pecheneg invalid. 
Moreover the government had, in a Note to the German Ambassador, 
"energetically protested" against a recent German submarine blockade 
of that coast, pointing out that this was in breach of the Treaty of 
Brest Litovsk. 
"Though not definitely saying so the Note... clearly 
hinted that the Soviet Government might be forced to 
invite the Allies to assist it in protecting the 
neutrality of these regions. " 
"Rumours of the impending Allied intervention" were, of course, well- 
enough founded, although it is hard to see how anyone, at that time 
and those conditions, could have foreseen from which direction it 
would first come, since the principal authors of it did not 
themelves appear to have made up their minds. It will be recalled 
that the f irst reinforcement of the British garrison at murmansk had 
taken place on 9 May, f ive days before the Cheliabinsk incident. On 
11 May, in what became known as the Abbeville Resolution, the Supreme 
US 
"or Council in Paris decided that Trotsky was to be asked to agree 
34 Manchester Guardian 26.6.18. Datelined Moscow June 6. 'Russia 
and FITe -Allies. Protection of Murman Neutrality'. Signed M. Philips 
Price. 
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that any Czechs not already on their way to Vladivostock should be 
allowed to concentrate at Murmansk. On the same day the War Cabinet 
in London set up a Committee to consider what could be done to 
organise military resistance to the Germans while the endless 
correspondence with America and Japan dragged on. Smuts' notes of 
this Committee showed that earlier the same day, at the meeting of 
the War Cabinet which had set it up,, Lloyd George had acknowledged 
that it would be "difficult and indeed impossible... for M. Trotsky to 
invite Allied intervention in Russia however much he might desire it, 
before an Allied force was on the spot to protect him against the 
enemyll. Some hours later the Committee also came to the conclusion 
that it would be unrealistic to wait for a formal invitation to 
intervene35. It came to the further conclusion that it would be 
"inadvisable" to ask the Japanese for ships to take the Czechs to 
Europe "at the very time when we were pressing Japan to undertake 
intervention in Russia, which would absorb all her tomage". The 
Committee felt that the Czechs who had already arrived in 
Vladivostock might be better employed "to stif fen the Japanese as 
part of an Allied intervention force"36. It was into this tidy 
solution that a brick had been thrown at Cheliabinsk. 
35 Churchill believed that an invitation to intervene had been "all 
important in overcoming the reluctance of the United States" to do 
SOr and that the advance of the Czechs into Siberia had provided a 
convenient alternative pretext. see w. S. Churchill The World Crisis. 
Vol. 6 The Aftermath (1929) pp. 91-95. 36 FIO 371.3286. 
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As late as 5 June the Russian Minister in London, Litvinov37 told 
r)-x Leeper of P. I. D. that if the Allies would really carry out an 1W 
intervention against Germany "pramptly and on a large scale 
sufficient to defeat the Germans ... the Bolsheviks would be prepared 
to run the risk of what might follow the arrival of the Allies. n38 
37 MAXIM MAXIMOVICH LITVINOV 1876-1951. After a brief career as a 
soldier, Litvinov joined the RSDLP in 1908, and was soon forced into 
exile. He became extremely adept at smuggling agents and literature 
in and out of Russia. From 1914-18 he lived in England, where he was 
appointed charge d'affaires for the Soviet government in December 
1917. He was arrested in September 1918 in retaliation for the 
arrest of Lockhart in Moscow but a mutual exchange was quickly 
arranged. From 1921 he became an increasingly valued member of 
Narkomindel, despite numerous disagreements with Tchicherin. His 
advocacy of disarmament at the League of Nations made him a world- 
renowned figure until he died, and despite his known disapproval of 
Cold War policies he was not persecuted. There is as yet no serious 
biography of Litvinov although much as been written about him. The 
best account of his career in English is by Henry L. Roberts in 
The Diplomats 1919-1939 (Ed. s Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert,, 
Princeton, 1953). His early period as a diplomat is also dealt with 
by Richard K. Debo in Slavic Review Vol. 34 (1975), pp. 463-482: 
'Litvinov and Kamenev - Ambassadors Extraordinary: the Problem of 
Soviet Representation Abroad'. 
38 Leeper might have used Litvinov's statement as the 
(unacknowledged) basis upon which he built up an argument in favour 
of intervention for presentation to the Advisory Committee on 
International Questions of the Labour Party. In June 1918 the 
Committee had invited Toynbee and Leeper (both in P. I. D. ) to prepare 
memoranda on Russia and the Eastern from "with special regard to a) 
the Brest Peace b) the Border States c) Intervention". Leeper 
submitted a memorandum in July 1918 which argued that the Bolsheviks 
had admitted their inability to offer adequate resistance to the 
Germans without a trained army, to build up which they needed time. 
But, he went on, Germany was "already the real master of Petrograd 
and Moscow and has extended her control throughout the Ukraine and 
the Don as far as the Caucasus". Therefore it was useless for the 
Allies to support the Bolsheviks, and intervention was not only 
justified but demanded by "those Russians who desire to save their 
country from German control". But it would have to come via Siberia, 
where the local inhabitants would be unlikely to f ight for the 
Bolsheviks. "It is true that Germany would overthrow the Bolshevik 
Goverment and occupy Petrograd and Moscow" Leeper concluded. "But 
the position of Russia would not be worse than at present as a result 
Of Allied intervention,, whereas the position of Siberia would be 
materially improved. " It seems reasonable to assume that this was 
One of many rational isations, being discussed in Whitehall in the 
weeks prior to the Allied landings in August 1918. Anothers, 
unsigned, memorandum, with an excellent hand-drawn map to illustrate 
the argument against intervention in the Far East, is to be found in 
the same section of the Labour Party Archives. There is no evidence 
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It is even arguable that but for the brick thrown at Cheliabinsk the 
western Allies could,, if only more by accident than design,? have 
drifted into a form of intervention which would have been more or 
less acceptable to the Soviet goverrunent. As it wasi, complained 
Cecil on 11 June, the decision to invade North Russia, now formulated 
"for the first time ... since it Admiralty in February, appears 
accidental result of a rapid el 
consequent on the Czechoslovak 
conscious stage in the process 
intervention". 
was turned down by the 
to be rather the 
volution of plans 
movement than a 
of general 
This was in a typed memorandum to Balfour. A postscript written in 
his own hand suggests that the British weekend had also played a role 
in the timing and placing of intervention: 
"The important decisions" Cecil wrote "appear to have 
been taken over the heads of the Russia Committee and 
perhaps the F. O. also. I certainly was never informed 
of them - perhaps because I was at Sandwich. n39 
On 23 June further reinforcements were landed at Murmansk, this tirm 
including French as well as British troops. Within a week the Allied 
representatives there had concluded an agreement with the Murmansk 
Soviet which virtually established an Allied protectorate. 40 
in the Minutes of the Advisory Committee that it was ever discussed. 
It went much further in opposing intervention than yet another 
memorandum (by Brailsford) which offered routine arguments against 
intervention and which was discussed by the Committee. The unsigned 
memorandum could have been by Toynbee,, who tended to specialise in 
the Near and Far East of Russia at P. I. D.. The Committee ended up 
hopelessly divided on the whole subject. Labour Party Archives, LP/l 
ACO and Memoranda 1-80. 37 FO 371.3305. 
40 Ullman's account of the British presence in Murmansk throughout 
the spring of 1918 is based on telegrams found in the Milner papers, 
Many of which did not find their way into the Foreign Office files at 
the P. R. O.. Between March and June Admiral Kemp's appeal to London 
for reinforcements at Murmansk were apparently not being heededr 
although General Poole was sent out as British Military 
Representative in Russia (arriving on 24 May 1918) to command any 
troops which might eventually arrrive. Both Kemp and Poole formed a 
good working relationship with the Murmansk Soviet,, as a result of 
which both went so far as to advocate de facto recognition of the 
Bolshevik government to London. But e apparent improvement in on- 
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onll June Price sent a cable which was printed, with significant 
missions, on 2 July4l, a few days after the first encounter between 
British and Russian troops. Many years later Price wrote: 
"In this despatch I was abandoning objectivity because 
it was now almost impossible to be objective. I was on 
a knife ed e and had to come down on one side or 
another. n4 
Why so much of it passed the censor is a mystery; possibly some 
censors interpreted their instructions more liberally than others. 
Price began by describing the difficulties under which the Soviet 
goverment was trying to maintain order. Bad news for the Soviet 
goverment was on the whole good news for the Press Bureau, and it is 
not surprising that this passage was passed. But Price was then 
allowed to go on to appeal specifically to British and Anerican 
Labour "to prevent the canker of anarchy f rom rotting the structure 
of the Russian Revolution" and to point out that the overthrow of the 
the-spot relations was suddenly reversed by the activities of the 
Czechs in Siberia and by German pressure on Moscow to get the British 
out of Murmansk (their presence being unquestionably in breach of the 
terms of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk) . On 15 June Lockhart received a categorical demand fram Tchicherin for the withdrawal of British 
forces from Murmansk. On 23 June Major General M. C. Maynard landed 
there with 600 men and immediately set forth down the railway. 
Despite having received clear orders from Moscow to protest against 
the landings and indications that armed resistance was being 
prepared, the Murmansk Soviet, on 30 June, passed a resolultion to 
defy Moscow and continue its existing co-operation with the Allies 
(from which,, it must be said, they at that time benefited 
considerably in terms of food supplies). On 6 July a formal 
agreement on the lines of mutual co-operation was signed between the 
Praesidium of the Regional Soviet on the one hand, and by Poole and 
the captains of the French and American cruisers then in port at 
Murmansk,, on the other. See Ullman,, Anglo-Soviet Relations Vol. I 
PP. 174-185; and Debo, Revolution and Survival pp. 267-270 and 280- 
288. 
41 Manchester Guardian 2.7.18. Datelined Moscow May 11. 'The Allies 
and Ru-ssia: Intervention Dangers' Signed M. Philips Price. (The 
Manchester- Guardian dateline is obviously a misprint. Price's own ýýa 
e clearly dated June 11. ) 
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soviet Goverment would in the long run benef it only Germany. 
then tackled the subject of recognition. 
"We are informed here that the Allies could not 
recognise a goverrment representing only one class if 
that class was the working class. " 
Yet a goverrurent 
"consisting mainly of landlords, bankers, industrial 
capitalists and intellectuals who call themselves 
democrats" 
he 
and who, tooj, represented only one class, would somehow qualify for 
recognition by the Allies. If there was discontent in Russia now, 
Price maintained, it was not due to dislike of socialist legislation 
but "an elementary outburst due to famine". if the Allies succeeded 
in setting up the sort of government in Russia that they appeared to 
want 
"the very workers and peasants who are now discontented 
with the Soviet Goverment on account of famine will be 
doubly more opposed to the Allies for class 
reasons ... the ground will be prepared for a much more dangerous explosion ". 
The violent reaction of the peasants in the Ukrainey Price went on, 
was a case in point. This was not a national but a class rising and 
the same thing would happen in any district in Russia in which the 
Allies set up a government, of Kadets and landlords who should proceed 
to take the land away from the peasants and crush the Labour 
movement. 
"The days of national coalition governments in Russia 
are gone and the capitalist lion can no longer lie down 
with the proletariat lamb except under one condition - 
that the lamb is inside. " 
He concluded by warning the All ies again against attempting to set up 
a PuPpet goverment in Russia, for 
"those who touch the social reforms of the Russian 
Revolution are only adding fuel to the Bolshevik flame 
which, though driven under ground will burst out with 
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even more destructive violence later. " 
What was left out of this cable was mainly concerned either with the 
Czechs or with the direct appeal that Price considered he was making 
to British and American Labour. After a first sentence in which he 
acknowledged that the Soviet Government was facing an anarchic 
situation, he wrote a long passage, which was suppressed, about the 
activities of the Czechs along the Siberian railway. The Czechs,, 
Price tried to say, were not the innocents they were made out to be. 
"It is si 
which CZE 
ificant that eve 
aks enter 
town of Siberian rail 
arrest local Soviet set 
up local goverment consisting of kadets local 
bourgeoisie cossack officers and other opponents Soviet 
authority stop When at same time French military 
mission and diplomatic representatives allies take 
Czechoslovaks under their protection as they are doing 
it is clear that allies are deliberately supporting 
rebellion against Soviet Goverment and financing 
anarchy in country. 
The censor then, af ter allowing a passage about famine and its 
relation to peasant discontent,, stopped a passage which read: 
"If allied governments have set themselves task 
overthrowing Soviet Government by economic isolation 
Muscovite Russia and utilising anarchy resulting fr 
famine for their own ends then they are to be 
congratulated on being about to accomplish their object 
stop Nevertheless they cannot now sanctimoniously 
pretend that they are not interfering_in_internal 
affairs Russia and are not helping one of the two class 
forces against the other stop Bolsheviks have always 
foreshadowed this possibility and Lenin himself always 
said that unless British and American labour cam to 
aid Russian revolution latter would perish. 
A third passage was cut from the very end of this despatchr but this 
may have been done for editorial rather than political reasons, since 
it contained a number of hackneyed phrases about the struggle between 
rival groups of finance capitalists and the hopes of brighter days 
for troubled humanity which rather took the edge off an otherwise 
remarkable defence of the Russian revolution which,, perhaps even mre 
remarkably, escaped the censor Is pencil. 
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Price later thought that this despatch may have prompted scott to 
send him, on 18 June, a cable - of which no copy survives - asking 
him to f ind out whether the Soviet government was prepared to enter 
into economic relations with Great Britain. The chances are that at 
the time Scott sent off the cable Price's despatch was stillfituck in 
the Press Bureau. But Scott would have been acting consistently with 
the line he had in any case been taking editorially for months: that 
the Allies would do well to find out what the Russian government 
needed if it was ever again to play a significant part in the closing 
stages of the war. Since outgoing cables were equally subject to 
censorship the Press Bureau must either have approved it or at least 
not dared to stop it. As soon as he received Scott's cable Price got 
an interview with Tchicherin and sent off a reply on 20 June which 
was printed almost word for word, but not until 8 july43. Price 
later recorded that at about this time he ran into Lockhart in the 
street and discussed with him the whole question of Allied aid to 
110%ussia. Lockhart confirmed that Tchicherin had said much the sam to 
him as he had just said to Price but, wrote Price, "he doubted if 
anything would come of it because the pressure working for 
intervention was now very strong". 44 Lockhart was, of course, now 
working for it himself - 
In his account of his interview with Price Tchicherin spelled out in 
some detail the kinds of economic aid which the Soviet goverment 
needed to re-establish industrial and agricultural productivityr and 
43 Manchester Guardian 8.7.18. Datelined Moscow June 20. 'How to 
Help-R-ussia. official Soviet View' Signed M. Philips Price. 
44 p. 127. 
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went on to say that the Soviet goverment would be ready in return to 
export certain raw materials and to make 
"certain public concessions under specified conditions. 
We have already made an offer to Germany to treat with 
us and to America, through Colonel Robins who is now on 
his way home. We have not yet made the offer to 
England sinply because we do not feel assured that the 
words of Mr. Lockhart to us represent the views of the 
British Government or only his own view" [sic]. 
But, Tchicherin went on, 
"we shall in no circumstances allow the workers and 
peasants of Russia to be made cannon fodder for the 
Allies, and the first practical step the Allies must 
take if they wish to help us is recognition of the 
Soviet Government". 
Price then put his own gloss on the interview. "If the Allies intend 
to act" he wrote "they have, as often before in this war, decided too 
late". He listed the opportunities they had missed for helping 
rather than interfering: in the Ukraine and in the Cossack regions 
during the past two months. He advanced the idea that "no greater 
service" could be done to Russia than that the Allies should offer to 
mediate between the Soviet goverment and the Czechoslovaks 
"with a view to the speedy removal of the latter to 
France, where they can be much more useful ... The first 
practical help the Allies can afford is to inform all 
military forces which have raised rebellion against the 
Soviet Government that they cannot count on their 
support, either material or moral. " 
The Soviet goverment was, Price believed, still strong enough to 
organise Russia, at least that part of Russia east of the Volga, if 
assisted on the lines suggested by Tchicherin. But if the Alliest 
like the Germans,? sought to bring about change by relying on the 
Russian bourgeoisie,, they would find that 
"the workers and peasants will not calmly stand by and 
see the restoration of the social system of Tsarism". 
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And even the Russian bourgeoisie, he suggestedl, were beginning to 
have second thoughts; 
"the lesson of the Ukraine Kadets is being learned by 
their Moscow colleagues". 
Price always thought that the subsequent arrival in Russia of the 
British Economic Mission was in some way connected with Scott's 
enquiry and his interview with Tchicherin. But in writing about it 
in later years he got the dates hopelessly confused. In any case he 
could not have known that the sending of the Mission had been planned 
in Whitehall, many weeks earlier. An account of the origins and 
adventures of the Mission is given in Appendix Vi. 
Among the last messages sent by Price of which parts,, at least,, got 
through were two sent on 14 and 21 June about Turkish annexations in 
the Caucasus. Only the second was printed (on 3 July) and 
unfortunately this was one of those of which he did not keep a 
copy. The two were, however, probably designed to go together. In 
the f irst, (14 June) . Price gave the background to the second by 
describing the situation in the Caucasus as reported to him by 
refugees recently arrived in Moscow f rom that area. They had told 
him that the Transcaucasus Goverment had collapsed three weeks 
earlier because the Armenians had withdrawn their support when the 
gOvernment acquiesced in the cession of the Kars plateau and the 
Araxes Valley to Turkey. The Turks had thereupon advanced into 
r-XN. ^ ,, --,, rgia and arrived within 50 Miles of Tiflis. 
"This threat believed to be sign of strong inperialist 
Party Constantinople probably led by nver Pasha who 
wishes draw nationalities Caucasus southeast Russian 
_pteppes 
into sphere Turkish influence". 
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Germany had blocked the Turkish move by insisting on the creation of 
an independent Georgian state under her own protection. The Turks 
then stopped their advance into Georgia but 
"there is said to be secret clause in treaty between 
Germany and Georgia ýy which latter agrees allow former 
transport troops through its territory". 
The consolation prize for Turkey was to be creation of an Azerbaijan 
Tartar Khanate under Turkish suzerainty. The Turksg, thwarted in 
Georgia, were countering by occupying the Persian province of 
Azerbaijan and were intending to create an autonomus province of 
Turkey consisting of Azerbaijan and the forner Transcaucasus 
provinces of Baku and Elizavetopol. 
"All this terri 
speaking Turani 
and formation i 
inhabited by Persian Shiites 
an dialect and its severance from Persia 
nto autonomous province of Turkey is 
part pan-Turanian party's policy whi 
for moment to be supporting against 
imperialist group in Constantinople. 
)anIslamic 
These events had resulted in strong anti-Turkish feeling in Persia 
and brought a pro-British goverment into power. 
"Whole of Transcaucasus except one spot Baku where red 
flag still flying must be regarded as lost to influence 
allies stop Latter could have barred the way of pan- 
Germans into Central Asia if they had acted in time. 
It is perhaps not surprising that the Press Bureau found it easier to 
allow the publication of the piece that Price subsequently wrote, 
which appeared on 3 July under the title "Dismemberffent of the 
Caucasus", than to pass on his suggestions as to how this might have 
een prevented45. 
On the same day (14 June) as Price sent the first of his despatches 
about developments in the Caucasus, he sent another accountr which 
45Manchester Guardian 3.7.18. Datelined Moscow June 21. 
'Dimemberment of the Caucasus'. Signed M. Philips Price. 
Germany seems 
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was suppressed entirely, of the activities of the Czechs in Siberia. 
He noted that they were getting support f rom both the Siberian and 
the Orenburg Cossacks, and from the Cossacks of the SOuth-eastern 
steppes. He recalled that he had 
"more than once pointed outvvhat basis of Cossack 
movements is 
and that the Cossacks feared 
"tide immigration peasants from Muscovite Russia as 
result calamitous economic state latter region ... Plan 
of Czechoslovak rising has apparently been skillfully 
laid and leaders have calculated on seizing poin+-4= ts 
where they could count on support wealthier Cossack 
population". 
Price went on to report the joint declaration made on 4 June by 
Allied diplomats in Moscow to the effect that the Allies looked upon 
the disarming of the Czechs as a hostile act. He also reported 
"t Tchicherin's Note of 14 June in reply, in which he had point out that 
"Russia neutral country and cannot allow armed forces 
not subjected to authority Soviet Goverment to exist 
in Russia. " 
Tchicherin's Note had referred to 
"information in possession of Goverrunent that 
Czechoslovak conmanders have been in close 
communication with agents who are trying to overthrow 
Soviet authority". 
Price attempted to amplify Tchicherin's reference in another 
despatch, similarly stopped, on 28 June, in which he summarised a 
report which had appeared on the previous day in the Czech 
internationalist journal Prukcpik Svobodi. This had stated that 
dOcuments discovered in Moscow proved that members of the 
Czechoslovak National Council had reoeived 11 million roubles and a 
further E80,, 000 for the use of regiments under the control of 
Council. Prukopik Svobodi had gone on to point out that if it had 
bL'en true,, as Czech commanders on the Siberian and Chinese Eastern 
8: 288 
Railways had reportedly told their men, that they were being 
prevented f rom going overseas, then 
"one would expect they would take steps to force their 
way eastwards". 
The journal had also observed that while it was true that 15,, 000 
czech troops had now arrived in Vladivostock, 
"no attempt being nMe send them to France Allied 
consuls stating there is no tonnage". 
Meanwhile the Czechs remaining on the railways were 
"engaged ... overthrawi Soviet administration 
establishing their opponents in power. " 
On 25 June Price sent two messages to the Manchester Guardian on the 
same day, as he had of ten done before. Half of one of them was 
printed but the other one was stopped. The one that was stopped 
harked back to his earlier disclosures about the Secret Treaties,, 
consisting of an account of Russo-Japanese relations as f ar back as 
the winter of 1914. At that time it had been agreed that the best 
way for Japan to help the Western Allies would be 
"keeping China free German influence", 
This decision had been embodied in a Russo-Japanese treaty in June 
1916, said Price, of which the Bolsheviks had now found the text. A 
secret clause of the treaty provided for the cession to Japan of 
Russia's interest in the southern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
and of navigation rights on the Sangari River, despite the fact that 
the railway was the joint property of Russia and China and the 
Consent of the Chinese had not been obtained. Not content with thiso, 
the Japanese had demanded, in January 1917, further compensation from 
the Tsarist goverment 
"for concluding military convention with Allies 
especially as all other Allies had already agreed 
Coq*nsation each was to reoeive at close war". 
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The Tsarist goverment had apparently replied that if the Japanese 
wanted further conpensation they would have to look for it in China. 
Price added: 
"Soviet Government circles here profess believe 
Jananese r>olicv not chanqed since then. " 
The agreement of June 1916,, with its cavalier treatzent of China, was 
still valid but 
"Soviet Goverment apparently desires regulate these 
points by agreement both with Japan and China 
confiming former in her concession interests under 
treaty without at sam time infringing sovereign rights 
China". 
The second despatch which Price sent of f on 25 June was the last, 
which he had written on Russian soil,, to be printed in the Manchester 
Guardian and at that it had been considerably shortened by the censor 
before it appeared on 11 july46. His references in it to a 
supposedly French-provoked rising of German prisoners of war at 
Irkutsk were deleted, and what remained was a precis of messages of 
bland assurance which the Irkutsk Soviet had sent to Moscow. The 
situation in Eastern Siberia was satisfactory. Semenov was 
retreating into Manchuria,, the Trans-Baikal Cossacks were quiet, the 
younger generation of Siberians were supporting the Soviets and their 
elders were neutral. It might, with equal justice and as much irony 
have been headed: "All Quiet on the Eastern Front". 
46 Manchester Guardian 11.7.18. Datelined Moscow June 25. 'The 
SOviieýtand Siberia'. Signed M. Philips Price. (Price's diary for 
24 
June contains the entry "Tchicherin phones me to see him about 
CWitions in Siberia". ) Price papers. 
9: 290 
Chapter 9. The Censor Wins 
In October 1918 an exchange of notes in the Foreign Office was headed 
"dangerous Activities of Mr. Price and Mr. Ransomell. Stephen Gaselee 
contributed to this, a PrOPOS Price, nWe have SOMetimes had to look 
very sharply at his telegrams to the Manchester Guardian'l. As has 
I Just been shown, Price's telegrams were being sharply looked at from 
at least February 1918. Evidence of the censorship of his messages 
throughout June was abundant. In July the five he tried to send were 
stopped. In August Price appears not to have tried to send anything, 
although one piece which appeared in the Manchester Guardian on 16 
August about the new Russian Constitution might have been by him, if 
for no other reason that he had just translated it into English. In 
addition, the account would appear to have been written bY SombOdY 
who took a partisan (i. e. favourable) view of it. Between 13 
September and 19 October he sent ten messages by wireless. After 
that he appears to have given up trying. 
Although there is some evidence that Price made use of the copies he 
kept between February and October 1918 - he occasionally quoted from 
them in his books - he did not appear to value them for what they 
are: an alternative account of the Russian revolution during most of 
1918 which could have been available to his contemporaries. It is 
the fact that Price told them,, at the time, so much of what has since 
I FO 371.3342. 
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been laboriously put together with industry and hindsight, that makes 
these despatches so interesting. In what follows all the information 
sumarised is taken direct and uncorroborated from his messages. 
Everything in italics is a direct quotation. None of it appeared in 
print. 
The message that Price sent in response to the landing of Allied 
troops at Murmansk on 23 June was dated 29 June. It began by 
recording that Tchicherin had delivered a formal protest, and that 
the Allies had replied by denying that they had any aggressive 
intentions, and protesting that the landings were necessary to keep 
open communications between Russia and the West which had been 
threatened by Finnish and German activities on Pecheneg. Price also 
noted that the agreement of the Soviet of the Northern Provinces to 
the landing was, in part,, prompted by hunger and the hope of food 
from the Allies. On the other hand the Petrograd Soviet in which 
recent elections had given an overwhelming victory to the Bolsheviks, 
was determined to defend the territories of the Soviet Republic at 
all costs and had ordered troops up to Murmansk. 
Allied governments appear singularly unfortunate in 
methods they adopt to Russia and by their recent action 
they seem about to create for themselves another 
Salonika on the Murman stop If they had recognised 
Soviet government in spring and treated it with 
ordinary civility they would have been in p2sition now 
with sanction of latter to secure Murman from German 
aggression and would probably have obtained dominant 
economic_position in north and centre of Russia stqp 
But now by recognising only Soviet of Northern 
Provinces they accelerate process partition Russia into 
spheres influence and throw Muscovite Russia into 
sPhere of Germany st2p Moreover unless Allied 
, 
qovernments understand that recognition Northern 
Soviets excludes all attempts interfere affairs country 
and to find so-called real Russia by overthrowipq 
workers Soviets and establishing rule of landlords and 
local bourgeoisie as Germans and Czechoslovaks have 
done they will arouse fierce resentment stop_It appears 
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certain people in England are anxious to arouse so- 
called healthy national feeling in Russia stop Anyone 
who has lived in Russia duripc I_these tines knows that 
healthy national feeling has been here all along stop 
But it is a nationalism that insists that Russian land 
shall be given to Russian peasants who work it that 
Russian workNen shall be emancipated from e=loitation 
by uncontrolled foreign capitalism and that the 
territories of the Russian Federal Soviet ke7 Rýýblic 
shall be freed from the imperialist forces of western 
and central Europe that are wandering over its borders. 
The next despatch that Price sent began with a dismissive reference 
to Kerensky's speech to the British Labour Party Annual Conference on 
26 June 19182. He pointed out that although Kerensky had been the 
popular hero of the revolution during the previous surnmer he had lost 
influence after the failure of the Stockholm Conference and the 
centre of gravity in Russia had subsequently shifted decisively to 
the Lef t. 
To put up Kerensky-now as-r )resentative of 
revolutionary Russia would be like trotting out corpse 
ierre to lead French Revolutionafter' 
been guillotined. 
Price went on to analyse what he called 
the inexorable force that drives humanity in periods of 
cataclysmic change. 
In February he had reported that the urban proletariat were against 
peace while the peasantry wanted peace at almost any price. 
If all allies had not hindered Soviet Government 
financing rebellion against it and if they had honestly 
supported its endeavours to reconstruct country Russia 
would now be in a position to avenge Brest Litovsk. 
The peace had given peasant soldiers a chance to go back to their 
hanes, 
to find land is indeed theirs and therefore now have 
sorething to fight for - 
2Kerensky made a surprise appearance at the Labour Party 
COnference on 26 June 1918, when he condemned the Bolshevik regime 
and appealed for British intervention in Russia. Michael Farbman in 
The Herald on 6 July sunTned up the occasion more in sorrow than 
in 
anger. 
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signs were not wanting that those who favoured peace in February were 
now 
thoroughly aroused against German tyranny. 
The anti-peace section within the Bolshevik party would gain ground 
if only 
the alliesby intervention donot prevent this healthy 
normal development. 
The Left S. R. s were also gaining ground, and Price recalled that 
although they had broken away from the right wing of the party in the 
autumn of 1917 and made cornmon cause with the Bolsheviks, 
particularly with regard to the confiscation of land for the 
peasants, they had parted with the Bolsheviks on the issue of Brest 
Litovsk. The Left S. R. s believed in 
war with all imperialist governnents and under no 
circumstances agree compromise on vital questions of 
principle of revolution. 
Price added prophetically: 
Upon them in fact has fallen mantle of the terrorists. 
He then reported an interview which he had had the previous day with 
one of the Left S. R. leaders, Sablin3, who had told him that at the 
forthccming 5th All-Russia Congress of Soviets the Left S. R. s were 
going to try to secure the renunciation of Brest Litovsk. Asked by 
3 yURI VLADIMIROVICH SABLIN (1897-1937). Born into an aristocratic 
family with revolutionary traditions, Sablin joined the army in 1916 
and after the March revolution was elected to the Moscow Soviet of 
Soldiers Deputies. In the November revolution he was a member of the 
Military Revolutionary Committee, and soon afterwards was elected to 
the Central Executive Committee of the 4th All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets. He is thought to have resigned in protest against Brest 
Litovsk, and he took part in the attempted Left S. R. coup in July 
1918y for which he was arrested,, tried, sentenced and amnestied. He 
joined the Communist Party in May 1919 and fought on three Civil War 
fronts. He went on to become a military academic and one of the 
founders of the Soviet Air Force. He was executed during the 
Stalinist purges but has been posthumously rehabilitated. Very 
little has been written about him in English. he is mentioned by 
John Erickson in The Soviet High Command (New York 1962) and by B. H. 
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Price about Left S. R. reaction to the Allied landirxgs Sablin had 
replied that they were at one with the Bolsheviks in resisting 
imperialist aggression to the last man. Price said that in the Left 
S. R. s he now found the spirit of 1812, and that 
rebellion will be raised against all who invade Russia 
whether as 
unblushing counter-revolutionaries 
like the Germans in the Ukraine, or the 
so-called supporters so-called real Russia 
favoured by the Allies in the Murman and Siberia. The Allies would 
not find support anywhere: neither among the proletariat nor among 
the poor peasants nor among the better-of f peasants. They could rely 
only on the Right S. R. s. 
One is therefore tempted to ask what the allies intend 
to do where when they decide to intervene and whether 
they have any idea of how to deal with the internal 
social problem in Russia which they must tackle if once 
they set out on their dangerous adventure stop Allies 
are sowing dragons teeth in Eastern Europe which will 
some day grow into bayonets which may be directed in 
direction they least desire. 
Price was present throughout the proceedings of the 5th Congress 
which opened on 4 July. In My Three Revolutions he devoted more than 
six pages to the attempted Left S. R. coup which took place during 
thisCongress because he thought its importance had been 
insufficiently recognised by most writers up to the late 1960s. 
"Moreover I was one of the few people who saw the whole affair at 
close quarters,, but I never succeeded in reporting anything about it 
tO the Manchester Guardian"4. This was not for want of trying; he 
Liddell Hart (Ed. ) in The Red Army (New York 1956). 
4M Three Revolutions pp. 119-126. The planning, execution and 
Political consequences (in terms of both internal and external 
Politics) of the attempted Left S. R. coup is described in 
considerable detail by Debo in Revolution and Survival pp. 311-331, 
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sent off four despatches about the Congress, but all were stopped. 
In the first, dated 4 July, he reported that Joe Fineberg5, whom he 
drawing largely on Russian sources. His account of the proceedings 
of the Fifth Congress up to the time of the murder of Mirbach tallies 
closely with that given by Price in the first of his four censored 
telegrams. However Debo goes on to concern himself entirely with the 
political consequences of the event; he does not return to the 
Congress. Price on the other hand continued to record its activities 
for the remainder of its sessions, including the passing of the new 
Constitution of the R. S. F. S. R., in three more articles which the 
British public did not get a chance to read. Price also described 
both the Congress and the coup graphically in his Reminiscences pp. 
313-326. The account in My Three Revolutions is essentially a 
condensation of that, with a few more personal recollections of the 
occasion added. 
5 Joseph (or John) Fineberg, (born Zhokin) in Poland in 1886 was 
brought to England by his parents at the age of 18 months. He became 
an East End tailoring worker and a member of the B. S. P., in which he 
became increasingly associated with the opposition to Hyndman's 
attitude to the First World War. Fineberg was a member of the 
Executive of the B. S. P. from 1914-1917 and a regular contributor to 
its journal The Call from its first edition in 1916. He was one of 
the 3 B. S. P. members to be elected to the Provisional Committee set 
up to carry on the campaign for the formation of Soviets in Britain 
after the Leeds Convention of June 1917. In February 1918 he became 
Litvinov's secretary and in July arrived in Russia just in time for 
the 5th All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Two articles by him appeared 
in the (British) The Call on 18 July and 5 September giving accounts 
of life and poliýical events in Moscow at that time which are unique 
in the English language. He quickly became involved in propaganda 
and journalism and in his own contribution to 
, 
Reminiscences of V. I. 
Lenin (Moscow 1960 pp. 205-209) stated that in 1918-1919 he was "busy 
editing leaflets and a small newspaper The Call which were to be 
distributed amongst British and American intervention troops in 
Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and other places". It is also clear that he 
had considerable freedom of access to Lenin and accompanied many if 
not most English-speaking visitors to Lenin, including Price. Among 
Lenin's letters is one written to Tchicherin early in May 1920 asking 
him"and Fineburg" to look through the draft of his Left Wina 
Conmunism: An Infantile Disorder and let him know if there were "any 
mistakes or errors of tact". (Lenin: Collected Works, English 
Translation, Vol. 4 p. 371). Fineberg took an active part in the 
preliminary work of setting up the Third International and endorsed 
in the name of the B. S. P. the manifesto which paved the way for its 
first meeting although he had no mandate to do so and the B. S. P. did 
nott in fact, affiliate to the Comintern until the autumn of 1920. 
From 1925-1926 he was TASS Correspondent in Peking. Fineberg is 
known to have worked for the Comintern until 1935 and survived for 
another twenty years. See also , 
The Internationalists (Moscow 1961) 
PP. 180,227,544-548,555,556. Reminiscences of V. I. Lenin appears 
to have been published originally under the title Lenin and the 
International Workers Movement: Reminiscences (Moscow 1934). There W_ýý 
296 
had met for the first time two days earlier, opened the proceedings 
by reading a resolution from the British Socialist Party demanding 
that the Allies cease interfering in the internal affairs of the 
Russian revolution. He was followed by a delegate from the Ukrainian 
Peasants' Soviet, who described what the Germans were doing to the 
Ukrainians and what the Ukrainians were doing to drive them out. 
This had brought loud denunciations of Brest Litovsk from the Left 
S. R. s, who then attempted to get the delegates to the Ukrainian 
Soviet accepted as members of the conference. But this had to be 
turned down under the terms of the treaty, which declared that the 
Ukraine was not within the jurisdiction of the Soviet Government. 
Trotsky had then come forward to allege that both Pan-German and 
Allied agents were working in the Ukraine to induce Soviet troops to 
take action before they were ready. A furious debate then took place 
in which the Left S. R. s Kamkov and Spiridonova6 called for action 
against the Germans while the Bolshevik president of the Petrograd 
Soviet, Zinoviev, called for restraint. Price reported him as having 
said: 
are also references to Fineberg in Walter Kendall: The Revolution 
Movement in Britain 1900-1921 (1969). 
ý6 MARIA ALEKSANDROVNA SPIRIDONOVA (1884-1941). A socialist 
revolutionary since 1905, Maria Aleksandrovna Spiridonova mortally 
wounded a Tsarist official in 1906 and was condemned to death, a 
sentence subsequently commuted to penal servitude for life. She 
returned to European Russia to attend the 3rd Congress of S. R. s in 
MaY1917 and became a member of the Petrograd Soviet and of the 
Central Executive Committee of the All Russia Soviet of Peasants' 
Deputies, of which she later became President. She supported the 
Bolsheviks at the 2nd and 3rd Congress of Soviets, her support including the ratification of the Treaty of Brest Litovskj, but in the 
SURVer of 1918 became more anti-Bolshevik, mainly because of policies 
towards the peasants. Implicated in the Left S. R. coup of July 1918, 
she was given a one-year sentence. From 1920-1928 periods of internal exile alternated with periods of imprisonment, house arrest 
andtreatment for tuberculosis. She is thought to have been killed 
in prison in 1941 at Orel by Soviet authorities as the German armies 
approached the city. There is one biography in English: 
L Steinberg: Spiridonova - revolutionary Terrorist (Loondon 1935). 
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We see at our doors crimes of Germans in Baltic 
provinces but we have sufficient revolutionary 
a-isciplineto know when and how to strike 
Trotsky had supported Zinoviev: 
we must not allow i t regiments at f ront to 
decide question of war and peace for that power 
belongs only to this conference stop Disorderly band 
isan) 
, 
warfare is tactic of political 
impressionists and not of statesmen. 
Trotsky had then proposed a resolution insisting on discipline. The 
resolution was adopted by the Congress but the Left S. R. s left the 
hallin protest. Price concluded this cable by suggesting that 
although the country was deeply divided 
as to tactics to adopt over question struggle against 
Brest Litovsk ... apparently Bolsheviks have learned from Governments of Germany and the Allies how to unite 
their people the masses against external danger by 
appeal to patriotism. 
On 8 July Price sent his second message about the 5th Congress. He 
reported that on the second day the Left S. R. s had returned and taken 
part in a debate on the report of the Council of People's Comissars 
on government policy in the past three months. 
Nevertheless even on second day it was clear breach 
Left S. R. s and Bolsheviks was widening every hour. 
In the morning they opposed on ideological grounds the Bolshevik 
policy of using force to extract food from the richer peasantry on 
the grounds that it would result in civil war. Even Left S. R. s still 
wanted to be seen in their historical role as representatives of the 
Peasantry , 
which they recognise as separate class in cowuniýy 
wrote Pr ice. But 
in matters concerning foreign relations ... part of Left 
S. R. leaders have fallen under influence certain 
terroristgroups ... Tactics of Socialist Revolutionaries 
as matter fact have always been distinguished by 
spasmodic outbursts of terrorism stop Present condition 
%issia crushed between two armed alliances produce_ 
feeling hopelessness and despair which inevitably 
reacts upon certain unbalanced intellectual minds. 
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The intrigues of German agents and the behaviour of the Allies had 
all 
.e ground 
for this terrorist group. 
Price referred almost casually to the assassination of the German 
Ambassador during the lunch-hour7 and quoted Lenin's statement 
after the liquidation of the attempted Left S. R. coup of which the 
assassination had been part as the epitome of revolutionary realism: 
The revolution (said Lenin) with extraordinary 
consistency brings to a logical end every one of its 
stages mercilessly exposing the stupidity and 
criminality of those tactics which are unsuitable to 
the given moment. 
Price concluded this despatch with a sLunmry of the Bolshevik 
position: 
They see that material forces are not at their disposal 
which enable them to fight against military power 
central empires with few guerilla bands armed with hand 
grenades while governments of England and France 
continue to finance counter-revolutionary organisations 
in their rear and occupy as much territory of the 
Republic as thty are capable stop Lenin's great speech 
on Friday was entirely devoted to need of realising 
what is and what is not practical for Russian 
revolution surrounded by whole world in arms against it 
stop On other hand tragedy Left Socialist 
Revolutionary party who apparently have not sufficient 
balance of mind to resist sacrificing themselves on 
altar of terrorism is much regretted by Bolsheviks for 
the two parties have worked together in more or less 
close union for many months stop Now Bolsheviks are 
guite alone and upon them rests superhuman task of 
bearinq the cross of the revolution against armed cimpps 
of Europe until democracies of other lands awake. 
7 Price was lodging at this time "not more than 100 yards from the 
German Embassy" and "On leaving my lodging near the end of Arbat 
about two o'clock to return to the afternoon sitting of the Congress 
I heard two loud explosions followed by what seemed to me to be 
revolver shots". (Reminiscences p. 322). Debo in (Revolution and 
Survival p. 316-317) gives an account of the assassination of Mirbach 
whi6--Suggests that Price misremembered the order in which the sounds 
Occurred and his sources are, of coure, a great deal more reliable 
than Pr ice Is aural memory. In fact the assass in Bl jumk in f irst f ired 
a pistol shot which mortally wounded the Arnha*ador; he then threw a 
bOMb into the room to cover his retreat as he was leaving. 
9: 299 
(The fate of this message is unusually we 11 -documented, and is dealt 
with in Appendix X because it illustrates the problems experienced by 
the British Censor in dealing with messages sent by wireless. ) 
on 10 July Price sent off a very short piece describing how quickly 
life had returned to normal after the attempted Left S. R. coup and 
how well the troops had behaved towards the civilian population. The 
Congress had resumed its work and had been discussing food 
production. The situation in central Russia was still critical but 
an excellent harvest was expected. On the last day of the Congress 
(11 July) Price sent a report of its final act,, the passing of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic. He noted 
brief ly who had the right to vote and who had not under the new 
constitution; only those with the right to vote had the right to bear 
arms but they would also be liable for military service. Private 
property in land had been abolished but it was recognised that the 
products of labour on the land were the property of those who had 
produced them. Railways,, waterways, mines and banks had been 
declared state property. Price reported that about half the S. R. 
delegates had taken part in this last session of the Congress, having 
disassociated themselves f rom, those who had been responsible for the 
attempted coup. Price gave his own characteristic explanation of the 
defection of the Left S. R. s: 
These delegates represent richer corn producing 
districts central Volga where peasants fear requi ition 
food stop Thus position analagous to that created by 
defection of Girondists from national convention in 
French Revolution stop Urban proletariat and rer 
peasantry now becoming controlling factors in 
gOvernment here. 
9: 300 
A COPY Of one of Price's messages to the Manchester Guardian sent at 
some time during the summer of 1918 is undated: the only one. It 
makes no mention of the Allied landings (which is not surprising 
since he must have guessed by then that nothing he said on that 
subject would ever be printed) but neither does it mention any of the 
events which he dealt with in the next series of messages that he 
sent, beginning 13 September. This suggests that the undated piece 
should be placed in the second half of August. It continued, 
predictably, to deal with one of the main preoccupations of that 
period in Russia: food. The piece began with a brief account of the 
rationing system operating in Moscow and of the food-gathering 
expeditions which Trades Unions and Shop Stewards Committees in the 
industrial cities were sending to the provinces8. Price was well 
placed to describe what was going on in the villages within walking 
distance or a short railway journey from Moscow, because by now he 
was food-gathering himself. 
Each industrial union takes a province and sends some 
of its workmen to take ... trainloads of manufactured 
goods to peasants and receive in return food for 
working population of towns stop Peasants readily part 
with their produce under these conditions and this 
process natural exchange has effect of doing away 
reducipg issue of fresh currency stop These workmens 
food e? peditions are also organising so-called 
committees of poor peasants in villages to requisition 
stocks from rural speculators stop Last week I was in 
rural district of neighbouring province and found that 
these committees ... are almost entirely controlling the 
P asant soviets and are organising village schools 
where there had been none before lectures reading room 
pu! blic restaurants in provincial towns stop In some 
_laces 
I found interesting e riments, in creation of 
agricultural communes among urban workmen recently 
returned to villages stop Land is worked in common and 
produce divided equally among members stop Soviet 
20yernment gives loans to them for development 
scientific agriculture by modern machinery and manures 
but scarcity latter greatly hinders successful 
8 See above Chp. 6 F/*N 37. 
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development stop Most of these comunes are founded on gie-domains of the now dispossessed landlords. 
on I August 1918 Price began work as a translator at Narkomindel (see 
below p. 318). The Allied landing at Archangel took place the next 
day. His response to it is not to be found in any attempted message 
to the Manchester Guardian but in his pamphlet The Truth About the 
Allied Intervention in Russia which will be dealt with in Chapter 10. 
By the date of his next attempt to send anything to his paper, 
Uritsky, the Bolshevik Chief of Police, had been assassinated; an 
attempt made on Lenin's life; the British naval attache Captain 
Cromie had been killed defending the former British Embassy buildings 
in Petrograd; Lockhart was shut up in the Kremlin; the Red Terror 
was in full force; and Britain had threatened to get Russia declared 
outlaw by the entire international community9. On 13 September 
9 On 5 August 1918, the day after the Allied landings at Archangel, 
the Cheka arrested and interned 200 French and British residents in 
Moscow and all the members of the British Consulate General staff 
except the Consul-General himself, Oliver Wardrop. Realising they 
could now no longer protect their nationals the Allied consulates 
took down their flags. British interests were given into the charge 
of the Netherlands Minister in Petrograd: Oudendyk. Although 
dipolmatic relations had not been formally broken off, the internees 
were used by the Soviet government as bargaining counters with which 
to get Litvinov and his staff out of England, and for the return of 
Russian soldiers serving in France. On 30 August the head of the 
Petrograd Cheka, M. S. Uritsky, was shot dead by a military cadet and 
in the evening of the same day Lenin was shot and severely wounded by 
Dora Kaplan,, a young Left S. R. Next day an armed mob broke into the 
British Embassy building in Petrograd. One of its few remaining 
OccuPantso, the Naval Attache Captain F. N. A. Cromie,, attempted to 
block their way and killed two of the mob with his pistol before he 
was himself killed. When news of this reached London Litvinov and 
his staff were put under preventive detention in Brixton Prison until 
all British representatives in Russia should have been allowed to 
leave. Balfour sent a telegram demanding immediate reparations and 
the punishment of those involved in the killing of Cromie. He 
threatened that in the event of any further violence against a 
British subject the British government would hold the members of the 
Soviet goverment individually responsible and would "make every 
endeavour to secure that they shall be treated as outlaws by the 
governments of all civilized nations and that no place of refuge 
Ghall be left to them. " This was sent on 4 September, the same day 
that Loockhart,, who had already been briefly arrested and inprisoned 
Once early in Augustr was arrested again, this time on charges 
involving him in a major Allied conspiracy (see below FIN 11 on the 
LOONýrtý- plnt), outside the relative safety of the area of 
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Price attempted to send off three numbered articles, all of which 
naturally ended on the censor's desk, and which are in marked 
contrast to the frenzied style of what was actually being printed in 
the British press at that time about events in RussialO. 
The first despatch began: 
According to foreign press received here it seems 
imagined western Europe that Russia is passing through 
continuous nightmare horrors stop In actual fact life 
in Moscow going on much as usual. 
He went on to admit that food was short 
thanks to those who have 
granaries 
ied Ukraine Siberian 
and that many industries had closed down for lack of raw materials 
for Czechoslovaks have cut off cotton supply and 
British in Baku cut off oil fuel. 
Nevertheless substitutes were being found in some instances, and 
productivity was inproving 
result stricter labour discipline. 
Price then continued his running comentary on the problems of the 
villages, now becoming crowded by the return of semi-skilled 
industrial workers for whom there was no work, and who were belatedly 
demanding their share of the land. These people also tended to be 
the most politically active in the villages, running the Committees 
of Poorer Peasants and ousting grain speculators. He reverted to the 
theme of agricultural cowunes. 
In several districts one hears that they have started 
co-operative agricultural communes to work landlords 
domains in opposition to system of mediaeval 
diPlomatic harassment,, the more dreadful events of the Red Terror now 
began to take place. Price gave his account of these days on 
PP- 334-337 of his Reminiscences. For his attitude to the Red 
Terror, see Chapter 10 below. 10 For an extended footnote on what a sanple of the British presS 
Were writing about Russia in September 1918 see the end of this 
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rural commune which older general peasants still cling 
with its primitive threefield system and antiquated 
ýWgio-ds distribution. 
He referred briefly to the theoretical preference of the Bolsheviks 
for state farming, and to the problem of dealing with 
a backward peasantry whose only idea is 
land regardless loss productivity. 
rab divide 
Until that question was resolved, said Price, there could be no 
alleviation of the famine. 
That is the most important internal problem Russia 
present moment 
Having said that, Price surprisingly began the second instalment of 
the series with the statement: 
While agrarian problem is in process of solution 
and went umediately into a short account of Lockhart's inplication 
in a counter-revolutionary plot. His account does not d if fer in 
essence from that given in Lockhart's own Memoirs of a British 
Aggentll. Pr ice merely convented: 
The Bolshevik leaders have not had ten- 
underground revolutionary training for 
vublic seems to have cow to conclusion 
diplomats if 
years of 
nothing ... Moscow 
that British 
intend continue these tactics should 
become more adept at the art. 
He went on to note the discovery of yet another counter-revolutionary 
plot which involved the blowing up of the main railway bridges 
C! @Pter. 11 Lockhart's own account of the "plot" is given in Chapter 9 of his 
Memoirs. New light was shed in 1971 by Debo, with access to newly 
availaBle Russian archives as well as at the Public Records office. 
In an article "Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinski Plot? " (journal of Modern 
History Vol. 3 (1971) pp. 413-419) Debo suggests that Lockhart began 
tOlisten in May 1918 to the agents of Boris Savinkov, the S. R. 
turned counter-revolutionary and through them, made contact with "The 
Centre". This was a Moscow organisation. with links to both Savinkov 
and Alexeiv, which Lockhart now began to finance. Meanwhile Chekist 
agents directed by Dzerzýhinksi succeeded in convincing the British 
naval attache,, Crmie, as well as Lockhart himselfr and the British 
agent Sidney Reilly,? that they could secure the surrender of the 
Latvian regiments which now provided the only organised force defending the North West. The murder of Uritsky and the attempt on 
Lenin's life by Left S. R. s compelled Dzershinski to spring his trap 
prematurelv. 
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leading to Petrograd12 and pointed out that 
outcome these 
ssion 
plots has been to increase measures 
ainst bourgeoisie and former officers. 
He admitted that hostages were being taken by the Bolsheviks and that 
a few wealthy British French subject have been arrested 
on suspicion financing counterrevolution. 
(Price did not evade the moral issues posed by the Red Terror, but 
dealt with them, in the main, in the course of his propagandist 
writings (see Chp. 10). ) He concluded this article as abruptly as he 
had begun it with the only ref erence he seems ever to have made to 
12 On 4 September Ren4ý Marchand, Petrograd Correspondent of Le 
Figaro, addressed a letter to the President of the French Republic, 
M. Poincar4. In it he claimed that he had always been a convinced 
anti-Bolshevik and had supported intervention "without the Bolsheviks 
and in spite of them" in order to help the Russian people to "shake 
off the German yoke". But he had observed "with anguish" that in 
recent months the Entente governments had become involved in Russian 
internal affairs in such a way as to increase the suffering and 
distress of the Russian people. He adduced in proof that he had been 
present at a meeting held on 23 or 24 August between the Consuls- 
General of the U. S. A. and France together with a number of other 
Allied agents whom he did not know, from whose conversation among 
themselves he learned of plans to blow up the railway bridges leading 
into Petrograd and for derailing trains on various lines, to bring 
about "the complete starvation of Petrograd". He added that 
throughout these discussions "not a word was said about the war 
against Germany". He said that he knew that Allied agents were 
actively searching for documents which would prove that there was an 
alliance between the Soviet and German governments: an alliance 
which, Marchand pointed out, was inconceivable because it would not 
Only be contrary to the Soviet government's own interests but would 
also compromise it in the eyes of international socialism. Marchand 
pointed out that anti-German sentiment in Russia was increasing to 
such an extent that Germany was having to reinforce her army in the 
occupied areas and even to extend the areas occupied. He pointed to 
German atrocities in the Ukraine and to Bolshevik support for anti- 
Germany partisans. Bolshevism had massive support, not only in 
Moscow and Petrograd but throughout Russia. Every attempt to 
overthrow the goverment not only intensified the sufferings of the 
Russian people but dissipated "ENERGIES WHICH COMBINED MIGHT ALREADY 
PEF41APS HAVE BEEN TURNED VICMRIOUSLY (Marchand's emphasis) against 
an enfeebled and increasingly powerless Germany". A copy of this 
letter came into the hands of the Soviet authorities during a house 
search and they published it in Izvestia. A precis of it among the 
Price papers,, and made on the typewriter Price was using at that 
tire, suggests that he may have considered trying to send a much 
fuller account of the Marchand letter to the Manchester Guardian than 
what he included in his cable. 
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the British practice of calling up Russian citizens in Britain for 
military service. This, he said, was 
bitterly resented working class population here 
and he concluded by suggesting that if the British government 
seriously desired to protect British subjects in Russia they should 
cease conscripting Russian subjects in Britain13. 
The third of the articles which Price sent off on 13 September dealt 
entirely with the civil war and needs to be put into its context. In 
the spring of 1918 there were, for a time, only two serious 
contenders against the Soviet goverment: Krasnov and Denikin 
(Alexeiv having died). Although the British were assisting Semenov 
in the Far East he was, as has been noted, little more than a bandit, 
and the alternative governments of Horvath/Xolchak in that area had 
yet to develop. In the South East,, however, Denikin's Volunteer Army 
and the Don Cossacks represented a real if momentarily latent threat. 
This was slow to emerge because the two leaders could not agree on a 
13 As noted above in Chp. 5 F/N 13, a Russian Political Prisoners 
and Exiles Relief Committee had been set up in London in the summer 
of 1915 in which Tchicherin played an active part. After the 
introduction of conscription in Britain the Committee became wholly 
engaged in preventing the conscription into the British army of 
Russian emigres, who were given the alternative of being returned to 
Russia to do military service there despite the fact that they were, 
Overwhelmingly at that time, political refugees from the Tsarist 
government. The Secretary of the Committee was Mrs. Mary Bridges 
Adams (see Dictionary of Labour Biography Vol. 6) and its chief 
spokesman in the House of Commons was Joseph King. On 24 June 1918 
King pointed out in the House of Commons (Hansard, col. s 765-771) 
that there were about 25,000 Russians of military age in Britain, the 
great majority of which were doing useful war-related work in the 
clothing and woodworking trades. Some 5,, 000 had already been 
conscripted but although Russia had since gone out of the war, the 
government were continuing to call them up. King also drew attention 
to the unfairness of the goverment's exemption policy. Of the 
13,000 Italians of military age in Britain (mainly working in the 
catering trade) no less than 3,000 had been exempted from military 
service, whereas only 1,, 500 Russians had been exempted, out of a 
total nearly twice as large. 
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conion strategy. Denikin remained pro-Entente; while hoping and 
waiting for help from the British he regrouped his forces in the 
Kubanr on the east side of the Sea of Azov. Krasnov meanwhile 
positively acquiesced in the German occupation of the Ukraine and 
accepted material help from the occupiers. 
What galvanised both these hitherto ineffective oppositional groups 
into something like co-ordinated action was progress of the Czechs. 
In May those of them who were not already proceeding eastwards along 
the Trans-Siberian railway turned westwards into the Volga provinces. 
In collaboration with the Orenburg Cossacks under Dutov they captured 
Samara in June and Kazan in August. In the same month Denikin 
improved his control of the area between the Black Sea and the 
Caspian by capturing Ekaterinodar as well as the Black Sea port of 
Novorossiisk. The British landed their small force at Baku. Krasnov 
took Novocherkassk and then turned north into the province of 
Voronezh. The British and American forces just landed at Archangel 
advanced down the railway towards Vologda and up the Dvina towards 
Kotlas. At the end of August only a narrow strip of land lay between 
the All ies caning f rom the north . the Czechs f rom the east, and the 
counter-revolutionary generals from the south. In the Far East the 
Americans and Japanese declared a protectorate over Vladivostock. 
The opening words of Price's third article written on 13 September 
reads like the triumph of wishful thinking: 
Work of creating revolutionary army for war on 
Archangel Murman Volga Don North Caucasus fronts is 
steadilv r)roceedinq. 
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The bulk of the population was so preoccupied by famine, he said, 
that 
apathetic to war 
but compulsory military service had been decreed 
for all urban rural proletarians who do not hire labour 
iiFd -sons of forwer propertied classes are being 
mobilised into labour battalions in rear ... The whole 
object of training is to create and intensify class 
consciousness and make the army political weapon of 
working classes. 
Price then referred to the presence in the Red Army of a number of 
German and Austrian prisoners and refuted any allegation that they 
were German agentS14 
They are all internationalists who have 
Russian citizenship 
he wrote, and pointed out that the German goverment had protested as 
far back as May that these "prisoners' regiments" were 
carrying on revolutionary propaganda and preaching 
rebellion against German Government. 
He went on to state that the Bolsheviks had succeeded in improving 
the performance of the Red Army in a remarkably short space o time, 
and noted that revolutionary agitation in the Volga district had 
begun to be ef f ective. 
Peasants responding to mobilisation orders as soon as 
they see that in territories occupied by Allies and 
Czechs land is given back to landlords. 
Considerable successes had also been announced f rom the Don and Kazan 
fronts and in the previous week three Cossack regiments had 
deserted 
Kraznov. 
All Don at present seems to be in a state of 
revolutionary ferment. 
14 See Chp. 7 F/N 39. 
9: 308 
c)n 4 October Price sent off three more despatches, one of which was 
entirely about developments in Bulgaria, which had come out of the 
war on 29 September. The remaining two of the 4 October series dealt 
with the internal situation in Russia and the civil war. There was 
good news to report from the Volga front, where the Red Army had 
begun to drive back the Czechsl5. Russian Cossacks and peasants who 
had joined Czech regiments were now deserting them, and Price 
reported that Trotsky had 
icly thanked Czechoslovaks for service 
revolution 
had 
by demonstrating so clearly what the consequences of a successful 
counter-revolution were likely to be: 
a regime which reminded everyone of the worst years of 
Alexander Third'Sib reign stop As a result Red Army 
has found on its return pcpulation very much more 
revolutionary than when it lef t. 
Price then turned to Archangel front and described the treatment of 
English prisoners who had recently been taken. Among the benefits 
these men were receiving from their captors he wrote was 
plenty of suitable literature in 
political conditions in Russia. 
with i: )resent 
15 In September 1918 Trotsky's efforts to recreate an effective army 
began to bear f ruit. On 17 September the Red Army recaptured Kazan 
and on 9 October Samara. A month later the European war ended. 
Price barely referred again, in any of his other articles, to the 
civil war in Russia which was to continue for more than the next two 
ypars. 
16 After the assassination of Alexander II his son set out to 
institute what would have been a considerable counter-reformation had 
it been successful. The main elements of his policy were: changes in 
the sYstem of elections to zemstvos favouring the gentry; increased 
censorship; a retrogressive education policy; increased Russif ication 
and increased anti-Semitism. The effects of his reign are described 
bY Peter A. Zaionchkovsky: The Russian Autocracy under Alexander III 
(Edited and translated by David R. Jones,, the Russian Series Vol. 22, 
Florida 1970) ; Heide W. Whelan: Alexander III and the State Council: 
Bureaucracy and Counter-Reform in Late ImperialRussia (Rutgers 1982); Norman Naimark: Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian 
(Harvard 1983). 
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This must have been written torxgue in cheek, since by then Price 
himself was producing much of the literature in question (see Chp. 
10). He concluded this piece with a brief reference to the reaction 
of Chinese and Korean labourers on the Urals f ront 
who on heariRg of Japanese invasion of Siberia have 
formed re-giments for Red Argy stop Feeling against 
Japanese ruling class very high among these workmenjL7 
In his third message of 4 October Price noted a 
marked abatement in measures repression against counter 
revolutionary elements 
in the past week, which he attributed to a combination of increasing 
confidence on the part of the Soviet government and increasing 
hopelessness which has apparently overcome Russian 
bourgeois class in chances of overthrowing its enemy 
stop While there have been cases particularly in 
provinces where local soviets have taken former 
landlords and officers as hostages and have shot them 
in reply to attempts on lives Bolshevik leaders still 
in main repressive measures of government have taken 
form of arrests suspected persons and shooting only 
those found guilty of counterrevolutionary plots. 
Price went on to note that in taking hostages the Bolsheviks had done 
no more than the Czechs had done in Ufa, where they were holding the 
wives of a number of Bolshevik commissars whose release were being 
17 As a consequence of the very late and very rapid process of 
industrial isation in the Urals, particularly in the years 1913/1914, 
an extreme shortage of manpower developed in the area. As a result 
factory managers were allowed to recruit labour not only from other 
Parts of Russia but from as far afield as Harbin, which accounted for 
the presence in the Urals industries of a noticeable number of 
Chinese and Korean workers. Although as a percentage of the total 
workforce their number was not great - less than 5% - in certain industries, notably the mining and metallurgical industries, they 
formed a higher proportion of the workforce than in others,? and 
higher than the proportion for which they accounted in the region as 
a whole. See 0.1. Laskova, 'ChisLamost' Sostov Urallskii Rabochi 
1910-1914' g. g. ('Numbers and Conposition of the Urals Workforce'), r 
Akad Nauk, Istork-cheskL*4. Zapiski. (Akad,.., Nap. k,, Historical 
OtisO VOf 9ij, p. 268. See also Central War Industries Committee: 
Report for 1917 on the Workforce, Moscow 1917; Lenin Libraryi, 
Microfilm. I am indebted for this information to Mrs. Sue Causey. 
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r, egotiated by a member of the Friends Relief Unit, E. St-John 
CatchpOO118. But 
Enemies Soviet 
their way to give 
measures. 
ernment seem to have gone out of 
(Bolsheviks) pretext for repressive 
The piece concluded with another summary of Marchand's letter to 
President Poincare protesting against Allied counter-revolutionary 
plots, which he adduced to illustrate the last point. 
The next (and penultimate) message that Price sent to the Manchester 
Guardian from Russia is dated 11 October and begins 
Events in and Balkans be watched here with 
intense interest and unbounded enthusiasm. L9. 
18 E. St. John Catchpool was a Quaker and a Conscientious Objector 
who originally went to Russia in the spring of 1916 to do relief work 
among refugees from the Polish front, but found himself diverted to 
Armenia instead. He met Price in Tiflis in 1917 and it was he who 
subsequently introduced Price to Count Sergei Tolstoy, in whose 
house Price and Catchpool shared a room in the summer of 1918. 
(Letter from Catchpool to Price, 8 July 1964,, Price Papers. ) The 
Turkish offensive in the spring of 1918 compelled the British and 
American relief missions based at Erivan to withdraw to Baku, and 
from there Catchpool went to Moscow,, where he worked with homeless 
children. In the late summer of 1918, as the Red Terror was just 
beginning and with it the practice of hostage taking on both sides, 
Catchpool volunteered to go to Ufa on a mission to secure the release 
of the wives of a number of prominent Bolsheviks being held hostage 
there. He received every support and help from Tchicherin, and his 
attempt, which appeared at one point to be about to succeed,, is 
chronicled in his book Candles in the Darkness (1966) pp. 47-64. A 
noteworthy feature of his account is the ferocity of the French 
officers who appeared totally to dominate the Czechs, who were doing 
most of the fighting in that area. See also A. E. Backhouser W. A. 
Kennedy M. D. and E. St. John Catchpool: In TransCaucasia, a pamphlet 
publ ished by the Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fundr London 1918, 
(The Library of the Society of Friends, Box 380/10). 19 The most significant of these events must have been the 
appointment,, on 4 October,, of Prince Max von Baden as Imperial 
Chancellor. After Bulgaria came out of the war on 29 September, with 
the Turks collapsing in Mesopotamia and Allied troops at last 
beginning to advance northward from Salonika,, Ludendorff insisted 
that Germany would have to sue for an armistice if the German army 
was not be be completely destroyed. The appointment of Prince Maxt 
10ng known for his liberal views, was the Kaiser's response to this 
demand. From his memoirsr it is quite apparent that even Prince Max, 
when he took office#, had not appreciated how badly the old Prussian 
sYstem had broken down. At the same time he appears to have been 
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He quoted f rom a letter which Lenin had written to a joint session of 
TsIK and the Moscow Trades Unions, in which he had said: 
"Bolshevik tactics of waiting for slow development 
world revolution was being justified tenfold by 
events ... German government will now have to settle 
accounts for Brest Litovsk peace with German 
proletariat and Russian proletariat looks to their 
German comrades and not to Allied ipperialists for 
iustice in this matter. " 
Price went on to say that the reaction of Soviet official circles to 
the Fourteen Points (on the basis of which negotiations between 
America and Germany were then being conducted) was that they were 
little more than fourteen phrasesto drug the awaken 
revolutionary masses of Europe into sleep again. 
In the same circles the idea of a League of Nations was considered to 
be 
league of allworld financial oligarchies to protect 
right of propertied classes to live like parasites 
under fast crumbling capitalist system. 
At the same time, a capitalist peace presented no threat to Russia. 
Here Price was quoting an unnamed member of the Supreme Council of 
Public Economy (see pp. 36: 9 - Mcj ) because the economic effects of the 
war had gone so far that the proletariat of all countries would 
sooner or later be forced to accept Bolshevik principles of state 
socialism. Even a world-wide counter-revolutionary alliancer said 
the spokesman, would 
Only hasten process of uniting the revolutionary 
in Russia, Germany and Austria to which labour in 
Anglo-Saxon countries will probably join later. 
f ront 
Official circles in Moscow, Price reported, while not minimising 
gravity of struggle with forces of allworld 
counterrevolution nevertheless regard condition created 
Ei fall of Prussian war party as beginning of 
surprised by the extent of the divisions in the German Lef t and by how strong (though not powerful) the extrene Left was - An English trmslation of the Memoirs of Prince Max was published in New York in 1928. The original German version was published in Berlin in 1927. 
This note is based on a new German edition edited by Golo Mann and 
Anreas Burchkhardt: Errinerungen und Dokumente (stuttgart 1968). 
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victorious march of Bolshevism across hills and plains 
of Eurcpe. 
price then dealt with news from the Ukraine, where Skoropadsky was 
trying to pre-empt a Bolshevik victory by foming a goverrment 
supposedly on the lines of the old Rada. He reported that the Red 
Army had now defeated the Czech forces on the Volga front and was 
advancing on the Urals and Orenburg to join up with revolutionary 
forces in Central Asia. He repeated what he had said in an earlier 
message about the effects of the Czech occupation upon the political 
thinking of even the wealthy peasants of the Volga provinces, and he 
concluded with the words: 
I remarked in a telegram on the eve of Allied 
intervention the Allies aresowing dragons teeth in 
Europe and these teeth will someday-grow into bayonets 
which will be turned in directions which they least 
expect unquote It seems that these words are likely to 
be realised earlier than seemed likely. 
On 19 October 1918 Price sent off his last message from Moscow. It 
began 
After readij 
loss to dec 
nql ish 
whethe 
ers which arrive here I am at 
sons giving information 
about events in Russia are deliberately fabricating 
news for political ends or whether they are merely 
victirm of chronic nervous breakdowns. 
Price went on to state that he felt it was his duty 
to comunicate a few facts about conditions prevailing 
here 
and went on to deal systematically with most of the areas of public 
activity in Russia about which he felt qual if ied to report. 
It is safe to say that never since comnencement of war 
has there been more order and tranquility in Moscow and 
Petrograd than at 2resent stop Everyone is busy working 
in somepolic department either in new Red Army or in 
one of numerous economic councils which are everywhere 
growinq up and transforming forner anarchical system of 
speculation and private profiteering into one in which 
production and distribution is organised on 
basis in interest of working_class pcpulation stop One 
no longer hears shooting in streets at night there are 
no more wastrels walking about streets with rifles and 
beggars have almost disappeared stop Not only is there 
no unempi t, but there is shortage of labour 
esj)ecially skilled workmen st22 
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Last month only e 
arrive in Moscow each dal 
s of food used to 
let never less than 
100 and sometimes 300 wagons of flour alone each day 
stop Food distribution is carefully worked out whole 
population is classified and receives rations according 
to amount and intensity of work performed stop Everyone 
is guaranteed with a minimum and former propertied 
classes can receive the same food ration and pay as 
working classes if they agree to work or enter public 
service stop 
Whole economic life of 
22ý! erful body called S 
stop An American busin 
from tour in 
to 
country is controlled b 
preme Council of Public 
ssman who arrived here 
ovinces has described-it as a more 
r useful and efficient bod, 
_, 
or_tne_ 
_ great capitalist trusts in America stop It is divided 
into departments headed by Commission appointed by 
Central Soviet Executive stop Each department controls 
a public service like rail transport water transport 
nationalised iron coal cotton leather oil industries 
also food distribution and state finance stop 
In 
be i 
ere vublic education new constructive 
introduced Primary schools cpen 
pro2ranm 
d for winter 
season last week stop Pupils are taught to introduce 
discipline into schools themselves Meanwhile number and 
strength of Red Army is im-reasing every day and 
discipline is becoming very severe stop Trotsky makes 
periodical journies to different fronts accompanied 
by his supreme military council stop I may here state 
that strict orders have been issued to cormnanders on 
northern fronts that all conmn soldiers from ranks of 
Allied armies who are taken prisoners are to be well 
treated stop Recently a number were brought to Vologda 
where they are now comfortably housed. 
The situation 
interest an 
to All-Russ 
Russian pro 
Proletariat 
in Germany 
enthusiasm s 
ten wag 
now we 
is watched here with intense 
top Lenin in his recent letter 
a Central Sov 
etariat must 
in its strugg 
iet Executive stated that 
be prLapared to help German 
le against its own and for. 
Imperialists stop He foreshadowed large increases in 
Red Army and creation in Central Russia large grain 
reserves to help the German revolutionaries as soon as 
they take over the power in Germany stop The content of 
this letter has been suppressed by the censor in 
Germany and recently we hear that frontier at Oshal has 
been closed stop Article in Kreuzzeitung stating that 
fight with Bolshevism is bridge across which Allies and 
Germany can unite to protect their culture is looked 
upon here as attempt to create twentieth century form 
Of Holy Alliance. 
This message was transmitted through Stockholm on 31 October and 
recentl 
e 
ItOPPed at the Press Bureau, apparently on the orders of the Home 
9: 314 
secretary himself when it reach London on 5 November -A copy of it 
was forwarded by M17 (a) to Cecil but his comments, if any, have not 
survived. In accordance with the War Cabinet's decision Of December 
1917 Scott's lobby correspondent Harold Dore was shown this despatch 
at the Press Bureau. He made a remarkably accurate summary of it 
which he sent to Scott on 19 November20, ending with the words: 
"Sir Frank Swettenham told me exception is taken to 
whole message which undesirable to circulate in this 
country. He considered sting was in tail - presumably 
Kreuz Zeitung reference. "21 
Scott passed a copy of this message on to Price's aunt in Manchester 
and it thus became the only example he was eventually able to see 
for himself of the way in which his despatches were regarded and 
treated by the Press Bureau. In My Three Revolutions he wrote, f if ty 
years later: 
"I am ready to state now that, while what I wrote 
somewhat exaggerated the situation in Moscow, it was a 
healthy antidote to the kind of rubbish that was being 
circulated throughout the world about conditions in 
Russia at that time. But we had reached the position 
by that time in Britain that a military censor was 
deciding what political ideas the British public should 
be allowed to hear. My despatch did not touch in any 
way on military matters. It was strictly a statement 
of political and social facts as I saw them. Yet it 
20 John Rylands University Library of Manchester, scott papers 
335/57. Also F0 371.3342. 21 The paper known as the Kreuz Zeitung was still at that time 
properly called Neue Preussiche Zeitung and was held to reflect the 
view of the Junkers. It was published under that title fram 1846- 
1929, went on from 1929 as Neue Preussiche Kreuz Zeitung, until in 
1932 it finally appeared sirrply as Kreuz Zeitung - It ceased Publication in January 1939. It is not difficult to see why 
Swettenham should have taken such particular exception to the 
CluOtation from this paper. It must already have appeared in print in 
Britain, since King quoted the same passage in a debate in the House 
Of C00rions on 13 November (Hansard, Cols. 2791-2792) , describing it as "the novel and extraordinary doctrine" which would create a bridge 
Of common interests across which "the capitalists and militarists" of 
the former belligerents were to be led into Russia for its N exploitation and domination". As noted in Chp. 7 above, the Press Bureau were scmetimes frustrated by the continued freedom of 
expression which obtained, more or less unabated, in Parliament. 
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was not allowed. I can inlagine what Scott said to Sir 
Frank Swettenham about thisn22 
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1918 Scott had continued 
relentlessly to question in his leading articles every aspect of 
Allied policy in Rissia (see Chapter 10, pp. 394-397). But it is 
unlikely that he said anything to Sir Frank Swettenham as the result 
of seeing Dore's summary of his last despatch from Price. He 
reserved his fire for a leading article which appeared in the 
Manchester Guardian on 6 December, and which represents a kind of 
judge's suming up of the case against the Goverment. After tracing 
the pretexts upon which the various acts of intervention had been 
based, he declared that the thin disguise of military necessity could 
now no longer be maintained. Questions would be asked but, said 
Scott, it was doubtful if they would be answered because the real 
reason for the intervention was 
"not a very nice reasons, nor one that is likely to 
ccmmend itself to reasonable people in this country or 
to our working class. That reason, of course, is that 
the war against Russia has from the first really been a 
war against that particular form of Socialistic theory 
known as Bolshevism. We are no admirers of that 
theory. Applied to any Western European country,? we 
believe it would be disastrously subversive. Even in 
Russia we may doubt its permanence. But there it is. 
It has established itself; it has existed for more than 
a year. It is not weakening in power; all trustworthy 
information goes to show that it is gaining in power, 
that it has established orderi, that it meets with 
general support from some eighty millions of people 
whom it controls, that it is grappling successfully 
with the food problem, that it is promoting the popular 
artst music and the drama, and is preparing a great 
scheme of popular education - that,, in fact,, it is 
performing most of the normal functions of a Government 
and performing them with increasing success. These are 
the facts but they do not suit the policyp the policy 
at least hitherto pursued by our freedom-loving 
Government. The telegrams of the few British 
correspondents, including our own, who are still in a 
position to give authentic information are ruthlessly 
censored or suppressed, and the Government goes on in 
its blind and foolish wayl, a way that canr if persisted 
in, lead only to discredit and disaster. " 
27 
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Although Scott did not change his mind about the folly of the Allied 
intervention; although he quite clearly believed that his 
correspondent had been telling him the truth even to the point of 
echoing some of the phrases which Price had euployed in his censored 
despatchesr Scott was now caning under pressure to disown him. The 
wider effects of Price's despatches on Whitehall will be dealt with 
in Chapter 11; but in the matter of his relationship with the 
Manchester Guardian he had lef t himself open to criticism by allowing 
his connection with the paper to be advertised on the front page of 
his pamphlet The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia. This 
left Scott, too, vulnerable,, and he felt obliged to terminate the 
relationship. An epitaph is given in Appendix XI. 
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Footnote 9 (11) 
An impressionistic survey has been made of the headlines on Russia 
and of the essence of the columns beneath them, of five British 
newspapers, for the month of September 1918. They are the Times,, 
E? Týessr Morning Post, Daily News and Manchester Guardian. (John 
Bull was also looked at for the month, but Russia was only nentioned 
twicer the paper being wholly given over to a hate campaign against 
Germany. ) 
The Express: The front page headline on 2 September was "Murder of 
Lenin: Russia's Evil Genius killed by a Girl"; the leader described 
Dora Kaplan as "Russia's Charlotte Corday". Between 2 and 11 
September the headlines and comments dealt more soberly with the 
attack on the British Embassy and the danger to British residents in 
Russia. On 11 September there was a headline "Blood Madness in 
Russia" on the front page. The leader on 12 September was headed 
"The Depths of Disgrace" and dealt with the murder of the Romanov 
women (the Tsar was not mentioned) for which the Express managed to 
blame the Kaiser. On 18 September: "Out for Mur r: Bolsheviks 
Intoxicated with Blood Lust"; on 21 September "Massacre in Petrograd: 
Wholesale Slaughter of Allies. German Instigation". Most of the 
remaining headlines in September containing the word Bolshevik dealt 
with what the paper called British Bolsheviks: the strikers on the 
Clyde and on the railways. The imputation of guilt by association 
with Russia was always made clear. 
The Morning Post: On 3 September Lenin's death was reported under 
the headline: "Bolshevik Regime of Blood; the Moscow Shambles". The 
column went on to suggest that the death of Lenin was "perhaps ... of 
greater importance than the disappearance of the Tsar". On 7 
September, under "Bolsheviks the Tool of Germany" was a report by a 
"prominent Englishman" just returned from Russia, which included the 
words "Their leaders are not really Russians but mainly renegade 
Jews". On 10 September under "Russian Nightmare" it was reported 
that peasants were marching on the capital and the Bolsheviks were in 
flight. On 12 September the following headlines were all on the main 
news page: "Petrograd on Fire"; "Sequel to Bolshevik Misrule"; 
"Gaunt Famine" and "Strange Scenes in Streets" (which turned out to 
be about people exchanging food coupons). On 13 September the 
headline was "Russia in Revolt: Peasants Arm against Bolsheviks", 
but there was not a single word in the short column beneath the 
headline which supported the statement. On 18 September, "The 
Russian Tangle: Bolshevik Defeats: Officers Deserting to the 
British" (at Archangel) . In the last week of the month 
the Morning 
Post, while not letting up on reports of the "awful anarchy to which 
Russia has been reduced". also concentrated its f ire on British 
Bolsheviks on the Clyde and in South Wales. 
The Times: The death of Captain Cromie was reported with very little 
COMMent, but a leading article on the same day (5 September) 
contained possibly the most convoluted reasoning found in any of the 
press on the British intervention, which had then been going on for 
just over a month. Taking as its text the Supplementary Treaty of 
Brest Litovsk,, the leader concluded: "We are told that Russia will 
fight against the Entente in North Russia. If the statement is 
correct, the Bolsheviks would seem to regard themselves as in a state 
Of war with us. But only savages began war by assassination. " BY 
11 
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September the Times was in full voice: "Bayonet Rule: Worse than 
French Terror"; on 12 September "Blood for Blood"; on 16 September 
"Bolshevist Frenzy for Blood" and on the same page a column on the 
Sisson documents headed "Lenin and Trotsky Disclosures. Paid Agents 
of Germany. " On 25 September "The Russian Terror; Direct Despatch 
frcm Petrograd; Terrible Plight of the People; British Colony's 
Danger. " This had been written on 14 August (my emphasis) . cam from 
"Our Petrograd Correspondent" and had reacfiýd London "By an indirect 
Agency". The substance of the column was indeed about the 
precarious situation of British residents in Russia, but this was as 
the result of the intervention and the cholera epidemic in Petrograd. 
The headline was clearly intended to make it appear that the piece 
was about the Red Terror,, which had not begun at the time it was 
written. On 26 September "The Russian Nightmare. How the Masses Are 
Deluded"* Most of the statements supporting the column were made by 
an escaped American journalist in Stockholm. On 28 September the 
Times reached the peak of its frenzy with the headline "A Red Wave of 
Blood"' which stood over an account (by the correspondent of the 
Berlin Lokal Anzeiger) , and which contained the statement that "some 
sailors who participated in the executions almost every 
night ... contracted the execution habit, executions having become 
necessary to them just as morphia is to morphia maniacs". Indeed the 
Times made considerable use of German correspondents' reports in 
September 1918, including those of Alfons Paquet in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung, but generally managed to put a lurid headline over even the 
most factual of his despatches. 
The Daily News: During early September Ransome was sending 
despatches almost daily from Stockholm. His sources of information 
were necessarily indirect, although his contacts were undoubtedly 
less anti-Bolshevik than those of other newspapers. But only on one 
occasion did his report appear under a sensational headline. This 
waslO September: "Starvation and Terror. Wholesale Murders and 
Executions 
, 
in Russia. 'The Verge of Delirium"'. But this was a 
completely untypical presentation by the Daily News, and the delirium 
Ransome was writing about was - as he made quite clear - the delirium 
of starvation. 
The Manchester Guardian: In striking contrastr Guardian headlines 
were strictly related to content, which was almost entirely devoted 
to bulletins about the fighting on the Northern Front or at Baku, 
taken some times f rom War Of f ice bulletins or f rom German 
correspondents via neutral countries. The most sensational headline 
Of the whole month (on Russia) was on 11 September: "Shot by 
Bolsheviks. Protopopof f and other Ex-Ministers. Oppressors Under 
the Tsar". The column underneath was given up to an account of their 
careers and misdeeds. The paper also made spacer on 14 September 
under the headline "A Great Russian Revolutionary Woman", for a long 
obituary of Breshkovskayal the "grandmother" of the Russian 
revolution. 
In conclusion it should be born in mind that two other subjects were 
contending with Russia for attention in September 1918 although one 
Of them: the strike wave on the Clyde and in South Wales, was of ten 
used as a pretext for homilies on the dangers of Bolshevism at hcme. 
N Other was, of course, the f irst signs of the German collapse 
in 
the West. 
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chapter 10. From Journalism to Propaganda 
(i) Moscow 1918: The Group of English-Speaking communists 
glen Price returned to Moscow from Vologda. in April 1918 he at first 
found a room with "some very nice people called Fidler ... friends of 
the Kropotkins", as he described them in a letter to his aunt on 7 May. 
The house was on Glazof skaya, not f ar from the German Embassy; he sometimes 
saw Mirbach coming and going in his motor and was close enough to hear 
the shots which killed him in July. In the same letter to his aunt he 
wrote that he was so f ar able to keep his head "above water. But one 
never knows what tomorrow may bring. The whole of civilisation is 
collapsing above one's ears and I often wonder if I shall ever live to 
zee it through. " But,, he added,. "I shall stick to the Soviet Government 
wherever it goes". On 3 June he wrote again to his aunt, "Ransome and 
I keep on hammering away and loading the telegraph wires with our cables 
demanding the recognition by the Allied governments of the Soviet Govern- 
ment here. " His last surviving letter written from Russia (again to his 
allnt) is dated 18 July. (Al I three of these letters were prefaced by 
a sentence or two saying that he had j ust heard of a chance to get a 
letter out of the country,, but he never afterwards explained how. It 
must have been the same means which brought him his last letter from 
England,, from Charles Trevelyan (see below p. 323)). In July he moved tO 
lOdgings in the house of Count Sergei Tolstoy, the eldest son of the 
writerl a move brought about by the good offices of one of his former 
associates in Armenian Relief work, St. John CatChPoOl- "They are very 
rlice people" Price wrote of the Tolstcys "but rather reactionary. 
Cziously enough on account of my good relations with the Bolsheviks 
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tney expect me to protect thern from the latter. " 1 He described the 
worsening food situation, which he attributed to the civil war in the 
South and east. "The Allies aPParentlY want to complete the iron circle 
which is enclosixig this unhappy land and reducing it to a state of misery 
indescribable in the history of man. When I am at my last gasp and can 
do no more work for the Manchester Guardian I shall enter the Red Army 
as a volunteer and be killed fighting for the revolution". (Price's 
attempt to enlist in September 1918 is described below, see p. 331). 
He ended this letter by praising Lenin: "... the most courageous states- 
man in Europe at present,, and history will I believe put him down as one 
of the great brains of this period. " (A long quotation from the letter 
appeared in Canmon Sense on 7 September 1918. ) 
These three letters to his aunt contain the last subjective accounts of 
how Price was thinking and living at this time, and he added very little 
of a personal nature in either of his books about the Russian Revolution. 
By now money had again become a problem. The Manchester Guardian had 
been able to send him some of his back pay in May, but since then he had 
been unable to receive anything more, whether as salary or from his 
Private income. At this point Tchicherin once more came to his rescue 
arid offered him a job as a translator at the Soviet Foreign off ice 
(People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs or Narkomindel) - Price accepted 
the offer, obviously at least in part because he needed to earn som 
MOneyj, but perhaps also because he hoped to make himself useful to a cause 
he had now come unreservedly to espouse; although he could hardly have 
fOmeen, 
r when he took up his post on 1 August,, where this step would lead 
In a footnote on p. 135 of My Three Revolutions Price wrote j, with 
reference to his account of the Tolstcys: "The Merit Of Pasternak's 
great book Dr. Zhivago to my mind is that it gives an excellent 
Picture of just these social types in Russia who suffered intenselY 
during the Revolution. " 
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him. His appointment coincided almost exactly with the Allied intervent- 
ion in North Russi-a 
2 
and early in August 1918 Price added to his continuing 
- if by now completely unavailing - attempts to report the situation in 
Russia for his paper and to his new work as a translator, 
3 
the role of 
propagandist. 
At about this time Price met the f irst German journalist to come to Russia 
after Brest Litovsk,, Dr. Alfons Paquet,, who represented the Frankfurter 
Zeitung. 
4 In My Three Revolutions Price recorded that he first wet Paquet 
2 The Allied occupation of Archangel took place on 2 August 1918. For 
an account of the operation see Ullman: Anglo-Soviet Relations, Vol. I,, 
chapter 8. 
3 Price left no record of what his work as an official translator at 
Narkomindel entailed over and above the translation of propaganda. 
However he undoubtedly translated the Constitution of the R. S. F. S. R. 
into English at some point, and he also mentioned, in his Reminiscences 
(p. 344) that he sat up all night in the autumn of 1918,. translating 
a Note to President Wilson "prepared in the Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs" which "surpassed in pungent wit and biting sarcasm anything 
which had yet been produced by that office. " This was almost certainly 
Tchicherin's Note of 24 October,, subsequently reproduced in pamphlet 
form. According to William H. Chamberlin: The Russian Revolution 
1917-1921 (1935) V61.2 p. 154, Radek was involved in the drafting of 
that notýý 
4 ALFCNS HERMAN PAQUET (1881-1944) was a contributor to the Frankfurter 
Zeitung from 1904 until it was forced to cease publication in 1943. 
Paquet was not only or even primarily a journalist, however. His works 
include poetry, drama, short stories and novels,, although many of them 
reflect an imaginative approach to political and social issues. From 
1916-1918 he represented the Frankfurter Zeitung in Stockholm, and 
from July-November 1918 in Moscow,, where he was also Press Attache 
to the German Consulate General. After his return to Germany he wrote 
a lively account of this period in his book Im Kommunistischen Russland. 
, 
Briefe aus Moskau (Jena 1919). He also published three lectures given 
shortly after hi return under the title Der Geist der russischen. 
Revolution (I-P-ipzig 1919). Baumgart's edited edition of his Moscow 
ýýiýes aýnd letters are copiously cited; they provide an extraordinarily 
vivid picture of the life of a foreign intellectual in Moscow during 
the summer and autumn of 1918. A yet unpublished work is Paquet's 
navel Von November bis November, which deals with the first year of 
the R6 sian revolution. Price wrote a revealing passage about Paquet's 
delighted reaction to the news of the mutiny of the German fleet at 
Kiel in his Reminiscences (p. 394). For a good short account of Paquet's 
life and wcaýk see H. M. Waidsonp 'Paquet and the Russian Revolution, 
Germano Slavica. Volume 3 (1981) pp. 319-330. 
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in Nc)vewbp-r 1918 but his only reference to paquet in his Reminiscences 
suggests that by then he already thought of him as a friend and irldeed 
his own diary shaws that he met him on 10 August. 
5 There are a number 
of references in Paquet. Is published diaries and letters 
6 
which show that 
they quickly established a relationship,, and which shed a unique light 
on what Price was already doing by mid-August as a propagandist, as well 
as giving the only description so far discovered of how Price looked,, 
thought, felt, talked and behaved at this time. Paquet's diary for 
15 August noted that Price visited him in the evening. 
"We sat together on the balcony with a bottle of red wine,, 
Kornmissariat bread and sausage, from 9- 12.15. [Talked] Much 
and freely... I promised out of a feeling of friendshi to send 
Price, who is very ragged, my old grey suit tomorrow, " 
On 21 August Paquet recorded that it had rained heavily all day and that 
he met Price in the Kommissariat 
"wearing an old fur, underneath it my suit. His socks were 
wrinkled and dirty and his shoes stuffed with paper... Today 
he seems 1 ike a fcýo I. n8 
A week later Paquet recorded another long evening visit from Price, this 
time 
"very nice and reasonable... Looks thin, emaciated, poor. 
In my grey suit,, the sleeves of which are too short. Eats 
bread voraciously. We drink tea and smoke cigars. "9 
5 
Reminiscences p. 348; My Three Revolutions p-144- 
6 
Von Brest LitovsW zur Deutschen Növemberrevolution. Aus den 
Tagebtiffie-rn, Briefen und Aufzeichnungen von Alfons Paquetr Wilhelm 
GrOener und Albert Hopman Marz bis November 1918. 
Herausgegeben von Winfried Baumgart mit einem Vorwort von Hans 
Herzfeld. Vanden Hoeck & Ruprech in Gottingen,, 1971. 
7 
Baumgart,, Von Brest Litovsk etc. p. 108. 
8 
Lbid. p. 118. 
9 
p. 132. 
10 : 321 
price, unl * most other goverment employees, did not live in an official 
Cmmne and thus did not get the official rations. He was forced to 
become a meshochnik -a bagman - and he spent most of his weekends hunting 
for food for the Tolstoy household in the villages around moscow. paquet 
several times referred to Price's food-gathering expeditions in his diaries 
as if he found it surprising that they should have been necessary. Most 
other foreigners in Moscow seemed to manage better. 
on 16 August Paquet wrote to his editor enclosing some material 
11... in English, specially written to be dropped from aero- 
planes to the soldiers in Murmansk and Archangel. The author/ 
translator is the correspondent here of the Manchester Guardian, 
Mr. M. Philips Price, an interesting young cKip who has travelled 
widely in Central Asia and has been on the Russian front prac- 
tically throughout the war. He is a Cambridge scholar and comes 
from a good family but has for months been as good as cut of f 
fran England; also strongly proletarianised and lives for very 
little money at Count Tolstoy's and is the courade in thought 
and fate of his colleague Arthur Ransome who has now gone to 
Stockholm... Both Ransome,, who is older and wiser, and Price, 
who is a kind of madcap, give the impression of sincerity. "10 
Paquet concluded his letter by asking to be sent cuttings of their previous 
articles and despatches in the Daily News and Manchester Guardian - The 
Interesting point here is that Price had apparently, by 16 August, already 
both written and translated propaganda material. He must, therefore, 
have been responsible for at least translating some of the very first 
leaflets to be dropped. One of 
are doing? " is actually dated - 
10 August. This is very likely 
his editor only six days later. 
cluded and which Price may also 
deals with the proclamation issi 
these, headed "Do you realise what you 
the only one to be so - and the date is 
to be one of those which Paquet sent to 
Another leaflet,, which he way have in- 
have translated,. is headed "Al-lies" and 
. ied by the Allies on 
8 Augustr setting 
10 
Ibid. 109-110. 
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out their ostensible reasons for having invaded Russia. Both these leaf- 
lets went Out Over the names of Ienin and Tchicherin. 
To have been one of the handful of Entente nationals who supported the 
Soviet Goverment, in Moscow, in August 1918, was obviously a traumatic 
experience. Writing about it only two years later in his Reminiscences 
price appears already to have telescoped some of the events of this period 
and got others out of order, as for example the date he first met Paquet. 
Thus the relevant passage in that book suggests that he wrote his first 
propaganda pamphlet, The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia, 
in response to the revelation of the so-called IA)ckhart plot (accounts 
of which did not appear in the Russian papers until 3 September 1919. 
But on the same page Price wrote: 
"I sat down during the second week of August and wrote off, 
as fast as my pen would permit me, a pamphlet entitled The 
Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia and signed my 
name to it so that every Englishman should knaw that there was 
at least one of his countrymen who would not be silent. "11 
Paquet's diary for 24 August noted: 
"Radek has now taken the Propaganda Centre into his department. 
The f irst production [emphasis added] is Price's pamphlet under 
his full title as 'Correspondent in Russia of the Manchester 12 
Guardian'... An equally strong piece is coming out from Ransome. " 
11 
Price: Reminiscences P. 332. 
12 
This was almost certainly Ransome's pamphlet The Truth About Russia,, 
written in May 1918 under great pressure so that Robins could take 
the text back with him to America. It was printed there by The New 
2ýpýlic but also appeared in pamphlet form. From Paquet's account 
it was issued by Sovprop. Another edition of it was later made by 
the Writer's Socialist Federation, 400 Old Ford Road, IDndon E. 3. 
but it is not dated. A copy of this edition -Ls to 
be found in the 
library of the Wndon School of Economics,, D208(47). See also 
HUgh Brogan The Life of Arthur Ransome (1984) pp. 196-198,214. 
There is no mention of it in the Autobiography of Arthur Ransome 
edited by Rupert Hart Davies. 
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price again spent an evening with paquet on 28 August, when the two men 
talkedf wrote Paquet,, "about his pamphlet which is just coming out,,. 
They also, he noted, discussed the contents of a letter written on 4 August 
which Price had, by some means, recently received f rom Charles Trevelyan 
about the poor prospects of a revolution in England. 
13 14 
If paquet was right,. the pamphlet which they discussed must have been 
The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia,, and it was the first 
production of Savprop, the new organisation. mder Radek to which he had 
alluded four days earlier. But Price was also working for Narkornindel, 
and it seems almost certain that he was also at this time translating, 
if not himelf writing,, propaganda put out by the Commissariat for Foreign 
13 Baumgart Von Brest Litovsk etc. p. 132. Paquet made the following 
note of the content of Trevelyan's letter to Price of 4 August,, as 
related to him by Price: "Trevelyan writes that he doesn't believe 
that there will be a strong revolutionary movement in England but that 
there will be far-reaching changes when the armies come home. The 
property owners are shaking with fear for their properties. (Lloyd 
George will probably be thrown out in the November elections. ) The 
possessors are determined to defend their position with the bayonet. 
England will be obliged to have a Standing Army after the war (on 
social grounds), the army will want to go home as soon as peace is 
made, just as the Russians formerly did. Trevelyan thinks that the 
English and German governments will take the path of negotiation. " 
The words underlined were in English in the original. Paquet was 
presumably referring to the British conscript army in his penultimate 
sentence. 
14 It seems probable that in the summer and even in the early autumn of 
1918 a number of ways had been found,, not only of communicating with 
Price but even of getting money and clothes out to him. In a letter 
to Charles Trevelyan written as late as 25 August Robin Price wrote 
that Price's bank in Gloucester had got some money for him as far as 
Stockholm "which I hope he may get... The Bank refused to give the 
money to Litvinov without the Treasury's sanction, which of course 
they refused to give. " On 2 Septerd: )er Robin Price wrote, again to 
Trevelyan, that he wanted to get a letter and some clothes to his 
brother. "If you t1iink there would be any chance of L. being able 
to take them or send them by somebody, would you tell me where I could 
have them sent to? " A letter written on 20 Septent)err when Britain 
had broken off diplomatic relations with Russia,, shows that yet another 
line of communication with Price had been opened up,, this time via 
the Editor of the Daily News in London and Ransome in Stockholm- 
NeWastle university Library. Trevelyan papers. CPT 82. 
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Affairs. A confusing kind of conf irmation of this was provided by the 
Soviet historian,, K. L. Seleznev in his appreciation of Price published 
in 1974: 
"Price became involved in the work of the Department for Inter- 
national Propaganda of the People's Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs and helped to produce leaflets and newspapers for the 
German soldiers at the front. u15 
Actually there is no evidence whatever that Price had been involved in 
the production of Bolshevik propaganda in German,, and it is probable that 
Seleznev was thinking of some of the other English-speaking writers who 
undoubtedly were so involved. But there is plenty of evidence that Price 
became involved in the propaganda activities of Narkomindel while working 
there as a translator,, and that he then also began working for Sovprop. 
The authors of The Internationalists, 
16 
an account by a group of Russian 
historians of the work of non-Russian communist sympathisers,. stated that 
Price was "especially prominent" among those doing this work, and their 
references suggest that they had good evidence fOr making the statement - 
The sheer volume of material which has now,, with a greater or lesser degree 
Of certainty, been traced to Price also suggests that he was working for 
more than one propaganda organisation in August 1918 and within a month 
he was working for three - Propaganda was, at that time, by far the m0st 
POwerful weapon in the Soviet armoury, and it is not surprising that more 
than one organisation was concerned in its production. 
17 
15 
1K. L. Seleznev. Istoria SSSR Vol. 3. (Akad.. Nauk SSs-9 Moscow 1974. ) 
pp-217-219. 
16 
International isti (The Internationalists). (Akad.. Nauk S-sskr Moscow 
1967) The book is a symposium. Chapter 14 (pp. 516-572), by L. M. Zak, 
L. P. Karlov and R. Ya. Tsivlina deals with French, Anglo-American and 
17 
Italian communist (or communist sympathiser) groups. 
Within weeks of the November revolution Trotsky had instituted at the 
COMMissariat of Foreign Affairs a Press Bureau under Radek and a 
Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda under Boris Reinstein, 
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In a passage in his Reminiscences referring to the so-called JOckhart 
plot exposures in August 1918 Price wrote: 
"The indignation which these criminal plots aroused in the 
minds of all honest men caused a number of Allied citizens in 
Moscow, including myself, to stand by the Russian Soviets come 
what might... Quickly a little group of Allied citizens was formed in Moscow who mutually pledged themselves to continue 18 work of this kind until the Allied intervention was stopped. " 
The "work of this kind" was propaganda to be directed towards the Allied 
troops of the intervention, and the "little group" had its beginnings 
at a meeting held at the Internationalist Club in Moscow at the end of 
August, an account of which was given in Izvestia on 1 September. A copy 
of that account found its way to Whitehall with a translated sumary 
supplied by the British Consul in Moscow, Wardrop. The sunnary was head- 
lined "Meeting of Anglo-French Conrunists at Moscow" and contained the 
words "Comrade Price of the Manchester Guardian presided. Club formed 
one of the many English-speaking Russian refugees who had returned 
trom America after the March revolution. Reinstein's section concen- 
trated on the production of material in English and among those who 
wrote for him were John Reed and Rhys Williams. Radek's section, 
staffed mainly by prisoners of war from the armies of the Central 
Powers,, produced Die Fackel (The Torch) in German, and equivalent 
publications in Magyar, Roumanian,, Serbian,, Czech and Turkish. Under 
the terms of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk the dissemination of propa- 
ganda in German proceeding from a Russian department of state was 
prohibited. Reinstein's Bureau was disbanded, but a Bureau of Foreign 
Literature was immediately established under Radek's direction,, which 
employed the same personnel, but produced propaganda which was now 
party - rather than government-inspired. The foreign sections were 
later organised into a Federation of Foreign Groups of the Russian 
COMPunist Party. After the Allied invasion of North Russia a new 
bureau, Sovprop, was set up under Radek's direction, and both SovprOP 
and Narkomindel (not bound by any treaty with the Allies to refrain 
from doing so) began to issue propaganda in English. A few weeks later 
the Group of English-Speaking Communists also came into being. This 
group probably originated more propaganda material than SOvprOP and 
Narkomindel put together, and much of it was subsequently republished 
by the Comintern. For further reading on the development of Bolshevik 
Propaganda organisations, see Carr, Vol. III pp. 18-22#, 73r 129; 
J. W. Wheeler Bennet: Brest Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace (1939 pp. 90,261, 
271; Debo: Revolution and Survival pp. 89-90; Rhys Williams: Journey 
18 
into Revolution Chapter 2. 
Price: Reminiscences P. 332. 
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for PrOPaganda Purposes and the teaching of English and French. Apostles 
will go forth from the Club to Preach Bolshevik principles. " 19 The authors 
of The Internationalists stated that "the real fOunder and organiser" 
of the group was the French communist jeanne Ta )Urbe20 but that Price 
was present at the first meeting and outlined a programme of meetings, 
lectures and courses to be harnessed to the requirements of propaganda. 21 
A second meeting took place on 4 September,, when Price reportedly spoke 
of the need 
"to establish links with the Central Committee of the Bolshevik 
Party and with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs 
and of associating themselves with the Federation of Communist 
Groupsattached to ZK [the Party Executive]. 22 
Price's reported statement appears to irxiicate that both party and govern- 
ment organs were again involved in propaganda and strengthens the 
19 FO. 371.3336. 
20 
Jeanne Marie Ta )urbe 1877-1919. Born into a peasant family near Vichy#, 
Ta )urbe's father was a Paris Communard. She obtained a post as a 
governess in a Polish family in 1896 and returned with them to Poland,. 
where she got to know Polish and Russian revolutionaries. She used 
her French passport to get a number of Russian wornen revolutionaries 
out of Russia. In 1905 she joined the Bolsheviks and took an active 
Part in the 1905 Revolution. By 1917 she was married to V. Markovic,, 
one of the organisers of the Yugoslav group of the party,, and was 
working in Moscow as a teacher. In August she managed to see Ienin., 
who gave her a letter of introduction to Tchicherin to discuss, pre- 
sumably, the need for propaganda in foreign languages. She was a 
founder member of the Anglo-French Group and when it split on linguistic 
lines became secretary of the French Group. She edited a newspaperi, 
Le-Communiste, for distribution to the French intervention troops and 
sailors. When the French landed in Odessa - according to one account - 
she literally threw herself between the French and Russian troops and 
Was arrested on the spot (The Tribunal, 18.9.19). The entry for her 
in the English translation of the collected works of Ionin (Vol. 44) 
states merely that she was arrested by French intelligence services 
and shot. The Tribunal also stated that no soldier was willing to 
carry out the sentence,, and that she was shot by French officers. 
See also The Internationalists pp. 518-520. 
lei The Internationalists pp. 516,519. 
22 
Ibid. p. 546. 
10 : 326A 
presunption that he himself was already involved with both. It was at 
this second meeting Of the group that the need was recognised to divide 
the work on linguistic lines: French and English. An advertisement for 
the first meeting of what came to be known as the Anglo-American Group 
and then as the Group of English-Speaking Communists stated that member- 
ship was to be confined to "English-speaking communists who had lived 
in England or America" although this qualifi--ation was later modified to 
allow "sympathisers" to take part. 
23 
The question of Price's membership 
of the Commnist party will be dealt with below (see p. 333), but there 
can be no doubt that he was involved with the Group from the start. 
The Group of English-Speaking Communists gave itself a formal constitution 
in November 1918. It was accepted as a member of the Central Federation 
of Foreign Groups - as Price had recommended - in January 1919 and it 
remained in existence at least until the beginning of 1920. It was res- 
ponsible for producing probably most of the English-language propaganda 
to emerge from Soviet Russia between Septenber 1918 and May 1919 (when 
the Comintern began to produce its own material, although some even of 
that took the form of reprint-s of the Group's earlier wor4 
?4 Much of its 
23 Ibid. V. 548. 
24 
For the first ten weeks of its existence the rremiDers of what was f inal- 
ly known as the Group of English-Speaking Communists were apparently 
too busy to give themselves a formal constitution, but on 28 November 
a meeting chaired by Fineberg formulated a structure and chose an 
Executive Committee (Nauk--- 544). The first consisted of Joe Finebergs, 
Peter Petrov,, S. J. Rutgers,, Raisa Likhacheva and Solomon Mikhelson. 
I. M. IOkhel and Moisev (M. Finkel) were elected on 9 December and 
KOValevsky and Kolontai on 5 January 1919. On 8 January Reinstein 
became a member of the Executive and on 24 January Fineberg becam 
its Secretary,, with Dobin as his Assistant. On 26 Deceffber 1918 the 
Group decided to publicise their existence and sent formal announce- 
ments to Pravda and Isvestia as well as letters to Ip-nin and SverdlOv 
in which they stated their objectives. These were defined as being 
"to engage in spoken and printed propaganda among British and American 
workers in Russia and abroad; to educate and organise British and 
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output was in the form of leaflets and pamphlets: some in the name of 
the Group and some unattributed. Af ter November 1918 the Group decided 
that from then on some of its leaflets were also to be attributed to 
Lenin and Tchicherin, as certain earlier Sovprop and Narkomindel product- 
ions had been. It is, of courseo, perfectly possible that Ienin and 
Tchicherin actually wrote some of the texts that appeared over their names,, 
but it seems more likely that they were ghosted by members of the Group. 
Members of the Group also helped the Petrograd section of the Central 
Federation of Foreign Groups to produce a weekly journal in the English 
language, Kommuna (see below,, p. 359). But its main work throughout the 
period. of its existence was the production of a small (four-page) weekly 
newspaper, The Call. 
Price never referred in later life to any of his work as a propagandist 
except for his authorship of The Truth About the Allied Intervention in 
Russia. But he always put a circle round the words The Call whenever 
it was referred to in any of the books about the Russian Revolution he 
was so of ten asked to review. It was supposed by the few surviving members 
Of the English or English-speaking comTunity in Moscow in September 1918 
that he was its editor, and this impression was firmly conveyed to and 
American prisoners of war; and to inform the Comaunist party about 
the labOur movement in Britain and America". It would seem that by 
early 1919 the Group was no longer directing its activities exclusively 
t0wards, the troops of the Allied intervention,, but so long as they 
remained on Russian soil the Group appears to have taken on the role 
of distributing as well as producing propaganda. In February 1919 
10cal party organisations in the Northern Front area sent both to the 
Group and to Savprop for literature, and the Group arranged a weekly 
despatch of material to both Northern and Southern fronts. In April 
and May 1919 170,300 copies of various leaflets and pamphlets were 
Printed for the Northern Front alone. In June 1919 the Group was 
asked for literature for distribution in the Astrakhan area and Persia. 
They were specifically asked to send copies of The Shame of BeI42! j a 
Scaby Do You Realise What You Are . and the Truth About the Allied Yn-Uýi7vgit-Tio-n"in Russia. The Internationalists pp. 536; 544-546; 555-556; 
563. 
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25 held by the Foreign Office in London. But Fineberg later stated un- 
equivocaaly that he was the editor of The Call whereas Price was extreme- 
ly ambivalent about his precise role. There can be no doubt however that 
he was very much involved in the production of The Call . in whatever 
capacity,, during the early months of its existence. In the same period,, 
moreover, a number of articles appeared in its columns which it is diffi- 
cult to imagine anyone but Price having written,, in Moscow,, and at that 
time. (These will be dealt with below, see pp. 348-359. ) 
During his last four months in Russia Price worked hard. He was still 
officially the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Russia, he was a 
salaried translator, a pamphleteer and,, for most of that time,, if not 
editor then closely concerned in the production of a weekly newspaper. 
It is no wonder that the fastidious Paquet sometimes found his behaviour 
o-d-d-, his appearance unkempt and his manners leaving a good deal to be 
desired. The Northcliffe press,, wrote Paquet in his diary,, was "as dirty 
about him as he looks "a 
26 
Price's diary reveals of his personal life 
only that he went to the theatre and to concerts as much as he could, 
and that he spent most weekends hunting for food, although he somet-UrIes 
noted that he did not feel well enough to enjoy the walking this entailed 
as much as usual. There are indications in his books and in the unpub- 
lished manuscript upon which the second one was based, that the Worst 
things he felt at this time were the sense of isolation from the rest 
of the world and the sense of sharne for what his country was doing. 
01 used to look at the maps of the Civil War with fear every day because 
I felt that if I realised fully what was happening I would lose hope. 
25 
FO. 371.3342. 
26 
Baumgart Von Brest Litovsk etc. p. 160. 
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It was better under the circLunstances to ignor6 facts and simply set one Is 
teeth , 
27 But during the same period,, although he was ready to defend 
the Red Terror with his pen he was personally appalled by it and made 
what protest he could with his voice to his employers at the Soviet Foreign 
off ice. 
28 On 9 September 1918 Price and Paquet were together for part 
of the day and probably heard together the shootings which paquet noted 
in his diary with "severe twinges of conscience "a 
29 
Throughout the autumn Price continued to go through all the motions of 
a foreign correspondent: he read the papers, attended meetings, inter- 
viewed political leaders and wrote articles which he must have sent of f 
in much the same frame of mind as if he had been throwing bottles contain- 
ing messages into the sea. Af ter the declaration of martial law in 
Moscow,, factory meetings were held every Saturday at which the government 
attempted to keep workers informed of what was going on. Price must have 
been one of the very few outside observers who attended them regularly, 
although Paquet. described once going with Radek to what might have been 
one of them. He found Price already there, he wrote,, and went to sit 
behind him,, pulling up his coat collar "so as not to show my white shirt 
30 
Price and Paquet also frequently encountered one another at meetirxgs of 
the TsIK,, and later of the Sixth Congress. Paquet described how he had 
walked home with Price through the Alexander Garden Of the Kremlin On 
30 SePtember, and that Price had talked on the way of his work for ROSTA 
(the Russian overseas Telegraph Agency) - 
31 This is the only reference 
27 
Price Papers. Ms. "Back Bench Traveller". pp. 690-694. 
28 
Price: Three Revolutions p. 137. 
29 
Baumgart: Von Brest Litovsk etc. p. 157. 
30 
Ibid. p. 145. 
31 -- 
ROSTA: the acronym for Rosiiskoye Telegrafnoye Agentsvo. In the summer 
Or autumn of 1918 ROSTA took the place of PTA (Petrograd Telegraph 
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anywhere to the fact, if it was a fact,, that on top of all his other 
activities Price worked at this time for an official Russian ne,, aagency 
(which is what the Foreign Office in Iondon had assumed he was doing all 
along (see Appendix X) - Meanwhile his food-gathering expeditions kept 
him to some extent at least in touch with village life. His diary records 
that during the summer and autumn of 1918 he visited Pushkin,, Sokolniki, 
Fili, Vlacheraskoye,, Mojaisk, Vorontsova, Dimitrov and Mamnotov; on one 
occasim he found himself on the battlefield of Borodino but (unlike 
pierre) too tired to walk around it. But he was able to report from 
first-hand observation the increasing success with which the supply of 
food from village to town was now being organised,, and the remarkable 
efforts of self --education which were being undertaken in the villages 
even at such a time. 
On three occasions during this period the sword seems to have appeared 
to Price to be a more relevant weapon than his pen, although he only once 
attempted to wield it himself . In August the American journalist Robert 
Minor applied to Lenin personally for permission to go with Price to the 
Volga front, presumably as war correspondents. 
32 
Lenin took up the request 
Agency) , the former main Russian press agency at the time of the 
revolution. ROSTA was one of several agencies which were eventually 
amalgamated into TASS. 
32 
Robert Minor (1882-1952) joined the American Socialist party in 1907 
and by 1911 had established himself as the chief editorial cartoonist 
of the St. D: )uis Post Despatch. In 1912 he went to Paris to study 
art and became converted to anarcho-syndicalism. His anti-war cartoons 
were published in the New York Evening World, but after America came 
Out on the side of the Allies, Minor took his talents to The Call and 
The Masses, for whom he went as a war correspondent first to France Z! ýthen Eý Russia (1918). According to Paquet Price and Minor began 
to associate in August 1918, possibly just before makirxg their joint 
request to go to the Volga front. Minor remained friends with Price 
when Price was Daily Herald correspondent in Germany and was one of 
the few American or Russo-American journalists and writers from this 
Period to whom Price continued to refer in later life. He joined the 
American Communist movement in 1920 and became a cartoonist for the 
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with Tchicherin but nothing came of it which,, in view of Price's useful- 
ness to Tchicherin at the Soviet Foreign Office at that momnt is not 
surprising. 
33 
After the attempt on Ionin's life,, when Price "thought 
the last hour of the Soviet Republic had actually struck"34 he tried to 
join the International Legion of the Red Army. 
35 
He went to a camp on 
the Moscow River which was supposedly its headquarters , with the intention 
thp, rp- 
of enlisting. However when he gotýhe found 
"practically no organisation in existence and no equipment. 
Everything was, of course, being sent to the Red Army now on 
the Volga front. Also I saw a number of suspicious characters 
whom no-one seemed to know much about and who were obviously 
White spies. So I wished them good luck in getting something 
together and decided for the moment to do nothing more. lv36 
And again, much later, on the very eve of the Armistice on the western 
Front, Paquet recorded that he had talked with Price and Sadoul , the 
Socialist French Military AttacI4 who was as much at odds with the French W %. ^, 
goverment as Lockhart had at f irst been with his. 
37 . Both" wrote Paquet 
Daily Worker, but was repelled by Stalinism and retired frorn active 
politics in the late 1940s. Theodore Draper in The Roots of American 
Communism (New York, 1963) gives the only available account so far 
dis ývered of his political activities. Some of his cartoons were 
reproduced in Paul Avrich's The Russian Anarchist (Princeton 1967). 
33 
M. Trush. Vneshnepoliticheskaya Deyatlenost V. I. Lenina 1917-1920. 
Den za dnem. (V. I. Lenin's activity in the sphere of fore; bý? qlic 
1917-1920). (Moscow 1963). 
34 
Price: Revolutions p. 135. 
35 
Albert Rhys Williams,, by his own account, took the initiative in forming 
an International Iegion of the Red Army in February 1918. This is 
described in chapter 9 of Journey into Revolution. He did not mention 
the fact that he was asked by Lenin to write an aPPeal for volunteers 
which was published, by lenin's order,, in both English and Russian#, 
in all the main Russian newspapers on 23 February 1918. This is 
related on p. 540 of The Intemationalists. 
36 
Price Papers Ms. 
37 
"Back Bench Traveller" pp. 704-5. 
JaCclues Sadoul was a socialist lawyer on the staff of the socialist 
Minister of Munitions in the French coalition government,, Albert Thomas. 
In August 1917 he was sent to Russia notionally as a member of the 
Frerich Military Mission, but actually to report direct to Thomas On 
the state of affairs in Russia which Thomas,, quite correctly#, believed 
were being misrepresented in the despatches of the French Ambassador, 
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awant to get to the Western Front via Germany to agitate among the 
Entente soldiers". 
38 
But nothing came of that idea either,, and in the 
circumstances Of the time it maY well have been the euphoria of an 
Englishman, t a Frenchman and a German whose countries were about to stop 
destroying each other. 
of the top Soviet leaders Price knew Tchicherin the best. Throughout 
1918 he appears to have been able to get interviews with him whenever 
he wanted to, and Tchicherin twice intervened to make his life easier. 
But Tchicherin was a remote figure who worked mainly at night, and 
foreigners did not seem to get close to him,, as Sadoul , Ransome and Robins 
got close to Trot-sky and John Reed and Albert Rhys Williams appear to 
have got close to Lenin. With Radek it was a different matter, and for 
about a year, from the spring of 1918 to the summer of 1919 Price appears 
Noulens. Sadoul's letters to Thomas were eventually published in 
book form as Notes Sur la Revolution Bolchevique (Paris 1919) and 
Quarante Lettres de Jacques Sadoul (Paris 1922). Sadoul was the same 
kind of realist about the prospects for survival of the Bolsheviks 
and of the possibility of doing business with them as Robins and 
Lockhart. But on 1 June 1918 he wrote to Thomas "Robins a compris 
l'inutilitj& de ses efforts et a regagne' les Etats Unis. Le pauvre 
Lockhart est rentrg dans sa tente. Mois je suis d6sespere'. " (Notes 
pp-384-387) It is not known when Price and Sadoul met, but that they 
knew each other is certain. Paquet referred to their conversations 
at his flat in his diaries, and Price, in his Open Letter to the 
Workers of Gloucester (Leicester 1920) referred to "my friend Jacques 
Sadoul" and described how they had worked together to try to get 
information out of Russia about Allied support for counter-revolutionary 
activities in Russia in the summer of 1918. Sadoul was ill throughout 
the autumn of that year and was probably therefore not able to take 
an active part in the activities of what began as the Anglo-French 
Group. He remained in Russia after the end of the war and became a 
member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In France he was 
condemned to death in his absence but eventually returned to defend 
himself and to live out the rest of his life as "a lawyer acting for 
Soviet interests and as an agent in Parliamentary circles" (Victor 
Serge: Memoirs of a Revolutionary p. 145 in 1984 edition). The best 
accouný of Sadoul's life is to be found in an unpublished doctoral 
thesis by Carol Knuth Sakoian, "Jacques Sadoul and the Bolshevik 
Revolution". (Boston University, 1977). See also Antonio Coen: La 
Veritig sUr 11 affaire Sadoul (Paris 1919) and Paul Vail lant-C-Outurier: 
Et Sadoul? (Paris 1922). 
38 Baumgart: von Brest Litovsk etc. p-228. 
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tc) have enjoyed an extremely friendly relationship with him. Moreover 
Radek was the only Soviet politician of that period who was openly 
appreciative of the work Price was doing. In a speech to a combined 
sitting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies,, Factory 
Comittees and Trade Unions on 3 September, Radek referred to Price as 
a "manly and honest Englishman" who had said 
"clearly and often that the English had come to Russia to break 
the revolution and to rebuild an Eastern front" 
and he quoted parts of the last three paragraphs of The Truth About the 
Allied Intervention in Russia to illustrate his point. 
39 On 20 September 
Radek wrote to Ransome,, then in Stockholm,, asking if he had yet succeeded 
in getting Price's pamphlet published "in the Scandinavian languages". 
He went on to report in affectionate terms that "little Price" (he was 
six feet tall) had "joined the party... is editing an English newspaper 
for our front" and "generally creating a marvellous impression" by his 
"liveliness and devotion to the cause. " He continued: 
"God knows how a Bolshevik like that came out of a good English 
family. Your mother would doubtless say that some beautiful 
Bolshevik girl or other was the cause but you know that is not 
how things are with Philips. "40 
The letter is interesting for several reasons - It contains the f irst 
reference to the translation of Price's first pamphlet into Scandinavian 
languages. It appears to confirm that Price did indeed edit. The Call 
at that time. And - most interesting of all - it states that Price had 
39 
Karl Radek: 'Die internationale Lage und die äussere Politik der 
Mteregierungf 
. Speech reprinted by Rote Fahner Berlinr and published 
as a pamphlet by Sovprop. Date indecipherable. L. S. E. Library. 
D (47) B. 21. 
40 
Ransome papers,, Brotherton Collection, Brotherton Library, 
University of leeds. ' 
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"jOlned the Party"* 9070tever that may have meant in terms of card-holding,, 
it must at least mean that Price considered himself a Conuunist long 
before he Joined the CPGB (which was not until 1922) and therefore that 
he was in the movement three times as long as he was generally considered 
to have been: six years and not two. 
Without a doubt the high point of Price's life during his last months 
in Russia was his interview with Lenin, which may have been arranged at 
ieast in part to show some recognition of his work. LexLin was not someone 
who needed to be convinced as to the value of propaganda. "It is necessary 
to publish one hundred times more" he wrote to Joffe on 18 October 1918, 
when Joffe was the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin. "Hire translators! 
,, 41 And we are not doing anything. Scandal . The Russian authors of The 
International: . Lsts stated that Lenin "pearsonally directed on an everyday 
Dasis the activity of the foreign groups, including the Anglo-American 
,, 42 Group . This was probably an overstatement,, but there can 
be no doubt 
of the urportance that Lenin attached to propaganda. on the occasion 
that Price met Ienin he shared the interview with Robert Minor and Joe 
Fineberg, and it is remarkable how closely Fineberg's and Price's accounts 
Corroborate not only each other but also the statements made by the authors 
of The Internationalists. "Lenin read every pamphlet and suggested 
uprovements where these seemed sensible" wrote Fineberg. "He put himself 
out to explain to us in the most meticulous detail how we should print, 
41 
A few days earlier Lenin had written to Berzin,, his representative 
with the publishing house Proinachust Bern Belp in Switzerland (see 
F/N 82 below): "It is necessary to hire translators in order to publish 
in four languages: French, German,, and Italian. You have 
nothing in the last two. SZandall Scandal! (V. I. Lenin, Collected 
. -m- 
42 
Works,, English translationr Moscow 1970r V01.44,, pp. 153-154 and 155. 
The Internationalists pp. 547-548. 
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pack and send out literature so that it would find its destination what- 
ever the obstacle". 
43 Price,, in My Three Revolutions 44 described how 
JR= had showed them "Minute photographs of secret messages which could 
carried on as1 ip of paper in a pocket or notebook without anyone 
suspecting what they were. " 
it is not certain when this meeting took place. In his diary for 1918 
Price has it down for 1 November, but with a question mark after it, as 
if he had tried to locate the meeting in time later on, from memory. 
He certainly got the date wrong in My Three Revolutions, when he put it 
in "August or early September "0 
45 The conversation he reported would 
have made no sense in the historical context of August; by early Septenber 
Le= was fighting for his life. Wen Price saw him he noted that Lienin 
was recovering "and he assured me that he was getting on well. " He 
devoted only one paragraph to the meeting with Lenin in his Reminiscences 
46 
but considerably more in My Three Revolutions. 
47 He was frequently asked 
to describe the occasion, particularly at the time of the 50th Anniversary 
celebrations of the November Revolution. Miat follows is an account he 
sent to Pravda at that time; it is substantially the same as what he had 
just written for my Three Revolutions, although this had not yet been 
Published. 
"... M. 70-hicherin arranged that I should see Lenin in his room 
in the Kremlin. It was the same room that one can now see and 
looks very much as it was then. After my enquiries about his 
health,, we talked about the general situation and I soon began 
to notice a cautious realism in his conversation which I had 
43 
Ibid. 
44 
Price: My Three Revolutions p. 140. 
45 
Ibid. p. 139. 
46 
Price: Reminiscences pp. 345-6. 
47 Price: My Three Revolutions pp-345-6. 
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seen in his speeches ever since the Bolsheviks had come into 
power. It was quite clear to me from this conversation with 
him that he did not share the prevailing optimism since the 
Red Army had recaptured Kazan and had beaten back the Czecho- 
Slovak troops on the Volga. Nor had he any illusions about 
the imminence of world revolution. The previous autumn, it 
was he who had insisted on the seizure of power in spite of 
the opposition of some of his colleagues,, but to hear him speak 
now, it seemed that he had come more and more to the opinion 
that many obstacles lay in the way of the Revolution and of 
any world movement which might support it. I had noticed this 
during his great fight in favour of accepting the German- 
dictated peace at Brest-Litovsk and later when he had criticised 
his own followers for being "slaves to phrases" and Limpractical 
people. In answers to questions which I put to him, he seemed 
to think that, if the German Imperial system broke down in 
Central Europe, the Soviet Republic might be exposed to new 
and greater dangers. His eyes were clearly fixed on the shores 
of the Black Sea where he seemed to discern Allied naval forces 
passing through an open Dardanelles and landing well-trained 
armies equipped with tanks on the coast of Southern Russia. 48 
"What can we put up against this if they really send them" he 
said "and if the Allied soldiers really obey their rulers and 
march? " "And" he added in a thoughtful vein, "I fear that the 
social revolution in central Europe is developing too slowly 
to provide us with any assistance from that quarter. " 
When I first saw Loenin at the Peasant Congress in Petrograd 
in April of the previous year, he had not impressed me greatly. 
He seemed to have an inelastic mind and was fanatically devoted 
to a fixed idea. That may have been true at the time,, when 
the Russian revolutionary movement was emerging from underground 
and when ideological discipline was needed. But when I met 
him in the Kremlin some fifteen months later, he was becoming 
a world statesman. He had had to compromise and to force his 
followers to do likewise in order to save the revolution in 
Russia. It was not what he wanted,, but he had the wisdom to 
realise what was possible and what was not. 
His whole life had been devoted to the idea of world revolution. 
It was a religion to him. He did not at first see that other 
countries had different history and traditions to Russia,, but 
when I met him he was clearly beginning to see this. If world 
revolution did not come now,, it would come some day and mean- 
while the Russian Revolution must be saved. This was how his 
mind seemed to be working. %ben I asked him if he thought he 
had convinced his followers of the need for this tenporary 
48 
Ironically, while Lenin was looking anxiously towards the Black 
Sea for signs of an Allied landing, the Allied Naval Council was 
equally alarmed at the prospect of "Russo-Turko-German" forces 
(by which they meant captured Russian naval vessels repaired and 
mamed by Germans) breaking out of the Black Sea into the Mediter- 
ranian and inflicting severe damage on the Allied fleets there. 
Memorandum, yy the Secretary of the Allied Naval Council, 24 Sept- 
ember 1918. Milner Papers. The Great War. Box AB1. 
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compromise, he smiled and said nothing. He was not going to 
give away his inmost thoughts to me. Yet I think he was glad 
to see me, especially as I was British,, and he knew there were 
few sympathizers in Britain for his Revolution at that time. 
I suspected while I was with him that, with his realistic out- look,, he did not expect changes to come in Britain in the same 
way as they came in Russia, but, of course, he would not say 
anything definite to me. I could see that his main interest 
now was to save the Russian Revolution. What happened in other 
countries was for the moment less important. 
I left him feeling that,, with the philosophy he had,, he must 
have been not only a humble but a happy man. He was hurrible 
because,. as a good Marxist,, he felt his personality did not 
count very much. There, of course, he was wrong. He mattered 
very much,, not least to Russia. He was a happy man because 
he clearly enjoyed, in spite of its dangers, directing a great 
movement as long as Fate allawed him to do so. 
Price had been introduced to Lenin at least once before and had heard 
him speak on innumerable occasions, but this meeting was the only oppor- 
tunity he had to talk with him. The fact that Lenin referred to the slow 
progress of the social revolution in Europe and the threat posed to Russia 
by Allied troops who might soon be released from other fronts suggests 
that the meeting did, in fact, take place more or less when Price entered 
it in his diary: 1 November. The war was not yet quite over; the German 
revolution, such as it was, had not quite begun. Price had heard Lenin 
make the offer, in a speech to the Moscow Trades Unions on 30 Septembert 
of military and material help to the German workers "if " as Price reported 
it "they should overthrow the Kaiser's Government and get into difficulties 
with the Entente,,. 49 He had heard Kamenevr two days later at a meeting 
of TsIK,, announce the appointment of Prince Max with the duty of making 
Peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points. He had heard the "howls of 
derision" with which the announcement was greeted and cormiented later 
that the instincts of the Russian revolutionaries at that time had been 
"extxaordinarily correct ... these persons .. were just puppets put up 
49 
Price: Reminiscences pp. 343-44. 
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by distressed reaction to divert attention f rom the real issues,,. 50 
It was Price who sat up all night translating the Soviet Government's 
NOte to Wilson coffu*-ýnting on this aevelOPment, and POinting out that a 
general peace was precisely what they had proposed a year earlier. 
few days later he spent the whole day walking in the great procession 
wtiich marked the f irst anniversary of the November Revolution, but on 
8 November he was back as a reporter, attending the second session of 
the 6th Congress, which was being held at the Bolshoi Theatre. Paquet 
describes how he ran into Price "in the orchestra stalls" where "Price 
told me in the midst of the excitement the latest news: radio message 
f rom Nauen: the sailors of the German North Sea Fleet at Wilhelmshafen,, 
Kiel, - Ciýen, Hamburg and Brertien have occupied and taken over the public 
buildings. But complete order. A central administration instituted. 
Iooters shot on sight. Triumphant news. " 
51 
For a short time events in Germany continued to appear to belie Lenin's 
bitter realism. On 9 Novent)er the Kaiser abdicated, a national republic 
was proclaimed in Germany and a coalition government f ormed of Majority 
and Independent Socialists (the latter at that time still including the 
extreme Left Spartacists) . The 6th Congress sent a message of congratul- 
ation to the independent Berlin Soviet and the following day was declared 
a Public holiday in Russia. Price was invited to a party at the Kremlin 
at which toasts in honour of the German Revolution were drunk in coffee 
"nothing stronger being available" and Price danced "a very inferior 
Polish mazurka" with Mme. Litvino. v. Lenin was conspicuous bY his absence- 
"Perhaps" wrote Price in his Reminiscences 
52 mhe had an inkling of what 
50 
Ibid. 
51 
Baum9art Von Brest Litovsk etc. pp. 224-225. 
52 
Price: Reminiscences pp. 343-44. ' 
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ttils 'revolution' really was,, as his conversation with me a few days 
before seemed to suggest. " In his unpublished autobiography Price re- 
called that for some days the popular euphoria continued and that even 
the Soviet Foreign Office "would not take the view that what had happened 
in Germany was only a removal of the Hohenzollern regime and there was 
no knowing who would replace it", although there may have been an element 
of hindsight in the recollection. 
53 
Writing only two years after the 
event, however, he already considered that many Russian communists "were 
guilty of grave errors of judgement at this time" . and that by their 
wishf ul thinking, by their overestimation of the extent and authenticity 
of the GerTnan revolution they fatally compromised the Spartacists and 
helped to ensure their failure "by making them appear as warmongers, 
54 
anxious to convert the national war into a revolutionary one" . 
At the same time it was becoming clear to Price that the situation had 
altered for him personally,, and that he was now no longer necessarily 
confined to the territory controlled by the Soviet goverment. PerhaPs 
naively, he thought it would be "easier to conuunicate a true account 
of the situation in Russia" from Berlin "and thereby to escape the British 
censor. . 
55 
Although he was very well aware that he had been the object 
of considerable attention by the British censor, clearly he still had 
no idea of how formidable the apparatus of censorship had become in 
Britain. He was also, characteristically, attracted by the idea of being 
the first Western Correspondent to arrive in Western Europe#, after the 
end of the war, from the East. He therefore sent , on 21 November,, a 
radlotelegram to the Foreign Minister of the German provisional Government 
53 
PriCe papers Ms.,, Back Bench Traveller,, p. 727. 
54 
Price: Poeminiscences P. 352. 
55 Price papers Ms., Back Bench Traveller,, p. 729. 
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a copy of which was picked up by Le Temps and printed on 18 December, 
56 eventually finding its way into the Foreign Office archives. 
Sir: on hearing that English and American journalists will 
soon be allowed to visit Berlin in order to describe in their 
papers the situation in Germany af ter the revolution, I respect- 
fully request, as correspondent of the manchester Guardian in 
Russia, your permission to visit Berlin for the same purpose. 
I need hardly remind you that the 
' 
Manchester Guardian, since 
the beginning of the war, has fonseen a policy of accommodation 
with the German democracy for the creation of a League of Nations. 
Yours sincerely Philips Price, correspondent in Russia of the 
Manchester Guardian. 
on 27 November the German Foreign Office telegraphed back that his "journey 
to Germany in order to report on the situation there will meet with no 
objection. " 
In view of what is now known of the extent of his commitment to the Soviet 
Government at this time, it is inconceivable that Price made the decision 
to go to Germany in isolation. Indeed in an account of this period among 
his private papers he stated that it was Radek's idea that he should go - 
57 
The mere fact that Price continued to write for Communist propaganda 
Organisations from Berlin is further evidence that he had no intention 
of disassociating himself from the Group of English-Speaking Communists 
by leaving the country. Publicly he said that he discussed his proposal 
to 90 to Germany with Tchicherin and Radek and that they offered him a 
free pass on the Russian railways as far as the German frontier. 
58 There 
carinot have been time to work out more than a very general plan of action; 
only eight days elapsed between the date Price sent his telegram and the 
date he received the answer,, and three days later he was on his waY tO 
-&-arlin. Radek gave him introductions to Liebknecht and Luxemburg - 
56 
FO 371.3345. 
57 
Price papers 
58 
Price: my Three Revolutions p-147. 
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There appears to have been no doubt in his mind at that t-une as to his 
standing with the Manchester Guardian, and it does not seem to have 
occurred to him that Scott might be coming under pressure to disown him. 
Un 
.,, left Moscow believing that he could continue - but more effectively 
to ride simultaneously the two horses of journalism and propaganda. 
His last few days in Russia were crowded. On the evening of the day that 
he received permission to go to Berlin (28 November) the Group of English- 
Speaking Communists celebrated their formal constitution. The entry 
"English Communist dinner" in his diary is the only indication anywhere 
in the whole of the Price papers that he had anything to do with the 
Group, although this may have been at least partly because he lost so 
many of his papers (see below p. 342) . The entry for 29 November reads 
59 "Arrangements to leave. Clothes. and for 30 November: "Arrangements 
to leave. Receive instructions from Radek. Theatre. Friend of the 
Family. , 60 At 9 P. m. on 1 December 1918 Price left Russia almost exactly 
four years after he took up his post as correspondent there for the 
Manchester Guardian,, and after travelling for five days he reached the 
German frontier. 
"I left Russia with a heavy heart" he wrote in MY Three RevOlut- 
ions. "Russia had been my home for so long that I felt it had 
become part of me and I almost part of it. Yet I knew that 
somethuig new and interesting was now happening in the Westr 
especially in Germany. eo6l 
-59 
Price's wife Lisa, describing their marriage the following Augustr 
wrote in an unpublished memoir that he wore his only suit, a Russian 
Onet "which looked as if it had been made of birch bark and 
60 
Probably was. " Price papers. 
Price papers. A striking feature of Price's inainly engagement) diary 
for the period April-November 1918,, when he lived in Moscowr is the 
number of times he appears to have been able to go both to concerts 
and to the theatre. This is corroborated in a letter to him from 
E. St. John Catchpool written in 1964 (see Chp. 9 F/N. 21) recalling 
61 
the wonderful concerts they went to together at that time. 
Price: My Three Revolutions p. 159. 
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But the first thing that happened,, when he crossed the frontier at 
Eytkunen,, was that the German official acting on behalf of the local 
w)rkers ' and Soldiers' Soviet 
"relieved me of many of the papers I had brought with me, 
including all the copies of Izvestia... from the f j-rst days 
of the Revolution till the day that I left Moscow.,, 
price went on to note that he could sense 
"at once, on entering Germany, that the Revolution was barely 
skin deep... By this time I knew a revolution when I saw it. 
But if not a revolution, what was it that I was coming into 
now? n62 
Price arrived in Berlin on 6 December in the middle of an unsuccessful 
counter-revolutionary putsch. According to his diary he went at once 
to see Liebknecht, and was arrested,, with him and others present,, f or 
three hours. For the next two weeks he seems to have spent most of his 
time meeting the leaders of the German Left, but his normally laconic 
diary is scattered with phrases like "petty bourgeois atmosphere", "not 
very revolutionary", "stif f compared to Russia", "very right atmosphere" 
cand 11some alarm in Soviet quarters. " %ben he was not seeing people or 
attending meetings he recorded in his diary that he wrote parnphlets - 
He also wrote four des] 
Guardian, all of which 
the fate of which wi 11 
He fomed a "Committee 
patches about events 
were printed, 
63 
and 
be dealt with below 
of Foreign Socialis- 
in Germany for the Manchester 
he wrote a letter to Scott, 
(see Chapter 11, p. 398). 
ts" and hired a room for it. 
64 
62 
Ibid. 
63 
Manchester Guardian 16.12.18: 'Attempted Reichstag Coup'; 
ibid--. 17.12.18: 'Germany's Unsolved Problem'; ibid. 20-12.18: 'The 
German Congress'; ibid. 27.12.18: (i) 'German Government's Stability' 
(ii) 'Wreck of Militarism'; ibid. 28.12.18: (i) 'Struggle for Power 
in Berlin' (ii) 'A Government Defeat'. All these articles were 
attributed to "Our Special Corresporident" without naming Price. 
64 
Price papers: diary. 
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This suggests that he was, at least in his Own mind and perhaps also 
under ]Radek's "instructions", simply carryirxg on in another setting the 
work of the Federation of Communist Groups to which, it will be recalled, 
the Group of English-speaking Communists in Moscow had been affiliated. 
It seems probable that Price was also, to some extent,, helping to prepare 
for an expected visit to Berlin by Radek who must,, by the end of November, 
when Price last saw him, have been either intending, or waiting for an 
invitation, to go there. As it turned out,, Radek was invited by the Berlin 
Soviet to come to Berlin as one of the representatives of the Soviet 
Government at the f irst All-German Congress of Soviets on 16 December. 
The other members of the delegation were turned back at the German frontier, 
but Radek eventually got through under an assumed name. Price attended 
all f ive days of the Congress and learned at the office of the Spartacist 
paper Rote Fahne, where he went as soon as it was over, that "R. is 
65 here" . He wrote in his diary for the next day (21 December) "Papers 
amounced R. 's arrival. Look for him but cannot f ind. WrOte pamphlets 
in evening. If But next day he found Radek at the Rote Fahne office. 
"Great talk. " In the following eight days Price lunched or dined with 
Radek four times. Radek made a more or less surprise appearance at an 
All-German Congress of the Spartacist Party on New Year's Ever after which 
he and Price had supper together and Radek gave him "material for tele- 
graph". 66 
The "telegraph" was the last that Price was to send to the Manchester 
Guardian for nearly 26 years. It was stc)pped by the Press Bureau, which 
had so unexpectedly al lowed his four accounts of conditions in Germany 
65 
Ibid. 
66 
Ibid. 
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to go through only a few days earlier. The only copy of this despatch 
in existence was found in the Press Bureau's files, where the transcript 
shows that it was indeed, addressed to the Manchester Guardian. 
67 
it 
would seem that Price was not considered as dangerous to public opinion 
in Britain when he dealt with German aff airs as when he dealt with Russia, 
and this particular despatch dealt once more with Russia. Consequently 
it was never printed. The following precis of that interview with Radek 
appears for the first time. 
price began by offering Radek a chance to clear up charges made in Allied 
countries that the Bolsheviks were agents of the ex-Kaiser. Radek coun- 
tered that by negotiating with the Scheideman goverment, "consisting of 
men who licked the boots of the ex-Kaiser", and by making war on the 
Soviet Government in the Baltic Provinces "with the aid of soldiers of the 
ex-Kalser's army" the Allies themselves were the collaborators. If they 
wanted "proof that the Bolsheviks had always been enemies of Prussian 
railitarism" they had only to look at the documents relating to the annis- 
tice at Brest Litovsk. Price then asked Radek upon what conditions the 
Sc)vlet Goverment was ready to open negotiations with the Allies for the 
avoidance of f urther bloodshed. ]Radek replied by reminding him that the 
Soviet Goverment had repeatedly offered in the spring of 1918 to enter 
1nto economic agreements with Britain and America but that the Allies 
had never given any reply to their repeated offers. Prompted by Pricer 
Radek went on to say that the Soviet government was now "ready to oPen 
rlegotiations on the same terms, the more so becauser thanks to the 
German revolution, the Soviet Government has been freed fran the 
reparations levied on them at Brest Litovsk. " But iRadek was not hoPef ul r 
because,, he said,, the "present rulers of Allied countries have shown that 
f-h'M 
%licir object in Russia is the establishment of counter-revolution 
6 HO 139-35 
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wherever they come" - Radek went on to point out that these activities 
had merely served to broaden the base of support for the Soviet government 
in Russia. "We await the future with confidence, knOwing the justice 
of our case. " By spring the Red Army would be one and a half million 
strong, "and if the Allies continue their present policy they will be 
too busy putting down revolutions in Germany and Austria to attend to 
us. " Price concluded the interview by asking Radek about the conditions 
of British prisoners of war taken on the Archangel front. Radek's reply 
was: 
"their relations need not worry... If they wish to return the 
only difference their friends will find in them will be that 
their ideas about society have changed. " 
Something needs to be said by way of epilogue on the relationship between 
Radek and Price: in many ways two ill-assorted men who nonetheless appear 
for a while to have worked closely and successfully together. 
68 It is 
68 
KARL RADEK (1885-1939) was born in Poland and graduated in the social- 
ist revolutionary movements of Poland and Germany, like Rosa Luxemburg. 
Despite their common background, however, Rosa Luxemburg disliked and 
distrusted him and Radek found his talents more appreciated as a journ- 
alist and general emissary in Bolshevik Russia. Although it was he who 
Persuaded the Spartacists that a separate German Communist Party was 
necessary,, he quickly realised, having done so, that the situation in 
Germany in January 1919 was not ripe for revolution, and he spent the 
next five years txying to restrain "putschist" tendencies in the KPD. 
When Price noted in his diary thathe must write to Radek about the need 
fOr coming to an "understanding" with the USPD he was preaching to the 
converted. Radek, who had entered Germany illegally in 1919 and sub- 
sequently spent the better part of a year in the Moabit prison, nonetheless 
returned to Germany on innumerable occasions and Price met Mm More than 
Once while he was Daily Herald correspondent in Berlin. There are 
9 references to Radek in his Reminiscences and 21 in My Three Revolutions- 
In his article 'November' (Krasnaya Nov Octcber 1926 pp. 139-175) Radek 
WrOte that Price kept him informed about "the British movement --- and thrOugh him it was possible to establish some kind of connection with 
it. " Price's last words on Radek (My Three Revolutions pp-182/3) suggest 
that he was still smarting, forty years later,, from some Occasion when 
he felt his friendship had been abused. In his Appendix to Carr's article 
(see below) he noted that Radek had used him to fly a journalistic kite 
arid that he had been unwise enough to do so without first checking the 
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ilr, onceivable that the pamphlets which Price was to write during his first 
four months in Berlin were written without Radek's prior knowledge. It 
is, indeed, more likely that he had already asked Price to write at least 
some of thein before he lef t Russia - For Price, Radek must have been the 
last embodiment of his links with the Bolsheviks and for some years af ter 
he left Russia those 
links remained strong. But documentary evidence 
is thin, as is of ten the case when a relationship is presumed to be ongoing, 
and Radek was not an important enough figure for Price to have made a 
point of collecting or keeping material about him at that time (as he 
did in the case of his letters from Sir Charles Dilke) . In his diary 
for 1919 he noted on 26 February "wrote article for R" and on 28 February 
"Talked with MU'ller and Markovsky and agreed an understanding between 
USP and Communists absolutely necessary. Shall write to R in this sense. " 
The allusions to Price in Radek's letter to Ransome of September 1919 
(see above p. 333) were amused and affectionate. Towards the end of 1919 
Price, by now a former resident himself of the Moabit prison (see below 
p. 424) went to visit Radek there. They appear to have talked entirely 
about the already-receding prospects of revolution in Britain. Awng 
the Price papers is an autographed photograph Of Radek dated "Berlint 
10.12.19. " on which Radek had also written - what mist have been a private 
joke at the time - "Dear Philippi I say: Ulster will fight and Ulster 
Will be right". The two men certainly met in April 1922j, when Radek 
facts. For a man who himself wrote so Muchr there is very little in 
print about Radek in English. His only biographer is Warren Lerner: 
Karl Radek: the Last Internationalist (Stanford 1970). E. H. Carr's 
'Radek's Political Salon in Berlin, 1919', with an Appendix by Price, 
appeared in Soviet Studies 3 (1952) pp. 411-430. His activities in 
Berlin in December 1918/January 1919 are described by J. P. Nettle: 
Rosa Luxemburg,, V01.2,, Chp. 17 (oxford 1966). There are accounts in 
German by Mary Louise Goldback: Karl Radek und die deutsch - 
sowietischen Beziehunel"1923 (Bonn/Bad Godesberg 1973) and Dietrich 
MC31ler: Karl Radek in Deutschland M51n 1973). 
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represented both Russia and the Third International at the meeting of 
all three Internationals in Berlin,, and they met againi, probably in secret, 
at Hamburg in May 1923, which was almost certainly their last njeeting. 
69 
Radek appears to have known better than anyone else how to make use of 
price's particular abilities, yet Price never gave the slightest indication 
in later life that he had ever been closely associated with him. Radekis 
implication in the Moscow trials must have been painful to Price but he 
never spoke of it. of course he knew more than one of the defendants, 
but none as well as Radek. But whereas he heavily and frequently under- 
lined the text of Bukharin's last plea in the official transcript of the 
trials, thus proving that he read them,, there is not a word in the margins 
69 In the early 1920s several attempts were made either to keep the Second 
International alive or to set up a new Socialist International, not 
so much in opposition to the Third International as providing a non- 
communist alternative. An organisation, unkindly known as Two-and- 
a-Half , began to emerge from a meeting in Vienna in February 1921 
and resulted in the Berlin meeting of April 1922 at which both the 
Second and Third Internationals and the Vienna Union were represented. 
This was to be, in the words of the invitations, which were sent out 
by the British Labour Party, a "general international conference of 
class-conscious proletarians". Radek was one of the representatives 
of the Third International and played a prominent part, as noted by 
Price in My Three Revolutions (pp. 195-196). The Third International 
withdrew,, in the course of subsequent attempts to organise a follow- 
up conference, but, in May 1923 delegates of 41 parties from 30 
countries representing all shades of socialist tendency except 
Communism, met at Hambtirg and formed themselves into the Labour and 
Socialist International, which lasted until 1939. Radek, obviouslyr 
was not officially at Hamburg and Price did not mention either the 
conference or Radek in My Three Revolutions, but it seems that Radek 
was there secretly, since Price began a letter to him in June 1924: 
"I have been wanting to write to you for some time,, f irst to tel I you 
about my doings since I saw you in Hamburg last May... " (Price papers) 
For further reading about the Internationalst see Julius Braunthalr 
Vol. I 1964-1914 (English translation 
London 1966), Vol. II 1914-1943 (1967). Chapters 11 and 12 of Vol-II 
deal wiLth the immedij- post-war period. See also Jane Degras: The 
Commnist International 1919-1943 Documents selected and edited in 
ErFývolumie-s-F(I-9569') _; ýEý_i_. H. Carr The Bolshevik Revolution Vol -III 
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of either the examinations or the last plea of Radek. Price's last 
reference to Radek,, written in the late 1960s for My Three Revolutions, 
suggests that somewhere along the line Radek had been too clever for Price 
and had offended him: 
"I found Radek one of the most acute minds I can remember. 
He could size up a situation in no time and my poor slow brain 
could hardly follow his mental gyrations. I realised also that 
he could be quite unreliable and an arch-intriguer". 70 
(ii) Journals: The Call and Komnuna 
The first number of The Call was printed in Moscow and issued on 14 Sept- 
ember 1918. The paper continued to be printed weekly from then on until 
at least the end of 1919. By January 1919 the regular printing of the 
paper was 15,, 000 copies. 
71 The fact that Joe Fineberg, who had previouslY 
worked on the journal of the British Socialist Party which bore the same 
name, was closely involved in the production of the Moscow paper almost 
certainly accounts for its title. price was thought to have edited it 
for a wbile but there is no f irm evidence Of this and indeed Fineberg 
categorically stated that he was the editor (see Chapter 9, Footnote 5) - 
On the other hand Radek said that Price edited it (see Chapter 10, P. 333) . 
If Sor it can only have been until the end of November 1918, when he lef t 
RUSSia. It must be said that there was a marked change in the tone and 
Style of The Call in the course of the autumn of 1918. An analYsis Of 
the f irst 17 issues is given in Appendix IX. 
70 Price: my Three Revolutions pp-182-183. 
71 
The Internationalists P. 548. 
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The policy of The Call was stated over what would have been the leader 
column in a more conventiona 30urnal: "The Call is Published by the 
Central Executive Committee of the Council of workmens ' and peasants 1 
Deputies with the object of convincing its English-speaking fellow workers 
that the interests of the workers of all lands are the same, and to urge 
the need for establishing that solidarity of international labour upon 
which alone the peace of the world can be secured. The Editorial Staf f 
hopes to keep its readers informed of the progress of the class struggle 
at home and abroad. 11 
All the articles which appeared in. The Call were unattributed, the only 
proper names to appear being those attached to direct quotations frorn 
the speeches or writings of Lenin,, Trotsky and Tchicherin. Vibat follows 
is an attempt to identify the articles that Price probably contributed 
during the first months of its existence. This will be done on the basis 
of his style, the use of words or phrases characteristic of him at that 
Period, subject matter that had already demonstrably interested him in 
the past or of which he had special knowledge,, or subject matter of which 
it is unlikely that other - mainly Americanised - members of the Group 
of English-Speaking Communists would have had special knowledge (as the 
English wool trade in the seventeenth century) - It is easy enough to 
identify the articles he did not write because of the American spelling 
which characterised an increasing number of them as time went on. 
The first number of The Call contained a short article which fits exactly 
Into the category of those which it is difficult to imagine anyone Other 
than Price having written,, in Moscow,, at that time. Moreover In terms 
Of layout it occupied a place roughly corresponding to that of a leading 
article in a more conventional journal, and it would not be surprising 
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if an article by him had been given a place of honour in the f irst number. 
price had taken a leading part in the formation of the Group and his 
comitment to the Soviet cause at this time was, as has already been 
noted, both recognised and appreciated by some, at least,, of its leaders. 
In any case the article,, short as it was, strongly echoed. The Truth About 
the Allied Intervention in Russia which he had finished writing only a 
few weeks earlier. Entitled "Two Expeditions", the -piece contrasted the 
first British expedition to Archangel in the seventeenth century with 
the one currently taking place. 
72 
Then, the Englishman had come to Russia 
"as a friend", to trade. Now the English were "trying to cover their 
friendliness under the threat of machine guns and artillery. " The 
article brief ly recapitulated the Soviet Government's attempts to get 
material aid from the British earlier in 1918 but concluded that the Allies 
never had any intention of helping the Russians; they intended, rather, 
"to punish them for daring to abolish the sacred rights of 
property... We are convinced that if the truth were known the 
British workers and soldiers [would] refuse to be the tools 
of their own exploiters. " 
The second issue (21 September) contained the first of what was to become 
One of the more regular features of the journal: a column, sometimes morej, 
On the "Progress of the Revolutionary War. " It is tempting to ascribe 
these to Price, at least until the end of November 1918,, because as a 
72 
Price got the century wrong. In 1553 a group of London merchants 
Sent three ships to seek a north-east passage to the Indies. Two 
were lost with all hands but the third,. captained by Richard 
Chamberlain, was shipwrecked in the mouth of the Dvi-na, much to the 
SUrprise of the local inhabitants who had never seen or heard of 
foreigners before. He was taken to Moscow carrying a letter with 
Which he had had the forethought to provide himself,, from Edward 6 
to Tsar Ivan 4,, asking for permission to trade. This episode was 
to result in the formation of the London Muscovy Coiq: )any with 
charters from both the English and Russian governments. A short 
account of this episode is given by Geraldine M. Phipps: "Manuscript 
Collections in British Archives relating to pre-petrine Russia". 
AýanLAmerican S11avic Studies Vol. 6 (1972) p. 400. 
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former war correspondent this kind of reporting had become second nature 
tc) himr whereas most of his colleagues on. The Call were more purely 
pc)litical and polemical writers. Another article in the second issue, 
entitled "Four-Square against all Imperialists" also seems likely to have 
been contributed by him. Despite its title it was merely a plain account 
of the reasons why Russia had been compelled to get peace at Brest Litovsk; 
the article then described some of the unexpected consequences of that 
peaCe so far as Germany was concerned. German troops had come under the C-- 
influence of Bolshevism; it had proved almost impossible to get any food 
out of the Ukraine; the German warlords saw "the Napoleon's fate awaits 
them". - It was not,, said Price, surprising that the Supplementary Treaty 
of Brest Litovsk just concluded had contained a number of major concess- 
ions favouring the Soviet Government. 73 
The third issue of The Call (28 September) contained nothing which suggests 
the hand of Price; if he did contribute it must have been in the capacity 
of editor,, in which case the results were not distinguished. The entire 
issue was composed of 21 excerpts from Allied and neutral papers. The 
fourth issue on the other hand included what might again be described 
73 
The supplementary treaty of Brest Iatovsk was signed in Berlin on 
- 27 August 1918. Under its terms Russia was further penalised to the 
extent of 6 billion marks of reparations,, the cession of Estonia and 
. Livoniar the recognition of Georgian independence and the promise to 
Germany of 25% of all the oil from Baku. But Russia gained in return 
a German undertaking to withdraw from Bielorussia, to occupy no more 
territory and to cease supporting counter-revolutionary movements in 
Russia. Price, in his Reminiscences (p. 343) notes that the Bolsheviks 
were "jubilant" about the terms of the supplementary treatyr and 
regarded them as a vindication of IRxLin's diplomacy. In his diary 
he noted that he had discussed the treaty with Radek on 9 SePteffber- 
]Kurt Riezler, at that time First Secretary at the German Embassy in 
Moscow,, recorded that in a secret Appendix the Germans offered their 
OWn and Finnish troops to help evict Allied intervention forces from 
North Russia and Baku. See also Konrad H. Jarusch: "Co-operation or 
Intervention? Kurt Riezler and the Failure of German Ostpolitik 1918",, 
Llavic Review (1972) pp. 381-398. 
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as a leader, which not only bore a strong imprint of price 1s style but 
also contained a reference to Goethe: one of price IS favourite pc)ets. 
Hung upon the newspeg of the Austrian peace proposals, 
74 
the author itemised 
the reasons why Austria could be expected to sue for peace at that time. 
"so ... the dove of peace goes forth with its message. But 
it finds cold comfort in the camps of the imperialists... The 
French Government laconically replies that Austria can always 
have peace if she wants it,, on the condition,, of course, that 
she first allows herself to be throttled... [The British 
Goverment] only went to war to protect small nationalaities, 
still it could not possibly think of returning the German 
colonies in which English bankers have become so touchingly 
interested. " 
The article concluded that the Austrian peace proposal contained a lesson 
for all the world. 
"And it is this. Peace will not be made by the Governments 
of the ruling classes but will be made over the heads of those 
governments by the people of all lands. " 
At least part of an article in the f if th issue (12 October) might have 
been written by Price. The main body of it, under the title "The Crash 
74 
By mid-August 1918 the German High Command had realised that Germany 
could not win the war, but were not yet ready to make peace on the 
basis of abandoning all their war aims. A conference of the political 
and military chiefs of the Central Powers was held at Spa with both 
Emperors present. On 30 August the Emperor Karl warned the Kaiser 
that Austria could on no account carry on through the winter. It was 
then that he first proposed that the Allies should be invited to send 
delegates to a neutral country for confidential and non-commital 
discussions, with the object of agreeing on a basis for peace 
negotiations. Despite every effort by the Germans to prevent him 
from doing so,, Karl did precisely this in a public invitation to the 
governments of all the belligerents issued on 14 September. It was 
rejected by all the Allies, although the Queen of the Netherlands 
Offered to make her residence available for such a meeting. On 
4 October, when Germany finally sent to President Wilson a proposal 
for peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, Austria sent a similar 
Noter but while negotiations between Germany and the Allies were still 
Proceeding,, the Ehperor Karl informed the German Government that he 
was going to sue for a separate peace. Austria surrendered unclOndit- 
iOnally on 3 November. See R. B. Mawat A History of European DiplomacT 
1914-1925 (1927) Chapter 14, and Lloyd George,, War Memoirs Chapter 85 Kits 1&2", 
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of World Imperialism", was about develOPMents in Bulgaria, a country in 
which he had taken a keen interest and about which he had written at some 
length for the Manchester Guardiano, although these despatchest too,, had 
fallen foul of the censor. But the lead-in and concluding paragraphs 
drew conclusions about the significance of those developments to which 
it is unlikely that Price, at that time, subscribed, since he recorded 
his cOntnulng reservat'Ons about the imuLnent demise of Inperialism 
even af ter the German revolution had broken out, a month later. 
75 
The 
"Progress of the Revolutionary War" column in this issue contained another 
indicator that Price was probably its author, being an account of class 
divisions among the Cossacks, a subject on which he had often written 
before. The front page article of the sixth issue (19 October) could 
have been another collaboration. The subject matter and scope of the 
article are typical of Price but the style is uneven and contains more 
revolutionary cliches than Price usually employed. (on the other hand 
lie often said, decades later,, that he thought his use of the English 
language had been the main victim of this period in his life. ) The article 
argued that class war was the common factor in developments both in the 
Ukraine and in Bulgaria, and that the subjection of Bulgaria by the Allies 
76 
75 
In his Reminiscences, published only three years later,, Price did not 
permit himself to express the doubts he remembered half a century later,, 
although he recorded the reservations expressed to him by Lenin (pp. 345- 
356). In My Three Revolutions (p. 142) he described the atmosphere in 
Moscow in October 1918 as apocalyptic: "a modern form of Slav mysticism 
which makes Russians often difficult to understand". He illustrated 
what he meant with his own reaction to seeing a newspaper headline: 
"World Revolution has Commenced! " "... Even I, who had in general now 
abandoned much of my former objectivity,. began to feel doubts of this 
76 
interpretation of events, especially after my interview with Lenin. " 
The collapse of Bulgaria was a turning point in the process of bringing 
the war to an end. As the result of an Allied offensive on the Salonika 
front in Septeziber 1918 the Bulgarian Government sued for an armistice 
On 28 September. Hindenburg is reported to have said,, on hearing of 
this: "Who would close the gap if Bulgaria fell out once and for all? " 
The terms of the armistice signed between Bulgaria and the Allies On 
29 September made it clear that Bulgaria was, indeed,, to be left wide 
OPenj, and that both Hindenburg and Price,, from very different stand- 
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could only mean one thing: 
11 ... a footing for a grand invasion of Russia across the Balkans 
and the Black Sea. " [This was] "sure to be one of the results 
of the penetration of Russian revolutionary influence in Germany, 
the ukraine and Bulgaria. " 
The article went on to argue that the appointment of Prince Max of Baden 
as the head of a caretaker government in Germany was merely a device by 
the Kaiser to save his crown. 
77 The Prince's willingness to negotiate 
with President Wilson on the basis of the Fourteen Points was another 
device,, for "befogging the minds of the English and American working 
classes. " Was this not "nothing more than the ghost,, called frorn the 
grave, of the Holy Alliance? " Contemporary parallels with the Holy Alliance 
in one form or another were not infrequently cited by Price. This (sixth) 
issue also contained a "Progress of the Revolutionary War" column, this 
time dealing almost entirely with the way in which the Allied Governments 
had taken advantage of the Czechs in Russia: 
points, were right. The armistice provided for the immediate evacuation 
of all territories still occupied in Greece and Serbia and the dembbilis- 
ation of the Bulgarian army, its arms to be deposited at points con- 
trolled by the Allies. The Central Powers were given four weeks to 
withdraw their troops, military organisations, diplomatic and consular 
representatives from Bulgaria. Lloyd George War Memoirs pp. 3257-3258 
and 3261-3262. 
77 
Lloyd George described the creation of a German government that would 
Pass for a democratic one as "a duapy facade imposed as an emergency 
war measure by the Emperor". This was fair enough insofar as the re- 
construction of the German government was seen by Ludendorf as a pre- 
condition of armistice negotiationst and represented it as such to 
the Kaiser,, who reluctantly signed the necessary decree on 30 September 
1918. Next day Hindenburg let it be known that unless Prince Max von 
Baden agreed to form a new government he would sue for an immediate 
armistice. The Note to President Wilson was not,, however, sent until 
4 October, as Prince Max himself thought that the German High Command 
did not appreciate the implications of the Fourteen Points; moreover 
he was unconvinced that the High Command were not, in reality, playing 
for time in which to re-group, their armies. Pruice Max appears to 
have understood the situation rather better than price gave him credit 
for doing. For instance,, as early as 15 October he had written: "We 
are already in the middle of a revolution". But from where Price was 
Sitting he could hardly have been expected to know that- See memoirs 
of Prince Max of Baden (New York 1928) Vol. II pp. 24,68,85,87, and ERýU George, war memoirs Chapter 85,, specifically pp. 3283-3286. 
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"... for the real interests of the Czechoslovak peasants they 
cared not a rap,, as can be seen f rom the plight in which they 
have left the Czechoslovak soldiers on the Volga. " 
The seventh issue of The Call came out on 26 October and its front page 
article took as its theme a passage in the Prussian paper Kreuz Zeitunq 
about which Price had already written in an unpublished article for the 
manchester Guardian (see above p. 31.4) 
it is quite possibrle that Price was the author of an article in this issue 
on the implications of that proposition, although if he was he came out 
much more strongly than he had done i-n any of his previous writings, 
calling upon the troops of the intervention to arrest their officers and 
refuse to f ight the Red Army. Another colum-long article in the same 
issue was almost certai-nly written by Price. Its theme was that,, far 
from having no revolutionary tradition the English should renv-mber that 
they had a very long one, beginning with the Peasants' Revolt, developing 
through the Civil War, and last heard from during the Chartist movement. 
If Ernest Jones and Bronterre O'Brien#, 
"names that should still be green in the memory of the British 
working class... could see what work British soldiers in Russia 
are engaged in, they would rush back to theix graves in very 
shame. 11 
The eighth and ninth issues of The Call were particularly well put together 
but there is not one item in either of them which has the impression of 
Price's style or reflects his particular interests. The main articles 
cOntained a number of American spellings and Americanisms, perhaps reflect- 
IN the gradual change in the style and content of The Call which is 
Perceptible in the course of the autumn of 1918 and which is dealt with 
in APPendix IX. At this timer in fact, Price must have been heavily 
eNaged in writing his second major pamphlet which, when publishedr was 
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dated Noventer 1918 (see below p. 367) . However articles which read as 
if he could have written them continued to appear,, notably the inter- 
rnittent series "Progress of the Revolutionary War". There were instal- 
ments under this title in both the tenth and eleventh issues of The Call 
(16 and 23 November). The first described the behaviour of the retreat- 
ing Czechs on the Volga frontr matched by that of advancing mlite Russians 
in Siberia, where the Allies were helping "to save the 'real' Russia fr(xn 
Bolshevik-German hands". In the Don and the Caucasus, continued the 
report, the Red Anny was doing well, but since the re-opening of the 
Dardanelles 
78 
Krasnov would be looking for more assistance from the Allies. 
"If British Tommies and Jacks don't want the eternal disgrace 
of going down to history as the hired bandits who helped to 
re-establish a bloodstained tyranny, let them be men enough 
to refuse to do this foul crime against humanity. " 
The eleventh edition of The Call had banner headlines: WAR IS ENDED 
on the front page. There were two items in it which could have been 
written by Price. One was the "Progress of the Revolutionary War" 
column, the subject of which was the apparent formation in the Caspian 
area of ""a joint Anglo-Turco-Russian counter-revolutionary alliance". 
The other was an account of the first Conference of the Committees of 
78 By 9 octd: )er 1918 the Allies had already drafted and approved 
armistice terms for Turkey. Five days later Turkey joined with the 
Other Central Powers in sending a Note to President Wilson, on similar 
lines. But the Turks could not wait for a conclusion to the negotiat- 
ions and on 20 October sent their former prisoner of war, General 
Tawnsend (whom they had captured at Kut in April 1916) to sue for 
Peace at Mudros. The British Admiral Calthorpe was empowered to 
accept the Turkish surrender and an armistice was signed on 30 Oct- 
Ober. The terms included Allied occupation of the Dardanelles, the 
Bosphorus and other strategic points; the use of Constantinople and 
Other ports on the Black Sea as naval bases; Allied occupation Of 
Baku and Batum,, of those parts of the TransCaucasian railways then 
under Turkish control,, and the withdrawal of the Turks from their 
Positions in TransCaucasia and North West Persia to behind their Pre- 
war frontiers. Lloyd George War Memoirs pp. 3264-3266,3312. 
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poorer Peasantry of the Northern Commune (as it was described) which had 
just taken place in Moscow. Though there is no mention of it in his 
engagement diary, this was exactly the sort of meeting to which Price 
was likely to have gone. His interest in the problems of agrarian ref orm 
had been evident throughout his time in Russia. His colleague-contribut- 
ors to The Call, insofar as they can be identified, were almost certainly 
better grounded than he in the politics and economics of the industrial 
proletariat, but there Can have been few who were better informed about 
the problems of the land. The article contained a remarkably succinct 
account of the various attempts to solve the problems of land distribution 
and food distribution since the Bolshevik revolution. 
The twelfth issue of The Call appeared on 30 November, two days before 
Price lef t Russia for Germany, and not surprisingly there was no sign 
in it of any contribution by him. However five more articles appeared 
between then and January 1918 which he could well have written and left 
behind for use if needed, since all of them dealt more with the background 
to news than with news itself . In the thirteenth 
issue (7 December) 
there was an article indignantly headed "Under Whose Laws! " This ref er- 
red to a recent declaration by the Allied governments that they would 
be invading South Russia to restore I law and order'. This had stated 
that 
loall the unhealthy elements of the populations of Russia, the 
Bolsheviks and their synpathisers,, are declared outside the 
law. to 79 
79 
Ttle following is an extract from Price's Reminiscences (p. 
357): 
"On November 16 the Neue Nachrichten, organ of the German forces of 
Occupation in the Ukraine at Berdiansk,, printed a manifesto of 
the 
Allied command in South Russia. It ran as follows: 
'We inform hereby 
the inhabitants of Odessa and the neighbourhood that we 
have arrived 
On Russian territory with the object of restoring order and Of 
freeing 
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The writer of the article in The Call was 
de, ply grateful to the Allied governments for at last tearing 
off that thin veil of hypocrisy with which they have till now 
made fitful attempts to hide the cynicism of their imperial- 
ist designs. " 
He noted the "touching solidarity" between the Allied commanders and 
their former enemies,, Generals Mackensen and von Falkenheim 
"now careering about Europe offering their services to every 
oppressor of freedom they can find... A Holy Alliance indeed. 
... to force capitalist 'law and order' on a people who, for 
the first time in the history of the world have made working 
class law and order. " 
The chief reasons for tentatively attributing this article to Price are 
stylistic and idiomatic. 
The fourteenth issue of The Call (14 December) contained a column and 
a half on the history of events in the Ukraine since the March revolution; 
the Ukraine had long been one of Price' s areas of special interest. The 
next issue (21 December) contained a column headed %by Are You Fighting 
Us Now? " which could have been written at any time in the second half 
of November. one reason for - again tentatively - attributing it to 
Price is that the sense and style of it followed on from a leaflet entitled 
the country from the Bolshevik usurpers. Both the Germans and our- 
selves have come here not as conquerors, but as champions of right. 
Hence their objects and ours are identical... All unhealthy elements 
Of Russia - that is the Bolsheviks and their adherents - are hereby 
placed outside the law. Persons harbouring them will be handed over 
to court-martial. We do not recognise any organisation except those 
which are fighting them - the Volunteer and Cossack Armies as well 
as the troops of the Constituent Assembly. '" A footnote to the page 
reads: "This manifesto was sent out by radio on November 20 and I saw 
a copy of it in Moscow a few days later. It was also reprinted in 
the Vorwgrts for December 6 and in the Manchester Guardian for Jan- 
Uary 2.11 Price pointed out further down the page that the German 
military authorities could not have printed it in the Berdiansk Neue 
Nachrichten, under the nose of the Allies,, if it had not been truer 
and no one could have sent the text out by radio from South Russia 
bUt the Allied commanders themselves. 
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to Murmansk? which was definitely attributed to Price 
by the Russian historian Seleznev (see below p. 361) . The leaf let quite 
obviously related to the early days of the intervention; the article so 
to speak brought the story up to date. The writer challenged the Allies' 
pretence that they had invaded Russia in order to rescue her from Germany 
and set out the reasons why,, if it was not true before it was less than 
ever true then. The intervention had all along been intended to destroy 
the Russian revolution. Ever since March 1917 the spread of revolutionary 
ideas in Europe had increasingly frightened the Allies; they were there- 
fore bound to try all the harder to destroy Bolshevik Russia. Allied 
troops still fighting should be clear why it was they were fighting. 
It was 
"to keep the world safe for Plutocracy. Is such a cause worth 
dying for? ". 
Finally, on 1 January 1919 there appeared an article entitled "Destruct- 
ion and Reconstruction" which could also have been written at any time 
the preceding three months. It dealt with the capitalist press myth 
that the Bolshevik revolution had been nothing more than "an orgy of 
destruction" and outlined the process by which the industrial proletariat,, 
educated by experience and guided by the Supreme Council of Public Economy, 
had learned from its initial mistakes and had succeeded in reconstructing 
mxh of the heavy industry which lay within the sphere of control of the 
SOViet government. Price was, at that time,, very much impressed by the 
SuPreme Council,, as will be seen in some of his pamphlets (see below. ) 
authors of The Internationalists state that the first nurber of another 
jOurnal,, Kommuna, appeared on 7 November 1918.80 Produced by the 
80 
Ze Internationalists pp. 352-3. 
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petrograd Section of the Central Federation of Foreign Groups it was , 
like The Call, primarily intended for distribution to Allied troops on 
+-k, m ., - Northern front,, printed in several other languages as well as English. 
The authors quote from ten separate issues of Kommuna (identified in their 
footnotes) and name other writers who contributed to it,, among them 
Lunacharsky and Gorky. Presumably, therefore, articles in Kommuna attri- 
buted by them to Price are so attributed because they were either signed 
or in some other way identified, and there is no reason to doubt that 
, hAe wrote them. Although one of thern did not appear until af ter he lef t 
Russia, it is as true of this one as of the others that he may have 
written for The Call,, that he left them behind for use if wanted. 
In the 14 November edition of Kommuna there was, on the basis of this 
evidence, an article by Price entitled "on the German Agents" which began 
by describing how he, as an Englishman, felt "dizzy" when he read the 
English newspapers. Public opinion in Britain and the USA did not know 
what was going on in Russia. Price refuted the allegation that the Bol- 
sheviks were German agents and quoted the - by now familiar - passage 
froFn the. Kreuz Zeitung to support his assertion that Germany and the 
Entente powers were planning to collaborate to destroy the Soviet state. 
He also pointed out that many soldiers from f oreign countries, including 
Entente countries, were serving in the Red ArmY - were they to be 
des- 
cribed as agents of the Kaiser? 
On 2 January 1919 Kommuna. carried another article by Price called "Their 
Real Objectives". Aimed at English and French soldierst it Pointed Out 
t-h-at the war had been started under f alse pretences, as the Secret 
Treaties had subsequently shOwn- NOw that the war was overt why had 
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the Allied troops not gone home? Miy were they still bejng sent to 
suppress revolutions in Hungary and the Ukraine? 
These summaries are, of course, taken from secondary sources, but the 
subject and style of them are caTpatible with Price's other work during 
t1lis period. 
(iii) loaf lets 
In the course of his work as a translator for Narkomindel it is reason- 
MI-% . le to suppose that Price was responsible for the English language ver- 
sions of at least some of the early propaganda material put out by the 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of August 1918 Price 
had as yet little experience of propagandist writing, but he was by now 
an experienced writer with an increasingly distinctive style,, and this 
would have been bound to mf luence the presentation of any text he was 
given to translate. At least one of these texts: %by Have You Come To 
Mumansk? was definitely attributed to Price by Seleznev,, despite the 
fact that it appeared in two versions (leaf let and poster) one of which - 
the leaf let - was signed by Lenin and Tchicherin. 
81 The poster was un- 
attributed, and it is unlikely that the authorship of this text can now 
ever be definitely established. However it appeared to be addressed 
exclusively to British troops,, and began by telling thern not to believe 
that they had been sent to Russia solely for the purpose of defending 
the Murman railway against the Finns and the Ge rmans. "Comrade, it 
is 
not true. " The author invited readers to look at the map and see for 
81 Seleznev. See above FIN 15. 
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themselves that the roads and railways frorn Finland ended hundreds of 
miles short of the Murman railway. If the Finns wanted to go any f urther 
they would f axst have to cross hundreds of miles of marshy forest land 
"and you know how dif f icult it is for an army to do that. " If the Germans 
wanted to get to the railway they would have to take Petrograd first, 
and this they could not do without again declaring war on Soviet Russia: 
an unlikely event. 
"You have been brought here to occupy our country in the interest 
of Allied capitalists. You have been brought here to overthrow 
our revolution and bring back the reign of Tsarism !1 .1 11 
The leaf let/poster went on to support this allegation with quotations 
fr(xn the British press, and to explain that the Czechs were already being 
used for this purpose. The British landing in Murmansk was part of the 
scheme to co-operate with the Czechoslovaks. British troops were being 
asked to f ight, not enemies but working people like themselves. 
"Comrades! Descendents of the great Chartists! You have always 
expressed sympathy with the Russian revolution, are you going 
to assist the first efforts of working people to free themselves 
from their sweaters and exploiters? " 
If Price wrote this it would have been the first time that he el"PlOYed 
such a direct appeal approach. And Yet the invitation to the soldiers 
to look at the map,, it must be saido, sounds very much like him. 
Two other leaflets, issued later by the Group of English-Speaking Communistsi, 
Could have been written by Price. onef Parliament or Soviet? was address- 
AW4 " %. okA to American and British soldiers" but most of the points it makes 
were illustrated from British labour history and the British constitution- 
It made the case,, in language which appeared over and over again in Price's 
PamPhlets I that the Soviet provided a more truly representative 
form of 
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democracy than Parliament. The moderate appeal to troops with which it 
ended: to form their own "Soldiers' Councils" and demand to be sent home, 
is also typical. Price seems never to have brought himself to incite 
mutiny in so many words. One other leaflet, Socialist Russia - Capitalist 
Enqland, has many features characteristic of Price,, who always assumed 
ff- 
that he would be understood and that the people to whom he was addressing 
himself shared his interest in the subject about which he was writing 
or speaking. His style was, in consequence, unemphatic,, factual and 
rarely rhetorical. This leaflet. in a mere eight hundred words, des- 
cribes with considerable lucidity how a socialist society - Bolshevik 
version worked. 
"Is it such an awf ul bogey? Do you think it is your business 
as working men to try and crush it? Compare the social system 
in Russia with what goes on in England. " 
The leaflet went on to remind the reader who owned the land and who pro- 
duced the wealth of Britain; who got the benefit of the production, and 
what happened to a British worker when he grew old or if he lost his job. 
"This is Capitalism. This is the system you are defending when 
you fight against Bolshevism. ... Which do you think should 
be crushed, Bolshevism or Capitalism? " 
Again the leaflet called on the soldiers to demand to be sent home, but 
it ended more boldly than the other: 
"... when you get there take your reckoning of the gang of 
Plunderers who have devastated the world for their own profit. 
Sweep Capitalism from England as we have done in Russia... " 
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Pamphlets 
13etween August 1918 and April 1919,, When he became Daily Herald corres- 
pondent in Berlin and presumably had tO begIn Spending more time on 
journalism and less on propaganda,, Price wrote the texts of at least six 
pamphlets. A seventh, which seems to have appeared only in America,, was 
an amalgam of three of those six. All but one of them were signed, and 
the unsigned one can be attributed tLrhim with vixtual certainty. Copies 
of fifteen different versions have been collected,, involving eleven pub- 
lishers and translations into four languages (German, French, Polish and 
Norwegian) besides the original English. There is no evidence that all 
his pamphlets were equally widely translated, but there is also no knowing 
whether more were not translated than it has been possible to f ind. For 
that matter,. he may have written more than it has been possible to f ind. 
They were printed on very poor paper (although the design and type-setting 
was often remarkably good) , and so far as the troops#, at least, were con- 
cerned, it was not found advisable to be found in possession of one of 
them (see Chapter 11 p. 404) . Most of the pamphlets contain some 
indic- 
ation of the month in which they were writtenr but some show onlY the 
year of publication. 
The first appears to have been a straightforward translation, without 
any gloss: The Constitution of the R. F. S. F. R. . published bY the Depart- 
ment of Foreign Literature of Narkomindelt dated moscaw 1918 and nott 
Of course, signed. Price wroter howeverr in his Reminiscences,, that while 
Workirxg as a translator for the Soviet Foreign office he had made a trans- 
lation of the Constitution. The! r. liances are that this was One Of the 
first things he did as a translator,, and that he did it at the VerY begin- 
rLing of August 1918 because by the second week of August,, again according 
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tc) the Reminiscences, he was hard at work on The Truth About the Allied 
Intervention in Russia. The pamphlet version of the Constitution appears 
tc) have been translated into at least one foreign language, because on 
the back of another of his pamphlets, listed among the publications of 
the Communist Party of Germany/Austria in 1919, is one attributed by name 
to m. PhiliPs Price, entitled Die_Verfassung der Russischen RAterepublic 
(The Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic) . 
The second pamphlet was The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia, 
the f irst edition of which was published in August 1918 by Sovprop. A 
1082 French translation was published in the same year in Berne, and a second 
English edition, with a Foreword by J. F. (presumably Joe Fineberg) was 
Published by the Executive Committee of the Communist International. L- - 
It is quite possible that it was also published in the "Scandinavian 
languages" referred to by Radek in his letter to Ransome in September 
1918 (see above p. 333), but no copy has so far been discovered. 
82 
At the end of May 1918 a small Soviet news agency, Russische Nachrichteno, 
was established in Berne,, a location from which it was hoped to dis- 
tribute propaganda material to France,, Germany,, Italy and - to a lesser 
extent - Great Britain (a realistic assessment being taken of the 
chances of getting much past the British censor). The agency proved 
remarkably successful in placing material in the European pressr arid 
it was decided to branch out into publications. Arrangements were 
made with a small and sympathetic Swiss publishing house, Promachos 
Verlag, in Belp (near Bern) to allow its name to be used as the pub- 
lisher of translations of a number of works by Lenin, Trotsky and Radek- 
It also published pamphlets, including Price's The Truth About the 
Allied Intervention in Russia and Sadoul's Notes sur, la Revolution 
'R31-9hevique. A detailed account of Soviet propaganda activities in 
Lcy and the Revol- ýAEerland is given by Alfred Erich Sam, DiplRM 
Ution: the Soviet Mission to Switzerland 1918,, University of Notre 
Darne Press 1974, Chapter 7 pp-111-127. An account of Russian PrOPa- 
ganda production in Switzerland sent to the Foreign Office by 
the 
British Ambassador, is to be found in FO 371.4369. 
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The f irst sentence of this pamphlet,, already quoted above (Chapter 7,, 
p. 210) bears re-stating: 
"One of the most deadly weapons wielded by the ruling classes 
of all countries is their power to censor the Press. " 
price went on to illustrate the effect of the exercise of that power in 
his own case . which had led him to take the way of the pamphleteer in 
order to lay the facts before the British working man , so that he could 
judge for himself whether he approved of British policy towards the 
Russian Revolution. Price went on to show that both the March and the 
November revolutions had been characterised by the desire to secure a 
universal peace, but that the second revolution had recognised that only 
a radical restructuring of society would remove the causes of war. From 
the moment they realised that this was happening, the Allied governments 
had begun to "Plot" for the overthrow of the Russian Soviet government. 
Price then dealt with Brest Litovsk and disposed of the allegation that 
the Bolshevik leaders were German agents. The Russian army had been 
finished as the result of Allied pressure for a summer offensive in 1917. 
The Soviet Government had no alternativep in the winter of 1918, but "to 
bow to every ultimatum which the tyrants in Berlin send them. " Price 
Went on to describe the ruined state of the Russian economy and the ref us- 
al of the Allied governments to help in the work of restoration. instead 
they had financed the Czech uprising in Siberia and completed the task 
begun by the Germans in Ukraine,, cutting off Central and Northern Russia 
from all their main sources of food and raw materialsp "Condemning the 
wOrkers and peasants of Muscovy to famine and their industries to destruc- 
tion. " What the British government was doing on the Murman was asking 
the British soldier "to impose fresh tribute on the Russian people... 
tO still further increase their misery, indescribable as it is at present" 
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on the pretext that they were restoring law and order. 
I'Miere is the order which brings war to a land that is already 
exhausted by three years of slaughter? " 
price concluded by reminding his readers that the tradition of freedom 
was 'If irm in the memory of the British working man". It was the British 
ruling classes who had tried to suppress movements for freedom in the 
eighteenth century in America and France. They had not succeeded then 
and they would not succeed in Russia now. But to bring this about 
"the workers of En land must know the truth and knowing it 
must dare to act. , 
93 
In November 1918 Price wrote another pamphlet: The Old Order in Europe 
and the New Order in Russia. This was signed and dated and first published 
by Sovprop. Another edition was published by the Socialist Publication 
Society of Brooklyn. 
84 
Yet another edition of it was published in 
83 On p. 700 of his Ms. "Back Bench Traveller" Price wrote: "I cannot see 
that there was anything treasonable in this. I was not to hear the 
last about this pamphlet for some time, and in some circles it has 
been held against me for the rest of my life. But if I had to live 
through this time again I would write and do exactly the same. " Price 
used this passage in the edited version of the Manuscript,. My Three 
Revolutions (p. 135) but added to the penultimate sentence "and no doubt 
affected my career when I got into Parliament. " 
84 
The Socialist Publication Society began publication of a bi-monthly 
Magazine The Class Struggle at 15 Spruce Street, New York in May or 
June 1917, almost certainly as a result of Trotsky's influence during 
his short period of residence in Brooklyn. At some point it moved 
to 431 Pilaski Street, Brooklyn where it continued to publish The 
Class Struggle but also began to publish pamphlets. Two of the first 
ten were by Price and one by Ransome. Theodore Draper in The Roots 
of American Communism (New York, Viking Press 1963) stated that "about 
half" the pro-Soviet pamphlets available in the United States in 1918-19 
were written by British or American journalists,, and he added Albert 
Rhys Williams to their number. It is not known whether Publishers 
Other than the Socialist Publication Society were involved but if sOr 
no trace of them remains. The Society, too, disappeared when, as the 
result of the rivalries accompanying the formation of the Coummist 
Labour party, its editors split and the Party took the publication 
over. 
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May 1919 by the British socialist Party in London, but for some reason 
they changed the title to, Capitalist Europe and Socialist Russia. 
German translation was published in Berlin in 1919 under the title Die 
Warheit Ober Sowjet Russland a title which,, when translated back into 
English, is confusingly like that of his pamphlet,, The Truth About the 
Allied Intervention in Russia. It contained less argument and more 
information than the former, however, being in effect a short history 
of the origins and iorganisation of the Soviet Government. The chaos 
resulting from the failures of successive Provisional Governments had 
paved the way for the Bolshevik Revolution, Price wrote,, and the invediate 
priorities confronting the f i-rst Council of People's Commissars had been 
self-evident: the ending of the war and the public ownership of industry 
and land. Price did not spend much time on defending Brest Litovsk in 
this pamphlet. Instead he gave a detailed account of the make-up of the 
national debt inherited by the Bolsheviks, and their realisation. that 
if they were to secure any improvements for the population they would 
have to take over the banks, annul the internal war debt and repudiate 
the Tsarist goverment's foreign loans. He went on to describe the 
fissiparous tendencies which then emerged in the Russian economy: the 
Factory and Shop Stewards Committees, the Workmen's Courr-ils and the 
Professional Alliances, and how the need had been Perceived in January 
1918 for the creation of some form of organisation which would reconcile 
allthese conflicting interests in the national interest. 
"The Suprem Council of Public Economy was the tool designed 
to create the new order in Russia; the Soviet was only the 
temporary weapon to protect the hands that worked that tool. of 
Price went on to make startlingly large claims for the SuPreme COuncil- 
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He thought it would eventually become 
"the economic nerve centre of public life .9, destined to replace 
parliaments elected on a territorial basis without any qualifi- 
cations to deal with the problexLs of industry, transport, foreign 
trade,, finance etc. ... Free from the need of defending itself 
from enemies without, [the Supreme Council] combines legislative 
and executive functions and concentrates under its control the 
whole industrial and scientific apparatus of a modern state. " 
The parnphlet then described how the Soviet Government had begun to deal 
with "the third great problem of the revolution: the land. 11 The Land 
Law of January 1918 had provided for what was in effect a three-option 
or three-tier system: state land departments, labour coffuunes or co- 
operatives, and "peasant comnunes of the old style". But the law did 
everything to discourage the "old style". Comittees of Poorer Peasantry 
had become 
"the advanced guard of the revolutionary army, educating the 
backward peasantry in the remote rural districts during the 
summer of 1918 and incidentally ensuring that food began to 
come again from the villages to the starving towns. " 
The panphlet concluded with a spirited denial that the Bolshevik Revolution 
had brought anarchy and chaos to Eastern Europe: rather the reverse. 
Moreover, Price stated unequivocally: 
"conditions are being created in every country of the world 
which are forcing the masses to liquidate the old social and 
economic system. " The Russian Revolution was "... a signpost 
On the road of Time, marking the orderly progress of human 
society. " 
It is ironical that this relatively buoyant account - because Price did 
r'Otr in November 1918, personally subscribe to the view that the German 
revolution signalled the imminence of world revolution - should have 
beP-n translated into German when most of that early hope had already been 
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confounded by the events of January 1919.85 The German version of this 
pamphlet differedo, howevero, from the other versions in two respects: 
it was preceded by a long and thoughtful i-ntrOductiOn bY the German Social- 
ist Ernst Dciumigo, and it contained a number of passages obviously written 
86 
in especially for the German reader. Dgumig's introduction called 
attention to the pamphlet's relevance in Germany at a time when all the 
machinery of state propaganda had been directed towards making the man 
in the street frightened of Bolshevism, to the promotion of counter- 
revolutionary opinions , and to making it impossible f or the frightened 
working classes to take any f urther steps along the road to Socialism. 
I%umig had gone on both to make distinctions and to draw parallels between 
the German and the Russian revolutions. The German Republic had "erected 
barriers between the Gennan and Russian workers which must be pulled down 
as quickly as possible", but to do this "a clear account of the state 
of af fairs in Soviet Russia was needed", and that was what Price's pamph- 
let provided. 
85 
Price published his own account of events in Berlin in January 1919 
in his book Germany in Transition (1923) Chapter 2 pp. 18-33. 
86 
Ernst Wumig was a German Independent Socialist who had strong connec- 
tions with the Revolutionary Shop Stewards: the German counterpart 
of the British Clydeside Shop Stewards. He organised political strikes 
against the war as early as 1915. He played an active part in the 
German November Revolution but considered that the Revolution had 
"Committed suicide" when it rejected the soviet or council system of 
democracy and opted to retain the parliamentary form. He refused the 
Offer of the post of Minister of War in December 1918. At the same 
time he was not a Spartacist. Price appears to have met him for the 
first time on 4 January 1919 and noted in his diary having a talk with 
him on 13 January, in the middle of the Spartacist uprising. Daumigr 
according to Price, considered it ill-timed and "disastrous" because 
the mass of returning soldiers were "not ready for the first steps 
Of revolution". D; Jumig's introduction to Price's pamphlet does notr 
however, appear to indicate any loss of faith in the future of revol- 
utionary socialism. He held a number of government posts in the Weimar 
republic and was murdered in the Black Forest in 1924. There are 
fre- 
quent references to Ddumig in A. J. Ryder The German Revolution of 
1918 
(Cambridge 1967) . 
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For the benef it of German readers Price wrote an entirely new preliminary 
section to the pamphlet, showing how the Bolshevik government had been 
systematically vilified by foreign powers and misrepresented "as a kind 
of castle held under a spell and the Soviet Government as Kundry. " Not 
just the Entente powers but the Kaiser's government also had "convinced 
themselves that they had found everything about Tsarism in Russia good 
and the country in a healthy state. " Price also wrote an extra paragraph 
aboUt the Provisional Government,, explaining that its weakness had enabled 
"the British and French f inancial wirepullers to persuade themselves that 
nothing had happened. " That was, until the Novezber Revolution. After 
that "It was useless to pretend that nothing had happened" and both the 
Entente and the Central Powers had "found thernselves in trouble, united 
through the dangers by which the ruling classes of Western Europe felt 
threatened. " 
Another special section was introduced before that in which Price dealt 
with the Supreme Council of Public Economy, perhaps designed to calm any 
apprehension the reader might feel about the pace of change. In Western 
Europe, Price explained,, societies had developed unevenly, capitalism 
both could and would hold out longer and a period of transition would 
be necessary before the working classes of Western Europe would be able 
to enjoy the benefits of socialised production. Price also interpolated 
an explanation, for this version, as to why the Soviet had felt obliged 
bOth to sign the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and simultaneously to appeal 
fOr economic help to the Entente powers,? going so far as to offer them 
as a 
_qLiLd 
pro quo the partial recognition of Russia's obligations 
in 
respect of war debts, and concessions in respect of raw materials. 
of This proposal for a commercial relationsýp with the Allies 
was like throwing a leg of mutton to a wolf with the intention 
of holding up the pursuit long enough for the sledge to get 
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to the safety of the next village. But the proposals were not 
taken up because the wolves thought that a whole sheep would 
be better than a leg of mutton. That is the real reason for 
the intervention of the Entente in Russia... They went there 
to destroy a regime in East Europe, the stability and example 
of which threatened the internal order which prevailed in their 
own countries. " 
In his next pamphlet Price addressed himself to the task of,, if not justi- 
fying then certainly explaining the Red Terror. The text originally 
appeared as an article in the Norwegian paper Social Demokrat on 12 Feb- 
ruary 1919. It was signed by Price, then still described as Manchester 
wardian correspondent in Russia , but a reference to the date of his depar- 
ture from Russia makes it clear that he wrote the piece in January 1919. 
The same text appeared again as the middle section of a compendium edition 
of three pamphlets by Price published by the Socialist Publication Society 
of Brooklyn, under the title Red and MAte Terror in Russia. 
87 It began,, 
without defensiveness: 
"In a country where the capitalistic system holds sway, persons 
who have committed high treason or who have taken part in con-- 
spiracies against the State are condemned to death or in any 
case to a long term of imprisonment. " 
Price did not have to look far back into history to find an example of 
what he meant: the execution of Sir Roger Casement - He went on to ack- 
rmledge that according to theix own lights capitalist goverraents were 
Perfectly entitled to defend their privileges. But in order to do SO 
theY needed to imbue their wage slaves with the spirit of militarism. 
The slaves of one country were trained to hate the slaves of other coun- 
tries in the name of patriotism,? or "pseudo-eros". Under the Soviet system 
Patriotism could be equated with the international solidarity of the 
wOrking classes, but this form of patriotism threatened the very foundations 
87 
The compendium pamphlet,, called The Soviet, the Terror and the Inter- 
vention consisted of the texts of The Soviet Sys in Rusýi7ýa,, E! ýq 
and MAte Terror in Russia and The Truth About the Allied Interventi-On 
in Russia. 
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of the capitalist world and the expropriated classes of Soviet Russia 
were fighting for what they considered to be their rights, so the Soviet 
Government was compelled 
"to make reprisals against those... who refuse to recognise 
the new social system. " 
wben capitalists shouted "terror" to the Soviet Goverment they were 
hypocritically protesting against methods of class warfare which they 
themselves employed. Price went on to assert that the Soviet Government 
had not taken action against their class enemies until the latter had 
themselves begun to employ terrorist methods. He gave examples of Allied 
support for counter-revolutionary terrorist activities in Russia in the 
summer of 1918, mostly by Czechs and Right S. R. s. These had been serious 
enough to warrant the declaration of a state of siege, and during that 
period 
"It is probable that three to four thousand agents of the 
counter-revolution met their death. " 
These were people who were convinced that the Soviet Government was about 
to fall,, and nothing could shake that conviction except a show of strength- 
Price distinguished between Red Terror,, which was mass terror directed 
against a class, and White Terror, the agents of which were mainly Right 
S. R. s, a party which had traditionally dealt in individual acts of 
terrorism. The Red Terror, in conformity with Marxist principles, 
Kwas, not concerned with executing A or B but with keeping them 
as hostages for the good conduct of a large number of people 
who were representatives of the ruling classes. " 
But the Bolsheviks held no monopoly of these tactics. Price gave examples 
Of mass terror practised by Krasnov and Kolchak,, and by the armies of 
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all the belligerents, for that matter, in occupied territories: Belgium, 
Mesopotamia, Persia, Syria. Price did not balk at describing the Red 
Terror as a "frightful period". But he claimed that it had been 
"abolished as soon as the Soviet Government had organised their 
internal forces so far as to be able to ignore those persons 
who did not recognise their authority... It has retired to 
the background and protects proletariat discipline and order. 
Its admonitory war-cry is Revolutionis salus; suprema lex. 11 
A translation of the article was sent from the British Embassy in Christ- 
iana to the Foreign Office in London. On the Minute accompanying the 
translation Sir William Tyrell, then as Assistant Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, wrote: "For perversion and inaccuracy this statement would 
be dif f icult to beat. 1188 The Brooklyn Socialist Society's version of 
this pamphlet differed in respect of idiom from the translation made at 
the British Embassy; it may, of course,, have been the original English 
version as written by Price,, but unfortunately no other version has been 
discovered with which to compare it. But the American edition al so dif - 
fered in another interesting respect. It omitted a reference which Price 
had made to the virtual outlawing in America of the Industrial Workers 
of the World, about which he had written, in the original: 
"He who commits the crime of being a promiji@nt leader of that 
party may expect to be punished by death. ', 89 
Price must have written the text of his f ifth pamphlet early in 1919; 
it could easily have been one of those he wrote while waiting to find 
88 
FO 608.181. 
89 
It is not surprising that the sentence was lef t out,, since it did not 
accord with the facts. Membership of the I. W. W. was never punishable 
by death although members of the I. W. W. lost their lives because of 
their membership. What Price was probably thinking of was the systeM- 
atic harassment of the organisation by the American government. In 
September 1917 the Federal Justice Department, having failed to show 
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I in Berlin. It ed that in German, as Das Mte-System Radek appear year 
in Russland (The Soviet System in Russia) and it was also translated into 
pc)lish. The only version of it to survive in English appeared, untitled, 
in the Brooklyn Socialist Society's compendium edition. The 2,500 words 
of this pamphlet fall into two parts,, one describing the political organ- 
isation of the working class in Russia and the other its economic organ- 
isation under the Soviet system. In the first part Price described with 
considerable honesty the chaos which had followed the Bolshevik decree 
m workers' control. He admitted that there had been "a modicum of truth" 
in the criticism levelled by the Menshevik Internationalists and the 
Novaya Zhizn group,, 
90 
that this was not socialism but anarcho-syndicalism. 
The Bolsheviks, though determined to put an end to industrial anarchy, 
were "nevertheless by no means ready to magnify the centralised state". 
that the I. W. W. was receiving money from Germany, contrived to con- 
struct charges of various types of criminal conspiracy against 166 
members,, by quoting selectively and out of context from the masses 
of I. W. W. literature which they had confiscated by raiding the party's 
offices throughout the USA. In addition to wartim-e and anti-Bolshevik 
hysteria, there is little doubt that an attempt was also being made,, 
by imprisoning the I. W. W. 's leaders, to break its hold on the lumber 
indust. ry and pave the way for the more amenable A. F. L. Despite having 
to endure every kind of harassment,, membership of the I. W. W. was, how- 
ever, never a capital offence. Most histories of the movement were 
written either just before or immediately after the First World War; 
the first major reappraisal to appear was written by J. S. Gambs, , 
The 
Decline of the I. W. W. (New York, first published 1932,, reprinted 1966). 
This was followed by P. Renshaw: The Wobblies. The Story of Syndicalism 
in the United States (1967). The most recent and most detailed account 
was given by Melvyn Dubofsky: We Shall be All. A History of the 
Industrial Workers of the World. (Chicago,, 1969. ) 
90 
Novaya Zhizn was a daily paper, published from May 1917 to july 1918, r 
and closely associated with the Menshevik Internationalists. It was 
edited by A. N. Tikhonov but is better known for its association with 
Maxim Gorky. Sukhanov was also a member of the editorial staff - 
It was closed down by the Soviet government in July 1918. Throughout 
its short life it retained its independence, sometimes supporting the 
Provisional Government and Sometimes the Bolsheviks. Kamenev and 
Zinoviev,, two Bolsheviks who had reservations about the wisdom Of the 
timing of the Bolshevik siezure of power in November 1917, did SO 
publicly in the columns of Novaya 7-hizn. 
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historical 1Y the main institutional support of cap, tal, sm. The recog- 
nition that some form of political organisation. was required evolved 
gradually as a defence mechanism. Once the threats posed by imperialism 
and counter-revolution had disappeared the political organisation would 
"gradually cease its activities". However that day had not yet come, 
and in the meantim the political organisation of the state was vested 
in the Soviet system,, which price proceeded to describe. The central 
point of it, he argued, was that its highest authority was 
"chosen by bodies of the people who are united by a common 
economic interest... Instead of being driven to the ballot 
box by some agent of a capitalist political party ... the voter of the future must join a workers' organisation ... a class- conscious proletarian whose right to vote was based on the 
fact of his status as a worker. " 
A decision-making executive composed of delegates who understood the 
real interests of their voters was, Price claimed, infinitely more repre- 
sentative than a system based on geographical district and political 
party. But the only real task of the Soviets consisted of 
firldn' 
defending the Republic against external and internal enemies, 
forming a frontier guard, maintaining connections with foreign 
capitalistic states, signing treaties and controlling foreign 
policies. " 
The real foundation of the new social order, Price maintained#, was its 
central economic organisation,, and the second half of this pamphlet was 
devoted to an account of its two main organs: the All-Russia Union of 
Trades Unions and the Supreme Council of National Economy (Vesenkha) - 
91 
91 
Price always referred to Vesenkha as the Supreme Council of Public 
Economy, but more recently historians appear to be employing the term 
Supreme Economic Council or S. E. C. The original theoretical role of 
Vesenkha was to preside over the transition period of Soviet Conriunism 
until the elimination of the state became feasible. Almost at once 
the theory ran into opposition from the facts,, above all the resis- 
tance of other organisations (workers' and peasants' interest bodies) 
and the devasting effects of the intervention and the civil war. 
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price traced the development and Organisation of industrial unionism j-n 
Russia and f avourably compared its highest body with the British TUC,, 
doomed "to pass resolutions which are thrown into the waste-paper basket 
by the factory owners". The Russian systern was frankly syndicalist. 
But to eliminate the risk of inter-union anarchy, the Bolsheviks had 
invented the Supreme Council of National Economy to regulate relations 
between industries. Founded early in 1918 with, initially, a purely 
advisory function, Price described how it had quickly assumed an executive 
authority and had become incorporated with the Soviet of People's Com- 
missars (Sovnarkorn) under the supreme control of the Central Executive 
Committee (TsIK) , and "considered by the theoreticians of the revolution 
as the nerve centre of the future Socialistic state. " 
In one sense, also, the history of Vesenkha is the history of the 
transition from war communism to NEP. Price noted the signs of opposition 
to it when he attended its very first public meeting (Reminiscences p. 214) 
and observed that the representatives of both factory committees and 
trades unions were united in their suspicion. By the spring of 1918 
Vesenkha was also encountering the hostility of the Left Communists. 
Although listed in the same category as the People's Commissariats in 
the Soviet Constitution of July 1918,, responsible for carrying out the 
government's nationalisation programme, the days of its paramount in- 
fluence were already numbered. By December 1918 Vesenkhals centralising 
tendencies and its use of bourgeois specialists came under increasing 
fire. In the course of 1919 even Ioxdn began to question its relevance 
and by the end of 1920 Vesenkha's status had been reduced to that of a 
commissariat with responsibility only for enterprises of a national charac- 
ter. One of the best accounts of Vesenkha is given in an unpublished 
dOctoral thesis by Herbert Ray Buchanan: 'Soviet Economic Policy for the 
Transition period: The Supreme Council of the National Economy 1917-1920' 
Undiana,, 1972). There is useful information about it in S. A. Smith: 
Red 2ttK2grad (1983) pp. 213-224; E. H. Carr deals with Vesenkha in con- 
sider6le detail scattered throughout Vol. II of The Bolshevik ! ýevOlutiOnr 
nOtably on pp. 74,, 103-104,, 114 and 180. See also Samuel A. Oppenheim: 
'The Supreme Economic Council 1917-1921' Soviet Studies 25 (1973) pp. 3-25. 
The last days of vesenkha are described I; y- Sheila Fitzpatrick in , 
Soviet 
Studies V61.35 (1985) pp. 153-172: 'Orzhonikidze's Takeover of Vesenkha: ý C-as-eStudy in Soviet Bureaucratic Politics'. 
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In April 1919 Price wrote the last of what must be regarded as this series 
()f pamphlets as a more or less off icial apologist for the Soviet Govern- 
ment. But he had by now been away from Russia for several months, and 
there are signs in the text that he had begun to adopt a wider perspective. 
This was a booklet written in Berlin in April 1919 and published in London 
by the People's Russian Information Bureau 92 under the title The Origin 
and Growth of the Russian Soviets. In this, by far the longest of his 
pamphletso, Price allowed himself the luxury of not one short paragraph 
but f ive long ones on the history of the ideas and the economic and 
political factors which had brought about the March Revolution. He was 
able to feed into this account generalisations, drawn from his own exper- 
iences both as a war correspondent and during his travels in the Russian 
provirices during the autumn of 1917 and the spring of 1918. He used these 
generalisations, to illustrate and explain the origin of the soviets: . J-- 
"the creation of the free spirit of man which had just burst the bonds 
92 
In May 1918 Sylvia Pankhursto, the suffragist/ socialist whose paper, 
the, Women's Dreadnought had changed its title to Workers' Dreadnought 
in July 1917,, was approached by an intermediary and asked to assist 
in creating an organisation for the promotion of knowledge about Soviet 
Russia in Britain. What emerged was the People's Russian Information 
Bureau (PRIB),, which began to operate in October 1918 in two rooms 
at 152 Fleet Street. The staff of the Workers' Dreadnought also pro- 
duced the PRIB publications, and the same press was used. The PRIB 
was undoubtedly subsidised from Mowcow, first through Litvinoff and 
then through Theodore Rothstein. The PRIB printed or reprinted and 
distributed material received from Russia and elsewhere. The follow- 
ing pamphlets printed by the PRIB are collected in the Marx Memorial 
Library: Seymour Cocks: Russia and her Allies; Douglas Young: British 
Consul Replies to Anti-Bolshevik Slander; George Tanabury: My Impres- 
sions of Soviet Russia; Ren6 Marchand: letter to Poincare; John Eaman: An Eyewitness from Russia; Captain Jacques Sadoul: The Social- 
ist Soviet lic of Russia; Ipenin and Tchicherin: Are You a Trade ýEonist?; M. Philips Price: The origin and Growth of the Russian 
ýVieýý; and three pamphlets whose authors are not named: Red Paper 
On Executions and Atrocities Coninitted; Russian Code Of Labour Laws 
and The Russian Soviet Constitution. Information about the PRIB is 
Scattered throughout Walter Kendall: The RevolutionarY Movement in 
Britain 1900-1921 (1969). The Sylvia Pankhurst papers are at the 
Tn_týernational Institute of Social History at Amsterdam. 
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of an archaic, now useless form of society. 11 It was as though he had 
not heard of the 1905 Revolution,, but his Oversimplifications possibly 
had the virtue of catching the uragination of the reader and holding it 
while he proceeded to deal with the more mundane matter which formed the 
second section of the booklet,, Order Out of Chaos. In this Price des- 
cribed how the desire for peace, Originally articulated by the soldiers' 
soviets, had developed in parallel with the attempts of the workers to 
run industry by factory committees , and the seizure of land by the peasants. 
"None had heard of the Bolsheviks in those days" - Kornilov's attempted 
coup had temporarily united the people in defence of the revolution but 
it had also strengthened anarchic tendencies. "If the Bolsheviks had 
not put themselves at the head of the movements, some other unknown group 
would have done so. " 
The next section dealt with Brest Litovsk. "There is probably nothing 
wre tragic in modern history than the picture of revolutionary Russia 
struggling with the German war lords and deserted by the Allies. " Price 
described the bitter conflict between the realists who recognised the 
need for a breathing space, and the idealists who would have preferred 
death to peace. He claimed that Brest Litovsk had given the German people 
"a taste of peace" which "broke their will to war", an opportunity of 
which the Bolsheviks had taken full advantage with their massive propa- 
ganda offensive, resulting in the further demoralisation of the German 
ar"Y. The breathing space had created an opportunity to begin building 
UP the Red Army and to reconstruct the econoffac I ife of the countrY Won 
Socialist principles. Price went on to describe how, instead of helping 
in the work of reconstruction the Allies, in the spring of 1918 had begun 
actiVely to support counter-revolutionaxy generals on the Volga, the DOnj, 
arid in the North Caucasus, and to mislead and entrap the Czechs into 
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joining forces with them. (His account of the involvement of the Czechs 
makes greater allowances for the fact that they had been deceived than 
anything he had written about them hitherto. ) In soffewhat hyperbolic 
language Price then recounted the achievements of the Red Army in the 
Volga during the summer and autumn of 1918. "But it was too late to bring 
up food for the starving towns, for the ice had bogun to set im. 11 mean- 
while the counter-revolution had found another leader in Kolchak, and 
between them the counter-revolutionaries had succeeded in cutting off 
the people of north and central Russia from all their sources of raw 
materials. Gradually, however,, their tactics had turned the inhabitants 
of the occupied territories against them. In the Ukraine, when the war 
ended and the Germans went home "the Red flood was indeed let loose 
Everywhere along the western and southern borders of Muscovite Russia 
there has come into being a chain of labour republics. They sprang up 
everywhere like mushrooms, as soon as the artificial force of the foreign 
bayonets had been dispelled, like an unhealthy miasma before the pure 
wind of heaven" (an example of the occasional but striking metaphorical 
infelicities which have sometimes helped to identify Price's work) . 
Remarkably,, Price made only a slight passing reference in this section 
to the Allied intervention in North Russia. 
The second half of the booklet is devoted to an account Of the soviet 
SYStem in practice. In it he enlarged on the account he had given in 
Das R-Rte-S ystem in Russland. He also described more fully th an in any- 
t1ling he wrote before his Reminiscences both the problems of agrarian 
reform in Russia and the various attempts which had been made to solve 
them, devoting some 2,000 of the 11,, 000 words of the booklet to this 
subject. it is noteworthy also that in his account of the structure of 
the ecorxmry he makes no reference to the Supreme Council of National 
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E, conomyj, for which he had made such extravagant claims in the earlier 
pamphlet, referring only briefly to the existence of "a State Congress 
for managing the internal affairs of the different branches of industry. #, 
Instead he now appeared to be attaching more importance to the All-Russia 
union of Professional Alliances - "the real labour parliament" - although 
his inconsistent use of titles makes it difficult to be sure to which 
body he was referring. 
93 
Price went on to make a lively defence of the 
democratic credentials of the Al I-Russia Congress of Soviets as compared 
with the short-lived Constitutional Assembly, in a passage which was per- 
haps aimed especially at British readers with a lingering nostalgia for 
the sort of representative institutions with which they were familiar. 
The booklet concluded with a direct appeal to "the working classes of 
England, France and America" not to listen to horror stories about Russia 
in "the inspired press of Western Europe" but to listen,, rather,. to the 
voice of the Russian people, who asked only for peace and economic assis- 
tance. The Soviet government would enter into relationships with 
93 
Price used at least four different titles by which to describe at 
different times what would appear from the context to have been the 
same body: the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions. (The titles he 
so confusingly interchanged were: Central Trade Union, All-Russia 
Executive of Unions,, All-Russia Union of Trades and All Russia Union 
of Professional Alliances. ) Trade Unions were late to emerge in Russia 
and tended to be industry-based. The first All Russia 
, 
Conference of 
Trade Unions took place in June 1917 and it elected an all Russia 
Council of Trade Unions but the first All Russia Congress of Trade 
Unions only met for the first time in January 19i8. During most of 
1918 the Unions were primarily occupied with the rivalry of the Factory 
Committees movement and the effects of the Decree on Workers' Control 
(14 November 1917). Factory Committees and Unions saw eye to eye only 
in their initial hostility to Vesenkha (see Footnote 91 above) - BY 
May 1918 the unions had begun to make cam-on cause with the government 
(through Vesenkha) against the Factory committeeso, and by the end of 
the year'had gained ground over both. In January 1919 the Second All 
Russia Congress of Trade Unions was strong enough to require and enforce 
Compulsory trade union membership, to declare that its decisions were 
binding and to begin to construct a wages policy. See E. H. Carr The 
Bolshevik Revolution Vol. II pp. 62-63,74,103-104,180,198; '§. A-. Smith Red Petrograd pp. 159,213,220-224. The standard work on 
Soviet Trade Unions isr of course, Isaac Deutscher, Soviet Trade Unions: 
(1950). 
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capitalist governments on their terms if it had to, but 
,, if English,, French and American workers take these matters 
into their own hands they will find -in Soviet Russia a friend 
and ally. " 
There is one more pamphlet which is a borderline case. It is tempting 
to attribute it to Price although there is no firm evidence for such an 
attribution. Called Civil War and Red Terror it was published by the 
Group of English-Speaking Communists. There is no date or place of origin 
upon it and the only known copy to survive is in the Archives of the 
Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. The title is the only indicat- 
ion of the time it was written. The temptation to attribute it to Price 
beains with the f act that he had already written one piece on the same 0 
subject,, and it is not unreasonable to infer that he had written that 
one because he had been asked to do so by his old associates in Moscow. 
Civil War and Red Terror is in no way a revamped version of the piece 
which appeared as an article in Social Demokrat and was subsequently pub- 
lished as a pamphlet by the Brooklyn Socialist Society. It is longer 
and it is tougher, but it still reads as if Price had written it. The 
illustrations used to support the argument are all taken from English 
history. Although Fineberg,, brought up and educated in England., is Ob- 
ViOusly a possible author of the piece, it somehow does not come across 
as if he did. Subject to this caveat, the pamphlet will therefore be 
Summrised with the others of which it is known that Price was definitely 
the author. 
The central argument of the pamphlet was that the Red Terror was as much 
Mecessity of the class war as of the civil war. In this sense a clear 
lirse of development can be traced from the concluding statement of the 
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eariier piece: Revolutionis salus suprerna lex. It began by accusing the 
CaDitalist press of hypocrisy on the sub ect of i the horrors of the civil 
war in Russia. The capitalist classes had themselves started "the most 
dreadful war in history". What right had they to point an accusj_ng finger 
at Russia? 
"Civil war is the accompaniment to every revolution, and 
revolutions mark the stages of a nation's development. " 
The author cited Magna Carta, the peasants, ]Revolt, the "Cronvell Revol- 
ution" and the Anti-Corn Law Riots as the landmarks of development in 
English history. The dominant class in society at any given moment was 
that which controlled the methods of production. Political struggle 
inevitably accompanied changes in the methods of production and such 
struggles tended to be violent. The author illustrated his thesis with 
two examples from the seventeenth century in England: the iq: )osition by 
Charles I of a tax on wool exports, which had severely damaged sheep- 
rearing; and the ship tax which precipitated the civil war. The merchant 
class thus entered into a struggle with the King and the aristocracy which 
it won; but after the Industrial Revolution it, in turn, lost power to 
the manufacturing class. The struggle this time turned not on export 
but on import duties, notably the Corn Laws. In all these struggles the 
masses, who had done most of the f ighting under the delusion that theY 
were doing so in their own interestst always found that "their efforts 
only resulted in the enfranchisement of the class immediately above them-" 
UrIder the capitalist system only one class now stood between the workers 
and power. The revolutions in Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany had 
been "the first shattering blows against capitalism". But the Russian 
wOrkers had learned from history, and made sure that af ter the success- 
ful outcome of the struggle of botli capitalists and workers,, combining 
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against the Tsarist autocracy,, history did not repeat itself by installing 
capitalism as the sole oppressor. 
"Russian politics in eight months completed a process of devel- 
opment which has not yet been accomplished by the workers of 
Western Europe during a period of more than a hundred years. " 
But inevitably, the very success of the revolution made civil war 
inevitable. 
11 ... the ruling class has never, in any period of history, 
quietly accepted defeat. It is the overthrown class that insti- 
gates civil war... So it is in Russia. " 
This was why, the author went on,, the revolution could not pass immediate- 
ly into a period of complete freedom. Revolutionary discipline was 
essential until the revolution was secure, because "the deposed class 
will use the most treacherous means to secure its ends. " In Russia they 
had not hesitated to call in both the Allies and the Germans "to mirder 
their fellaw-countrymen. " Their officers had not only created the White 
Guard; they had also infiltrated - in order to sabotage - the Red Anrry. 
A reign of terror had begun early in 1918 in Finland,, the Ukraine and 
the Dc)n. The author devoted three paragraphs to the atrocities conratted 
by counter-revolutionaries in those areas. The working class had to defend 
itself. "False humanity" was 
"treachery to the lives and liberties of the workers. The Red 
Terror is not an evidence of the savagery of revolutionaries. 
It is called out by the White Terror employed by the ruling 
class back to slavery. " 
In a Concludiryg paragraph which called for the ruthless suppression of 
reSistance to workers' power,, the author called for realism on the Part 
Of the workers of Western Europe; they must not be "misguided into 
believing that revolutions are as pleasant as a picnic. " 
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Cliapter 11. Philips Price and the Formation of Opinion 
on the Russian Revolution. 
Throughout his life Philips Price was considered to be some sort of an 
authority on Russia even by people who did riot agree with hiln about 
anything. His books saw to that. Although he was distrusted on the 
Right as a renegade and on the Lef t, as a bourgeois intellectual, he ;V- 
nevertheless retained the reputation that he earned during his four 
years in Russia to the end of his life. There is, however, strikingly 
little hard evidence that his reports to the Manchester Guardian, 
especially those written in the period imiediately before and during 
the Intervention, exercised as much influence on his contemporaries as 
is of ten imagined. The Press Bureau saw to that. The f act that he had 
been the Manchester Guardian's correspondent in Russia frorn 1914-1918 
was, of course, the essence of his reputation, but it could be argued 
that this was based at least as much on what he wrote after he left 
Russia as on what he wrote from Russian soil. It is still unusualo, even 
after 70 years, to f ind a serious book on the Russian Revolution which 
does not include his Reminiscences in its bibliography or make some 
other form of acknowledgement to material provided by Price. However 
the purpose of this thesis was to discuss what he wrote at the time of 
the revolution, and to show how effectively he was,, in the end, muzzled. 
This is not, however, the end of the story, and it is not to say that 
his work was without effect or inf luence at the time - It is onlY to 
Suggest that a good deal of hindsight has been brought to bear On the 
subjects, and that when he is credited as having been one of the great 
jOUrnalists of the Russian Revolution it is of the articles that he 
wrote later on that many people may be thinkings, since so much of what 
he Wrote at the tine never appeared 3-n print. Indeed even when 
he was 
filing those of hiLs despatches which did get through,, there is some 
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evidence that they were not as highly or as widely regarded as those 
of Arthur Ransom except by a coterie. Yet Ransome lef t, Russia in July 
1918 and Price remained on the spot until December of that year. 
p, ansome,, writing from Stockholm Was,, though by his own account censored, 
not suppressed. Price , writing from Petrograd, volgograd and Moscow 
was effectively and selectively dealt with by v&itehall from as early 
as February 1918. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that during 
the period when Price was getting his despatches through more or less 
unscathed, that is between November 1917 and February 1918, he had not 
yet made up his mind how far he supported the Bolsheviks, and on the 
basis of his writing could by no means be regarded as their apologist. 
An atterirpt will be made to assess the impact of his work under five 
main headings: 
(i) on the contemporary lef t and liberal press and thus on the 
opinions of those who read it; 
(ii) on those who read his propagandist writings, whether troops 
or civilians, at home and abroad; 
(iii) on Whitehall and Westminster generally; 
on the Union of Democratic Control in particular; 
(v) and on the Labour party in Britain, which during the years 
immediately after the First World War was, perhaps,, not as Little 
England as it subsequently became and enjoyed a greater sense of 
involvement witb[European socialist movement. 
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(i) Journalism: Price and The Left and Liberal Press. 
The Left press had to take most of its foreign news at second hand, and 
most of its news from Russia was therefore taken from the despatches of 
price and Panscm, but with the exception of Labour Leader,, very little 
of what was reprinted was attributed to Price. He was completely 
ignored by The Call and hardly mentioned except venomously in Forward. 
The Workers' Dreadnaught took him up, but not until 1919. The Nation 
referred to him a few times and Common Sexise used him virtually as an 
unof f icial correspondent, but there was not a single reference to him in 
two other journals otherwise considered liberal: the New Statesman and 
the Cambridge Magazine. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Price's 
reputation on the Left as a reporter of the Russian Revolution was based 
on direct readership of the Manchester Guardian and owed very little to 
any reverberations in the Lef t Press. Robin Page Amott, interviewed 
in 1983, recalled that after his release from imprisonment as a conscien- 
tious ob3ector he found that Price Is writingswere being eagerly discussed 
by journalists in every pub in Fleet Street. Lord Femer Brockway,, 
Interviewed in 1985, described how conscientious objectors newly arrived 
in prison brought Price's articles, taped to the soles of their feet to 
avoid detection when they were striPPed On entrY r which he then cOP'ed 
out for his clandestine prison newspaper. 
Labour Ieader (of which Fenner Brockway was editor until his imprison- 
merit) was by far the most generous in its acknowledgement of Price's 
wOrk. On 3 May 1917 it asked 
"Wbo of us but a short six months ago could have conceived 
of the staid Manchester Guardian printing on its main edit- 
orial page the- wonderfully fine and vividly picturesque 
article by M. Philips Price? " 
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on 19 July two paragraphs in the same journal began, as if becoming 
used to the idea that the Manchester Guardian was worth quoting: 
of C, -,, ,,, ialist students of living history ought to make a 
point of reading M. Philips Price onthe 'Kronstadt Commune, 
in the Manchester Guardian for July 17.11 
On 23 August Price's Kerensky- inspired telegram about the Stockholm 
Conference (see above Chp. 3p-95) was given prominence second only to 
the casualty figures in 'Notes of the Moment'. On 6 September Labour 
Leader's leading article on 'Finland's Bourgeoisie' contained the 
sentence: 
"We confess to an amused curiosity as to how the bourgeoisie 
of Manchester read the immensely interesting and informed 
articles on 'Finland and the Russian Revolution' written by 
Mr. Philips Price on Friday last, apparently from Helsingfors. 
There were no references to Price for the next three months, which is 
not surprising since Price was during that time travelling in the 
Volga provinces and nothing from him was appearing in the Manchester 
, 
Guardian either, but Labour Leader quickly picked up his 'Through the 
Russian Provinces I series when they began to appear,, describing them 
as "a series of intensely interesting articles", some of which were 
summarised in the 13 Decenber issue. On 24 January 1918 a piece on 
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly referred to 
"Philips Price's admirably sincere articles in the 
Manchester Guardian". 
The 28 February issue quoted three paragraphs of a despatch by Price 
entitled I Russian Restoration' (printed in the 
. 
Manchester Guardian on 
21 February) . On 7 March Labour Leader 
described his article on 
'Fmssian Revolutionary Tactics' (Manchester Guardian 4 March) as 
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"yet another finely true description of the forces at work 
in and around Russia. " 
on 14 March there were extensive quotations fran his articles 'Russia's 
Unratif ied Peace' (6 March) and 'Tlýhat theY fight fOr in the Ukraine' 
(7 March) - On 30 May a section headed I phi I ips price, s Testimony, 
described as "most interesting" his account of Pan-German intrigues in 
the Caucasus (28 May) and quoted the whole of its last paragraph. on 
13 June: 
"Friends of the Russian Revolution are still mainly depen- 
dent for news upon the special correspondents of the 
Manchester Guardian and the Daily News. " 
At the end of October nothing from Price had been printed for more than 
three months and Lef t, j ourna Is were forced increas ing ly to re ly on 
Ransome's despatches in the Daily News from Stockholm. The Manchester 
Guardian's reputation was sustained through its leading articles. On 
31 October Labour Leader noted that 
"The capitalist daily press, with the Manchester Guardian as 
an honourable exception, seems determined to bar out news of 
Russia. " 
Price was referred to for the last time af ter a gap of f ive months 
when, in the issue of 13 March 1919 he and Ransome were referred to 
in the same sentence as "reliable authorities" on Russia. 
But even Labour ieader now seemed to switch its allegiance to Ransome. 
Price's pamphlets in English were hardly noticed. The issue of 29 may 
contained an advertisement placed there by the National Labour Press 
for Capitalist Europe and Socialist Russia but it was never reviewed 
by Labour Leader. By 19 June it was not even included in the box of 
National Press publications which advertised,, among other workst 
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Ransome's Six Weeks in Soviet Russia as "The Book you have been waiting 
for". Price was,, perhaps,, 1918's story. The redoubtable Joseph King, 
reviewing Ransome's pamphlet for Labour Iýeader on 12 June 1919 had so 
far forgotten Price as to write of Ransome: 
"No one in his position had the courage and insight to 
prepare the Allies as he did for the collapse of Tsardorn and 
the withdrawal of Russia frorn the fighting line. " 
21C 
A., noted above (ChpaF/N68) Forward's columnist Rob Roy had a very low 
opinion of Price's work, and only a few perfunctory references to 
Price's despatches in the Manchester Guardian were made in Forward 
between the Bolshevik Revolution and the Intervention. In one instance 
(8 February 1918) in which references were made both to Ransome and to 
the Mandiester Guardian,, the omission of Price's name appears deliber- 
ate. On 25 August 1918 Forward reprinted the whole of Ransome's Letter 
to America under the heading "The Truth About the jBolsheviki At Last! " 
On 26 October Forward repeated the Tunes Stockholm correspondent's 
report that 
"Mr. Philips Price, the late correspondent of the 
, 
Manchester 
Guardian... has joined the service of the Bolsheviks and is 
editing a Bolshevik newspaper. " 
On 19 March 1919 Forward reported Commander Bellairs' question about 
Price and The Call in the House of Commons (see below p. 422) under the 
heading 'A British Bolshevik It also reprinted in full Scott's final 
disavowal of Price (see below,, p. 400). 
Ibe Workers I Dreadnaught, throughout 1918 only mentioned Price by name 
once,, and then not until 24 August,, when Sylvia pankhurst herself wrote 
in the leading article: 
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"No confidence should be placed in the Russic-anews which 
appears in the press unless the telegrams come through the 
Bolshevik agency. Philips Price in the. Manchester Guardian 
and Arthur Ransome in the Daily News are the most reliable 
of the capitalist correspondents. " 
price was not mentioned again that year, although articles by Ransome, 
john Reed and Albert Rhys Williams were reprinted. The workerd Dread- 
naught made amends on 3 May 1919, however, when in a special Soviet 
number to celebrate May Day the whole of the front page consisted of 
a reprint of The Truth About the Allied InterVention in Russia. The 
editions of 19 and 26 July and 2 August also reprinted papitalist 
Europe and Socialist Russia in three instalments. (These were mislead- 
ingly called. The Truth About Russia being a translation of the title 
given to the pamphlet in its German version (see above Chp. 10 p. 368). 
Moving on to. The Call (the London versionh, Price was only mentioned 
bY rlwne once between January 1917 and May 1919. On 17 January 1918 it 
acknowledged that the Manchester Guardian was an "honourable exception" 
to the suppression by the capitalist press of all references to Trotsky 
in connection with Brest Litovsk, but it did not mention frorn whom the 
Manchester Guardian was getting its information. The omission of 
virtually all mention of Price in. The Call is not really surprising 
because it had, in a sense, its own correspondent in Russia in Joe 
Fineberg. Indeed the only really puzzling feature about The Call during 
t1le period under review is that though there was an oblique reference 
it on 31 October to the formation Of the Anglo-Frerr-h Gr0uPj, there 
was never any report of what became of the group. Nor was there ever 
ar'Y reference to its fellow-journal, the moscow-produced The call,, on 
WhIch both Fineberg and Price wOrked t0getherr in whatever capacities. 
The editors in London mist have known. 
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The Nation was renowned for its thoughtful and open-minded attitude 
to Russian af f airs throughout this period,, and its comentators obvious- 
ly read widely and used every scrap of information they could find in 
building up and interpreting a picture of what was going on in Russia. 
But it quoted from Price only four times, twice attributing the material 
to him personally and twice noting only that it came from the Manchester 
Guardian. The Nation seemed to set more store by Ransome, described on 
1 September 1917 as "the only correspondent whose telegrams are in any 
degree illuminating". Indeed in two articles on the Secret Treaties 
(1 and 9 December 1917) , supposedly Price's greatest scoop, the Nation 
made no reference to Price and on 2 March 1918 was once more naming 
Ransome as the one "who alone of the correspondents seems able to use 
his opportunities". 
The Herald took very little notice of Price apart from its one short- 
lived attempt to designate him as its Special Correspondent. On 12 May 
1917 a short leading article had deplored the f ailure of the British 
press to make the position in Russia "either clear or comprehensible" 
arid added: 
"We must however make an exception in the case of the Daily 
News and the Manchester Guardian,, especially the latter, 
whose correspondent at Petrograd is at great pains every day 
to explain the true position of affairs. " 
On 24 November 1917 the Herald printed one article by Price, possibly 
the least well-written of his career (see above, Chp. 6 FIN2). It reads 
like the work of a very tired man, which he must indeed have been, and 
he either sent nothing else to the. Herald or was not invited to contri- 
bute to it again. Since the 
. 
Herald was constantly using material 
derived from the Manchester Guardian there would have b een verY little 
POint, in arry case, in adding to the paper 's overheads by errPloying 
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its own correspondent - Moreover the Herald already had its own j-nter- 
preters of Russia in Brailsford and Farbmanj, than whom there could 
hardly have been better men for the job. 
Three generous tributes were paid to Price by leading figures of the 
Left in later years. In 1957 Harry Pollit wrote 
"To their eternal credit two British writers, Philips Price 
and Arthur Ransome tried in the Manchester Guardian and the 
Daily News to give some Tbjective account of what was taking 
place in Soviet Russia. " 
In 1978 Harry McShane described how he and his fellow-workers "studied 
every report" of the March Revolution: 
"The best were those written by Philips Price in the Manches- 
ter Guardian; he was their Russian correspondent, very sympaEh- 
etic to the Revolution,, and frorn his articles we could work out 
what was going on. " 
McShane also noted: 
"The revolutionary element, including some 
began to understand workers' denx)cracy for 
For the Glasgow socialist mc)vement the new 
was a revelation. From Philips Price's rej 
know the slogan 'All Power 2 to the Soviets' idea of what they were... " 
of the I. L. P.,, 
the first time. 
Soviet system 
ports we got to 
and to get som 
In the Golden jubilee Souvenir edition of Labour Monthly in 1971 
Palme Dutt made the harx1somest acknowledgement of all. Noting that 
thP Manchester Guardian had recently celebrated its 150th anniversary 
he went on: 
"Mention of that journal of the old heyday of liberalism 
calls to mind one of its most distinguished foreign corres- 
pondents, Philips Price, who fulfilled an historic service 
r"-Pollit. 
'The October Revolution and the Br7iiti!; 
ý 
Labour Mwement'. 
Marxism Today,, October 1957. 
Harry McShane, No Mean Fighter (1978) pp. 89 and 94. 
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when he gave, backed by the courageous editorship of C. p. Scott, 
the first truthful reporting in the non-socialist press of the 
Russian Revolution. " 
Although the names of Ransome and Price,, of the Daily News and the 
Manchester Guardian, were so often yoked together, in admiration or in 
obloquy, it was the influence of the Manchester Guardian and of Scott 
personally that the anti-Bolshevik establishment in the Foreign office 
most feared. The strorxgest evidence in support of this proposition 
comes from Lenin himself -a man not known for wishful thinking,, when 
in a speech to the 6th All Russia Congress of Soviets on 8 November 1918 
he said: 
"The English bourgeois newspaper the Manchester Guardian of 
October 23 writes that, 'if the allied armies still remain 
in Russia and still operate in Russia, their purpose can only 
be to effect a revolution in the internal affiars of Russia. ' 
The allied governments must, therefore,, either put a stop to 
their military operations or declare that they are in a state 
of war with the Bolsheviks. I repeat that the mqportance of 
this small quotation, which sounds to us like a call for 
revolution, like a most important revolutionary appeal, the 
importance of it lies in the fact that it was written in a 
bourgeois newspaper which is itself an enemy of the social- 
ists, but it realised that it is impossible to conceal the 
truth any longer. If the bourgeois newspapers talk in this 
way, we can picture to ourselves what the masses of the 
British workers say and think. "3 
Lenin was, of course referring to one of Scott's leading articles 
Between the beguuung of August and the end of October 1918 he wrote 
nine, in which he questioned every aspect of Allied policy in Russia: 
military and political. On 5 August he concluded regretfully that 
armed -Intervention had only 
become possible because President Wilson 
had Succumbed to pressure from the French Government. On 10 August 
he deplored the fact that the British Goverment had appealed over the 
3 
Lenin. Collected Works (English Translation) Vol. 28 pp. 162-163. 
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head of the Fbassian Government to the -Russian people, and wondered to 
whom they thought they were addressing themselves. He protested that 
this appeal had been published the day after Parliament had risen for 
the sumer, so that the explanation wtdch was "still due to the public" 
could now not be given, "but it is the sort of thing to which we are 
, coming accus I-VIt- * tomed. 11 On 17 August he suggested that there were better 
ways of protecting the road to India than by sending a derisory token 
force to Baku. On 26 AucJust he deplored the logistical folly of inter- 
vening via Vladivostock. "Much has been forgiven to Downing Street and 
the Quai d1orsay but they would never be pardoned if they defeated 
Marshal Foch in Siberia". on 30 August he asked what Allied policy viz- 
a-viz the Czechs really was: the Allies were supposedly "getting them 
out", but were they not "rather keeping them in and using thern as a 
disintegrating force to upset the existing order in Russia? " The Allies 
had protested non-interference in the internal affairs of Russia, but 
by their actions were making it clear that "the Russian people may have 
any Government they like except the Government they have got,, and that 
we will not interfere in their internal affairs except for the purpose 
of destroying that Government -" 
On 6 September Scott declared that the murder of Captain Cromie had, 
irldeed, been an abominable crime, but devoted the rest of his leader to 
thP argument that the murder was indicative not only of worsening 
relations betv&-en London and Moscowt but of increased danger of a war 
"which threatens to unite Moscow and Berlin. " ()n 11 September he raised 
(not for the f irst time) the question of what - or whom - the All ies 
wanted to put in place of the Bolsheviks if they succeeded in bringing 
them down. Did they want to restore the Romanovs? "Have the Allies a 
POlitical policy for Russia? If so, what is it? " On 20 September., after 
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the announcement that British forces had been withdrawn from Baku, he 
could not resist observing that he had pointed out the folly of the 
exercise fran the start. The lesson should be learned,, and the Allies 
should withdraw the Czechs, who were now ruming into stif f resistance 
from the Red Army in the Volga area, along the Trans-Siberian railway. 
on 23 October, in the article quoted by Lenin, the last major leading 
article on Russia before his thundering denunciation of British policy 
of 6 December (see above, Chp - 9, pp . 313-316) , he pointed out, as the war 
in the West was clearly drawing to a close, that when the Allies had 
ceased fighting the Central Powers they would still be fighting in 
Russia. Why? If it was, as the American Government had stated,, to get 
the Czechs out of Russia , the Czechs could get out of Russia whenever 
they wanted to, "... on ly they show no s igns of getting out ". So, he 
went m,. 
"Is it our intention and purpose to wage war against Lienin 
and Trotsky, or against the Soviet system, or against 
Bolshevik Socialism? ... When blood was being poured out in floods everywhere the English people were not very curious 
about a minor stream of it. But when British blood stops 
flowing everywhere except in Russia, they will want to know 
the reason for this exception. " 
Except in the case of his article of 6 December 1918 in which, as has 
been noted,, Scott appeared to be directly influenced in his choice of 
words by Price's despatch of 31 October, there is no other indication 
that any specific leading article was based on any specific message from 
Price after June 1918. But it is a matter of record that Scott sent 
Dore to look at thern and report the gist Of them to him#, and it is a 
measure of the importance which he attached to those reportst that when 
DOre could not go to the Press Bureau and read them, Scott sent somebOdY 
else to do it (see above Chp. 7 F/Nioq). It is not intended to suggest 
that Scott would nott in any case,, have taken the line that he did on 
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Russia. But it may reasonably be proposed that the despatches he was 
receiving from his correspondent there gave him a great deal of support. 
For all the talk in Whitehall, very little appears to have been done to 
put pressure on Scott until the end of 1918. Paradoxically, indeed, 
while his civil servants were beginning to assemble material for a Miite 
paper on Bolshevik atrocities, Lloyd George was still speaking of the 
need to get more accurate information about Russia into the press - At a 
Cabinet meeting on 23 December he talked of the reed to put home-based 
joumalists in touch with "anyone who had returned from Russia". "There 
was" he was reported as having said, 
"a Manchester Guardian correspondent who had just come back 
wiG a glowing account of Russian prosperity under Bolshevism, 
and it was desirable that all the information describing the 
true state of affairs in the country should be made public. ,4 
It is inconc-eivable that Lloyd George was not referring - even if some- 
what inaccurately - to Price's message of 31 October, an intercept of 
which had been circulated by the Press Bureau, and a copy of which could 
easily have found its way into his box. It would even appear that he 
knew that Price had lef t Russia, though he was wrong about his having 
" come back". The relationship between Scott and Lloyd George may still 
have counted for something, and it is not difficult to imagine that 
nObody was in a hurry to tackle Scott about his correspondent in Russia. 
On 27 December Price wrote to Scott himself frorn Berlin. All that sur- 
vived of the letter is a lengthy quotation fran it which was included in 
a PID Fortnightly Report circulated during the spring of 1919. (Since 
Only part of the report survives and there is no date on it, only the 
4 
FO 371.3346, War Cab. 45. 
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season can be inferred. It included material dated between 27 December 
1918 and 6 April 1919. ) 
5 
The following is what aPPeared in the report. 
"At last ... I am able to comnunicate direct with the 
Manchester Guardian again. I have during the autumn made 
attemptsj, probably futile ones,, to send despatches ... 
about what was going on in Russia,, for I determined that 
when the Allied Governments decided on intervention it was 
my duty to stay behind and redouble my efforts to explain 
to the outer world the folly and criminality of what they 
were doing... I see from back numbers of the Manchester 
Guardian that you have got an absolutely correct appreciation 
of the Russian situation,, and are continuing the uphill 
struggle against the hailstorm of lies and wickedness... 
I have now absolutely given up all hope of persuading the 
ruling classes of England or, for that matter, of any 
country of listening to the voice of reason. Having lived 
through two revolutions in Russia, and living through a 
third in Germany,, I have been forced to see that the world 
is now passing through a gigantic class struggle, in which 
the whole foundations of society are being constructed on 
more equitable lines. The war... was only one of the scenes 
in the drama... We cannot expect those interested in the 
maintenance of the old social order to voluntarily commit 
suicide. The war of the Allies against Russia is just part 
of the great class war which seems to me now inevitable 
throughout Europe, as the sole means of creating a stable 
peace and an equitable form of society. After the revolu- 
tion in Germany I sent a radio to the Foreign office in 
Berlin,, and obtained permission to come... I felt that from 
here I could communicate what was going on in Russia and 
Germany better than from Russia... I had the good fortune 
to get here in time for the first All-German Soviet Congress, 
which I describe in two telegrams#, copies of which I sent 
you... Please communicate with me and let me know if you 
get what I send. " 
It is impossible to know 
-Lf 
Scott ever got the letter, since it was 
clearly intercepted, as was a packet Price sent off to him on 3 January 
containing, among other material, a copy of The Truth About the Allied 
Intervention in Russia. The contents of the packet were sunnarised in 
the same edition of the PID report as the one which contained price's 
, Scott must have known 
that Price letter to Scott. By now,, in any case, 
had been described on the cover of the pamphlet as "correspondent in 
5 
P0371-4372. 
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Fussia of the Manchester Guardian", even if he had not yet seen the 
pamphlet with his own eyes. Scott had also heard from Aylmer Maude, 
who was acting as a special correspondent for him with the British 
forces in North Russia. In a covering letter to scott enclosing some 
of his despatches, Maude informed him on 17 January 1919 of pricels 
"present activities" as editor of The Call and author of The Truth About 
. 
the Allied Intervention in Russia. He asked whether Price "has still 
any right to call himself a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian?; 16 
Maude wrote this the day before Price,, in effect,, sacked himself and 
eleven days before Scott finally wrote to him. Scott's letter,, too, 
appeared in the same PID report,, which, in fact, contained no less than 
five references to Price. On 28 January 1919 Scott wrote as follows: 
My dear Price, 
I've been wanting to write to you, but have not known your 
address, and I'm not sure whether this will reach you. I'm 
sending you a wire to ask you to discontinue the correspon- 
dence for us. That would be necessary in any case because 
very little of what you telegraph gets through. But there 
is a further reason. It doesn't do for you,, as our corres- 
pondent,, to be carrying on Bolshevik propaganda. That may 
be right or wrong,. but we ought not to be in any way mixed 
up in it,, as I see we are in a pamphlet of which a copy has 
been sent to me,, where you are described as our corr. in 
Russia. This may have been done without your authorityf but 
obviously it involves our responsibility in a very consider- 
able way. 
I'm so sorry to have to complain at all after the splendid 
work you have kindly done for us in all these years,, but you 
will understand our point of view. You must have had a 
terribly rough time in Russia lately but are I hope all 
right again now. Mien will you be coming home,, I wonder? 
Yours very sincerely, 
c. P. SOOTT 
Price never saw this letter until af ew years before his death, when 
the historian of the Manchester Guardian,, David Ayherst,, found a copy 
F0371.3341. 
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in the paper's archives. 
7 
It is not known,, either,, whether he received 
Scott's telegrami, but the watchful eyes of PID picked this up tc*. It 
was addressed to a Mrs. Saxe Sluyters in Holland, for retransmission, 
and it apparently simply asked him to discontinue the correspondence. 
8 
PID also picked up a letter frorn Price to George Lansbury dated 18 jan- 
uary 1918 "offering his services as cable and mail correspondent to 
addressee's new labour daily" and enclosing "an article written in his 
characteristic strain of Bolshevik propaganda". (From the PID summary 
of it, this would appear to be Price's article on the Red Terror for 
Social DemokraL. ) It is fairly clearj, therefore, that Price himself, 
by mid-January 1918 , considered that his relationship with the 
Manchester Guardian had come to an end. 
On 21 February,, after reporting Comnander Bellairs' question about Price 
in the House of Commons (see below p. 422), the Manchester Guardian 
printed the following succinct account of that relationship: 
"Mr. Philips Price is a member of a well-known and disting- 
uished family and was at one time Liberal candidate for 
Gloucester. He is a great traveller,, and though he has never 
been a regular correspondent for this paper,, he has sent us 
valuable letters from time to time from Persia, Armenia and 
elsewhere. He appears recently to have become a convert to 
the economic doctrines of Bolshevism, but we should be slow 
to believe him guilty of any dishonourable act. Since we 
were informed of his connection with Bolshevik propaganda 
we have requested him to cease to correspond for us. " 
After this obituary notice, nothing more was said in public about Price's 
relationship with the paper; after Scott's death in 1932 Price 
began to 
Write occasional articles for it once more. But an estrangenlent, 
took 
7 
John Ryland Urliversity Library of Manchester. Scott Papers A/P53/17. 
8 
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place between Price and Scott which aPPeared to widen rather than narrow 
with the years - In some ways Scott appears actively to have promoted 
the rif t. Any attempt to explain it would be pure speculation, but an 
account of '-': o--ott's attempts to disavow his Connection with Price as late 
as 1924 is given in Appendix XI. What watters is not how it ended, but 
what it tried to achieve while it lasted. 
(ii) Propaganda 
Quite early in the autumn of 1918 word was already reaching Britain of 
Price's propagandist activities. on 14 September the Times (as already 
noted in the extended footnote at the end of Chapter 9) contrived in its 
column 'Through German Eyes' to turn a perfectly factual quotation from 
an article by Paquet in the frankfurter Zeitung into an allegation. 
According to the Times Paquet "charged" Price and Ransome with "pro- 
nr% 
Bulshevik propaganda". The Times then proceeded to give a straight- 
forward translation of Paquet's sumary of 'The Truth About the Allied 
Intervention in Russia'. With something like unconscious humour the 
Times then quoted Paquet's own connent at the end of the sunyflarY: 
"Doubtless the isolated protests of subjects of the Entente 
States against the policy of their Governments in Russia 
will not for the present stay the course of events. Both 
in England and in France nothing will be left undone to 
prevent these protests from becoming known. Nevertheless 
they wi 11 be heard. " 
Perhaps only readers of the small print appreciated Paquet's conclusion. 
In Price's own family reactions to the piece in the Times were mixed. 
TUffet wrote an anxious letter to Trevelyan professing himself " 
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concerned" for the position in which Price would f ind himself if and 
when he returned. His brother,, on the other hand,, was , delighted,, by 
the piece but observed,, also in a letter to Trevelyanj, that "' friends 
and relations' will now be able to indulge freely in the wc)rds pro, 
Gennan'". On 23 November the Times printed a Reuter fantasy from Stock- 
holm, headed 'A Bolshevist for England', which reported 
"advice frorn Petrograd... that the Bolshevists are hard 
pressed and intend making a supreme propaganda effort 
abroad, sending as special delegate to England Mr. Price,, 
who will be styled President of the Englisb Internation- 
alist Group in Russia. " 
on this his brother commented,, again to Trevelyan: 
"If he comes he'll have more courage than I could have 
thought possible in any man. Eitherhe knows our people 
can't touch him or he doesn't care. " 
Neither hypothesis was the truth. 
a) The Armed Forces 
Evidence of the effect of Bolshevik propaganda literature on the armed 
forces - whether written by Price or by anybody else - is not abundant 
for obvious reasons. Official files containing any such evidence have 
eitlier been pruned or are still not available to the public. But that 
it made an impact. upon some of those who read it camot be doubted, and 
SOme evidence of this is to be found. The most conclusive is in the 
Government's own white paper on "The Evacuation of North Russia 1919", 
10 
Newcastle University Library - C. P. Trevelyan papers. CPT82. 
10 
The Evacuation of Northern Russia CMD818 (HMSO 1920) p. 25. 
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which acknowledged that 
"of the troops of several nationalities under British command 
on the Archangel front,, the Director of Military Operations 
at the War Office reported in March 1919 that their morale 
was so low as to render them a prey to the very active and 
insidious Bolshevik propaganda which the enemy are carrying 
on with increasing energy and skill. " 
Enlarging on the low morale factor, a memorandum from the General Staff 
of 15 April 1919 which was included in the W-iite Paper stated that, 
having issued a "frank statement of the danger of the present position" 
to the Press,, 
"For obvious reasons... the most alarming feature which is 
that constituted by the lowered morale of the Allied forces, 
could not be made public. " 
Troops in the conditions - both physical and mental - prevailing in 
North Russia in the winter of 1918/19, when some of their comrades even 
. 
11 
in England were striking for speedier dembbilisation, offered a soft 
target to the organisers of Bolshevik propaganda. "Every morning" Iron- 
side wrote in his book Archangel 1918-19 
12 
"we found placards pasted on the walls of buildings and tracts 
and paq: )hlets in many different languages were stuffed into 
the letter boxes of offices and private houses. Many had been 
printed quite lately in Moscow and must have found their way 
across our lines. They were wvll-written and always sent out 
in the names of Ienin,, Trotsky and the Bolshevik Foreign 
Minister Tchicherin. One of the cleverest appeared over the 
name of an Englishman. " 
That this was 'The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia' would 
Seern to be corroborated by Lindley in a telegram from Archangel dated 
3 January 1919.13 It must have been sent in response to an enquirY from 
his book 
11 
An account of týýe-sestrikes is given by Axx7rew 
ýýQstein in 
The Soldiers' Strikes of 1919 (1980). 
12 Archangel,, 1918-19 by Field MI arshal Edmund Ironside (1953) p. 58. 
13 F0371.3950. 
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London which in itself suggests that Witehall was already worried about 
the effects Of BOlshevik propagandar because it began: 
"Your telegram No. 435. There is no fraternising of troops. it 
He went on immediately to illustrate the cause for concern. 
"Every effort is made to spread Bolshevik literature amongst 
them by pinning leaflets to trees and other means,, but I am 
assured that men regard this as a game in which they do their 
part by scattering anti-Bolshevik leaflets... I will forward 
by first available safe opportunity collection of Bolshevik 
literature being distributed. Most poisonous and least honest 
is signed as correspondent of 
, 
Manchester Guardian by a rene- 
gade Englishman named Philips Price known to Lockhart. Letter 
addressed last May by Mr. Ransome correspondent of Daily NeýOQ 
to President Wilson is circulated amongst American troops with 
preface by Radek. Successful conclusion of war has of course 
robbed this stuff of many of its arguments and discredited 
prophecies. " 
Lindley sent on 16 January 1919 what appears to have been a covering 
letter for a memorandLun by Ironside 
"illustrating the unfavourable reception which is given to 
Bolshevik attempts at fraternisation, also specimens of the 
literature which is dropped over the lines by Bolshevik aero- 
planes. 1114 
AHjLwe-- added that he was still "endeavouring to obtain" copies of the parrph- 
lets by Price and Ransorne. The fact that he could not easily lay his 
hands upon them may have been due to the fact that they were generally 
either destroyed (by the officers) or hidden (by the men). Andrew Roth- 
stein recalled in 1986 that an old man had come into the marx Memorial 
LibrarY in the 1960s and presented them with a copy of the leaflet "NbY 
HaVe You Come to Murmansk? I He had volunteered the information that 
thP local girls used to hand this sort of material out to the troops r 
bUt that if the officers found their men reading it they confiscated it. 
14 
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some, r at least,, of the men had obviously been interested enough to 
hide it from their officers. Possibly more remarkable still was the 
discovery, in January 1988,, that Price's pamphlet The Old Order in Europe 
and the New Order in Russia, which was not written until Novenber 1918 
and had been presumed to be directed at a much more general readership 
than the troops in Munrensk, was also apparently distributed on that front 
in 1919, for a copy of it was presented to the Killam Libraryi, Dalhousie 
University by a Canadian veteran of that campaign many decades later. 
15 
Another unsolicited testimonial came frorn a Major in the Royal Scots,, 
who wrote in the Official History of the Brigade: "... the Bolshevik news- 
paper The Call supplied our men with their most regular and accurate 
information. , 16 
In addition to working on the troops in the lines, Bolshevik propaganda 
was also directed to Allied prisoners of war. A PID memorandum written 
in November 1918 stated that there was already 
"evidence that Bolshevik propaganda is at work among British 
prisoners of war in Russian hands. These prisoners have come 
to regard the Bolsheviks as their true friends who treat them 
as their Own. "17 
15 
Killam Library,, Dalhousie Universityr Halifax,, Nova Scotia. 
Russian Microfilm. Supplement to Special List No. 7. 
16 
Major John Ewing The Royal Scots 1914-19 (1925) (Two Volumes) 
pp. 738-758. Ewing went on to observe that by the spring of 1919 
the men were "puzzled why the fighting should continue in Russia 
when the armistice had put an end to hostilities in all other 
theatres. It seemed uncornmonly like interference in the internal 
affairs of another nation. Such doubts had often invaded the minds 
Of the men during the winter months... and none knew better than 
the Royal Scots that there was little prospect of stirring up in 
the minds of the Russian peasants an active hatred against the new 
Bolshevik Government. " 
17 FO. 371.4377. 
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A Gc)vernment Committee was set up 'On the Treatment by the En&ny of 
British Prison= of War I and this dealt with prisoners of war released 
from Russian as well as from other theatres. An unattributed note in 
what remains of a file on this subject spoke of the need to keep prisoners 
returning from Russia under supervision "if and when" they returned and 
somej, at least, of them were interviewed by the Special Branch. 
18 
Most 
of the transcripts of these interviews that survive mentioned The Call 
as having been the chief source of news available to the men. One of 
the of f icers, a captain in the Royal Engineers who was taken prisoner 
in march 1919, identif ied the Group of English-Speaking Communists as 
the source of much of the Engl ish- language propaganda which was distrib- 
uted and noted, as if the names were familiar to him: 
"Philips Price has, I believe, left for Germany. I am not 
certain whether the Daily News correspondent is still in Moscow 19 
or whether he has left. We were given a number of his pamphlets. " 
AnEngineer Sub-Lieutenant taken prisoner 
Russian agents referred to the widespread 
of war of The Call and of pamphlets by Pr 
A number of soldiers: prisoners of war or 
singled out by the Bolsheviks for special 
in an attempt 
distribution i 
ice, Radek and 
in some cases 
attention and 
to 1 and two 
mwng prisoners 
Ransome. 
20 
deserters,, were 
brought to Moscow, 
"where an attempt was made to help improve their understanding 
of the modern world. "21 
Some were then sent back to their units "loaded with Proclamations and 
appeals". 22 Others actually contributed to The Call themselves: the 
18 
FO 371.3939. 
19 
FO 175.1. 
20 
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21 The internationalists pp. 560-562. 
22 Ibid. 
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30 Novenber edition contains letters from four soldiers testifying to 
the humaneness of their treatment by the Russians. The mcýst f amous apos- 
tate was Private Lapham of the Royal Scots, taken prisoner in October 
1918 , whose letter to his "brother Scots" was printed as a Bolshevik 
propaganda leaflet. Lapham appealed to his comrades to "think things 
over " and to 
"ask yourselves is it worth while killing each other to 
please people who care not what happens as long as their 
pockets are being filled at our expense. " 
There is an echo of Price's propagandist style in Lapham's letter,, and 
it is, indeed, possible, that the two men met,, since Price was still in 
Moscow when Private Lapham wrote it, and had referred to the condition 
of British prisoners of war in language that suggested first-hand know- 
ledge, in his last messages to the Manchester Guardian. 
In addition to working on troops and prisoners of war on the Northern 
front, Bolshevik propaganda either written in French or translated into 
French was in circulation in the south. This was well attested by French 
Intelligence; Bolshevik tracts were found on French warships even before 
the troops they were carrying could be landed. 
23 A French translation 
Of 'The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia' is in the Institute 
of Social History at Amsterdam. On 12 July 1919 Sylvia Pankhurst wrote 
in Workers' Dreadnaught, after returning frorn Russia,, about the powerful 
effects of 
"Soviet propaganda carried on through literature distributed 
by aeroplane and by oral agitation in the rear and on the front 
23 
Michael Jabara Carley: Revolution and Intervention: the French 
GOvernment and the Russian Goverment War 1917-1919 (1983) W-117 -and 144/145. 
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of the invading armies. The extraordinary power of this pro- 
paganda was illustrated by the breakdown of the discipline 
amongst the French troops,, 70% of whom,, according to a state- 
ment of General d'Anselmes,, the commander of the French army 
of occupation in the Southern Ukraine and the Crimea,, have 
been affected by Bolshevik propaganda. Unfortunately Comrade 
jeanne LaBourbe and a dozen other comrades wexe shot as traitors 
for carrying on this propagamida n24 
At present it is impossible to assess the effect of Bolshevik propaganda 
in Britain at this time, since the Home Office files on so-called subver- 
sive activities are closed until the year 2020. But in an article pub- 
lished in October 1957 Harry Pollitt. revealed that 
"copies of the appeals of the Bolshevik leaders distributed 
to the British soldiers and sailors inside Soviet Russia 
became available in Britain. They were reprinted by the 
revolutionary workers and distributed in the factories, labour 
organisations,, streets, and inside and outside military 
depots. t#25 
24 
In a speech delivered to the First All-Russia Congress of Working 
Cossacks in March 1920 Lenin alluded to the propaganda warfare 
which had been part of the Intervention in the following words: 
"True we had only tiny sheets,, whereas in the British 
and French press propaganda was carried on by thousands 
of newspapers and every phrase was publicised in tens of 
thousands of columns. We issued only two or three quarto 
sheets a month; at best it worked out at only one copy for 
every ten thousand French soldiers. I Am not certain 
whether even that many reached their destination. Miy,, 
tlien,, did the French and British soldiers believe them? 
Because we told the truth, and when they came to Russia 
they saw that they had been deceived. They had been told 
that they were to defend their own country, but when they 
came to Russia they found that they were to defend the 
rule of the landowners and capitalistst that they were to 
curb the revolution. The reason we were able to win over 
these people in two years was that although they had for- 
gotten that they had once executed their own kingst the 
moment they stepped on to Russian soil, the Russian 
revolution and the victories of the Russian workers and 
peasants reminded the soldiers of France and Britain of 
their own revolutions, and thanks totheRvents in Russia, 
they recalled what had once happened in their own 
countries. " 
lenin,, Collected Works, English Translation, Vol-30 P-385. 
25 
Harry Pollitt 'The October Revolution and the British Labour Movement' 
Marxism Today, October 1957; reprinted from the Soviet journal 
Westions of the His of the Ccxnmxnist Party of the Soviet Uniont 
also October 1957. 
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Abroad 
Evidence of concern about the effects of Bolshevik propaganda on neutral 
countries is not quite so scarce. In a PID memorandum of 2 November 1918 
on I Switzerland as a Bolshevik Centre' 
26 it was noted that one of the 
"latest achievements" Of the Bolshevik publishing house, Promachus Verlag 
(see above, Chp. 10 p. 365) was the publication of The Truth About the 
Allied Intervention in Russia. On 9 November the British Ambassador in 
Berne forwarded to the Foreign Office a report by a former director of 
the Tsarist Press Bureau at Berne which described the various kinds of 
, B, nlshevik propaganda now being produced there and the ease with which 
it could be obtained in libraries and news-stands. 
27 
Price's pamphlet, 
subtitled (in this report) 'How the English Goverment is Strangling the 
Russian Revolution', was named as an example of the type of material in 
question. The earlier report had also warned, at some length, that it 4 -- 
would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of Switzerland as a 
source of Bolshevik "contagion". Austria-Hungary, North Italy and South 
Germany were al 1 at risk. Even the Entente countries, said the PID re- 
port,, could Supply nevidence as to the importance of Switzerland" as a 
source of supply for Bolshevik propaganda. 
In the same month Whitehall was receiving alarm signals from British 
diplomats in Scandinavia. On 30 November the British Minister at Stock- 
holm forwarded a report from the former Austrian Vice-Consul in Moscow 
which gave an account of the organisation of the Bolshevik propaganda 
machine in Moscow and named Price as the chief editor of the British 
edition of a propagandist organ designed to spread the idea of world 
26 
FO 371.4369. 
27 
28 
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revolution. 
28 A lot of the superficial detail of the account does not 
tally with what is now known, but in essence it was probably true enough. 
on the same date the British Minister at Christiana sent a secret memoran- 
dum of the discovery by the Norwegian Government of a large quantity of 
Bolshevik literature in the boxes of a Russian courier. 
29 The Norwegian 
Gc)vernment had not at that time recognised the Soviet Government,, but 
the boxes were addressed to the representative in Norway of the Soviet 
Government. The boxes were opened by the Norwegian police and found to 
con in 
"inflwmiatory literature in English,, French and German" and 
"specially written articles by such persons as Trotsky and 
Mr. Philips Price. " 
Attached to the British Minister's covering letter (in the Foreign office 
archives) is a report that "Norwegian Bolsheviks" had purchased the news- 
paper Social Demokrat ,. "formerly a fairly moderate and proAlly news- 
paper". While the term "Norwegian Bolsheviks" is probably hyperbole, the 
fact that this paper was soon to print an article by Price about the Red 
Terror (see above Chp. 10 p-372) tends to suggest that there was an element 
of truth behind the rumour. Indeed Price himself made no bones about what 
he was doing. In a letter to Charles Trevelyan written on 12 May 1919 
he said: 
"I am writing in the Dutchr Italian and Norwegian left Social- 
ist press and also... in Berlin, the Republikv, 
30 
28 Ibid. 
29 
Ibid. 
30 
Newastle University Library,, C. P. Trevelyan Papers,, CPT 100. 
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(iii) MAtehall and Westminster 
It is ironic that the best indicator of the ef fects - or feared ef f ects - 
of Price's propaganda work is the amount of agitation which it appeared 
to inspire in Whitehall. By the beginning of Septenter 1914, the mere 
fact that none of Price's messages had been passed by the Censor for the 
past f ive weeks suggests that some at least of the staff of the Foreign 
office were well aware of his record as a journalist; certainly Gaselee, 
their link man with the Bureau, was. The news of his transition to overt 
propaganda seems , however,, to have come as something of a surprise, 
despite the early warning given by the Times. The first account of his 
activities in this direction to reach Whitehall was written on 18 Sept- 
ember by W. J. Ouden4. jk,, the Netherlands Minister in Petrograd who was 
teuporarily in charge of British interests in Russia. In a letter to 
Balfour primarily about negotiations for the release of British subjects 
htc-,, ld prisoner in Russia since the breaking-of f of diplomatic relations, 
Oudeneyk went on to report that he thought it was his "duty" to bring 
to the notice of the British Government information given to him by Captain 
Hicks of the British Mission about the activities of two Englishmen who 
were 
"exerting a not inconsiderable influence on the situation in 
Russia by persuading the Bolsheviks that they may count on a 
large measure of support frcxn the working classes in England. 
Orle of these was Ransome, about whose movements Ouderhyk proceeded to 
giVe a remarkably inaccurate account. The other was Price, about whom 
he aPpears to have been better informed - 
"The case of Mr. Price is, if anything,, worse . for he is working 
at Moscow in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on pro- 
Bolshevik propaganda. Among other things he is preparing litera- 
ture for issue to the Allied troops in the North calculated 
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to spread sedition and has already sent off radio messages 
which suggest that the Allies have had a hand in the murder 
of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin. 1131 
oudentyk's account was taken word for word f rom a letter written to him 
by Hicks f rorn the American Consulate General in Moscow, which had been 
taken over by the Norwegians and where some of Lockhart's staff , including 
Hicks, had taken ref uge. A copy of Hicks' draf tr by means unknown,, came 
into Ransome's possession and his marginalia to the passages concerning 
himself include "rubbish" and "show this to Lockhart,, who knows that 
every word is untrue. , 
32 
ouden4yk's letter was received in London on 7 October. J. D. Gregory, 
the first to see it, conrented 
"With regard to Mr. Ransome and Mr. Price, we have long known 
about their activities. " 
The correspondence was then sent to the Director of Military Intelligence, 
whose comments do not survive,, and to Stephen Gaselee, who did not comment. 
kben it reached the office of the Parliamentary Under Secretary,, Cecil 
minuted: 
"Steps should be taken to consider whether any criminal charges 
3ý 
returned to England would lie against Ransorne or Price if týe 
and their employers should be informed. H3 
The next news of Price came from Clive, the British Minister in Stockholm. 
Sent on 27 September, his telegram arrived at the Foreign office on 
11 October, 34 
"I learn from a reliable source that Price. correspondent of 
the manchester Guardian in Russia, is actively associating 
31 
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Ransome papers,, Brotherton Collection. Brotherton Libraryr Leeds. 
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himself with anti-English propaganda in Petrograd and that 
he has written a violent pamphlet against Erxglish intervention 
at Murman. Previous information given to me bY recent English 
refugees stated Price was actuallY running Bolshevik propaganda 
department and had presided at an anti-English demonstration 
two days after the murder of Captain Crornie. v, 35 
This telegram arrived at the Foreign Off ice via the Director of Military 
Intelligence who enclosed a note to cecil suggesting that it might be 
possible 
"to induce the Manchester Guardian to withdraw Mr. Price, their 
correspondent in Russia, if the facts are as stated in the 
telegram. " 
Failing appropriate action by the proprietors of the Manchester Guardian 
the DMI proposed that Price's passport should be withdrawn " if it is 
possible to compunicate with him. " This led to a flurry of Minutes. 
36 
E. H. Carr thought the most satisfactory solution would be to "disown" 
him, since "we cannot anyhow comunicate with him. " Gaselee added "You 
will have to f ind somebody who has some inf luence with Mr. Scott" and 
Sir William Tyrell, Director of PID, helpfully offered to "mention" the 
matter to Scott "if it is thought desirable", since Scott already had 
an appointment to see him within the next few days. Sir George Clerk 
was more circumspect: 
35 
This may well have been a garbled reference to the fact reported 
in Izvestia, that Price had presided over the first meeting of 
the Anglo-French Group. See Chapter 10 p. 325. 
36 
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"Even if the 
' 
Manchester Guardian agree, which is not certain, 
I am not sure Mr. Price may not do more harm here or in a 
neutral country than in Russia. 
I think we should rather collect such evidence as we have or 
can get as to his pernicious activities and consult our legal 
authorities, as already suggested by Iord Robert cecil... and 
then, if we have a case, wait for him. " 
Clerk, writing on 23 October,. was clearly referring to Cecil Is suggestion 
after reading the letter from Oudendyk, and when Clerk's Minute accom- 
panying Clive's telegram reached Cecil he merely added 
"Please act on it. " 
By 30 October a copy of the Swiss edition of The Truth About the Allied 
Intervention in Russia had come into Gaselee's hands. He forwarded it 
to the Russia Department of PID with the coffnent 
"Its appearance in English is significant - it is doubtless 
meant for introduction into this country. "37 
Gaselee had obviously rr--ýalised that the Swiss edition was intended for 
a wider readership than the Allied troops in North Russia. He went on: 
"I do not know whether Mr. Philips Price is still writing for 
the Manchester Guardian (I have not seen anything of his there 
latýly); but if he is, I should have thought that this pamphlet 
was quite sufficient ground to ask Mr. Scott to sever his 
journal's connection with him. " 
The pamphlet was now sent to the Foreign Off ice legal department for an 
opinion as to whether there were any grounds for a prosecution under DORA. 
Mearrwhile on 8 Novemberr Lockhart hav_lng returned to Britain with a copy 
Of the Russian edition of the pamphlet and the f irst two copies of The 
Call in his luggage, he sent them direct to 13alfour with a covering letter. 
38 
37 
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of The Cal 1 he wrote: 
"This newspaper I know from the best possible source is edited 
and run by the Bolshevik Foreign Office. I have the very 
strongest reasons for believing that Mr. Price, is, if not 
the actual editor,, at least one of the leading contributors. 
I have known Mr. Price slightly for some years. He is a young 
man of about 32, undoubtedly clever and more sincere in 
his Bolshevik sympathies than a journalist like mr. Ransome. 
Mr Price is a first cousin of Mr. Charles Trevelyan, the 
pacifist. " 
By now Gaselee had received an opinion from the legal department, written 
m4 November by H. W. Malkin, as to whether either Price or Ransome were 
liable to prosecution under any law or Regulation then in force. The 
opinion given was that though both men had 
"no doubt done many things which if done in England would have 
exposed them to prosecution under the Defence of the Realm Act 
Regulations" 
the fact that they had done these deeds outside the country , and that 
neither the Act nor the Regulations had any extraterritorial application 
made it unlikely that an offence could be deemed to have been committed. 
Nor, in Malkin's opinion, was it likely that a prosecution 
"for high treason committed abroad could be alleged,, as I doubt 
whether the facts as disclosed in these papers could be held 
to amount to this. " 
Malkin concluded, however, that it might still be 
11well to obtain an opinion from those responsible for the conduct 
of criminal proceedings, and I think we should submit the case 
to the Home Office and suggest that they should take the opinion 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions. n39 
On 16 November 1918 another flurry of Minutes was sparked off by the inter- 
Oeption and circulation of Price's telegram of 31 October (see abOver 
39 FO 371.3342. 
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chp. 9 pp. 313-3b). This series began in the Dmils office,, which was quite 
clearly aware of the Malkin opinion, one of the staff (signature uniden- 
tifiable) having "suggested some alterations" to the letter which Malkin 
had written to the Home Off ice - The file found its way to Sir Robert 
Clerk. Since prosecution under the Defence of the Realm Act had been 
ruled out, at least for the time being,, Sir Robert resourcefully suggested 
that, rather than waste such a useful piece of evidence it should be sent 
to Sir W. Tyrell and PID,, "who are working up the case against Bolshev- 
ism ". 40 On the same day but in another place Balfour himself entered 
the lists, and sent a letter to the Under Secretary of State at the Home 
office enclosing both the copies of The Call sent to him by Iockhart and 
the Swiss edition of Price's pamphlet. The Malkin opinion was used to 
anticipate that the difficulties of bringing any kind of action would 
be pointed out by the Home Office, but 
"Mr. Balfour would be glad should the Secretary of State concur 
in the adoption of such a course, if the opinion of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions could be obtained as to the possibility 
of taking any steps against Price. 41 
A reply was received at the Foreign Office on 17 December, enclosing the 
opinions of both Basil Thomson and the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
42 
Thomson began by noting that Price was "believed" to be related to Trevel- 
.1 -- 
The Dipl vant was a member of the Council of the UDC and the author of 0- 
matic History of the War - 
"U" 
He went to Russia,, apparently about two years ago, and 
for 
some time since the Revolution Mr. Scott of the Manchester 
Guardian was in some anxiety about him believing him to be 
destitute. It now appears that he had taken very good care 
40 
Ibid. 41- 
42 Ibid 
Ibid: 
11 : 417 
of himself by openly joining the Bolsheviks, and he and an 
American43 are believed to be authors of some leaflets which 
were distributed among Allied sailors at Murmansk inciting them 
to mutiny. He was reported to be IntendIng to visit this country 
to do propaganda for the Russian Bolsheviks, but a later tele- 
gram suggests that he is trying to 90 to Berlin. His pamphlet 
The Truth about the Intervention of the Allies in Russia (sic) 
and his articles in the first and second issues of The Call, 
published in Moscow,, if published in this country vZu--1d have 
rendered him liable to prosecution. I had a talk with Mr. Scott 
about him and he described him as an enthusiast; an impulsive 
kind of person who would take up any new political movement 
with enthusiasm. " 
The opinion of the Director of Public Prosecutions was that there was 
nothing in any of the documents sent to him upon which a prosecution for 
high treason could be founded. 
"With regard to proceedings under the Defence of the Realm 
Regulations, if Mr. Price,, or any other person,, were to be found 
in this country with either of these publications in his possess- 
ion,. a prosecution could be instituted under the Defence of 
the Realm Regulations (Regulations 27(b),, 27(c),, and 42) and 
any person who was a party to the publication in this country, 
and any person in the United Kingdom who was a party to the 
publication there,, of the documents in question might be proceeded 
against under Regulation 48. As the matter stands, however, 
there is no evidence of the commission of any offence punish- 
able by the Courts of this country,, because within their juris- 
diction no offence has,, thus far been committed. The two sub- 
sections of the two Sections in the Defence of the Realm Acts 
of 1914 and 1915,, to which reference is made by Sir Louis 
Mallet, 44 only apply to the trial of offenders whose offences 
have been committed within the jurisdiction of our Courts. " 
The Foreign Office made the best of it. The first to coninlent On the 
accompanying minute sheet was Professor J. Y. Simpson of PID 
"Mr. Price is probably at present less harmf ul in Moscow or 
Berlin than he would be if in this country. " 
43 
It is difficult to know who Thomson had in mindt but Bob Minor seems 
a likely candidate. Price and Minor had alreadyt according to Paqueto, 
been associating since August; Minor continued to be a friend of 
Price's in Germany in 1919; and none of the other American journal- 
ists or returned emigrants working in Moscow at that time were ever 
referred to afterwards by Price. 
44 
Over the name Sir Isouis Mallet somebody at the Foreign Off ice had 
written in pencil "Mr. Malkin(l) of 4, 
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simpson then added a lengthy afterthought,, written in another hand 
(presumably dictated) but signed by him. 
"Philips Price has been considerably more than 'two years' in 
Russia. I saw him in Tiflis in October '16 and he had then 
been more than 6 rnonths; in the Caucasus alone. He told me that 
he was a first cousin of Charles Trevelyan and had had a Cani-- 
bridge (I think) career. His father was,, I believe,, an Indian 
Army officer who died when P. P. was a child. In October '16 
he professed strong socialist views. I happened to meet him 
again in Petrograd in May '17,, when it was quite evident where 
his sympathies were qarrying him. He is a sincere and convinced 
Bolshevik and Republican in which he seemed to me to differ 
from Ransome,, with whorn Bolshevism seemed to be a pose. " 
Gaselee added: 
"I have noticed one 
in the last month or 
indifferent subject; 
longer necessary, as 
English journalism. 
might reconsider his 
n V-+ 
ax ticle by him in 
so, but -only one, 
a protest to Mr. 
Mr. Price is far 
If be should reti 
position. " 
the Manchester Guardian 
and that on a comparatively 
Scott is probably no 
remote and cut off from 
urn to this country,, we 
Gaselee's comment was written on 27 December, and probably the articles 
he had seen were hardly about "indifferent" subjects,, being those which 
Price had written and which had been printed about the German revolution; 
but as already noted,, the Press Bureau seemed to find Price on the German 
revolution far less dangerous than Price on Russia. 
Another, doubless unintentional, tribute to Price's propaganda achieve- 
merits was contained in a lengthy report by a returned businessman of 
Russian origin, Alexander J. Halpern, circulated in the Foreign off ice 
in Decemk>eer 1918.45 Halpern left Petrograd on 30 Novenber and wrote his 
report on 16 December. It was predictably, indeed even understandably 
hostile to the Russian Government in the light of the experiences of the 
English community in Petrograd in the autumn of 1918. But hostility 
did 
45 
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not blind him to the achievements of the Bolsheviks in the production 
of propaganda. 
"The Bolsheviks are doing wonders in this line,, besides sending 
hundreds of millions of roubles (I know of 125,000,000 roubles 
sent to Sweden alone) to foreign countries. They have issued 
printed leaflets,, pamphlets and periodicals in French, English, 
Swedish and German,, being assisted therein by some Socialists 
frorn Englando, America and Germany whom they have in their pay. " 
Halpern then singled out Price, "whom the Bolsheviks have, as I under- 
stand, now sent to Berlin",, and added: 
"The news given out by Bolshevik employees like Price of the 
Manchester Guardian that the intellectual and bourgeois classes 
have allied themselves with the Bolsheviks is a deliberate 
falsehood. " 
Indeed the Manchester Guardian was in darxger of bE! glrmirxg to suffer from 
a mild form of guilt by association with Price,, and few opportunities 
were lost to draw attention to his connection with the paper, or vice- 
versa. In December 1918 the People Is Russian Information Bureau reprinted 
as a small parnphlet Scott's denunciatory leadirxg article of 6 December. 
Mien this reached the Foreign Office the only comment written on the 
Minute sheet came from Professor J. Y. Simpson of PID, who observed: 
"The Manchester Guardian, which has supplied the material for 
this parnphlet, employs Mr. Philips price. "46 
On 20 December Basil Thomson wrote to Scott informing him that he had 
received a copy of The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia and 
that Price had described himself as "Correspondent in Russia of the Manches- 
ter Guardian" on the cover - 
47 This was the first attempt on record by 
46 
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any official to implement Cecil's injunction in October to "act accor- 
dingly". on 13 January 1919 Thomson sent another letter to Scott: merely 
a covering letter enclosing some more pamphlets (unspecified) , but in 
it he referred to his former letter in a way which suggested that Scott 
had not yet replied to it. Scott appears, indeed, to have been reluctant 
at this time to disown Price, although he was to do so later. Even Thomson, 
though now alarmed and alarmist about Bolshevik propaganda coming into 
Britain, was for some reason less than paranoid about Price personally. 
In a confidential report on 'The Progress of Bolshevism' 
48 
written by 
him as late as 28 January 1919 he acknowledged that several well-known 
and well-educated men (he iinstanced. Gorki and Chaliapin) had thrown in 
their lot with the Bolsheviks, and that there were many "specious" aspects 
of Bolshevism 
"designed to capture persons of all shades of opinion. It is 
not usually with the principles of a system of government that 
fault can be found but in the application of the principles... 
The rose-coloured accounts of the Bolshevik regime which are 
appearing in the Manchester Guardian are written by persons 
who have only the principles to go by. " 
To some extent he may have been thuiklrxg of Scott hirnself,, but he must 
also have had Price in mind. 
Qnv- 
Serious pressure on Scott from Whitehall was in part unthinkable, in part 
Urmecessary; pressure on Price was just beginning. The DMI's suggestion 
that Price's passport should be withdrawn had not been forgotten and on 
20 January 1919 M17 (a), apparently still under the imPressiOn that Price 
was in Russia, wrote to the Press Bureau informing them that Price was 
"possibly contemplating a visit to a neutral country. If he 
should go to a neutral country H. M. Representative there would 
48 
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probably be instructed to withdraw his passport. Will you please 
keep a look out for his arrival in a neutral country. " 
Across the bottom of the letter were written the words "Cable Room 
informed" 9 
49 
The Foreign Office continued to pursue Price well into 1919. Since five 
vestions about him were asked in the House of Commons between October 
1918 and March 1919 they could hardly have done otherwise. On 24 April 
1919 a telegram was sent to Paris,, Brussels and Helsingfors informing 
the (presumably consular) officers there that Price,, who was alleged in 
the telegram to have gone to Berlin "with Radek" had recently been sighted 
in Weimar. 
"It is very undesirable that any kind of facilities should be 
granted to him. Please request Government to which you are 
accredited not to grant him any visas without previous reference 
to uso, 50 
The coiTuon denominator in al 1 the questions about Price which were asked 
in the House of Commons was the desire in some way to punish him, or at 
the very least to withdraw facilities from him. The f irst came from Sir 
William Bull,, MP for Hammersmith, who, on 17 October 1918 asked the Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs a number of questions about. The Truth 
About the Allied Intervention in Russia and went on to enquire 
"whether Mr. Price holds any documents authorising his work 
as war correspondent which are under the control of the British 
Government; and whether official facilities will be withdrawn 
from Mr. Price in respect of his journalistic work in Russia 
in view of the results likely to ensue from such criticism of 
British policy by British journalists in that country. 
"51 
Cecil,, ar'swering fOr BalfOurr rePlied that he had not yet seen 
the parnphlet 
(indeed no copy of it had yet arrived ln London) , that PriCe 
held no 
49 
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dc)cuments from His Majesty's government, and that it would in any case 
be impossible to comranicate with him at that time. Nothing more was 
said in Westminster, although as has been shown there was considerable 
activity in Whitehalli, until 20 Februaxy 1919, when conk-inder Carlyon 
Bellairs, Liberal MP for the Maidstone Division, asked the Secretary of 
state for Foreign Affairs if he knew that Price had been editing a news- 
paper called The Call 
"which is spread among British troops in the Murman territory; 
whether the newspaper has incited them to revolt; and whether 
full information has been collected in regard to this man with 
a view to his ultimate trial. " 
Biel lairs was answered by the new Under Secretary for Foreign Af fairs, 
Cecil Harmsworth, who replied in the affirmative to all three questions. 
52 
The possibility of punishing Price by preventing him from getting any 
money out of Britain was first raised by the Unionist MP Lt. Col. Walter 
Guiness on 27 February 1919.53 Harmsworth replied that the question was 
receiving "careful consideration", although the surviving evidence suggests 
that it was not until April that really serious efforts began to be made 
to f ind out whether this could be done. Another line of approach was 
tried by Commander Bellairs on both 4 and 6 March,, when he asked a whole 
series of questions based on the implication that Price had gone to Russia 
in 1914 to avoid military service and that as a man of property and a 
justice of the peace he ought to be deprived of any "honourable post" 
that he might still hold. Had steps been taken, he asked,, to ensure that 
Price had nno control over his property in this country", that none of 
it was transferred to him in Russia by indirect means, and that the 
52 
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l3olshev . government did not 
"reimburse him in Russia in ordergthat his property may be used for propaganda in this country. "" 
To this last ingenious proposal Harmsworth replied that he would take 
note of it - Whether he had taken any steps before, he certainly ncw pro- 
ceeded to find out what he could do to prevent Price from getting any 
rm)ney out of the country. On 23 April he wrote to the Ministry of 
Blockade asking whether an exception could be made of Price when the black 
(or exclusion) lists of people not allowed to receive money overseas 
during the war were withdrawn. 
55 The Ministry of Blockade consulted the 
War Of f ice,, the legal department of the Foreign Of f ice and Basil Thomson, 
but all of them apparently replied that Price could not be singled out 
in such a way, as this would be a case of lex ad hominem. Harmsworth 
noted on the Minutes accompanying this correspondence that he was not 
happy with this opinion, since Price had been 
"the subject of more than one question in the House of Commons 
and a very lively interest is taken in it. If there is an 
exclusion list I think he should be given a place on it. " 
The officials continued obdurate, and on 26 May Harmsworth accepted that 
since there were no longer any exclusion lists it was obviously inpossible 
to put Price's name on one, but he added: 
"We should however ascertain whether there exist other powers 
by which this 'very wealthy man' can be prevented spending his 
money in pernicious propaganda work abroad. " 
On 30 May the Ministry of Blockade advised him that when the peace had 
54 
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been signed there was 
"no power whatever under any statute or under provision of 
the common law to prevent Mr. Price operating on his account in any method whatever. " 
Harmsworth accepted this verdict with what looks like an ill grace. 
His final note on the Minute was "All right. C. H. 5 June 1919.,, 56 
It was perhaps no coincidence that less than a month later Price was 
arrested in Berlin. He was seized without a warrant during the night 
of 30 June/1 July and taken to the Moabit prison. His British journa- 
list colleagues made "inviediate and repeated protests" but it was not 
until 36 hours later that the German Minister of Defence, Noske, made 
a statement to the Press. He told them that Price had been arrested 
because of his political activities in Germany; that the German Government 
56 The truth was that Price was trying to get hold of a large sum of 
money - E181000 - but it was not with the intention of getting it 
out of the country,. for himself or any other purpose. He wanted it 
paid to Tansbury, presumably to help with the cost of starting up 
the Herald as a daily paper again. From the letters which passed 
between Robin Price and Charles Trevelyan at this time it is clear 
that Price was both getting and receiving letters in Berlin, either 
via the Foreign Editor of the Daily Herald or via various addresses 
in Holland. The likelihood is that these letters were, however, read 
somewhere along the line and formed the basis of rumours that it was 
designated for "pernicious propaganda work abroad". As late 
as 7 July Robin Price was still under the erroneous impression that 
the Minister of Blockade was in a position to control payments out 
of Trustee accounts in Gloucester (which is where all Price's accumu- 
lated dividends for four years were being held), that he "allows no 
large sum to be paid of that account without permission, and he's 
never going to let it go to Lansbury. Possibly this order may be 
cancelled soon, but I doubt it. " (Newcastle University Library,, 
Trevelyan papers, CPT EX. 81). No mention is made in any account of 
the Daily Herald at this time of any such sum having been paid over 
by Price, but Price's wife said, many years later, that it had been 
paid. Price himself never mentioned it. 
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itself had no particular interest in him,, but that 
"the British Government has the right to demand that price be handed over to it. v157 
After his release five days later Price sent a note to the German Foreign 
off ice in which he declared that 
"the onlY thing alleged against him in cross-examination was that of Propaganda among Entente troops in the occupied dis- tricts of Russia" 
In his letter to Charles Trevelyan of 7 July (see F/N 56) Robin Price 
had referred obliquely to his brother's arrest: 
"I suppose the German Government have either become frightened 
of Phil or have received orders from England to expel him. " 
On 18 July he wrote to Trevelyan again: 
"I have a letter from Phil received yesterday. He says his 
arrest was engineered by 'khaki' 'west' of Berlin [sic] and 
that it was 'too near a thing to be exactly healthy' and that 
if they come for him again he will be 'well prepared, That 
means he'll blow his brains out... He goes on to say he thinks 
the worst is over for him now and that he must return to England 
some day,, where his real work is., 158 
The more improbable of these two forecasts was never put to the test and 
Price did not return to England to live for another four years,, having 
been warned by a well-placed friend of Trevelyan's in the Civil Service - 
57 
2ýýHýeraL ýld 7 July 1919. The account of Price's arrest is taken 
entirely from the Daily Herald which,, since Price was its correspon- 
dent in Berlin, may be assumed to have printed the most authentic 
version available. In the same account, it was noted that the Amer- 
ican journalist Robert Minor, who had recently written some articles 
for the paper,, was shortly afterwards arrested in Paris, allegedly 
at the request of the British authorities, and handed over to the 
American authorities at Coblenz. Jean Longuet, presumably on his way 
into Britain,, had also recently been arrested at Folkstone and deported. 
"Our new secret police, the article concluded,. "like the Tsarist model 
which they emulate are casting their nets wide and they are finding 
58 
strange accomplices in their work. " 
Newcastle University Libraryt C. P. Trevelyan papers,, CPT Ex. 81. 
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Gec)rge Young 
59 
- that it would be better for him if he kept away for a 
while. Whether his "real work" was in England or whether he had already 
done it is another question. 
iv) The Union of Democratic Control. 
In atteffpting to assess the extent to which Price succeeded in reporting 
the Russian Revolution in the years 1917 and 1918, mention must be made 
of his relationship with the Union of Democratic Control,, of which he 
was, as has been noted,, a founder member (see above, Chapter 1 pp. 28-29). 
By the year of the revolutions the UDC had a membership of 10,000, organ- 
ised in four regional federations and fifty more branches unattached to 
federations. It was producing a monthly journal,, U. D. C., and had published 
-. - 
24 parrphlets, 14 books and over 40 leaf lets. 
60 It was not uncomon for 
59 GEORGE YOUNG (1872-1952). Fourth Baronet. Educated at Eton and at 
universities in France, Germany and Russia, George Young entered the 
diplomatic service in 1896 and served in an unusually varied series of 
Postings both overseas and at home until 1915, when he was First 
Secretary at Lisbon. When war broke out he asked to retire but was 
ordered to remain at his post until 1915, when he was told his services 
were no longer required. From 1915 to 1918 he served in an Admiralty 
Intelligence section and in 1918 he enl1sted in the Honourable 
Artillery Company. From January to July 1991 he acted as Daily News 
correspondent in Berlin, when Price described him as his "fairy 
godmother" 
. In 1923 and 1924 he stood for Parliament as a 
Labour 
I candidate, and was appointed one of the expert advisers to the Labour Party (1920) and the Trade Union Congress (1924) delegations to Russia. His main occupations af ter the end of the war were, however, academic 
and literary. He was Professor of Portuguese and Examiner 
in Ottoman 
Law at London University from 1919 to 1922. His many publications 
reflect his Postings and his travels and include a treatise on 
Ottoman 
Law (1904) and books on Nationalism and War in the Balkans 
(1914), 
Portu al (1917) and New Germany (1920). He succeeded to the title 
in 
1930. 
harvin Swartz. Union of Democratic Control p. 48 
fn. 7, and Appendices B 
and E. 
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a printing Of 10,, 000 copies of a pamphlet to be sold out within days and 
for several more editions to be necessary. 
61 
This in itself suggests 
that even the considerable size of its meA)ership is not a suf f icient 
yardstick with which to measure the irlf luence of the UDC and the interest 
it generated among a wider public- As has also been noted (see above, 
chapter 2 p. 62) , Price frequently referred to the UDC in his letters 
home as the only sign of political hope - as he saw it - in Britain. 
He was a regular and generous subscriber to its funds. In added justi- 
fication of his decision to resign the Liberal candidature for Gloucester 
lie told Trevelyan that the UDC could have all the money he had hitherto 
been obliged spend in nursing his constituency. 
62 "He is a brick and 
m mistake" wrote Morel to Trevelyan, after an unexpected windfall from 
Price in 1916.63 
In a letter to Trevelyan from Tiflis,, written on 27 September 1916,, Price 
said: 
"I want to say how much I appreciate your letters both about 
me personally and also about the situation in England. I shall 
be most enormously delighted to receive such letters as often 
as you can spare time to send them and I in return will send 
you regular accounts of all that is going on in Russia. I hope 
that in this way I shall be of some use to the group around 
the Union of Democratic Control. n64 
By this time Price had already written ten of the thirteen letters or 
memoranda which were clearly directed to Trevelyan and of which there 
61 
For example, the f irst edition - 10,, 000 copies - of Morel's pamphlet 
'Tsardom's Part in the War',, which came out in August 1917, sold out 
in 5 days and two further editions each of 10,000 copies had to be 
printed. 
62 
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are copies in the Price papers. Several of these refer to others of which 
no trace has yet been found. In both the Price and the Trevelyan papers 
there is evidence that many letters or parts of letters from price to 
Trevelyan and to their aunt, Ama Philips, were copied and circulated. 
There is also evidence that at least some of those on Trevelyan's presumed 
circulation list were members of the UDC,, and that he had been circulating 
copies of letters even before Price offered to write for "the group around 
the Union of Democratic Control". A copy of a long letter to Trevelyan, 
also written from Tiflis, on 30 March 1916, was found in the Ponsonby 
papers at the Bodleian Library. Another copy of the same letter was found 
in the Trevelyan papers in an unstamped envelope addressed to him at the 
House of Comwns; , clearly having been sent by hand. 
65 A number of the 
copied extracts from other letters from Price in both the Price and the 
Trevelyan papers have the words "Please return to 14 Great College Street, 
C. P. T. " written across the top in Trevelyan's handwriting. Considering 
the fragility of carbon copies and the limited number which could be made 
at any one time, it is remarkable that even this much evidence has sur- 
vived. Another link between Price and the UDC was the fact that both 
the editors for whom he - officially or unofficially - worked: Scott and 
Hirst,, were if not members certainly syn-pathisers with the Union. For 
exanple, on 25 November 1915 Hirst wrote to Trevelyan asking him to "do 
somethirxg" about the new consolidated version of the Defence of the Realm 
Act in the House of Commons before it got to the IA)rds,. 
" otherwise we may have a reign of terror between now and the 
reopening of Parliament... of course the whole thing has a 
close bearing on the Press Censorship and I gather from the 
Press Censor that he holds that it is his duty to censor foreign 
policy. "66 
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Most of the letters which Hirst later reprinted in. Coamn Sense appear 
to have been addressed in the first instance to Anna Philips, but she, 
too, exchanged letters from Price With Trevelyan, and he made use of them 
in his way also. Clearly there were well-established links, through 
family and friends,. between Price, the. Manchester Guardian, the Economist, 
Common Sense and the UDC. It is unfortunate that the Economist's archives 
were destroyed in the Second World War, since among them there might have 
been further documentation. 
one of the surprising things about Price's letters to his cousin and to 
his aunt is that they arrived at all . Only one typed copy,. of a memo- 
randLun written in August 1917 (see below p. 431) has a gap in it, filled 
by the words "CUT BY THE RUSSIAN CENSOR ". 
67 
From its context, the missing 
sentence or sentences would appear to have been about the Komilov re- 
kl-A---Ilion. But as the war went on,, and even more after the revolution 
began,, Price referred more and more often to letters which he had sent 
and which had not, apparently been received, and this is more likely to 
have been due to British than to Russian censorship. The postal censor- 
ship in Britain was done in Liverpool not in London, where cables and 
intercepted wirless messages came more immediately under the eye of the 
Official Press Bureau and the Foreign Office. But some of Price's inter- 
Cepted letters in 1918 came to light in PID sumaries (see above, ppJ97 
-400). Most simply disappeared, whether as the result of censorship in 
Russia, censorship in Britain, or submarine warfare. Thus those of his 
letters and memoranda to Trevelyan and Ama PhiliPs which survIve have 
a scarcity value which makes them more than usually interesting. 
67 
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For example, in a letter frorn Petrograd written on 6 June 1915, a large 
section of which was typed for circulation,, Price noted how the perse- 
cution of the Jews in Poland had helped further to disrupt the Russian 
economy. He also described in some detail, as being the only military 
initiative against any of the Central Powers which might have stood a 
chance of success, a Russian plan to capture Constantinople from the sea. 
But Russian defeats in Galicia, he said, had compelled the High Command 
to divert the troops assembled at Odessa for the purpose,, to the Northern 
front. 68 In the letter f ran Tiflis of 30 March already referred to,, he 
also wrote at length about the state of the Russian economy and the demoral- 
isation of the soldiers with whom he had been talking - and these con- 
versations, must have been on the Caucasus front,, where the war had been 
going relatively well for Russia. He reported that there had been food 
riots in Tiflis, Baku and Moscow, and that the Progressive Bloc were 
utilising public discontent not to agitate for peace but for merely fiscal 
reforms. "The days of the old regime are numbered" Price wrote,, but "the 
autocracy and privileged classes will not yield up their position. " 
An account by Price entitled 'The Background of the Revolution', written 
on 11 April 1917,, appeared as the main article of the July 1917 edition 
of U. D. C. This was probably constructed from one or more of his letterst 
the originals of which have disappeared. It was supposed "to be continued" 
but the sequel appears not to have arrived. It is unlikely that if it 
had done so,, it would not have been used. The only other article by Price 
actually to be printed in U. D. C. did not appear until December 1918 (see above 
Chp. 6 p. 186 FIN 39). but there were editorial references to his articles 
for the Manchester Guardian in the December 1917 edition,, and at their 
Meeting in February 1918 the General Council of the UDC resolved to convey 
68 
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both to Price and to Scott their appreciation . of the "admirable services" 
they had rendered to the work of the UDC by the publication of the secret 
treaties. 
69 
Probably the most interesting of all the pages that he addressed to Trev- 
elyan were three long memoranda which Price wrote in Petrograd on 17 and 
18 August 1917 (see above , Chp. 3pp. 99-100). It should be remembered that 
at this time it had been agreed between Price and Soskice that the latter 
should write all the despatches on Russian goverment policy for the 
Manchester Guardian, and indeed Price wrote very little for publication 
during that month. These memoranda never appeared in print anywhere, but 
were certainly typed or retyped for circulation. In them Price described 
and explained many of the developments of recent monthsr but he also 
anticipated trouble to come. "Mediaeval serfdom" he feared "had given 
way so suddenly to international class consciousness" that as yet no 
"durable political structure" had been found for the expansion of ideas. 
Hence the recent stages of the revolution have been marked by 
indecision and a certain lack of capacity to create in fact 
what is felt in the heart.,, 70 
In a letter to Trevelyan from Samara written on 22 September Price des- 
cribed the further disintegration of the Provisional Government and the 
increasing strength and "Maximalism" of the Soviets around the country. 
"The masses in the country won't endure a coalition government 
which betrays the revolution behind their backs. "71 
The lengthiest of all the memoranda which Price wrote in 1917: 'The State 
Of Russia between August and Novenber 1917' was dated 2 Novemberr three 
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davs before the Bolshevik Revolution (see above Chp. 4 PP-114-116). There 
is a copy in the Price papers, but it was not typed on the typewriter 
that he had in Russia. There is no evidence that Scott ever sent copies 
to Trevelyan of what he himself was getting from Price and it therefore 
seems reasonable to assume that at the very least Price sent copies to 
both Scott and Trevelyan and that Trevelyan had his copy retyped. In 
addition to an extended account of what he had seen on his travels, the 
memorandum described the way in which "industrialists and bankers... with 
foreign assistance" had rendered the Democratic Conference in late Septem- 
ber useless. It described the strength of support for the Bolsheviks 
amc)ng workers and soldiers in Petrograd but also noted the antagonism 
existing between peasants and the urban proletariat, which increased the 
likelihood of famine. Moreover the same combination of forces which had 
ml tated against any chance of success at the Democratic Conference were 
also hoping for the prolongation of the warr in the expectation that this 
would bring the revolution down. This explained the tremendous emphasis 
which "revolutionary leaders" were placing upon their campaign for a gen- 
eral peace. 
72 
Although this memorandum cannot have reached Trevelyan until some time 
after the f irst. news of the Bolshevik Revolution appeared in the British 
press, there was, it will be recalled, an interval Of just Over twO weeks 
before the Manchester Guardian secured any reliable information from its 
own correspondent,, and there was little hard news of any sort in any of 
the newspapers for several more weeks. Anybody able to read this last 
memorandum from Price would have been better briefed about the November 
Revolution than most, no matter when it reached Britain. of course the 
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extent to which Trevelyan made use of the material which Price sent to 
him is not something which can be quantified. What is certain is that 
he sent it to at least some of his colleagues in the UDC. But it is not, 
perhaps,, stretching the point too far to Suggest that the extraordinarily 
well-informed concern about British policy in Russia which was expressed 
in the House of Commons, primarily by MPs who were also members of the 
uDC, owed something to these private briefings. 
Only two of the original signatories of the UDC manifesto were Members 
of Parliament: Trevelyan and Ramsay MacDonald. But within six months 
seventeen and by the end of the war twenty two MPs were also members of 
the UDC. 73 All but five were Liberals. For the first nine months of 
the war,, as Ponsonby put it in a letter to Trevelyan,. 
"it was not the conduct of the war but the origins and the 
settlement about which T would wish to express ourselves" 
(Ponsorby's emphasis) . 
The question of co-ordinating action across party lines did not then 
appear to arise. But by May 1915 Ponsonby was wondering whether the UDC 
should not now be expressing itself on subjects such as conscription,, 
casualties and war aims. 
"If we speak should not we decide on concerted action? Macdonald 
was rather in favour of our getting together our band and his 7 C, 
collecting his Labour band and joining forces. ""-ý 
-13 
At the second meeting of the General Council of the UDC,, on 9 February 
1915, the following MPs were present: C. P. Trevelyan,, Ramsay MacDonaldr 
Arthur Ponsonby, H. D. Denman, F. W. Jowett,, W. H. Dickinson,, W. Field,, 
E. T. John,, Sir Wilfred Lawson,, Aneurin Williams,, J. C. Williams,, 
Sir John Barlow, Philip Snowden,, Francis Neilson, H. G. Chancellorr 
D. M. Mason. Joseph King joined in October 1914 but was not present 
at that meeting. At the 4th Annual and 13th General Council Meeting 
on 31 October 1918 the following MPs were added: W. C. Anderson, 
R. C. Lambert,, R. L. Outhwaite,, Tom Richardson and J. H. Witehouse. 
Hull University Libraryo, U. D. C. Archives. Minute Book. DDC 1/1. 
74 
Newastle University Library. C. P. Trevelyan papers, CPT 74. Ijetter 
from Ponsonby to Trevelyan,, 22 May 1915. 
75 
Ibid. 
11 : 434 
By February 1916 this kind of collaboration was an established fact. 
on 3 February Trevelyan wrote to Ponsorby discussing who should propose 
and who second an Amendment to the Address on 15 February, Srxxjden being 
76 
willing to do it "even if Ramsay still fights shy" . In the event Snowden 
led and Trevelyan followed up, not with an Amendment (as it had been put 
to them that this would imply a hostile motion) but with the first speeches 
in the debate of 23 February 1916 On the Consolidated Fund,, in which they 
asked the Government for a statement of the terms on which it would be 
prepared to negotiate peace. Ponsonby and Outhwaite followed later in 
the debate. These four men became the nucleus around which formed a group 
which, for the next two and a half years maintained first a steady and 
later a relentless pressure on the government, particularly on three 
subjects: the desirability of a negotiated peace; the undesirability of 
censorship; and Russia. The most active were, as has been noted, Ponsonby, 
Trevelyan and Snowden, but they were closely followed by Outhwaite and 
eventually overtaken (if only in volune and sheer persistence) by King. 
Several MPs who were not members of the UDC,, notably the Irish MPs Dillon 
and Lynch, and two particularly sympathetic - if not in all things - 
Liberal MPs, Pringle and Wedgwood,, often joined with the other UDC MPs 
in backing up the main spokesmen - 
In jetween them this group for the f irst time in the war divided the House 
on a Vote of Credit on 16 May 1917, when Snowden introduced and Lees Smith 
seconded an amendment calling on the British Government to issue a dec- 
laration of peace aims on the same lines as those recently endorsed by 
t1le Provisional Government of Russia. On 16 August 1917 MacDonald agaln 
divided the House on a Motion to curtail the forthcoming Parliamentary 
Recess, and in the ensuing debate Outhwaite, Snowden, Philip Morrell and 
76 Bodleian Library. POnsonby papers C 664. 
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King all managed to ventilate the subject of the Stockholm Conference. 
Ipm , -tween August 
1917 and Novenber 1918 the saffe group acted together in 
thirteen debatesr nearly all of which had to do with British policy in 
Rassia. On 16 May Ponsoriby described, in a letter tO Trevelyan, how he 
had co-ordinated tactics with Outhwaite and another menber of the UDC 
in such a way as to coq: )el Balfour to answer "specific points" in a debate 
on relations with Russia. "The only person who was enraged by our tactics 
was the Speaker. He actually gave orders... that none of us were to be 
called. " 
77 
But as Ponsonby himself had said earlier in the year, when 
on 19 March he had seconded an Amendment proposed by Trevelyan calling 
for the appointment of a Standing Committee on Foreign Af f airs: 
"What are the opportunities for discussing foreign af fairs in 
this House? The Foreign Office Vote,. the Consolidated Fund 
Bill and the Motion for the Adjournment, and in addition ques- 
tions. We can put aside the Consolidated Fund Bill and the 
Motions for Adjournment because everybody knows that questions 
can only be raised on these occasions in a very unsatisfactory 
way. The Foreign Office Vote is not always put down... It 
must be admitted,, therefore,, that the opportunities for dis- 
cussing foreign policy in this House have,, in recent years,, 
been reduced to a minimum - they have arisen once or twice or 
three times perhaps in a Session. n78 
The value of the Parliamentary Question was quickly realised by members 
of 'the UDC, and by none more than Joseph King. In 1918 he asked 26 ques- 
tions on Russia alone. As noted above (Chp. 7 p-225) , the Press Bureau 
could not prevent the reporting of speeches or of Parliamentary Questions 
although it could - and did - try to do so. With paper limitedr news- 
paper reports of Parliamentary debates were not often very full except 
on great occasions, and even then the popular press did not devote much 
Space to them. But most of the Loef t press had some kind of lobby 
77 
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correspondent (Ramsay MacDonald wrote regularly about Parliament in 
Forward, for instance) , and the mere fact that the Government's policies 
on both Russia and censorship were endlessly and publicly questioned must 
have acted as some kind of restraint on the Government ando, if only to 
a limited extent,? promoted the circulation of views opposed to its 
policies. There can be no doubt not only that King made himself deeply 
unpopular through his endless questions about Russia, but also that every- 
thing possible was done to prevent them from being either asked,, answered 
or reported. For example,, on 27 February 1918, King having pre-arranged 
with the Foreign Office that he would be asking questions about the 
Russian Revolution and the Pope's peace initiative, Cecil pointedly lef t 
the House just before King could put the question. 
79 
Wben on 18 July 
1918 he was told by Cecil that his question entailed military consider- 
ations King asked "Are there no political considerations? " The Speaker 
intervened, saying "The Hon. Member has had his answer. "80 In the debate 
which followed the Prime Minister's Review of the War,, the last before 
the House rose for the sumrier, on 7 August 1918,, not only was Murmansk 
not touched on in the Review,, but not one of the UDC critics was called 
by the Speaker. It is inconceivable that none of them tried to catch 
his eye. 
King appears to have had better - and certainly more compromising - 
information upon which to base his cniestions than sometimes the Foreign 
Office had with which to answer him. Until Tchicherin left Britain in 
Jarluary 1918 he would obviously have been a source, as indeed may have 
been any of his contacts through his work for the Russian Political 
79 
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prisoners and Exiles Relief Committee. Though there is no evidence, it 
is unimaginable that Kirxg did not have equally easy access to Litvinov. 
He was certainly not unaware of what Price was sending to the Manchester 
. 
Guardian as well as to Trevelyan. In the debate on Supply on 27 February 
1918, he made a speech in which he contested the notion that the Bolshevik 
Government was not able to keep order in Russia and could not therefore 
be recognised. He pointed out that returning members of the U. S- Embassy 
staff at Petrograd had attested that the goverruTent was perfectly well 
in control,, and added: 
"the same judgement has been given by all the most experienced 
correspondents of the papers - the correspondents of the Man- 
chester Guardian and the Daily News - about the only two daily 
papers which gave us warnings of the coming revolution and gave 
us the truth of the revolution when it did come. "81 
But it is difficult to believe that he was not being, even if unconscious- 
ly, influenced not so much by what had appeared in those two papers as 
by what Trevelyan had surely sent him privately. It is true that between 
November 1917 and February 1918 Price was sending, and able to get printed, 
a good deal of "the truth of the revolution", but his earlier warnings 
were almost entirely expressed in his memoranda to Trevelyan, at a time 
when he was writing relatively little for the Manchester Guardian except 
his accounts from the Russian Provinces, which did not in any case appear 
until af ter the November Revolution. That King was indebted - via 
Trevelyan - to Price for at least some of his information cannot be Proved 
but does appear likely. One thing is certain, arxi that is that he con- 
tinued to take an interest in Price after the end of the war and after 
he had lost his seat in the House. In a P. S. to a letter to Trevelyan 
81 
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on 1 January 1919 he wrote: 
"I have a correspondence with Lord Beauchaj 
1.1 8T 
about Philips 
price about which I want to speak to you. m8 
And in 1920 he asked Trevelyan for Price's address in Berlin. 
83 
The success of the UDC in the years 1914-1918 was in its way proportion- 
ate to the sucoass of British censorship. The extent to which Price 
succeeded as a reporter in Russia and the extent to which he failed was, 
it could be argued, almost as much due to the extent to which uDC members 
of Parliament found their various ways round the restrictions, as it was 
to Scott's way of disregarding them. Asked to give his views on both 
the UDC and the Manchester Guardian in May 1985,, Lord Fenner Brockway 
admitted that he and his friends had regarded the Manchester Guardian 
as a bourgeois newspaper but one which they would have read in any case, 
82 The connection between Lord Beauchamp and Price is interesting. 
William Lygon, 7th Earl Beauchamp (1872-1938) was a convert to Liberal- 
ism. Made Privy Councillor in 1906, he was appointed IýOrd President 
in 1910 and again in 1914-1915, in the place of Morley who had resigned 
because of his opposition to the war. Beauchamp was also Lord Lieut- 
enant of Gloucestershire from 1911-1931. There are five letters from 
him in the Price papers. In the first,, written in 1912,, he complimen- 
ted Price on the way he had set about his Liberal candidature. In 
January 1914 he encouraged Price in his opposition to armaments: "Do 
put plenty of pressure upon us. It will all help and the influence 
of armament firm,, direct and indirect,, is very strong. " In Noveirber 
1914 Price sent him a copy of his Diplomatic History, which Beauchamp 
obviously read with great care and wrote three letters, on 10,, 13 and 
14 November, in which he politely but insistently contended that Price 
had distorted,, in paraphrasing,, part of a letter from Grey to Cambon. 
Unfortunately the page reference he gave is incorrect. But in Beau- 
champ's view Price had missed out a vital phrase which had provided 
for consultation between the French and British Governments so that 
"no amount of colloguing between the Staffs" could "in any way commit 
us without free opportunity to discuss each case on its merits. With- 
out those words or something like them, several of us would have re- 
signed then. " Beauchamp supported the war but remained Personally 
on good terms with Price. It would not be surprising if he had been 
asked, as a Privy Councillor, to put in a good word for Price When 
he was under fire in both Whitehall and Westminster. 
83 Newcastle 
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and that ey i so the more readily because of Price's articles in it. 
nut it had been a matter of surprise on the 1. ýieft,, he said , that it was 
4-V%A: l 
.,, Manchester Guardian which printed such articles. Asked to account 
for the apparent lack of impact made by Price on the lp-f t press, which 
ho agreed was overwhelmingly dependent on other papers for its news f rom 
overseas, he replied that those who worked for the Lef t press regarded 
themselves as "a pretty exclusive bunch" and that it would not have sur- 
prised him if they had, at first, looked upon Price with some suspicion. 
Asked about the standing of the UDC on the IRf t, Lord Fenner Brockway 
said that it was very high, and that its menbers , and even those anti- 
war Liberals who were not members, carried more weight where opinion on 
Russia was concerned than did most members of the Labour Party. Thus, 
nearly 70 years after the Russian Revolution, an admittedly interested 
observer distributed the honours fairly evenly between the Manchester 
Guardian and the U. D. C. 
Philips Price. 
v) The Labour movement - 
The denominator coffmn to both was,, of course,, 
It could be argued that the best thing that Price ever did for the Labour 
movernent in Britain was sirnply to come back in 1922, despite having been 
warned to stay away,, and fight three elections in two years as Labour 
candidate for Gloucester,, the first of which he lost by only 51 votes 
c This in itself is some indication of 
the response -Ifter three recounts. 
Of the British IP-ft to the stand which he had taken in - and on - Russia. 
It can also be argued that his influence began to be politically useful 
even earlier, with the formation of the "Hands off Russia" movement 
in 
11 : 440 
january 1919. This movement contained,, of course I many Labour supporters 
but it also included Liberals and pacifists: exactly the same mix of 
people who had made up the constituency of the Lm. Mien the second 
meeting of that campaign was addressed by Tan; bury in February 1919, 
Lansbury must already have been beginning to consider appointing Price 
as the Daily Herald's special correspondent in Berlin. Indeed it has 
been said that at this time Lansbury was making the af fairs of Russia 
one of his principal concerns. "The Daily Herald never failed to con- 
tradict the more obvious falsehoods about Russia contained in other 
journals. , 84 A connection with Price is surely inescapable. The need 
for the "Hands Of f Russia" campaign appeared to have come to an end when 
in August 1919 the British Government decided to pul 1 its troops out of 
northern Russia,. but was revived a year later when it connected with the 
national Councils of Action campaign which played a considerable part 
in preventing the extension of assistance to Poland in her war with Russia. 
Again there is at least one indication that Price played some role by 
providing information which helped to support "Iabour's unanticipated 
response": a phrase which Price heavily underlined in his review copy 
of the book in which it later appeared. 
85 For at a public meeting in 
Gloucester on 14 December 1919 the follawing resolution was "carried with 
acclamation and unanimity": 
That this meeting of over 500 citizens of Gloucester records 
its confidence in Mr. M. Philips Price, thanks him for the 
reliable information he has supplied, through the medium of 
his books,, pamphlets,, and the columns of the Daily Herald on 
the internal conditions of Russia and Central Europe,, of the 
84 
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way in which he has so nobly and generously fought for the 
welfare of the toiling masses in all countries. " 
In reply Price sent an 22ý, n lietter to the Workers of Gloucester which 
was read at a public meeting on 11 january 1920. In it he set out the 
reasons why and how his beliefs had changed since he resigned the Liberal 
candidaturer and accounted in detail his reactions to and actions since 
the Russian Revolution. One section of the letter is particularly 
relevant: 
001 can assure you that I am not wasting my time. I believe 
can do more good in informing Labour in England about the 
Labour and Socialist movements on the continent than in returning 
to England. For the problem, as I conceive it, of the immediate 
future is to establish a sound, efficient Labour International, 
freed from all social-patriots, pseudo-socialists and weak- 
kneed compromisers. In doing my little bit to help in forming 
this,, I believe I am serving your interests. " 
In a letter to Trevelyan. on 22 January, W. C. Edwards, the leading Labour 
activist in Gloucester,, later to become Price's Agent,, neighbour and 
friend,, related that the meeting had been very full and the press were 
present. "As you will suppose [it has] created a sensation here and in 
the countxy.,. 
86 Edwards went on to say that at a special meeting of the 
Gloucester ILP it had been decided to issue the Open Letter nationally, 
as a pamphlet, and that 10,000 copies had been ordered for sale at cost 
(twopence) . 
87 
When Price returned to Britain in 1922 and lost his first electoral contest 
standing as an ILP and Labour candidate, he made no secret of his 
COmmist sympathies. Just after the election he joined a London branch 
86 
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Of the CPGB butr On Page AMOVS advice,, did not take his card back to 
Germany with him. 
88 
He left the party in 1924. By then he had been 
defeated twice more each time as Labour candidate for Gloucester,. each 
time by a larger margin. In the late autumn of 1923 he brought his family 
back to England and lived on a farm in Gloucestershire for the rest of 
his life. His best-known book, his Reminiscences, had been published 
V%r% in J,., th English and German in 1920 and continued to exercise a powerful 
inf luence on the Lef t throughout the 1920s and on historians subsequently, 
as one of the few serious contemporary personal accounts of the Bolshevik 
revolution in existence. Price continued to write in the IP-ft press and 
to play an active part in the Labour Colleges movement throughout the 
1920s and early 1930s. He was elected Labour mp for the witehaven 
Division of Cumberland (1929-31), when Trevelyan made him his Parliamen- 
tary Private Secretary,, and for the Forest of Dean (subsequently rexkYred ., E 
West Gloucestershire) from 1935-1959. Although his own political ideas 
moved steadily to the Right of the Labour movement he never lost his deep 
interest in Russian affairs or his love and hope for Russia. During the 
Second World War he was much in demand as a lecturer on Russian af fairs 
and afterwards as a reviewer of books on Russia. He retired from Parliament 
in 1959 and died in 1973. Shortly before his death he was very pleased 
to be asked to write a short introduction for the proposed Russian trans- 
lation of his Reminiscences, which has, sadly, not yet materialised. 
At the age of 88 his draft included the words: 
"Naturally I see things more in perspective today. " But he 
went on to say: "I do not in the least belittle what I saw and 
wrote then. I still regard the Russian Revolution as the most 
important thing that had happened at that period of tme. n89 
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APPENDIX I 
THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS 
Stevens, the British Consul at Tiflis, reported to the Foreign Office that 
price had come to see him directly af ter his interview with the Grand 
Duke and repeated what he had been told. In his despatch (which was 
addressed to Balfour personally) Stevens used almost exactly the same 
words as Price later used in his memorandum to Trevelyan: "The new Govern- 
ment of the Empire exists and must be recognised. He will allow no re- 
action of any kind f or the new State of Russia must be founded upon a 
sure basis. "' Stevens also reported an account given to him by the Mayor 
of Tif I is,, Mr Matisov,, of an interview that he had with the Grand Duke 
on the same day as Price. From this it appeared that one of the Tsar's 
last actions before abdicating had been to appoint his uncle Commander- 
in-Chief,, but that the appointment had subsequently been conf irmed by 
the President of the Provisional Goverment,, Prince Lvcw. (Price also 
reported the confirmation of the appointment in his Manchester Guardian 
article 'How the Revolution came to the Caucasus',, written on 19 March 
though not published until 27 April). Stevens added that it was thought 
in Tiflis that the "ex-Viceroy" would leave either that night (18 March) 
or the next day to take up the supreme command of the Russian army. 
In his memorandum to Trevelyan Price continued the story. "The Caucasus 
People... continued to be suspicious of him and began on the Monday 
119 March] to demand his arrest. It was only express assurances from 
the Provisional Government at Petrograd that on his arrival in Russia 
I 
FO 371.2996 
APPendix I: (i i) 
as Counander-in-Chief, he would be carefully watched, which prevented 
the people of Tiflis from arresting him on the spot. He left on the 
20th in a great hurry. On the last day of his Viceroyalty in the Caucasus 
he summoned the representatives of the people and bade them preserve 
order and internal peace for the honour of Russia. Meanwhile the people 
were raiding his offices and arresting the police and other officials 
under Min... Then the whole of the Cossack Bodyguard of the Viceroy went 
over to the revolution. On the Tuesday they accompanied the Grand Duke 
to the railway station waving red flags and singing the Marseil laise. " 
On the day of Price's interview with the Grand Duke (18 March) the British 
Anbassador in Petrograd, Sir George Buchanan, reported to the Foreign 
Of f ice that he had been having discussions with the new Foreign Minister 
of the Provisional Government, Miliukov, about the undesirability of 
Russia becoming "committed" to republicansim 
2 "One reason why I advocated 
in conversation with Miliukov for retention [sic] of the G. D. Nicholas 
as Commander-in-Chief is that if he wins the confidence of the army and 
can keep it well in hand there will be certain chance of the G. D. Michael 
or some other G. D. being eventually declared Emperor with powers clearly 
defined within the limits of a really liberal constitution. As neither 
the G. D. Michael nor any of the G. D. s next in succession have any son 
who can succeed them there is no reason why succession should not pass 
eventually to the present Tsarevitch. " 
Within twenty four hours Buchanan began to have doubts about the feas- 
ibility of this intrigue. On 19 March he telegraphed again to the Foreign 
Office 3 that in a further conversation with Miliukov "H. E. expressed 
2 
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opinion that H. I. H. would be induced to renounce [the appointment as 
C. -in-C. I himself It, Miliukov, said Buchanan, was aware that there was 
"very strong and wide opposition in country" to the retention of the 
Grand Duke of the comiand of the Army. "Government had telegraphed to 
Rostov to stop his going to H. Q. and hoped to induce him to resign volun- 
tarily. If he did not do so Government would be placed in a serious 
predicament. " Buchanan went on to say: "I officially recognised Govern- 
ment today and consider it of f irst importance to give them all the moral 
support possible. I know appointment of Grand Duke would be desirable 
from many points of view but a refusal on his part to accept decision 
of Government would deal a heavy blow at prestige of latter and might 
be followed by disastrous consequences. " On the accompanying minute, 
over the initials of Sir George Cle-rk appear the words: "The army may 
yet have something to say. " Clerk may not have been far out in his 
estimation. A message from Lindley on 1 April 1917 
4 
contained the words: 
"The appointment and subsequent retirement of the Grand Duke Nicholas 
must have confused men's minds . and I am informed that many of the higher 
officers find it quite impossible to accommodate themselves to the changed 
conditions. " (For notes on Clerk and Lindleyr see Chapter 7. ) Indeed 
as late as June 20 the British Ambassador at Stockholm, Sir Evelyn Howard, 
reported to London that "there is a movement among Don Cossacks to elect 
Grand Duke Nicholas Emperor of Cossacks and then impose him on the rest 
of Russia. ,5 His information came from "a Russian here who is very 
inperialist" and was almost certainly wishful thinking. 
4 
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on 23 March Buchanan had become so apprehensive about the genie he and 
miliukov had let out of the bottle that he anxiously telegraphed General 
Hanbury Williamst British Military Representative at the Russian Army 
Headquarters, r urging him not to press for the appointment of the Grand 
Duke. 
6 "As a member of the Imperial family he is unacceptable to the 
majority of the Government and I believe General Russky is to replace 
him. It would seriously compromise us to press for the retention of the 
Grand Duke". On the same day Consul Stevens telegraphed about the un- 
easiness felt in the Caucasus "that mistake diplomacy has been made in 
allowing ex-Viceroy of Caucasus to take over supreme command of Army. 
This appears to be universally regretted as it is generally believed that 
notwithstanding his declaration to the contrary Grand Duke is liable at 
a given moment af ter taking over command to have his head turned and to 
form arrbitious views which may have grave consequences - ,7 
Despite the attempt to impose a news blackout on the Grand Duke's inten- 
tions,, some rumours about them must have reached London. The New Statesman 
of 24 March noted that it had been a great day for Russia when the Tsar 
abdicated,, "but it was possibly an even greater day when they decided 
that the supreme command of the Russian armies was not, after all, to 
be entrusted to his uncle,, the Grand Duke Nicholas. For that decision, 
if it means anything,, and if it stands,, means the end of the dynasty. " 
According to Price (U. D. C. July 1917) the Grand Duke "quietly went into 
retirement at Livadia and has been heard of no more". According to Pares8 
he "entirely ref used to be made a pawn in any calculation of the 
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emigrants, declaring that the Russian people must settle its questions 
according to its own wishes". Price did not live to f ind out why his 
story was stopped, but if he had known the reason it would have confirmed 
a certain respect that he always expressed f or the Grand Duke Nicholas. 
Appendix 
(NOTE: Appe ix II appears at the end of Chapter 4, to which it is closely 
related. ) 
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The Secret Treaties: Questions in Parlianient and the Press 
The first reference to the treaties in the House of CcxTuK)ns was made not 
in response to their publication in the. Manchester Guardian but nearly 
six months earlier. on 7 June 1917 Charles Trevelyan asked if the British 
Government had received a request from the Provisional Government to 
publish thern. Cecil replied for the Foreign Office, saying that no re- 
quest had been received. 
1 After the Manchester Guardian's disclosures 
on 28 November Cecil slightly changed his story, and denied that the 
British Government had refused a request from the Provisional Government 
to publish them,, which was not quite the same thing as denying that any 
such request had been received. 
2 But from now on the Government was on 
the defensive. 
On 19 December both Trevelyan and Ponsonby managed to raise the question 
of the Secret Treaties in a debate on the Consolidated Fund. Ponsonby, 
himself a former diplornat, welcomed the "tearing down of the curtain 
which hung before the secret diplomatic negotiations that were going on 
before the war" and adduced a number of instances on which both Asquith 
and Lloyd George had, in ef fect, lied to the House of Commons about 
British intentions or aspirations in fighting the war. "The point is 
that the people of this country did not enter this war in order to give 
Constantinople to Russia, and if that object ... was undertaken the 
3 
people of this country should have been openly and fairly told. 
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Trevelyano, later in the debate,? argued that if Russia repudiated the 
treaties and Britain disclaimed responsibility for them, why could she 
not now repudiate them too? The reasonr he alleged, was that there was 
a quid o quo. 
4 
On 20 December Outhwaite reinforced this point when 
hjLv--- asked why the British Government had denied that it had any territorial 
claino, at a time when the Provisional Govexmpent knew that denial to 
be false. Outhwaite went so far as to suggest that British refusal to 
repudiate the treaties was one of the causes of the fall of the Provi- 
sional Government, since it enabled Lenin to tell the Russian soldiers 
that they were fighting for the territorial claims of the Allies. 
5 
On 12 February 1918 Trevelyan raised the question of publication again 
in the debate on the Address. "You may be as angry as you please with 
the Bolshevik Government in Russia for making public secret treaties,, 
but the fact is that these treaties are now public property. 11 Cecil was 
unimpressed and replied: "as long as those treaties exist ... we are bound 
by them. ,6 On 27 February King told the House that he believed the 
reason why the American Government had chosen not to be formally repre- 
sented at the Supreme War Council at Versailles was the continued exis- 
tence and maintenance of "so many secret treaties. 
On 20 June,, in the debate on the Consolidated Fund, Philip Snowden 
seconded a motion proposed by Phillip Morrell calling on the Government 
"to lose no diplomatic opportunity to settle the problems of the war by 
agreement" and with that object to revise the treaties. In his speech 
4 
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Snowden told the House that the situation was even worse than they had 
thought. Not only did secret treaties exist, and not only was infor- 
mation about them withheld on the ground that Britain was only one of 
a number of Allies and Allies must act in concert. "It is one of our 
complaints" said Snowden "that they do not do that. A number of these 
secret treaties which were exposed were made by particular Allies behind 
the backs and without the knowledge of others. " Snowden went on to con- 
nect the British ref usal to discuss war aims in the Paris Conference with 
defensiveness about the Secret Treaties. That,, in turn, he alleged, 
"more than anything else was responsible for the overthrow of the f irst 
revolutionary Government. .8 
Between January and June 1918 mention was made in the House of Commons 
on a number of occasions and in different contexts to public discontent 
as a result of the secret treaty revelations. On 17 January, in the 
debate on the Second Reading of the Military Service Bill, the Labour 
MP William C. Anderson -a member of the UDC - referred to the treaties 
as having been made behind the backs of the people. "If 450,000 men are 
going to be flung into the cauldron of war they ought to know if there 
are still secret treaties for which they are fighting-1#9 On 12 February 
Trevelyan drew attention to dissatisfaction among working people about 
the secret treaties in the debate on the Address. 
10 on 27 February, in 
a question to the Foreign Secretary, Lees Smith asked if he was aware 
that the secret treaties "are one of the causes of labour unrest and that 
aW 
11 
evasive answers were "noted in every industrial centre . In the debate 
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on Supply on the same day Joseph King observed that when addressing two 
pub ic meetings recently he had got "a response from the audience and 
a quickening of interest which are very impressive" as soon as he men- 
tioned the secret treaties. 
12 Snowden in his speech seconding the motion 
referred to above on 20 June read out the full text of a resolution 
passed by the largest local Labour party in Britain, "the more remark- L- - 
n I-N able because this Labour party has been almost alone among local Labour 
parties in the country in having maintained throughout the war the atti- 
tude of strong support for the war. " The resolution spoke of the "ut- 
most dismay and indignation" of the Birmingham Labour Party on learning 
the contents of the secret treaties,, and its sense of having been 
"utterly deceived" into supporting the war in the belief that the war 
was being fought for the freedom of small nations and the sanctity of 
international law. The secret treaties "flagrantly violate every reason 
put forward by British statesmen in justification for the war. " The 
Birmingham Party believed "the absolute repudiation of these treaties 
to be essential to a democratic peace" and was convening a "large and 
widely representative Midland Conference at as early a date as possible 
for the purpose of considering these important documents -" Snowden con- 
cluded by saying that there was not a labour organisation in the country 
which would not endorse that resolution. 
13 
Forty years later Harry Pollit recalled that "a considerable wave of 
anger swept through the progressive and peace-loving forces in Britain 
at the hostile attitude of Lloyd George's coalition government towards 
the Russian goverment. There has always been in Britain a traditional 
12 
Ibid. 27.2.18. Col. s 1501-1502. 
13 
Ibid. 20.6.18. Col. s 560-562. 
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hostility to secret treaties, and the revelations now coming out of Soviet 
Russia rapidly led to a stronger Opposition to them than ever before. 1,14 
The Home Office intelligence-gathering operation which focussed on labour 
unrest and anti-recruiting and peace campaigns picked up a reference to 
the secret treaties which formed part of a speech by James Maxwell at 
the Co-Operative Hall in Maesteg on 15 February. Maxwell referred to 
the treaties as "infamous documents. " He went on: "The war,, we were told,, 
was for gallant little Belgium, or the rights of small nations and to 
destroy militarism. The secret treaties demonstrated the exact truth 
of the. contention that the real factor was the ambitious schemes of the 
Tsar ... the translation of the secret treaties or the parts of them 
piablished by the Bolsheviks revealed the degradation of European diplo- 
macy. " The police transcript of this speech was forwarded to the Director 
of Public Prosecutions, who recomended that Maxwell be prosecuted under 
the Defence of the Realm Act. 
15 
The Lef t wing press in Britain did not imediately make as much of the 
Publication of the treaties as might have been expected. This may have 
been partly due to the f act, as Snawden wrote in Labour Leader 
on 6 Decesber that "the archives of the Russian foreign off ice [have] 
not revealed much which was not already known to those who have closely 
followed international affairs in the last three years". The former 
editor of Labour IP-ader,, Fenner Brockway#, who was in prison as a conscien- 
tious objector at the time of the publication of the treaties, said in 
May 1985 that it was also possible that the Left press felt a little 
Piqued by the fact that the revelations had been made by a bourgeois 
14 
Harry pollit: 'The October Revolution and the British Labour 
Movement',, Marxism Today October 1957. 
15 HO 45.10743 and 263275. 
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1 ibera 1j ourna 1- References to the treaties in Labour I eader were 
scanty, although on 28 February 1918 it gave an account of E. D. Morel's 
first pub ic speech after his release from prison for a technical vio- 
lation of the Defence of the Realm Act. "Mr. Morel spoke briefly but 
with great force of the change in public opinion that had taken place 
since the publication of the secret treaties. " The Workers Dreadnaught, 
on the other hand, devoted almost the whole of its edition of 5 January 
1918 to a reprint of the Manchester Guardian translations of November 
and December. On 26 January it introduced a reprint of the translation 
of the treaty with Italy with the words: "The Manchester Guardian has 
again performed a public service by publishing further 'secret documents' 
disclosed by the Bolsheviks". Workers Dreadnaught issued a special 
supplement on 9 February entitled Secret Diplomacy Unmasked in which it 
republished the material contained in its 5 January edition. The Call 
made one reference to the treaties (2 January 1918) and credited the 
Manchester Guardian with their exposure. Forward on 27 April 1918 printed 
an article by Morel in which he wrote: 
"The Manchester Guardian is the only newspaper which has pub- 
lisheO the Russian revelations in full, and it is safe to say 
that not one citizen of these islands has the slightest idea 
that this government has entered into contracts behind his back 
which not only violate every public profession of lofty and 
disinterested war aims... but which respond to no conceivable 
national interest. " 
Predictably, perhaps, the organisation. which took the fullest advantage 
of the publication of the secret treaties was the union of Democratic 
Control. At the lith meeting of the General Council of the UDC on 
20 February 1918 it was resolved to convey to Price and to Scott the 
appreciation of the Council for the "admirable services... rendered to 
the work of the U. D. C. " by the publication of the secret treaties. 
Seymour Cocks had by then already prepared a book with the full texts 
APPendix III : (vii) 
of the treaties and notes , and the Executive at its next meeting ordered 
4,000 copies. The book was ready just after Easter and by the end of 
April the first edition had sold out and a second had been ordered. 
16 
Ethel Sncxwden personally paid for a copy to be sent to each of the one 
hundred branches of the Women's Peace Crusade. At the Executive Comm- 
ittee of the 30 April E. D. Morel reported a meeting which he had had with 
the Leicester Trades Council at which he had "explained" a plan he had 
"for making the secret treaties more widely known among Trades 
Unionists". 
17 The resolution of the Birmingham Labour Party referred 
to above may well have owed something to the proselytising work of the 
Union of Democratic Control. 
16 
Hull University Library,, U. D. C. Archive DDC 4/29. 
17 
Ibid. DDC 1/4. 
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APPENDIX IV 
RANSOME AND PRICE 
"When the Germans began to advance to Petrograd about the middle of Feb- 
ruary and all the foreign Embassies (except the American) and most of 
the newspaper correspondents began to leave Russia,, Ransome and I decided 
to stick to our guns and sink or swim with the Russian Revolution. "' 
Through his life Price tended, in any discussion of the Revolution, to 
begin sentences with "Ransom and I". Yet (as has been noted) Ransome 
did not mention Price in his autobiography and there are only two refer- 
ences to Price in all his surviving papers in the Brotherton Library at 
Leeds. One of these may hold a clue to what otherwise appears to have 
been a totally baffling relationship. On 16 April 1918 Ransome wrote 
in his diary: "Get telegram about Price". It is dif f icult not to sur- 
mise t the telegram came from Whitehall,, where Price must increasingly 
have been coming under suspicion since February 1918, when his cables 
began to be seriously interfered with. 
There is considerable evidence in the Foreign Off ice archives that from 
November 1917 Ransome was being used as an unofficial agent, particularly 
in the weeks before Iockhart's arrival, but also afterwards. 
2 On 2 April 
1918, just two weeks before that entry in his diary, Ransome, according 
to Lockhart, had been acting as intermediary in talks with the Soviet 
Cornmissar for Foreign Trade about the possibility of Russia resuming trade 
with the Allies. 
3 In July Lockhart justified to the Foreign office his 
1 
Letter from Price to Anna Maria Philips, 7.5.18. Price papers. 
2 
FO 371.3018/3284/3296/3321/3316. 
FO 371.3313. 
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action in getting the future Mrs. Ransome entered as already being Mrs. 
Ransome on Ransome's passport, prior to their departure for Stockholm, 
on the following grounds: "They should be useful in giving us information 
of underground work of Bolsheviks" .4 Clearly, however, and not unusually, 
one branch of the British f oreign service did not know what another was 
doingr for when in March 1918,, Lindley, then at Archangel, had tried to 
use Ransome to convey a friendly message to Trotsky, Ransome wrote on 
the back of the telegram that he eventually received: "I think it possible 
that an earlier telegram was suppressed by someone who did not wish Lindley 
to have any comnumcation with the Bolsheviks. ,5 From Stockholm Ransome 
continued to be useful to the Foreign Office as a messenger, though not, 
perhaps, in quite the way that Lockhart had envisaged. For Ransome had 
his other foot in the other camp. 
Ransome's relationships with members of the Soviet Government were, of 
course,, the necessary concomitants to his usefulness to the Foreign Office. 
But they were also genuine personal relationships. On 21 May 1918 he 
wrote to his mother: "Not a single one of my English friends is 
left in 
,6 Russia... My principle [sic] friends here are Radek and his wi e. 
Quite apart f rorn the f act that this indicates clearly that Ransome 
did 
not consider Price to be af riend, the statement underpins the assertion 
he made in a long letter to his editorr written on 11 August 
from StockhOlm 
-1 FO 371.3334. 
5 Ransome papers,, Brotherton Collection, Brotherton Library, 
Leeds 
After Buchanan returned to London Francis Lindley,, the Counsellor at 
the British Embassy was put in charge of the remaining British mission. 
Lockhart's position was therefore always slightly anomalous,, 
though 
he was supposedly independent within his terms of reference. 
In March 
1918 Lindley was in Archangel with the title of Comissioner. 
In June 
he was designated Consul General in Russia and Head of 
Mission. See 
also bio-data at the end of Chapter 7. 
6 
Ransorne papers I Brotherton 
Col lectionr Brotherton Library r Ik-ý - 
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shortly after his arrival there. 
"I had got to an extraordinary degree the confidence of the 
Soviet folk who certainly allowed me to see much more of what 
went on than was seen by any other foreigner, and were willing 
to talk straight to me when they would not do anything but put 
of f icial representatives of England of f with f air words... 
The Soviet people themselves had complained to me about the 
need of getting information out of Russia but lamented their 
shortness of hands and left me free to do what I liked, merely 
giving other people leave to help me. "7 
But in the same letter he had noted that 
11 00 when there was no longer hope of preventing intervention... 
Lindley agreed with me that the best that could be done would 
be at least temporarily to put me into cold storage at Stockholm 
with a view to possibilities in the future. " 
Nonetheless he went on to describe rather proudly to his editor the 
arrangements that he had made with the Russian government to be sent a 
regular supply of information from Russia,, the Ukraine and the Baltic 
provinces. He also clearly indicated, in the same letter, that Radek 
had been showing him confidential information from Berlin, and the contact 
with Radek undoubtedly continued in Stockholm It was in a letter to 
Ransome asking how he was getting on with arrangements for the translation 
of Soviet propaganda material into Scandinavian languages that Radek 
mentioned, in passing, that "Little Price" had "joined the Party ". 
8 
Ransome did not, either, underestimate his own importance purely as a 
journalist. He told his mother on 1 May 1917 that he had been specially 
invited to a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, with no other journalist 
Present, "because of the stuff I got through on their behalf before the 
Revolutionew. He repeatedly claimed, in his letters to his mother, that 
7 
Ibid. 
8 Ibid. See also Chp. 10 p. 333 and Chp. 10 F/N 40. 
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was the "only man" in a position to get a true picture of what was 
going on and to get it into printr although, as to this, he was to find 
that he was being tarred with the same brush as Price in the Press Bureau: 
another example of confusion in Whitehall. In his letter to the editor 
of the. Daily News (quoted above) he noted that he had been informed by 
another department of the Daily News "that my telegrams were from 7 to 
21 days late and arriving with whole sections mising and so of ten useless 
I telegraphed a full account of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Revolt 
at the time but suspect it did not get through; suspect, indeed, that 
nothing on that subject got through. " Just over a month later, on 
14 September 1918, Ransome sent off two articles to the Daily News which 
were referred to in a PID Sunuary (from which the date is missing) . One, 
according to the summary, was "unobjectionable" and had been "sent on". 
It was apparently entitled "The Germans in Esthonia. " The other was 
called "Terror, Red and White", and in it Ransome had apparently pointed 
out that most of the bloodletting in Russia at that time was being done 
by Whites. 9 The decision as to its fate was not reported in the PID 
Sunnary , but nothing by Ransome about the Terror, whether Red or White, 
was ever printed. A Foreign Off ice Minute in October was headed "Dangerous 
AVC-tivities of Mr. Price and Mr. Ransome. " J. D. Gregory commented: "We 
have long known about their activities". 
10 But it was still necessarY 
for Sir George Clerk to com-ent on a suggestion from the DMI that infor- 
mation about Ransome should be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions: 
"He has worked to some extent - or claims to have done so - on behalf 
of our people under arrest and we have wittingly agreed to his remaining 
in Stockholm. 11 
9 
FO 371.4362. 
10 
FO 371.3342. 
11 
Ibid. 
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Another layer in Ransome's personality was constituted by his reiterated 
assertion that he hated politics and was essentially a literary man. 
on 27 May he wrote to his mother "I hate politics as much as ever, but 
when you are suddenly planted in the middle of a huge thing like this 
it is impossible not to be interested. jj12 Again,, in a letter from Stockholm 
dated 12 October, he wished he had stuck to writing "tales" and not allowed 
himself to be drawn into politics. "But as an honest man I could not 
and there is an end of it. , 
13 Still later, on 4 December, he told his 
mother (who clearly did not approve of his continued defence of the Soviet 
Government): "I'm not a revolutionary. I'm merely an observer of 
revolutions. , 
14 As an "honest man" he deplored, in another letter to 
his editor dated 10 December 1918,, the fact that the British press appeared 
to be taking all its information from Russian refugees. "Only now and 
then does anything appear showing even the faintest ef fort to use imagin- 
ation and to see exactly what the position is. In my mind all the time 
is the knowledge of this flood of stuff going over to England unbalanced 
by a single disinterested statement. The hidden or open object of the 
whole mass of stuff is to get us coninitted in Russia - , 
15 
It is small wonder that Ransome, a subtle and complex person whose emotions 
and loyalties were being pulled in so many directions at once, had little 
time for Price, who must have seemed to him positively simple-minded. 
His only other reference to Price in the surviving papers of this period 
came in a letter from Francis Hirsti, written on 27 May 1918 and asking 
if he would like to publish his "Letter to America" as a pamphlet. 
12 
Ransome papers, Brotherton Collection, Brotherton Library, Leeds. 
13 
Ibid. 
14 
Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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He added as a p. s.: "I saw Price last ni4ht, in good condition,, 
fat and cheerful". 
16 It can only be concluded that Price's condition 
deteriorated dramatically between the end of May and August, when the 
German writer Alfons Paquet described him as "emaciated". 
17 
Paquet in- 
cidentally described Price to his editor as "the comrade in thought and 
fate of his colleague Arthur Ransome". (See Chapter 10 p. 321). But 
Ransome could hardly have f ailed to say something about Price in a letter 
to Hirst; he must have known that Hirst was Price's f riend and can hardly 
not have known that Price had been writing for Common Sense. 
Ransome was a patriot. He believed that the war was a just one and if 
he had been f it, he would have fought in it. Price strongly opposed the 
war. This fact must have coloured Ransome's opinion of Price. Once in 
Russia, Price quickly took himself of f to the Caucasus for two years while 
Ransome stayed for most of the time at the centre of political gravity. 
Clearly he was much better placed than Price to report the events leading 
to and following the March revolution, and he was probably not being 
immodest when he claimed to be the "only$$ man sending out accurate inf or- 
mation about the Petrograd Soviet, though this was not true after Novem- 
ber 1917. But from then until he went to Stockholm in August 1918 Ransome 
was working for two sides which were heading for a conflict which he would 
have done almost anything to avert. Constituted as he was, he could 
hardly have avoided doing as he did. Perhaps Price felt close to Ransome 
because they were both trying to say the same thing, but Ransome did not 
reciprocate Price's feelings because they were doing so from such differ- 
ent bases. perhaps Ransane felt uncomfortable about his double role. 
Perhaps he was even a little envious of Price's simplicity. 
16 
Ibid. 
17 
See also Chapter 10 p. 321. 
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In the 1920s Ransome and his wife became friends with Price and his family. 
It was Price Is tench which disappeared, as described in Ransome's essay 
in Rod and Line: 'Fai 1 ing to catch a Tench' . 
18 
But 3-n one of the few 
letters he wrote to Price,, not long bef ore his death, he commented on 
the article wMch Price had written on the Russian Revolution for Survey 
19 
in revealing terms: 
"I must tell you at once that you have been very handsome in your 
treatment of my performance on that stage. It must have been very 
hard for all you practised political philosophers not to be worse 
than inpatient with the intrusions of so obvious an amateur. st20 
18 Rod and Line (Oxford paperback 1980). Some indication of the relax- 
ation which had taken place in the atmosphere between the two men is 
given by an exchange of verses, begun by Ransome when he wrote the 
following lines in Price's Visitors' Book after having failed to catch 
the tench. 
Arthur Ransome to M. P. Price 
Where is the man who'd use a cartridge 
In April, on a sitting partridge? 
Where is the man who finds it pleasant 
To shoot the bantling July pheasant? 
And where the man who blithely kills 
Grouse in the time of daffodils? 
0 Philips Price! Did you not blench 
To catch and eat a Maytime tench? 
What wonder that a spell was thrown 
When such a monstrous deed was done? 
The affronted tench have gone for good 
Ducks undisturbed eat all the food. 
The anglers watching by the shore 
Shall see the great fish roll no more 
And Price's guests come late to meals 
Bringing not tench but wriggling EE1 
M. P. Price to Arthur Ransome 
Where is the man with knowledge slender 
Who sought a crow's nest in November? 
And where the boy who c1 imbed a1 arch 
To rob a magpie's nest in March? 
Oh Arthur Ransome! You amaze 
Me at your ken of Nature's ways; 
For who has seen, when daffodil 
our meadows deck o'er dale and hill 
A partridge sitting in April? 
19 Survey 41 (1962) pp. 14-26. M. Philips Price: 'Witnesses of the Revolution' 
20 Ransom papers, EirothertmCol lection, Brother Libraryr Leeds - 
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APPENDIX V 
THE MILNER MISSION 
The so-called Milner Mission was actually merely one of a series of 
Inter-Allied conferences, but it was the first to take place on the 
Eastern Front, and it was dominated by the very high-powered British 
delegation to it. Led by Milner himself,, it included Lord Revelstoke, 
a Dixector of the Bank of England and Chairman of Barings Bank, which 
had massive interests in Russia, General Sir Henry Wilson, Major General 
John Headlam (an artillery expert) . and Sir George Clerk, head of the 
Eastern Department of the Foreign Of f ice, the department responsible f or 
Russian affairs. The Conference lasted from 1- 25 February 1917, and 
in view of the known state of the Russian economy, it was distinguished 
from other Inter-Allied conferences by the fact that for the first time 
strategy,, finance and supply were all included on the agenda. 
On his return to Britain Milner tried to put it about that he had found 
no cause for concern in Russia. The Press Bureau's decision to distort 
or suppress virtually all news about the activities of the Mission was 
perfectly in line with its established policy on news from Russia. Yet 
from his confidential reports it would appear that Milner had not been 
at all blind or deaf as to what was going on. He complained bitterly 
of the poor organisation of the conference, but Sir Henry Wilson des- 
cribed him as "in depression, tired and worried and listless", convinced 
that the defeat of Germany on the Eastern Front was impossible and that 
1 
Peace terms would have to be considered. The confidential minutes of 
1 
Lloyd George: War Memoirs Vol-III p-1584. 
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the proceedings prepared by members of the British delegation conveyed, 
in Lloyd George's words, "the impression of a general state of chaos and 
disorganisation, of open corruption and incompetent leadership which made 
most of the work which the conference atteirpted to carry out as futile 
2 
as cultivating a quicksand" . 
Despite attempts by the Russian government to keep members of the British 
delegation away from Russian liberal leaders (Sir George Clerk noted that 
the Mission had been kept "in a sort of ring fence" to prevent "the 
liberal and anti-government faction" from using the Mission "as a demon- 
stration in favour of the principles for which they were fighting"), 
3 
Milner succeeded in meeting quite a few of them; or perhaps it might be 
truer to say that they succeeded in meeting him. His contacts included 
Rodzianko, the President of the Duma; the Kadet leader Miliukov; a leading 
Progressist, Riabushinskii (who had taken a leading part in the creation 
of another pressure group, the Union of War Industries Committees) ; the 
11'n 
head of the All Russia Union of Zemstvos,, Prince Lvov; and the head of 
the All Russia Union of Towns, also Mayor of Moscow, Michael Chelnokov. 
4 
Milner noted that the latter had sought to impress upon him - that the 
present state of things could not possibly continue and that Prince Lvov 
had expressed his fear that nothing could avert the revolution that was 
threatening. 5 The British representative on the Russian equivalent of 
the Ministry of Blockade,, Samuel Hoare, persuaded its Chairman, Peter 
Struve, to write two briefing memoranda specially for Lord Milner: one 
on the food situation and one on the political situation in Russia. 
2 
Ibid. p. 1585. 
3 
Ibid. p. 1590. 
4 
pearson: The Russian Moderates pp. 134-135. 
5 
Lloyd George: War Memoirs Vol-III p-1590. 
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In the latter Struve stated that Russia was "face to face" with revolution. 
The Russian government signally failed to isolate Milner from the facts. 
Indeed,, after news of the Revolution had been confirmed in Britain, Milner 
apparently coffrýeented that the Provisional Government consisted "mainly, 
perhaps entirely, of our friends". 
6 
Yet Lloyd George recorded that although both Wilson and Milner returned 
from Russia believing that a revolution was inevitable, they had succeeded 
in convincing themselves that it would not happen until after the end 
of the war. 
7 
Samuel Hoare commented that the Allies had been "mistaken 
in sending such a mission at all; the members of the mission were equally 
mistaken in almost all their conclusions about the Russian front and the 
8 
state of Russia" . It would appear that they were not so much mistaken 
as believing what they wanted to believe. Moreover, despite knowing what 
it is now clear that he knew, Milner was prepared deliberately to deceive 
not only himself but the British public also. 
A full account of the Milner Mission is given by Lloyd George in Volume 
III of his War Memoirs. Useful information about the Mission is also 
to be found in Raymond Pearson: The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of 
Tsarism 1914-1917; in Richard Pipes: Struve: Liberal on the Right,, 1905- 
1944; and in Keith Neilson: Strategy and Supply: the Anglo-Russian Alliance 
1914-1917. There is surprisingly little material about the mission in 
the Milner papers at the Bodleian Library. 
6 
Neilson: Strategy and Supply. The quotation from Milner is in Cab. 21/24- 
7 
Lloyd George: War Memoirs vol-III p-1588. 
Pearson:. The Russian Moderates pp-134-135. 
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APPENDIX VI 
THE BRITISH BCONOMIC MISSION TO RUSSIA 
A few days before the Allied landings at Archangel Price learned to his 
surprise that an Economic Mission from Britain had arrived in Moscow, 
and he went to see them at their hotel. 
"They told me that they had powers to discuss the possibility 
of an economic treaty with Soviet Russia. It was evident that 
the voice of reason had for a brief spell at least prevailed 
in L<)ndon. I suppose Scott, with Tchicherin's answer [to Scott's 
telegram of 19 June], with the backing of my despatches and 
of Ransome's in his paper had been able to influence the Prime 
Minister to take this step. "l 
Price got the details wrong. The mission arrived in Moscow just before 
the Archangel landings, not the Murmansk landings (as he recorded it) , 
and things were not what they seemed. However since he continued to iffegine 
for the rest of his life that he had had something to do with the arrival 
of this Mission it seems only proper to put the record straight. 
Shortly after the October Revolution General Poole had proposed that each 
of the Allies should allocate funds and despatch a financial represen- 
tative to Russia to buy up stores which would otherwise fall into German 
hands. Coincidentally plans were already being made through a number 
of more or less shady intermediaries for the British to buy up all the 
f ive major banks in Russia and to set up a Cossack bank in South Russia 
which could issue bank notes and thus provide the Don Cossacks and the 
Volunteer Army with funds. 
2 There has been a good deal of speculation 
as to what the mission was really supposed to achieve, but the fact remains 
I 
Price: tions p. 128. 
2 
Kettle: The Allies and the Russian Collapse. Chapter 5. 
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that the idea of sending a Commercial Mission to Russia was already be-Lng 
considered in May 1918 by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Russian 
Affairs in Riitehall on which the Board of Trade, the DepaLrtment of Overseas 
Trade, the Ministry of Information, the War Office and the Treasury were all 
, =, ý 
3 
represent,, . One authority (Ullman) thought that it had its origins in 
the brief period during the spring of 1918 when it seemed at least poss- 
ible that Lockhart's views might be taken seriously and that there might 
be some kind of rapprochement with the Bolsheviks. 
4 
Another (Michael 
Kettle) thought that the mission was going to try to tidy up the confusion 
which had resulted from the banking scheme. 
5 On June 10 the Inter- 
Departmental Committee was informed that the Foreign Office had not only 
approved the idea of sending a Commercial Mission but that it had, in 
fact, already left; it would be followed shortly by two more members, 
one of whom would "investigate the prospects of banking in Russia" and 
the other "the banking scheme negotiated by Colonel Keyes". 
6,7 The most 
convincing explanation of the mission is the one given by Lockhart in 
his Memoirs (p. 306): that one department in 16Citehall did not know what 
the other was doing. Lockhart first heard of the proposal to send a 
Mission from the British Consul General , Wardop, and in a telegram to 
the Foreign office on 26 May he showed that he was very much put out 
that such a change of policy as this appeared to indicate should 
8 
have taken place without his having been informed, let alone consult - 
3 
FO 371.3313. 
4 
Ullman: Anglo-Soviet Relations, Vol. I p. 223. 
5 
Kettle: The Allies and the Russian Collapse. Chapter 5. 
6 
FO 371.3299. 
7 
Colonel Keyes,? formerly of the Indian Army Intelligence service, was 
the political officer on General Poole's staff and played an active 
role in organising the bankers' conspiracy. 
8 
FO 371.3313. 
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on 13 June, the British Consul at Archangel, Douglas Young, was informed 
that Lindley had been appointed to "take general charge of British inter- 
ests in Russia". He was also told that Lindley would be acconpanied by 
a four-man Comvercial Mission who would shortly be joined by two experts 
in banking (in fact these two appear never to have succeeded in catching 
up with the other members of the Mission) . Young was told that the Mission 
had been appointed 
"to advise His Majesty's Government as to the best means of 
restoring and developing British trade relations with Russia 
and of countering enemy schemes of commercial penetration, and 
to assist His Majesty's Representative in giving effect to any 
policy adopted by His Majesty's Government for the above purpose. " 
The Mission would report, through Lindley, to 
"a standing interdepartmental conference in London constituted 
to co-ordinate the actions of the various departments in relation 
to Russian economic matters. "9 
he 
. Lockhart later pointed out (26 June) 
"The arrival of a commercial mission at a moment when every- 
one is expecting a close race between Allied and German inter- 
vention may lead to serious consequences for the Allies... 
I fear they have only come in time to start home again. "10 
Nonetheless on 3 July the Foreign office forwarded a long cable to the 
Mission instructing it to report as soon as practicable their opinion 
as to 
"the possibility and desirability of re-opening trade with 
Russia and the conditions under which it can be conducted-" 
They were to report on what classes of goods should be sent and in what 
quantities, how they could be landed, transported and sold, what 
9 
FO 371.3299. 
10 
FO 371.3300. 
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guarantees they could get that such goods wuI5 not f al I into enemy hands,, 
what goods the Russians could make available for export to the UK,, and 
how such exports could be organised. 
11 
The Mission,, (which was indiscriminately described as Commercial and 
Economic) having landed at Murmansk,, went on to Vologda, arriving there 
on 7 July (immediately af ter the murder of the German Ambassador in 
Moscow). 
12 on 17 July they left for Moscow and arrived there on 22 July. 
Their arrival "staggered" Lockhart who knew, insofar as he knew anything 
of the British Government's plans, that intervention was imminent, and 
who soon found out that the head of the Mission, Sir William Clerk, knew 
nothing about those plans. It fell to his htt, at a time when his personal 
relations with the Bolsheviks were severely strained, to take unwelcome 
visitors on a tour of Soviet offices for discussions on trade and commerce. 
"Could I be surprised when, later, the Bolsheviks accused me of Machiavel- 
lian duplicity? " 13 
The Mission stayed only two days in Moscow and Price saw thern on both 
davs. 14 
. 11 
But when he went round to their hotel on the second morning he 
was told that they had received orders to postpone negotiations sine die 
and to return to the Murman coast at once. The Allied Embassies,, who 
knew what was afoot, had already fled from Vologda,, where they had been 
sheltering since March, to Archangel, where they were held up for two 
days negotiating with the Soviet authorities for vessels to take them 
away. The delay was fortunate for the members of the British Mission. 
11 
FO 371.3313. 
12 
ullman: Anglo-Soviet Relations,, Vol. I p. 223. 
13 
Lockhart: memoirs p. 306. 
14 
Price: itions p. 128. 
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in the early hours of 28 v-), uly,, just as the vessels which had been secured 
were about to weigh anchor 
"another train pulled up to the station and the members of 
the British Economic Mission sprinted down the dock and 
climbed on board. "15 
i 144 
15 Ullman: lations Vol. I p. 234. 
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APPENDIX VII 
SOME CENSORED CABLES 
A remarkable survivor in the Home Office archives at the Public Records 
office, of which no mention has been found in any Other account of British 
censorship, was part of an index of press telegrams received in the Cable 
Room of the Official Press Bureau between January 1917 and April 1919.1 
It is probable that this was the index kept for only one of the desks 
in the Cable Room because the subjects covered by the telegrams listed 
do not provide anything like complete coverage of all the news that must 
have been Corning into the Room during that period. On the f lyleaf of 
the index one R. C. de la Candamine - clearly the person who decided to 
deposit and not to destroy the book - wrote (on an unspecif ied date): 
"This Vol. is kept because it gives clues to, among other 
things, the "D" notices to the Press which are kept. " 
Each telegram entered was briefly surranarised and dated, but no source 
given. Against each telegram a symbol was written, indicating whether 
the telegram was passed for publication, referred for a decision, or 
stopped (presumably because of an instruction to do so). A key to the 
symbols was put on the f lyleaf . Each telegram was also,, according to 
Candamine's note, supposed to have been prefixed "B, "C" or "D", referring 
to "official notices" issued by the Press Bureau. Sadly this was not 
done. Perhaps Candamine did not have the time to check through the index 
before selecting it for retention,, and as a result posterity is not as 
enlightened as Candamine appears to have intended. Nonetheless the index 
undoubtedly succeeds in giving "clues". 
1 HO 139.52. 
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The first evidence of the operation of official censorship policy on 
the Russian Revolution,, as interpreted by the people working on this 
particular deski, is to be found in April 1917, when it is apparent that 
all cables referring to calls for universal peace were stopped. A cable 
referring to "internal dissensions and dishonourable peace" was, however, 
passed,, and so was another epitomised as "massacre stories denied". This 
suggests a willingness to discredit the Provisional Government (even in 
a story denied) but an unwillingness to allow the British public to think 
that peace was even contemplated. In the same month "Labour [presumably 
Socialist] party favours war" was, not surprisingly, passed; but a cable 
referring to the repudiation of Miliukov was stopped. By May references 
to the rift between Miliukov and the Petrograd Soviet were being passedF 
and so were "Agitators from Germany to Russia" and "Northern towns on 
verge of starvation". In June nearly everything got through except ref - 
erences to disordets in the Russian Fleet and the fact that the Mullahs 
in Central Asia were preaching agrarian revolution. Little news of any 
kind was received in July, either about the July offensive or the July 
Days,, possibly because of the latter. 
Only a few cables were received in August: one dealt with the possible 
evacuation of Petrograd and another with the possible evacuation of Riga. 
Two halves of a cable received on 28 July were treated differently. 
One half noted that Lenin's "agents" had been arrested: that half was 
passed. The other half was sLmnarised "ParVUS Rakovsky in touCh With 
British F. O. " That was stopped. At the end of the month "RLmK)urs counter- 
revolution to restore Grand Duke Paul,, Kornilov and Cossacks involved" 
was stopped. on the other hand " soldiers lynching and looting" on 
10 September was passed. On the same day a reference to Grand Duke 
Nicholas as "leader of counterplot" was passed. A message about the 
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double-tracking of the trans-Siberian railway on 23 October, which was 
stopped, suggests some f ast thinking if not forward planning by the War 
Office. The first indication that there had been a change of Government 
in Russia appeared on 25 Novenber: "Lenin reforming independent states,,; 
this was Passed. So was "publication of secret documents" on the same 
day. What little came through in December was all stopped. Cables about 
"Japs leaving Moscow - Siberian frontier blocked to prevent attaches 
leaving", "Lenin's appeal to Mussalmen", "Trotsky's appeal to Allies 
working classes" and "Capitalists to pay for war" never got into print. 
A note in the index dated 18 December suggests a general rather than a 
specific instruction: "Bolshevik Propaganda- transits stopped inwards 
referred". This may have had something to do with the War Cabinet de- 
cision of 29 November (see p. 239) to allow the Press Bureau,. which 
theoretically did not concern itself with foreign policy matters, to stop 
all incoming cables and pass them at its own discretion. 
Another interesting survivor among the Press Bureau files 
2 
contains a 
number of the actual cables that were stopped or cut. Thus on 5 December 
1917 a Russian Governinent commmunique on the progress of the armistice 
negotiations was cut. The original text is in the f ile - stopped - of 
the Bolsheviks' appeal "to all the labouring class Moslems of Russia and 
the Orient". So are the proclamation of 6 February 1918 to German workers 
on the imminence of world revolutiono, and a communique on the agreement 
Of terms at Brest Litovsk on 15 February. 
In the same file there is an exchange of notes which hints at the pos- 
Sibility that Reuters was getting preferential treatment among the press 
2 HO 139.35. 
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agencies - On 15 December 1917 Reuters correspondent in Petrograd Guy 
Beringer sent a cable quoting Trotsky's call to the working classes of 
all the Allies to throw their weight in the scale On behalf of peace 
negotiations; and demanding that territories which suffered especially 
from the war should be indemnified from 'ý. nternational fund levied capital- 
ist classes all belligerents for on capitalist classes falls whole respon- 
sibility war". This was referred by the censor onto whose desk it came 
to the Home Of f ice Liaison Of f icer at the Press Bureau,, S. W. Harris,, with 
a note: 
"The point is that if the Sec. of State agrees that this should 
not be published may we understand that the same thing sent 
by special correspondents should also be stopped. " 
Harris replied: 
"S. of S. is -inclined to pass this unless Sir Frank Swettenham 
thinks otherwise. " 
It would seem from Candamine's index (see above p. (iii)para-1) that Sir 
Frank Swettenham did think otherwise. But it is interesting to note 
that in the censor's mind there was some kind of a distinction to be 
made between cables coming from Reuters and cables from the special 
correspondents in Russia of the daily press. It is also a fact that 
Reuters was subsidised by the Government 
3 
and the Managing Director of 
Reuters, Sir Roderick Jones, became soon after this exchange of notes 
the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Information in charge of Allied 
and Foreign Propaganda. 
INF 4 l1b xC/A/0/33320. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA LEAFIETS, POSTERS AND PAMPHLETS 
IN ENGLISH IN THE PRICE PAPERS 
A collection of 30 leaflets, posters and pamphlets in the English 
language has been asserrbled in the Price papers. Af ew of them were 
present in their original form and were found among his papers af ter 
Price's death. The rest are photocopies and have been assembled from 
a variety of sources, the most notable being those donated by the 
Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. Others were found in the 
Brotherton Collection at Leeds University, and in the Libraries of the 
Institute of Social History at Amsterdam,, the london School of Economics, 
the British Library and the Public Records Office. In the list which 
follaws those which can be att-ributed to Price with absolute or reasonable 
certainty are marked *. Those marked + were republished by the Comintern. 
Those marked x were republished by Promachus Bern-Belp. 
LEAFLETS 
Issued over the Names of Lenin and Tchicherin 
Do you Realise Miat You Are Doing? 
Al-lies + 
Allied Invasion of Russia to Suppress Workers' Revolution 
and Re-establish Tsarism (Tchicherin only) 
Are You a Trade Unionist? 
The Shame of Being a Scab 
Revolution in Germany 
Issued by the English-Speaking GrOUP Of COffvunists 
On Miose Side are You? 
Parliament or Soviet * 
Socialist Russia Capitalist England 
Capitalist USA and Socialist Russia 
For %bat Are You Fightirxg? 
why Don't You Return Home? 
Seething Unrest Among British Troops in Great Britain 
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PAMPHLETS 
issued. t)y ýTýe Department of Foreign Literature, Narkomindel 
The Constitution of the R. S. F. S. R. * 
Issued by Sovprop 
The Truth About the Allied InterventiorL. In Russia *+m (also in French) 
The Old Order in Europe and the New Order in Russia 
Say! What Are You? + 
issued I)y the English-Speaking Group of cornmunists 
Tchicherin's Note to President Wilson of 24 October 1918 
Civil War and Red Terror * 
Capitalist England - Socialist Russia 
MISM, TANEC)US 
(The following items in the collection cannot always be attributed to 
any regular or particular propaganda organisation or author. ) 
LEAFLETS 
Why Have You Come to Murmansk * (Attributed to Price by Seleznev but 
also attributed to Lenin and Tchicherin) 
British And American Working Men! (Attributed to 'Workers.. Peasants 
and Soldiers of Soviet Russia) 
What Have They Sent You to the Ukraine For? (The same title appears 
as a poster in five languages) 
Quit Fightingr British Soldiers and Join Your Russian Comrades 
(Private Lapham's appeal to his fellow-soldiers, dated 'Kotlas, 
14 October 1918) 
PAMPI=S 
Red and Mite Terror in Russia * (Originally appeared in Norwegian, 
reprinted by the Socialist Publication Society, Brooklyn) 
Das RNte-System in Russia * (also in Polish) 
The origin and Growth of the Russian Soviets (People's Russian 
Information Bureau) 
Die Warheit Uber Scwjet-Russland (A German adaptation of Capitalist 
Europe and Socialist Russia) 
Britain's Blunders 
You Volunteersl 
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APPENDIX IX 
THE CALL 
Immediately after this title,, on the first issue of The Call, followed 
the words: "of the workers and peasants of Russia to their English-speaking 
fellow workers. " Above the title was the familiar: "Workers of the World 
Unite! You have nothing to lose but your chairr, -" As noted elsewhere 
(Chapter 10 p-349) the POlicY statement of the journal on the inside page 
ended with the words: "The Editorial Staff hopes to keep its readers 
inf ormiEýd of the progress of the class struggle at home and abroad. " 
Who the editorial staff were, or at least who son-e of them were, can only 
be inferred from the names of people elected to the Executive Committee 
of the English-Speaking Group of C(xnmunists in November 1918. These were 
Joe Fineberg, Peter Petrov, S. J. Rutgers, Raisa Likhacheva and Solomon 
Mikhelson; later I. M. Iokhel, Moisev (M. Finkel), Boris Reinstein and 
Dobin were elected or co-opted. Price presumably did not stand for elec- 
tion arxi certainly was not a member of the Executive Committee,, as he 
was on the point of departure for Germany when the election took place. 
Considering the international isolation of Soviet Russia in Septenber 
1918 and the chaotic state of its internal communications due to the civil 
war and intervention, the amount of information about what was going on 
in the world which The Call managed to convey was quite remarkable. 
Some if not most of this must have come from the parcels of newspapers 
from all over the world which were collected by the Russian EnibassY in 
Berl]_n and despatched to moscow. Of necessity this news was old news 
by the time it reached Moscow, rarely less than a week and sometimes two 
weeks old. But it could always be used to exEwplify the task to which 
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the staff of The Call had addressed thezLselves in their policy statement, 
of convincing its readers that "the interests of the workers of all lands 
are the same, " and that the peace of the world could only be secured by 
"the solidarity of international labour. " The success of their endeavours 
Aa 
depended partly on the news itself and partly on who was writing it. 
Some news items lent themselves to exhortatory conclusions more readily 
than others. Very few articles were more than a column long, consisting 
of 300-350 words. Reading the first seventeen numbers consecutively, 
that is from 14 September 1918 to 8 January 1919, two impressions emerge: 
first that the journal came increasingly under American influence during 
that period, and second that it became increasingly polemical. It may 
t-.. - instructive, in an attempt to underwrite those impressions to make 
a comparison of the contents of three issues during that period: the 
first (14 September) , the last (8 January 1919) and the one in the middle 
(9 November) I which happened to be the issue comiTemorating the first 
amiversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
The first issue of The Call concerned itself in general more with matters 
likely to interest British than American readers. The first item was 
headed "Truth About German Prisoners in the Russian Army", and consisted 
of Trotsky's statement disposing of the rumour that armed German and 
Austrian prisoners were threatening the Siberian railway. It inciden- 
tally disposed of the American pretext for sending troops to Siberia: 
that they were going there to protect the Czechs from those same legen--- 
dary armed prisoners. The next item, "For Worn is the English Tonuy 
Fighting? " reported recent allegations in the British press that hugely 
excessive war profits had been made out of cellulose as the result of 
systematic bribery of certain ministers,, generals,, Members of Parliament 
and journalists (all un-named). Was this, the piece concluded, "what 
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the British soldier is shedding his blood for in cold distant lands? " 
This was followed by just over a column about strikes in the munitions 
industry in Britain caused by an attempt to compensate for the shortage 
of skilled labour by tying key workers to certain jobs. The second page 
began with an article (quite probably written by Price) comparing the 
motives which prompted the first British expedition to Archangel -a trade 
mi-sSion in the seventeenth century - with that of the current military 
intervention. The rest of the page was taken up with a long account of 
British hostility to the Russian Revolution beginning in March 1917 and 
culminating in the so-called Lockhart plot. The third page contained 
accounts of the growth of revolutionary feeling in the German army and 
of counter-revolutionary activities by the "Anglo-French-Czecho-Slovak 
oligarchy" in Siberia. Next came a short report of the denunciation by 
the Congress Party of proposed British reforms in India as being designed 
"to allay the growing unrest without at the same time giving any real 
guarantee of Home Rule". Underneath this was an account of successful . 11 - -- 
operations by Ukrainian partisans against the German occupying forces, 
concluding "... the same thing is likely to happen to other 'Prussians' 
who invade the cold and hungry forests of north Russia. " The fourth page 
contains a long quotation from the leading article in the Manchester 
Guardian which argued that the Russian opponents of the Bolsheviks were 
not necessarily Anglophil, and that many counter-revolutionaries would 
be ready to come to an understanding with Germany in order to overthrow 
the Bolsheviks. The Call added: "That is the job which you, dear reader, 
are now called upon to risk your life and limb for. " Then comes a short 
piece for the Americans: describing bow nepotism in the sub-contracting 
of services in the American ship-building industry had resulted 
in es- 
calatirxg costs and unf inished work: "f ive per cent plus f ive Per cent 
plus five per cent plus five per cent: that's what You are conscripted 
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for. " After this,, another short account: the success of the Amalganated 
Trade Unions of Moscow in establishing an eight-hour day and a minimum 
wage linked to food prices - This, added The Cal 1,, was the "I anarchy 1ee. 
about which the English capitalist press talks... It is not difficult 
to see why the English profiteers and American Bosses object to this 
'anarchy'. " The last item in the first issue of The Call gives an ac- 
count of attempts by the Tsarist Foreign Office in 1915 to buy Japanese 
support at the expense of Holland by agreeing to look the other way if 
Japan compensated herself with the Dutch colonies in the Far East. The 
article concludes "British and American soldiers who are fighting in the 
faraway regions of north Russia have been told nothing of this. But one 
more than suspects that if they knew the truth,, they would see that they 
are fighting in Russia to give amongst other things the colonies of the 
small Dutch nation to the greedy Imperialists of Japan. " 
Wberever possible in the f irst issue,. readers of The Call were invited 
to draw their own conclusions from the items of news offered to them; 
but the appeal to them actually to do anything as a result was more im- 
plied than overt. By contrast,, the ninth issue was far more direct. 
The three lumn front page article, headed "Twelve months of Working 
Class Rule" immediately shows American influence both in the spelling 
and in the choice of illustrations. Capitalist stereotypes were the 
Morgans and the Rockefellers, labour is "labor"; the 7 Novent)er is "our 
4 JulyM. The article calls on the reader to "quit" scabbing and con- 
cludes by telling him how to do it. "... Here are a few suggestions. 
Talk the matter over quietly with some comrades whom you kncw to have 
true wc)rkingmen Is hearts in them. With them you can form soldiers' corrr- 
mittees,, keeping the matter secret until you can gather enough strengthr 
when you can break from discipline, arrest the officers who are driving 
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you to this criminal invasion, and shoot them if they resist. You can 
do this without fear of helping the Kaiser. The world war is drawing 
to a quick end and the great world Revolution begins. Or. come over to 
us. We will welcome you. You will find comrades among us who speak 
Eng 1 ish. " 
The f irst article on the leader page of the ninth issue points out that 
revolutions are made by soldiers. "It is time British and Americans did 
this. They at least need not fear that the Russians and Germans will 
not follow. " There follow a number of short news items, three from 
Britain and two about Russia. The whole of the third page and the first 
column of the fourth is filled with extracts from Tchicherin's Note to 
Wilson of 24 October 1918, under the title "Explain, Mister Wilson. " 
The last four items in this issue are, again, very short. An extract 
from the German Socialist paper Vorwaerts describes the League of Nations 
as "a society f or the mutual insurance of the propertied classes from 
the danger of social revolution. " This is followed by an extract from 
a document found when the Red Army recaptured Samara, "signed by the 
counter-revolutionary governments of landlords and bankers which the 
English and American governments are supporting there", which document ;; o 
had naively deplored the fact that "the principle of a volunteer arnry 
in Siberia and Samara to fight the Bolsheviks has met with no response 
from the peasantry". Next comes an account of the large numbers of re- 
cruits who had flocked to join the Red Army, "prepared to make all sac- 
rifices to defend the Revolution... What have the British and American 
soldiers to sacrifice themselves for? Nothing. They left the slavery 
of the factory to go into the hell of the trenches and they will go back 
to 
a the slavery of the factory. " The ninth issue of The Call concludes 
with another extract frorn. Vorwaerts which attributes Bulgaria's refusal 
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to remain in the war to revolutionary unrest rather than to military 
def eat. 
The sixteenth issue of The Call (1 January 1919) was the first to 
inscribe itself "The organ of the English-Speaking Group of Communists 
in Russia" rather than that of the workers and peasants of Russua. The 
seventeenth, similarly inscribed, is the last to be studied in connection 
with the present thesis. The front page carries a banner headline "German 
Revolution taking Bolshevik Turn" and consists of eleven very short news 
items illustrating this assertionr drawn from agency messages or news- 
paper reports from Berlin,, Nauen,, Minsk,, Dvinsk,, Verror Narva and Liban. 
The second page contains an unusually long (1,000 words) and thoughtful 
article comparing the progress, stage by stage, of the Russian and German 
revolutions. The article concludes "The similarity in the course of the 
Russian and German 'Revolutions is no mere coincidence. It is due to the 
operation of social laws: laws which are also operating in Western Europe 
and America" and which will "as sure as f lowers blossom in the spring" 
result in revolutions in these countries also. The page is completed 
by news items from France suggesting that under Clemenceau French militar- 
ism would not relax its grip on policy and would look for fresh fields 
to conquer. The third page begins with an article describing how the 
Allies had begun to fight amongst themselves over a number of issues: 
the meaning of the notion of the freedom of the seas, the objectives of 
the League of Nations,, the question of whether or not to exact indemnities 
from Germany,, the definition of frontiers and the acquisition of terri- 
tories. The article concludes "If the workers of the Allied countries 
do not speedily take control they will find themselves flying at each 
other's throats again to fight out their masters' quarrels. " Next comes 
a news item from the Ukraine: the black troops of the Allied occupation 
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orces were being withdrawn, ostensibly because of the cold but (the 
aLrticle implies) perhaps also because they were not "such devoted suppor- 
ters of European civilisation and progress" as "Polish legionaries and 
the hordes of Tsarist desperadoes at Odessa. " This is followed by the 
greater part of a colunm on the attitude of the English press to the 
intervention, couparing the lineS taken by the Daily Chronicle, the Daily 
Express and the Daily News. The f i-rst had noted that the British elec- 
tions had shown that there was considerable sympathy in Britain for the 
Bolshevik government; the second had questioned whether there was now 
any point in fighting Russia since Germany now acted as a buffer; and 
third had asked whether economic aid would not be a more effective answer 
to Bolshevism than machine guns. The page ends with a short suraTury of 
the joint election manifesto of the Independent Labour Party and the 
British Socialist Party, which had exposed "the intention of Allied Capital- 
ism to crush the Russian and German Revolutions". Half of the last page 
of the seventeenth issue was taken up with a report of Lenin's address 
on the international situation to a meeting " last week" of the Conference 
of All-Russia Councils of Public Economy. The quotations chosen were 
in keeping with the whole tone of this issue. Le-nin had pointed out that 
the peace terms now being proposed for Germany by the Allies had over- 
stepped all limits and had resulted in a backlash among the formerly 
chauvinistic labour movements in France and England. Taken in conjunction 
with "the reported fraternisation of the Anglo-American soldiers with 
our own Soviet troops Russia may consider herself as standing upon solid 
ground. " But the effect of I-senin's cool and lucid appraisal of the 
economic tasks and priorities facing the Russian people was almost 
blotted 
out by the last item in the seventeenth issue of The Cal 1. This was an 
account of the complex situation in the Ukraine, where 
the downfall of 
Skoropadsky had not resulted in a straightforward victory for the Soviet 
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principle because of the recrudescence of Petliura's brand of nationalism, 
which had not hesitated to appeal to the Allies for troops to help keep 
or er i-n the Ukraine. "The mist is dispersing and the old familiar sight 
unfolds itself before us. on one side the interventionists and on the 
other the masses of people marching under the communist banner towards 
a new world. " 
in its way this last sentence epitomises the whole history of the first 
seventeen issues of The Call. The first few were mainly factual and 
unemphatic. Readers were invited to think for themselves and if they 
acted upon their conclusions, so much the better. By late October 1918,, 
when the war was clearly coming to an end, the editorial policy-makers 
of The Call obviously perceived the need for an all-out propaganda offen- 
sive of which direct incitement of the Allied troops to mutiny was an 
essential ingredient. But by mid-January 1919 the mist was dispersing, 
and it became clear that if the battle for world revolution was not lost, 
neither had it yet been won. 
It is not known when The Call ceased publication. The Killam Library 
at Dalhousie University have the latest edition which it has been possible 
to trace: 16 April 1919. A footnote to V01.30 of the English translation 
of the Collected Works of Lenin (p. 567) speaks of it as having been 
"published in 1918-19", and Lenin.. in his account of Bolshevik propaganda 
given to the First All Russia Congress of Working Cossacks on 1 March 
1920 (Vol. 30 P. 385) spoke of it in the past tense. 
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APPENDIX X 
VESTNIK 
On 25 November 1917 an Instruction to Censors (No. 393) signed by Sir 
Frank Swettenham,, contained the words: "You had better look carefully 
at all Vestnik messages from Petrograd as it is possible that they will 
be influenced by the Leninites. " 1 
The literal translation of the Russian word "vestnik" is "announcer" or 
"herald". Although it has proved impossible to establish the exact sig- 
nificance of the word when attached to messages from Russia in 1917-1918, 
it has become clear that it did not mean that the message- in question 
had come f rom,, or even via, an of f icial Soviet Press Agency. The Press 
Bureau, however, had clearly already jumped to that conclusion when, on 
14 December 1917 one of the Home Office Liaison Officers posted there, 
Sir Edward Troup, wrote: 
"Vestnik was the Russian Reuter but the Leninist Government 
have taken possession and they are sending out propagandist 
telegrams exactly the same in substance as their wireless 
messages.,, 2 
In fact the "Russian Reuter" at that time was still the Petrograd Tele- 
graph Agency, PTA, which was not replaced until September 1918 by the 
Russian Telegraph Agency, ROSTA (which in turn was succeeded by TASS) - 
But on the previous day, 13 December, one of the Directors of the 
Press 
I 
Bureau, Sir Frank swettenham, had received a warning about the increased 
use being made of radio by the Bolsheviks from one of the Bureau's 
1 
HO 139.35. 
2 HO 139.27. 
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military Liaison officer,, Brigadier General Cockerill. Swettenham 
imediately wrote to another of his Home Office Liaison officers saying 
that in view of what he had been told by the military 
"we propose to treat the Russian wirelsg, on the same lines 
as the German wireless and not to publish it unless it contains 
information likely to be useful to the Allied cause... 
Wireless messages are Government property and if we pass, they 
are published with official authority"3 
'He added that the French were apparently already suppressing all "official" 
Russian messages and that Balfour was asking the Horne Secretary to con- 
sider giving instructions to "censor the Russian official messages" in 
the same way. When Troup passed this suggestion on to the Horne Secre- 
tary, his covering letter shows that the Press Bureau were not only worried 
but completely at a loss as to what significance they should attribute 
by the attachment of the word "vestnik" - sometimes apparently quite 
indiscriminately - to both wireless and cable messages. 
4 Swettenham then 
wrote another memorandum,, not apparently addressed to anyone in particular 
but possibly for the information of his fellow6-Director, Sir Edward Cook. 
In it he outlines the problem of differentiating in the treatment of Russian 
wireless messages and telegramst adding 
"it is really childish to stop one and pass the other when 
they really come from the same source and are in practically 5 identical terms". 
The Press Bureau's problem may in part have been due to the fact that 
in Britain all wireless systems had, indeed, been taken over by the 
Government at the outbreak of war, and also because one of the chief press 
agencies, Reuter's, enjoyed preferential treatment by the Government. 
In Russia, in late 1917 and for much of 1918, there was no such clear-cut 
3 HO 139.35 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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situation. A brief analysis of the despatches which Price sent in this 
period shows that the conclusion that Vestnik = wireless= "official" was 
based on a fallacy. Most but not all of the messages sent by Price, at 
least from 25 May onwards, ended with the words I'Vestnik,, Moscc)Wl, and 
the date - Sometimes the message in question is known to have been sent 
by wireless but some of them, those sent before July, could still have 
been sent by cable. There is no way of knowing, although after July it 
is known that he was only able to communicate with his paper by courtesy 
of the Russian wireless. Nine of the despatches he sent during this period 
were not labelled "Vestnik" and two of them (25 May and 20 June) were 
printed uncut,, but this does not prove anything with regard to the means 
by which they were transmitted or the extent to which they could be re- 
garded as "officially" inspired. 
Some light has been thrown on the subject by Andrew Rothstein, whose father 
Theodore was the first Soviet envoy to Teheran after the Bolshevik 
Revolution, and who as a very young man was in a position to see so-called 
Vestnik messages for himself. On 13 May 1985 he wrote in a private letter: 
"I remember my father receiving copies of Vestnik messages 
(signed as such) usually from Stockholm, where the Lef t Social 
Democrats had a press centre. The messages were on all sorts 
of subjects - internal (the struggle with the Wbites, new pro- 
gressive institutions set up in the Soviet Republic, public 
meetings or Soviet sessions etc. ) and external (Peace proposals 
of the Soviet Government, reports of negotiations etc. ) This 
was in the first half of 1918... My impression is that they 
came from the Propaganda Bureau of the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee of Soviets... and were copies of radio 
messages with which the Soviet Goverment strove to break through 
the wall of silence or lies set up against Soviet Russia by 
the Entente Powers. " 
The extent to which the Russian government made use of wireless was 
naturally influenced by the availability of alternative facilities. 
Appendix X: 
The Of f icial History of the Blockaue (see Chapter 7, p. 214) . inf ormative 
about most other cable systemsr does not state at what point the Great 
Northern Cable, through which telegrams to and from Russia had previously 
passed, ceased to function. In May 1918 Lockhart complained to London 
of delays in the transmission of telegrams between Moscow and London, 
adding that Tchicherin had told him that he, too, was experiencing delays 
and that he had suggested that the British might have set up a cable 
censorship at Alexandrovsk. 
6 
Tchicherin was right. A Minute from the 
War Office on Lockhart's cable confirmed that the British Admiral at 
Alexandrovsk was indeed establishing an intelligence service there, and 
had begun by imposing a censorship which was holding up all telegrams 
in both directions. On 16 July Swettenham referred to the breakdown "for 
some weeks" in the cable service between Russia and Britain which had 
resulted in all press messages of which the Soviet Government approved 
(or so Swettenham inferred) being sent by wireless. 
7 It would appear 
therefore that the cable ceased to function some time early in June. 
An example of the confusion which followed was the fate of a message frorn 
Price to the Manchester Guardian sent on 8 July, about the 5th Congress 
and the attempted Left S. R. coup. This arrived at the Press Bureau in 
two sections, each being part of a corriposite intercept forwarded from 
the Admiralty on 9 July. It was addressed to the Manchester Guardian 
but the wireless operator clearly mistook it for a quotation from the 
paper and presented it as such. Sir Fdward Cook immediately concluded 
that 
"it looks as if the Russian Government were putting out as a 
quotation... what Philips Price has sent or is intending to 
send. " 
6 
7 
FO 371.3330. 
HO 139.35. 
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Stephen Gaselee added: "I think that this is most rightly stopped"8 
It would appear that nobody had actually read the Manchester Guardian 
and discovered that the message had never been printed in the first place. 
At the heart of the problem, for the British, were the devious methods 
which the Foreign Office was employing in the matter of censorship of 
messages dealing with foreign affairs. The Bureau continued to have to 
go through the motions of asking for Permission to stop them. In a hand 
written Minute on a memorandum from Cook concerning the transmission by 
wireless of two messages from Price and another from Fineberg, Gaselee 
noted: . 
"Although we must pass ordinary cabled press messages if they 
only contain Foreign Affairs we are not at all bound so to 
treat the Russian Wireless because it professes to contain a 
press message. "9 
Yet less than a week later Swettenham was again asking for formal approval 
from the Home Office to stop press messages from Russia sent by wire- 
less. 10 He pointed out that only messages of which the Soviet Government 
approved were transmitted in this way, notably those addressed to the 
Manchester Guardian and the Daily News. He gave as reasons for stopping 
such messages: 
" Because they are not calculated to help our cause. 
Because they come by Wireless which is a Government 
system and if issued goes on with a certain authority. 
(iii) Because if passed to the Manchester Guardian and the 
Daily News it would be giving those papers a manifest 
advantage over the messages of other correspondents not 
favoured by the Soviet Government. " 
8 
Ibid. 
9 
Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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Al 1 the same, he wanted to know "whether the Secretary of State approves 
our action? " Sir Edward Troup, presumably acting on behalf of the Home 
Office, handed back the chalice. 
"Generally I think this is right but perhaps some articles of this kind might be 'cut' and not suppressed. It is a matter for the directors of the Press Bureau. " 
on balance such fragments of evidence as exist appear to support Andrew 
Df-% I 
Rothstein s "irrpression" that Vestnik was primarily but not exclusively 
an organisation responsible for sending wireless messages overseas and 
that some,, but not all of these were directly initiated by Sovprop. 
Those that were not so initiated had almost certainly secured some form 
of official approval and because this was obviously the case they were 
stopped in Britain on the grounds described by Swettenham. Litvinov,, 
again according to Rothstein, received copies of Vestnik messages un- 
censored because of his quasi-diplomatic status, and probably passed some 
of them on. This would account for the fact that very occasionally news 
direct from Russia appeared in the Left press between the Allied landings 
in August 1918 and the deportation of Litvinov in September. The message 
from Fineberg which appeared in the same Admiralty intercept as Price's 
message about the attempted left S. R. coup was printed in the August 
The Call and another message from Fineberg, presumably via the same route, 
appeared in the following month. 
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APPENDix xi 
SCOTT AND PRICE 
It is not known when Price first met Scott,, but it would not be surprising 
if they had met while Price was still a boy. His great grand-father had 
been one of those who put up the money with which to start the Manchester 
Guardian in 1821. His grandfather and great uncle on the Philips side 
had both bee n Members of Parliament for Lancashire seats. His mother's 
spinster sister Anna Maria lived in the family home on the edge of Manchester 
after her father's death in 1890. Anna Maria Philips became outstanding 
in her own right in Manchester in the field of voluntary social service. 
(The Dean of Manchester,, speaking at a Memorial Service af ter her death 
in 1946, described her as "our very own Eminent Victorian". ) She knew 
Scott,, and from this it follows that it would have been very easy for 
a young man with radical views,, strong local connections and political 
itions to meet Scott. 
The first time that anything by Price was printed in the Manchester 
Guardian was November 1912,, when he wrote some "letters" from Anatolia 
and Turkey. In 1913, when he was planning his travels in Asia Minor and 
the Middle East, Scott commissioned some more. Rates of payment wx-ze 
agreed and Scott gave Price letters of introduction. 
1 In Nove-aber 1914 
it was arranged that Price should go to Russia for a few months and send 
back letters for both private and public consumption. This time Scott 
gave Price something more like real credentials. 
1 
John Bylands University Library of Manchester, Scott papers, P r; 3/23a. 
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"Mr. M. Philips Pricer personne trf)s honorable qui porte 
cette lettre, est le correspondent particulier en Russia du Manchester Guardian- 
Je serais bien reconnaissant a tous qui lui rendraient 
service. 
C. P. Scott 
Redacteur en Chef du 
Manchester Guardian. " 
,, tt s attitude to his correspondents was pragmatic. He did not believe 
"in keeping a good man tied down to a particular place", 
2 
and when occasion 
arose might send a second man to a place where he already had a corres- 
pondent, in order to "liberate him... for visits to other places. " This 
is undoubtedly the reason for his decision to send first Farbman and then 
Soskice out to Russia in the spring and summer of 1917. With hindsight, 
Price quite mistakenly attributed this decision to a combination of lack 
of confidence in him on Scott's part, and pressure from Whitehall. But 
although he was hurt by Soskice's arrival, it undoubtedly did "liberate" 
him, and had it not been for Soskice Price would probably not have been 
Ile to undertake the journey into the Volga provinces which resulted 
in his unique account of that area between the revolutions. 
Despite his designation as ". correspondent particulier" Price's status 
on the Manchester Guardian appears never to have been very clear. He 
was formally appointed special correspondent in November 1917,, but an 
undated internal memorandum to Scott from a member of the accounts depart- 
rnent of the paper, stated that Price "was never on our staf f and the 
amunts we sent him altogether were far exceeded by his contributions. 
We have never had a 'settling up' with him. .3 During this time in Russia, 
Price sent, in fact,, 141 "contributions"o, of which 102 were attributed 
to him by name, 19 as "our correspondent, 6 as "our correspondent 
2 Ibid. 335/134. 
3 Ibid. a/P53/23a. 
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M. Philips Price", 5 as "our special correspondent M. Philips Price", 
4 as "Our Petrograd correspondent", 1 as "our special correspondent", 
and 4 as "a correspondent". 
Personal relations between Scott and Price were cordial throughout the 
whole period of Price's association with the Manchester Guardian before 
and during the war and only turned sour later on. Price venerated Scott. 
in April 1917 he wrote to him from Moscow to offer belated congratulations 
on what he thought had been Scott's 60th birthday (in fact Scott was 
then 70). 
"May you live long,, Mr. Scott,, to guide the great journal which is the centre of light and intellect for this little island. 
For my part it will be the proudest memory of my life to feel 
that I have helped it in its work., '4 
Scott's letter asking Price to cease the correspondence could hardly have 
been couched in gentler terms. The most damaging thing he appears ever 
to have conceded about Price was that he was liable to enthusiasm (see 
above p. 417). It is,, therefore,, the more startling to find that in 
February 1924 he wrote, apparently out of the blue, to the General Manager 
of Labour Monthly,, Arthur Reade , protesting that to describe Price in 
an advertisement for the magazine as "Manchester Guardian Correspondent,, 
Russia,, 1914-18" was "extremely misleading. ,5 Scott went on: 
"Mr. Philips Price was in those years a traveller in Persia 
and the Middle East and in Russia and sent us letters and occasional 
telegrams, but he was never a regularly appointed correspondent, 
and after he joined the Bolsheviks he ceased to be connected 
with the paper. " 
4 Ibid. 334/163. 
5 
Ibid. A/P53 25-38 (This reference covers the entire correspondence 
between Reade, Scott and Price. ) 
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Reply-ing on 2 March Reade explained that he had taken the statement f rom 
The Labour Who's Who without reference to Price himself. The advertise- 
ment had related to a forthcoming memoir of Lenin to be written by Price, 
and the reference to him as Manchester Guardian correspondent was intended 
as "an example of his experience and qualifications rather than as a 
political testimonial. " Reade added in a postscript: 
"I suppose you have no objection to my sending a copy of this 
correspondence to Mr. Price, since it is only f aix that he should 
be informed of a misunderstanding of what is, I think, very 
generally believed to have been his position (-with] the Guardian. " 
Scott thereupon wrote to the Editor of The Labour Who's Mio making a 
similar disclaimer, but added: 
"there would be no objection to his being described as 'an 
occasional contributor' to the Manchester Guardian. " 
He asked for a cor'rection in this sense to be made to the next edition 
of The Labour Who's Who. Scott also agreed to Price seeing the corres- 
pondence, and having seen it Price wrote to Reade: 
"Apparently Mr. Scott regards a newspaper correspondent only 
one who has a fixed salary on the staff of the paper. Under 
this interpretation I was certainly not their correspondent 
in Russia. But in that case it is remarkable that he printed 
over my communications 'from our special correspondent in 
Russia', 'from our own correspondent', and other descriptions 
which are also applied to salaried correspondents. If he only 
regarded me as an occasional correspondent he ought to have 
printed over my communications 'From a correspondent' or 
'from 
an occasional correspondent. ' The fact is they were very glad 
to have me for their regular correspondent for a time because 
they knew that I was the only person who could get them certain 
information and I remember receiving urgent wires from Mr. 
Scott 
sending me money for telegrams and expenses. Then after 
it 
was all over,, like in the case of many of their correspondents 
whom I know,, they chucked me over on the plea that 
I was supposed 
to have been 'bought over by the Bolsheviks. ' 
Yours fraternally, 
M. PHILIPS PRICE 
p. S. I have no objection to you sending this to Mr. Scott. 
" 
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Reade sent Price's letter to Scott with the ccmTent: 
"I think that since the Manchester Guardian published Mr. Price's 
despatches under the heading 'frombur correspondent' and not 
as 'from A correspondent' [Reade's emphases] we are justified 
in describing him as your former correspondent, and that you 
must have overlooked the above circumstances in stat3-ng that 
he was simply an occasional contributor. " 
Scott did not imediately reply, although there is a draft indicating 
that he meant to do so, but that there were "some points of detail which 
I wanted to ascertain. " These may, indeed,, have been the points upon 
which he was seeking clarification with his accounts department. Reade 
wrote again on 31 March 1924 pressing for a clear statenient of Price's 
position viz-a-viz the paper, and proposing that 
"if you do not care to favour us with your reply personally 
perhaps you would prefer to communicate with Mr. Price himself, 
and I am informing him of this suggestion. " 
Scott's final answer, written on 20 April, was short: 
"My only feeling about Mr. Philips Price is that he should not 
use the name of the paper in such a way as to connect us with 
his own change of views. It is not a very iqDortant matter 
and must be left to his own sense of fitness. " 
Reade had the last word. On 25 May he wrote: 
"I am sure that Mr. Price would be as reluctant as you are for 
his present political position to be confused with that of the 
Manchester Guardian but that does not invalidate the fact that 
for some years he was your correspondent on the terms disclosed 
by the accompanying copy of the credentials with which you 
supplied him and which seem to contradict your original 
letter 
to us, since I can think of no possible translation of 
'corres- 
pondent particulier' other than 'own correspondent'. 
" 
The most likely explanation of Scott's apparent change of 
heart towards 
Price emerges from his letter of 20 April. It was the 
fact that Price 
had used, or a1 lowed to be used,, his connection with 
the Manchester 
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Guardian as, what in effect it was, a recommendation on the fly-leaf of 
The Truth About the Allied Intervention in Russia. 
There is no evidence that Price and Scott ever mended fences, but Price 
never ceased to be proud of his previous connection with the paper. His 
children were taken at an early age to see it being printed. His sadness 
when Scott died was memorable. Price wrote a letter of condolence to 
Ted Scott after his father's death and merely remarked that he had not 
seen much of the old man in recent years. Ted Scott's reply must have 
done much to obliterate any bitterness that Price might still have felt. 
"I well remenber the helP you gave my father in those early 
years of the revolution and he was always grateful to you. 
It needstwo,, at least,, to tell the truth in a newspaper.,, 6 
Price papers. 
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